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Preface
This book marks the end of a very pleasant intellectual journey for 
us. It began in spring 2013, when we started our research project with 
the admittedly technical title Translocal Goods — Education, Work, and 
Commodities Between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China, and the Arab 
Emirates. We aspired to explore new ways in which the exchange 
relations of mobile actors from Central Asia redefine their own (emic) 
as well as our (analytic) understanding about identity, ethnicity and 
Islam as they extend beyond common ‘containers’ of local community, 
nation state and regional setting. Within that conceptual frame, three 
individual scientific efforts each dealt with quite distinct themes:
• Studying Islam Abroad — Students’ Mobility, Life-Chances and 
Translocal Muslim Practice in-between Tajikistan and the Arab World 
(Manja Stephan-Emmrich)
• The ‘China-Business’ — An Ethnography of Kyrgyz Traders and their 
Translocal Livelihoods in-between ‘Home’, China, and Russia (Philipp 
Schröder)
• Translocal Hijab — The Producing, Distributing and Consuming of 
Religious Clothing in-between Tajikistan and the United Arab Emirates 
(Abdullah Mirzoev)
We have presented in detail the concepts and empirical data associated 
with these projects in an earlier publication (Schröder and Stephan-
Emmrich 2014), as well as in the introductory chapter to this volume. 
But academia can only thrive to the degree it is supported by a generous 
institutional structure. In that regard, we could not have found a better 
partner than the Volkswagen Foundation (VolkswagenStiftung), and 
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in particular the program Between Europe and the Orient — A Focus on 
Research and Higher Education in/on Central Asia and the Caucasus. Until 
2017, the funding provided by the Volkswagen Foundation enabled us 
not only to conduct our individual ethnographic fieldwork in Central 
Asia, Russia, China and the United Arab Emirates, but also to engage 
actively within various circles of the scientific community. 
One such key event was a workshop held in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) 
in April 2015, which we jointly organized with our main local partner, 
the American University of Central Asia. Over three days, our group 
of participants intensively discussed draft papers that approached the 
notion of ‘translocality’ from all kinds of disciplinary, theoretical and 
methodological angles.
Since then these early texts have been developed into full-fledged 
chapters, due in no small part to our invited discussant, Barak Kalir 
of the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. As someone who 
shares our interest in mobility studies, but also draws from extensive 
research experience outside of Central Asia, his intuitive commentary 
provided the authors with a fresh perspective, challenging them to 
think beyond conventional approaches in their disciplines or focus 
areas. We are very grateful that Barak agreed to condense his thoughts 
on the contributions gathered here into a remarkable afterword.
At the beginning of this book you will find a foreword by Nathan 
Light of Uppsala University in Sweden. We appreciate his thoughts as a 
senior scholar of Central Asian studies, because they allow us to situate 
our authors’ contributions within the wider perspective of (trans-)
regional historic development. In this way, we believe, the fore- and 
afterwords complement the introduction in interesting ways: in the 
latter we could focus on the immediate conceptual issues of translocality 
as addressed by our authors, precisely because the fore- and afterword 
develop such invaluable contextual knowledge in regard to both area 
and mobility studies. Finally, we are grateful to all contributors, who 
all worked hard to meet the various expectations and shifting deadlines 
we set them.
As this volume is an unusual assembly of authors for whom English 
is not their native language, we are particularly thankful to our language 
editor, Tricia Ryan. Due to her own background in social science 
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research in Central Asia, her timely remarks improved the manuscript 
beyond grammar or style. 
We are indebted once more to the Volkswagen Foundation for 
agreeing to provide additional funds to support the publication of this 
research in Open Access format. In that regard, many thanks also to 
Alessandra Tosi of Open Book Publishers, whose patience and careful 
management were invaluable during this book’s production process. 
Furthermore, we are grateful to Bianca Gualandi and Lucy Barnes, also 
from OBP, for supporting us in matters of visual design and language-
editing. Nora Bernhardt, Karin Teuber and Fiona Smith of Humboldt-
Universität of Berlin have been crucial assets to our project since 2013, 
and their enthusiastic support for our common research-and publishing-
efforts is very much appreciated. 
Finally, we do not see the present volume as an end to our exploration 
of translocality, but rather as a new beginning. We believe that 
beyond this collective contribution, presented on the following pages, 
translocality has much more descriptive and analytical potential to be 
uncovered. Examples of such potential include conceptual innovation 
in the field of ‘new area studies’, the anthropology of emotions, internet 
studies, or philosophical approaches to mobility and place, as is outlined 
in the foreword, introduction and afterword of this volume.
Berlin, February 2018 
Philipp Schröder and Manja Stephan-Emmrich

Foreword
Nathan Light
The present volume brings together a valuable range of contributions 
that develop the analysis of translocality and mobilities. This research 
perspective is particularly important in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
because people in these regions have a long history of movement 
and engagement with surrounding regions. Adopting a translocal 
perspective helps reveal the ways researchers from elsewhere have 
shaped these regions’ histories by emphasizing, on the one hand, 
enduring occupation of stable regions in the Caucasus and, on the 
other, mobile lives along the ‘Silk Road’ of Central Asia: in contrast, 
people living in these regions have long created more complex histories 
and cultural relations along both imagined and practical dimensions. 
Another important contribution made by this volume is to stimulate 
diverse perspectives through collaboration among researchers from the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, and abroad. In what follows I point to some 
ways that Central Asian and Caucasian realities can inspire new insights 
into the developing theoretical paradigms of research on translocality 
and mobility practices.
Social science and humanities studies on globalization, 
transnationalism, and mobility began as somewhat novel themes 
in the 1980s, and have expanded rapidly since. In social and cultural 
anthropology in particular this research area became popular and more 
diverse in the 1990s. Mobility is now a well-established interdisciplinary 
research perspective, as evidenced by such landmarks as the journals 
Mobilities founded in 2006 and Transfers: Interdisciplinary Journal 
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of Mobility Studies in 2011, and the Routledge Handbook of Mobilities 
published in 2014. Translocality or translocalism has emerged more 
slowly into the academic limelight, being overshadowed by the more 
established paradigms of globalization and transnationalism with their 
emphasis on larger-scale transformations. 
Mobility and translocality and the theories, models, and 
methodologies linked to them have been dominated by ideas about 
the contemporary expansion and acceleration of movement across the 
globe. Nevertheless, the conceptual framework used to research mobility 
and translocality facilitates investigation of past movements of people 
and things as well. The modernization and globalization paradigms 
deploy a linear sense of ongoing acceleration, broadly aligned with the 
aspirational economic expansion institutionalized within many national 
and international governmental practices. This contrasts with more 
nuanced research on translocal mobilities focusing on varying patterns 
of historical and contemporary movement and circulation under the 
shifting constraints and aspirations of mobile subjects. 
The increasing attention given to mobility and translocality in 
the social sciences over the past twenty-five years has extended to 
topics such as transport, migration, refugees, tourism, borders, and 
exile. With an initial emphasis on changing relationships among 
people, communities, and the nation state, researchers examined how 
globalizing economic activities, tourism, and migration were leading 
to novel transnational practices and identities. On the one hand, 
situations were treated as ethnographically distinctive in order to 
highlight emergent and shifting practices, such as commodity chains, 
mobile capital, or new patterns of labour migration, while on the other 
hand, researchers also pointed to broader trends in which increasing 
mobility and global connections led generally to postnational social 
dynamics that required new theories and methodologies. Usually 
rooting their narrative in Benedict Anderson’s (1983) discussion 
of the rise of the nation state and its social, political, and territorial 
institutions to become a twentieth century universal, anthropologists 
such as Arjun Appadurai (1990), Liisa Malkki (1995), and Aihwa Ong 
(1999) suggested that the nation state was being superseded in ways 
that required new concepts, theories, and methods to understand.
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Emergent transnationalism and globalization were identified as new 
conditions calling for new ways of thinking. Fewer scholars sought 
ways to use these new models to examine past mobility practices. At the 
extreme, the focus on novel conditions has led to studies emphasizing 
radical change and disruption such as Marc Augé’s Non-Places: An 
Introduction to Supermodernity (2008), Thomas Eriksen’s Overheating. An 
Anthropology of Accelerated Change (2016), or Steven Vertovec’s ‘Super-
Diversity and its Implications’ (2007). Such titles point to a broad 
narrative of modern lives being swallowed up by ever-increasing 
activity, rather than allowing for shifts, eddies, or deflations that might 
complicate such inexorable increase. 
The underlying notion of a great divide emerging in late modernity 
has been difficult to deny. The emphasis on the ‘acceleration of 
everything’ — or ‘time-space compression’ as David Harvey (1989:284–
307) aptly puts it — points to real processes, but raises many of the same 
problems as other great divide theories, such as stadialism in nineteenth-
century cultural evolutionism (Meek 1976), or the posited oral-literate 
divide (Collins 1995). There is much room to debate whether or not 
people are experiencing radical changes or ruptures that call for entirely 
new ways of thinking. Both historians and anthropologists have tended 
to find more multidirectional shifts and practices, such as ‘vernacular 
modernities’ (Knauft 2002) and ‘multiple literacies’ (Street 1993) that 
undermine generalizations about the effects of new technologies, 
while sociologists tend to focus on the broader changes characterizing 
postmodern life.
Despite continuing consideration of acceleration and emergent 
mobilities and complexities, more recent studies generally make fewer 
claims about radical novelty, and expend more effort comparing 
transformations and examining long-term and ongoing processes. 
These approaches consider both ruptures and continuities, as well as 
considering earlier studies of mobility in order to enhance theories 
about it. 
Mobility has arguably always been a key aspect of scholarly 
habitus itself, due to the importance of travel for research, cooperation, 
publication, and jobs (with equivalents in classical or medieval 
periods, and in Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East). Other 
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economic activities have likewise long involved workers, managers, 
capital, raw materials, equipment and products moving in distinctive 
ways along widely varying circuits. All over the world, people move 
and carry ideas and objects with them and pass them along to others. 
These are fundamental to social processes, historical narratives, and 
cultural expression, but their centrality has often been overlooked due 
to what might be termed methodological localism. The contemporary 
expansion of the variety and extent of movement has prompted more 
careful attention, and challenged researchers to consider the qualitative 
changes caused by such mobilities. However, assessing the scale 
of movement and the degree of qualitative change requires deeper 
understanding of the prevalence and varieties of mobilities in the past.
Disciplinary genres and models
Disciplinary research often fits within what might described as 
typical chronotopes: sociologists generally emphasize large-scale 
transformations, while anthropologists often seek criss-crossing 
temporal connections, rather than embracing linear concepts of a present 
emerging from and diversifying upon the past. Anthropologists tend to 
discover more varied social formations, and, at least since the work of 
Eric Wolf (1982) and Johannes Fabian (1983), they have exhibited less of 
a tendency to view people as travellers in culturally-assigned positions 
along convergent historical paths. Changes, including shifts in mobilities 
and translocal practices, are more varied in the diverse social formations 
that anthropologists study. Earlier generations of anthropologists have 
explored cyclic (e.g., oscillations between gumsa and gumlao described 
by Edmund Leach 1954) and multidirectional histories. Historians, on 
the other hand, are less inclined to subsume activity within models of 
cycles or linear processes, and focus more on unique paths, avoiding 
both linear and cyclic chronotopes. In yet another pattern, economists 
are prone to identifying developmental stages, but also find a variety 
of cycles of development and decline within such stages. Economists 
thus tend to subordinate cycles to longer-term linear transformations of 
economic systems.
Disciplinary chronotopes and models emphasize different dimensions 
when making sense of mobility and translocality in their contemporary 
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forms. Most sociologists, geographers, anthropologists, political 
scientists, historians, and cultural studies scholars continue to work with 
somewhat different understandings of mobilities, but a few specialists 
have been making productive connections among these evolving 
theoretical models. These include Peter Adey (2017), Tim Cresswell 
(2006), and Peter Merriman (2007) in geography, John Urry (2007) in 
sociology, Noel Salazar (2010) and Salazar and Nina Glick-Schiller 
(2013) in anthropology, Peter Greenblatt in literary studies (Greenblatt 
2009), and Ulrike Freitag and Achim von Oppen (2010) in history. 
Although historians have a longer tradition of studying regional 
networks and interactions, and generally focus on particularities, the 
limits of methodological regionalism have led to the subordination 
of translocal connections under the broader perspective of ‘world 
history’. Between the levels of world and regional history, historians 
and cultural studies scholars have produced important new frames for 
understanding ‘connected histories’ involving many local processes, 
such as the Black Atlantic (Gilroy 1993, Thornton 1998), the Indian 
Ocean world (Anderson 2012, Freitag 2003), Indian merchants (Dale 
2002, Markovits 2000), and studies of the Islamicate, Persianate, and 
Sanskrit ecumenes (Hodgson 1974, Pollock 2006). The large-scale 
sociopolitical perspective of civilizational analysis has also become 
increasingly popular (Árnasson 2003, Arjomand 2011), but should be 
informed by more studies of cosmopolitan subjectivities and mobilities 
(Kia forthcoming). 
Dominant concepts within scholarly institutions strongly influence 
the ideas and research perspectives taken up within them. Patrick 
Manning’s (2003) suggestive history of scholarship on the African 
diaspora shows how the study of interregional connections has been 
limited by institutional commitments towards more geographically-
defined specializations. Recent critiques of the limits of area studies 
has led to a ‘new area studies’ paradigm that seeks to overcome its 
earlier narrowness and rigidity (see particularly Mielke and Hornidge 
2014, and the discussion by Stephan-Emmrich and Schröder in this 
volume’s introduction). But the most radical innovation will be to 
integrate the study of individual translocalism and the larger processes 
that dominate research.
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Philosophical approaches 
Although philosophical work has inspired important thinking across 
methodological and disciplinary frames, relatively few philosophers 
have written relevant works, principally Michel de Certeau (1984) and 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987). Deleuze’s extravagant analysis 
of ‘the fold’ (1993) has not been widely used to theorize movement, 
but offers valuable suggestions about how to understand non-linear 
connections among times and places. Emil Nasritdinov elegantly takes 
up the fold in his contribution to the present volume, and develops its 
potential for understanding mobility in spiritual terms. The abstractions 
expounded by Deleuze are slippery: his is a Baroque theory of the 
Baroque, and its complexity and flexibility makes it difficult to apply. 
But Nasritdinov suggests that the concept of the fold can help us 
understand Islamic beliefs and practices in both their complexity and 
rigidity, and their creativity and rapid transformation. According 
to him, through the mobile religious practice of davaat, people attain 
transformative experiences that make them more devout, but without 
a stable logic or structure for this transformation. He suggests that the 
fold connects multiple ‘movements’. Including dreaming, pilgrimage, 
and remembering, which are crucial to Muslim spiritual transformation.
De Certeau, Deleuze, and Guattari all suggest that the dominant focus 
on stable concepts in Western philosophy has restricted consideration 
of interactions between disorder and boundaries, or among movement, 
assemblage, and entanglement. In short, the logic of capturing stable 
truths promotes the search for bounded entities and their characteristics, 
rather than investigating the interplay of chance, planning, and routine 
in shaping complex trajectories such as those that emerge in mobility.
The discussion of place and space is closely linked to that of mobilities 
and translocality, but connects to the larger philosophical literature 
that I will not attempt to review comprehensively here. Two important 
contributions are the work of Tim Ingold (2011) in anthropology, and 
Edward Casey in philosophy, both working on phenomenological 
accounts of places and ways of moving among them. Casey cites 
anthropological research extensively and has in turn been widely cited 
by anthropologists. His phenomenological analyzes of imagination 
(1976) and memory (1987) stimulate thinking about transtemporal 
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connections, while his efforts to recuperate place as a central category 
of life from the spatializing tendencies of rationalizing modernity (1993, 
1997) have been important for thinking about space and place in recent 
humanities and social science research. 
Casey examines the role of movement among places at some length 
(1993:271–314) but does not explore connections to his earlier work on 
imagination and memory, and suggests that mobility is subordinate to 
place. He takes up many strands in his discussion, but his prevailing 
approach to place follows Heidegger, writing that ‘For Heidegger, place 
and the self are intimately interlocked in the world of concrete work’ and 
thus ‘place and self are thoroughly enmeshed’ (2001:684). Expanding 
from the idea of work to Bourdieu’s broader concept of habitus, Casey 
proposes that ‘habitus is a middle term between place and self, and, in 
particular, between lived place and the geographical self. This self is 
constituted by a core of habitudes that incorporate and continue, at both 
psychical and physical levels, what one has experienced in particular 
places’ (2001:686). Although he does hold that places and journeys 
are mutually constituting, writing that ‘places introduce permanency 
into journeys’ and ‘journeys bring out what is impermanent and 
continuously changing when we are in place itself’ (1994:289), his 
treatment of the practices related to journeys and movement is limited, 
and a sense of attachment to essentialized and materialist concepts of 
place prevails in his work, reifying place as the foundation underlying 
human embodiment and activities.
Casey’s extensive analysis of the treatment of place in philosophical 
tradition raises important issues and suggests how practices embed 
people into places, but he downplays the importance of movement and 
activity in the constitution of places. In order to promote a contrasting 
perspective, I would argue that human experience is founded 
upon and emerges within motion, whether constrained movement 
around a room, field, or workspace, or within larger ambits, which 
should be considered part of the investigation of translocal practices. 
Attention to subjects in places should recognize their activity within a 
phenomenology of movement, with psychic or physical confinement or 
constraint as dimensions to be accounted for, but not absolute bounds 
of emplacement.
12 Nathan Light
Examination of the role of translocalism and movement in the 
constitution of subjects can take several directions. A recent treatment 
developed by Tim Edensor is based on Henri Lefebvre’s concept of 
rhythmanalysis. Edensor suggests that ‘rhythmanalysis elucidates 
how places possess no essence but are ceaselessly (re)constituted out 
of their connections. For instance, cities are particularly dense spatial 
formations containing a complex mix of multiple, heterogeneous social 
interactions, materialities, mobilities and imaginaries which connect 
through twists and fluxes of interrelation’. He continues, ‘As Lefebvre 
says, ‘(There is) nothing inert in the world’, which he illustrates with 
the examples of the seemingly quiescent garden that is suffused with 
the polyrhythms of ‘trees, flowers, birds and insects’ […] and the forest, 
which ‘moves in innumerable ways: the combined movements of the 
soil, the earth, the sun. Or the movements of the molecules and atoms 
that compose it’ (Edensor 2011:190, citing Lefebvre 2004).
Tim Ingold (2011) also focuses more on motion than place, and 
rejects either bounded places or beings in favour of a more fluid 
‘meshwork’. Ingold’s suggestion that neither the subject nor the path 
are bounded entities helps disrupt assumptions about how to do 
fieldwork on mobilities. Phenomenologically informed fieldwork can 
investigate mobility practices even within everyday places. In their 
recent edited volume, Salazar, Elliot, and Norum (2017) suggest that 
there are many ways to investigate mobility while remaining ‘in place’ 
and that understanding people’s activities within mobility formations 
and infrastructures calls for a broad range of perspectives and methods.
Categories
Questions of time, space, and place have been widely developed 
in philosophy and the social sciences, but mobile people have been 
investigated more as distinct types or figures: flaneurs, commuters, 
tourists, nomads, foragers, hunters, traders, itinerants, vagabonds, 
and pilgrims have been subject to particularistic consideration, as Noel 
Salazar (2017) points out in the introduction to a recent special issue 
entitled Figures of Mobility. Space and time are treated as continua, while 
commoditized mobilities, distinct ways of passing through space and 
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time, are seen typologically as categories for labelling people and things 
(e.g., first class, posh, express, or even the ironic term for the Midwest in 
the US: the ‘flyover zone’). Travel typologies can be used to distinguish 
modern from pre-modern, or even civilized from primitive. The very 
technologies that provide mobility across boundaries are themselves 
segregated and differentiated because they are commoditized products. 
Social stratification within transport allows elite travellers to isolate 
themselves and alleviate some of the travails of mobility, and divides 
the spectrum of mobility practices into socioeconomic categories. Elite 
spaces, such as airport club lounges and limousines, are inaccessible to 
those on non-elite trajectories.
Communication media also invite typological distinctions, making it 
more difficult to identify similarities and continuities of practice as new 
technologies become part of people’s lives. Smartphone technology, 
with apps such as WhatsApp, provides for convenient and cheap 
communication and the sharing of digital images when travelling or 
living abroad, but there are important functional similarities in their 
use to create mementoes for oneself or images that can be circulated 
to significant others. Photographs and letters sent by post, phone calls, 
and SMS texts serve similar purposes regardless of their prominent 
differences. Technology may change rapidly but it participates in 
a complex balance of transformation and continuity: people adopt 
technologies that serve existing goals more readily than they adapt 
themselves to technologies by discovering and taking up novel goals 
and practices.
Questions persist about how to recognize and evaluate the ways 
new technologies and mobility practices are changing people and their 
social relations. Transport is undeniably faster and more ubiquitous, 
consuming more energy and other resources despite improving 
technologies, and taking people farther and more often. But are people 
spending more time and effort travelling? And does that travel isolate 
them from their community and lead to weaker social ties? Or are 
communication technologies making it possible to stay in touch, and 
facilitating mobility, allowing people to compensate for distance by 
alternative connections? Do community-based trust networks expand 
more easily to distant places through more versatile communication 
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technologies? Such questions have to be carefully addressed by 
exploring how practices compensate or interact with one another, 
potentially reducing the effects of acceleration and complexity through 
connectivity and communication. 
In a somewhat different direction and one that has been more 
extensively researched, online bulletin boards and discussion lists 
promote broader dialogue among members of ethnolinguistic groups 
and keep people in touch with developments affecting people, both 
in their home country as well as in foreign communities (Wilson 
and Peterson 2002, Bernal 2006). As with the role Benedict Anderson 
(1983) identified for print capitalism in shaping ethnic and national 
consciousness, online discussions can also lead to stronger identification 
with a community despite distance. Although print also enabled 
ongoing connections, it depends upon more localized production and 
distribution while internet access allows the community to stretch much 
more widely.
In my own research, I find Kyrgyzstani villagers using digital media 
to circulate information about each other despite wide displacement 
around the globe, but I am not sure that much of this information would 
not have been similarly distributed, if more slowly, through face-to-face 
encounters and postal communications in the past. In any case, it is 
clear that technology offers capacities that serve people’s aspirations 
and values more than to reshape them. For example, villagers feel it is 
important to document ritual events, but usually do this through hiring 
a specialist to make high quality video recordings and edit them for 
distribution and replay. Cell phone videos are too low quality to preserve 
important events, so at least during the past ten years I have found that 
Kyrgyz rely upon local videographers and editors who create highly 
professional videos that people then circulate as physical recordings. Of 
course, the rapid shifts from black-and-white still photography in the 
Soviet period, to color photography after 1991, and then VCR and DVD 
videos does show an increasing rate of change, with new technologies 
giving young technology buffs the opportunity to become local 
professionals. Nonetheless, the most successful technology business in 
one village where I work remained, even in 2016, a photographer who 
uses camera, computer and printer to produce and edit digital color 
images for local customers.
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Cosmopolitan connections
A wide variety of studies have taken up questions of cosmopolitan 
lifestyles and mobilities in Eurasia, including studies of connections 
among South Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia. 
Cosmopolitanism has a long history throughout Eurasia, and reflects 
continuities within mobility practices such as trade and pilgrimage. 
Work by Engseng Ho (2006), Caroline Humphrey and Vera Skvirskaja 
(2012), Scott Levi (2002), Magnus Marsden (2008, 2016), Madeleine 
Reeves (2014), Jonah Steinberg (2007), Rian Thum (2014), and Pnina 
Werbner (1999, 2006) and many others have helped refine our knowledge 
of cosmopolitan mobility practices in this region. 
Many of the works mentioned above, as well as chapters in this 
volume, can be seen as part of the broader study of Muslim mobilities. 
Important works in this field include Eickelman and Piscatori (1990) 
and Gelvin and Green (2014). Muslim translocal practices are widely 
reflected in Islamic literary tradition, with scholars, traders, and 
geographers leaving more than a millennium of written documents 
reflecting the circulation of people within the Islamic ecumene and 
beyond (e.g., Miquel 1987). Relevant to Central Asia is Wennberg’s 
(2014) study of Bukharan literati reflecting upon acceleration, travel, and 
temporality in the late nineteenth century. Emphasizing the mobility 
of cosmopolitan Persianate literati, Mana Kia (forthcoming) describes 
the ideals of conduct known as adab as a mobile ethos that facilitates 
interaction among Muslims who encounter each other far from home.
Cosmopolitan activities were also an important aspect of the Soviet 
Union’s ideology of progress, and included travel for professional 
and trade education, military service, and the participation of young 
workers in national projects such as the Baikal-Amur Mainline railway 
and hydroelectric construction projects. These efforts brought people 
together from many parts of the USSR and helped create pan-Soviet 
social experience and shared ideology and values. Such Soviet-era 
activities, along with tourism and long-distance trade, provided a 
foundation for ongoing connections in post-Soviet contexts, as well 
as shaping cosmopolitan aspirations and practices that motivate 
translocal mobility.
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Post-Soviet translocal practices seem to be shaped more by 
economic motivations than the long distance or interethnic social ties 
that developed under socialism, and are characterized by regional 
patterns and asymmetric movement: Central Asians from poorer 
states (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) move to Russia and Kazakhstan as 
workers and students, but few come from other post-Soviet states to 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to work or study. Instead, migrating workers 
and students come to Kyrgyzstan from China and South Asia. 
Post-Soviet travel infrastructure perpetuates patterns established 
during the Soviet period. Travel by plane is usually through Moscow, 
regardless of where one is going in the post-Soviet space, but few people 
move among the economically lesser developed regions: cross-border 
mobility is well-developed among Central Asian states, and between 
Russia and Central Asia, but there is far less between the Caucasus 
and Central Asia. Members of Caucasian Muslim ethnic groups such 
as Chechens who were exiled to Central Asia around World War Two 
dominate movement between these two regions. For example, during 
numerous flights I have taken between London and Bishkek on British 
Airways flights that stopped in Yerevan, Armenia, I never saw someone 
board in Yerevan to travel to Bishkek or vice versa. In fact, many of 
the Armenians I met were travelling between Yerevan and Los Angeles, 
where roughly forty percent of Armenian Americans live (Wikipedia). 
Nonetheless, people from different parts of the Soviet Union do end 
up migrating and working together in cosmopolitan centres, including 
some centres, such as Istanbul, that were not part of Soviet-era mobilities, 
but are important trading centres linking the Middle East and post-
Soviet Eurasia. The effects of Soviet-era cosmopolitanism thus shape 
post-Soviet economic ties and migration for work, but have resulted in 
fewer ongoing social ties.
Soviet-era cosmopolitanism has significant ties to mobility practices 
of the Russian Empire involving trade, education, and military 
expansion and governance. But Muslim Central Asia and the Caucasus 
were also linked internally and externally by cosmopolitan mobilities 
even before China and Russia conquered the regions. Many cities were 
important for trade, while some, such as Bukhara and Turkistan, were 
also important centres of Islamic education and pilgrimage. Education, 
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political ties, and trade motivated travel and resettlement to and from 
the Ottoman Empire, China, Russia, and British India. 
Looking further into the past, we find several millennia of important 
translocal mobilities in Central Asia: prominent examples are the 
conquests of Alexander the Great, the arrival of Greek settlers in 
Greco-Bactria (Holt 1989), and the Sogdian traders and literati moving 
among the Chinese, Sasanian, and Turkic Empires during the first 
millennium (de La Vaissière 2005, Rose 2016). In a different manner, 
nomadic pastoralists lived highly mobile lives that sometimes brought 
them into close contact with urban and settled society, but because 
their mobile economy offered greater wealth and flexibility, they 
generally maintained independent political and military practices that 
enabled both defence and occasional conquest. Nomads were willing 
participants in trade, but if they took up urban or cosmopolitan lifestyles 
most remained somewhat separate as conquerors or as soldiers serving 
those in power (Barfield 1993, di Cosmo 2002).
The Mongol conquest created some of the most important and 
long-lasting spatial networks for cosmopolitan formations connecting 
Central and Inner Asia, the Caucasus, Iran, and nearby regions. 
Merchants, officials, scholars, soldiers, and craftspeople moved great 
distances and distributed products and practices widely throughout 
the Mongol empire and its successor states. There is also a long history 
of Caucasian and Central Asian people moving as refugees and exiles 
due to conflicts, or because ruling groups have relocated them as 
settlers, farmers, and soldiers. This includes groups such as the Sibe and 
Taranchi, who were moved by Qing China’s leaders to the Ili Region 
of Dzungaria in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The so-called 
Volga Germans were recruited by Catherine the Great of Russia to help 
promote rural agricultural development in the eighteenth century, but 
many later moved, along with Russian agriculturalists, to Central Asia 
as settlers. Refugees fleeing conflicts include Kalmyks in the seventeenth 
century from Siberia and Dungans in the nineteenth from China. More 
recently, some of the largest movements involved the deportations 
of entire ethnic groups from Soviet border zones, particularly in the 
Caucasus and Korean border areas, to Central Asia under Stalin in the 
period around World War Two. Central Asians also repeatedly fled 
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from conflict, collectivization, and hunger in both Russian and Chinese 
Central Asia, with significant groups of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz ending 
up as far abroad as Turkey, and Kalmyks in New Jersey in the United 
States. Each large-scale movement has resulted in continuing translocal 
mobility practices connecting these widespread communities.
Time
This sketch of movement and cosmopolitan identities across time in 
Central Asia is intended to direct attention to the final issue I wish 
to raise in this foreword. The capacity to move within and establish 
ongoing connections across space raises questions about how these 
relate to time, which plays an important role in movement but differs 
fundamentally as an experience, despite often being misleadingly 
described as a ‘fourth dimension’. In the preceding paragraphs, I 
intentionally presented Central Asian history in a somewhat disjointed 
way to stimulate reflection upon more voluntary movements in time, 
through imagination, memory, and narrative.
Obviously, sequences of events or experiences in time, or even 
sequences of mental associations and perceptions, occur in contiguous 
moments of ‘real’ time. Nonetheless, memory, imagination, and social 
activities such as planning or narrative offer the power to reorganize 
events in time into meaningful associations that help make sense 
of experience. We can identify varieties of temporal translocality 
(transtemporality) that emerge both from sequences of experience in 
time, as well as from techniques that bring multiple moments together 
in consciousness. Transtemporality encompasses ways that people 
communicate with each other across time, carry out culturally meaningful 
life cycle rituals together, and invoke ideologically meaningful temporal 
formations around concepts such as civilization, economic development, 
or modernity. Movement through time is shaped and managed within 
social relations, and people rely on interactive social cognition to create 
futures and interpret pasts, to remember and plan. Communication, 
planning, and memory are in turn vital to organizing spatial mobility. 
Communication media enable forms of co-presence that transcend 
distance in both time and space, although in profoundly different ways. 
Interactive dialogic communication has to take place synchronously, 
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regardless of how far apart people are in space, while the converse, 
communication across time, is possible among people in the same 
or different places. In fact, both memory and technologies such as 
writing can be seen as ways a person communicates with him or 
herself. Writing, objects, public representations, and memories all help 
construct continuity among different moments of experience and thus 
help constitute individual and collective subjectivities. 
One does not move voluntarily through time in the way that one 
can in space, but memory and imagination are tools for engaging 
with time and our passage through it. People have considerable 
control over physical movement in space, although they experience 
many constraints, while movement in ‘real’ time is continual, outside 
of people’s control, and shared by all. Access to the past may differ 
depending upon memory capacity, or technologies for documenting, 
storing and retrieving, but people cannot shift in time to experience a 
different past or future. Everyone moves together in time. Although 
some people aim to recreate or reinhabit pasts or control movement 
into the future, they are simply creating a present that they believe is 
more like a desired past or future. Their ability to create such presents 
may reflect unequal access to resources and imaginaries in the present. 
Understanding the extent and expression of choice and agency in such 
situations is an important part of research into transtemporal practices.
Questions about spatial and temporal translocality and the 
relationships between them have only begun to be explored. The varied 
and rich chapters in this volume contribute to this effort. As Barak Kalir 
points out in his afterward, translocality helps overcome the kind of 
methodological regionalism reflected in the area studies paradigm, and 
reorients study towards the mobile subjects themselves. I would add 
that analysis of transtemporality can help overcome methodological 
contemporaneity and explore the complex ways people position 
themselves within time.
Most of the present chapters consider people’s experiences and 
representations of temporal transformations as part of personal lived 
experience. However, those by Kamoludin Abdullaev, Henryk Alff, 
and Svetlana Jacquesson also investigate the ways people imagine and 
construct shared pasts and use them in social practices. Translocal and 
transtemporal perspectives study the ways people make lives amidst 
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connections to different times, places, and people through movement, 
communication, and imagination. They reorient us from the imposition 
of institutional, legal, political, economic, or scholarly containers and 
boundaries that we use to purify our collections of objects and subjects, 
make our generalizations more accurate and our knowledge more stable. 
Analysis of mobile subjectivities draws us closer to people’s experiences 
as they make sense of and move among different places and times.
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Introduction  
 
Mobilities, Boundaries, and Travelling 
Ideas Beyond Central Asia and the 
Caucasus: A Translocal Perspective
Manja Stephan-Emmrich and Philipp Schröder
Translocality — a cross-cutting research perspective
Translocality, as Greiner and Sakdapolrak (2013) in their overview of 
the employment of the concept in the humanities have rightly pointed 
out, has come into vogue. Since Appadurai (1996) introduced the term 
in Modernity at Large, translocality has been widely used to depict the 
social and cultural representations of a globalizing world, which is 
shaped through the movement of people, goods, and ideas across 
borders. As an attempt to overcome methodological nationalism and 
to scrutinize the idea of culture as a closed entity, translocality has been 
used as a synonym for ‘post-nationalism’ and the ‘deterritorialization’ 
of social life. However, since then, the term has become a catchphrase 
in many disciplines such as geography, area studies, history, 
anthropology, and development studies and is used in various ways 
as a conceptual or descriptive tool to tackle the multiple social realities 
of mobility, migration, spatial connectedness, and cultural exchange 
across national borders. Although critical voices justifiably warn that 
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an inflationary and often unreflective use of translocality exposes the 
danger of turning ‘trans-terminology’ into ‘empty signifiers’ or ‘catch-
all phrases completely lacking any theoretical or analytical depth’ 
(Bromber 2013:64), many studies have explored the potential of the 
concept to introduce new perspectives and epistemological parameters 
to established research traditions. 
While, in migration studies, the term is often simply used as a 
synonym for transnationalism and thus promotes an understanding 
of ‘trans-’ processes merely as crossing nation state borders, human 
geographers use the term as a lens to trace how processes of migration and 
mobility feed into the formation of mobile, or translocal, subjectivities 
(Conradson and McKay 2007). Importantly, the concept emphasizes 
that such subjectivities emerge out of mobile actors’ simultaneous 
situatedness both ‘here’ and ‘there’, which eventually leads to multiple 
belongings and different, yet changing notions of ‘home’ (Taylor 
2013, Brickell 2011). Shifting from mobility and mobile subjectivity to 
practices and processes of emplacement, or placemaking, other studies 
have argued for a conceptualization of translocality that goes beyond 
merely geographical notions to include discussions about the social 
constructedness of place and space. Following Massey’s idea of place 
as a setting for interaction (1993, 2006), in urban studies, for example, 
translocalities have been understood as places in which mobile subjects 
are locally grounded and where transnational ties are regulated and 
institutionalized. As such, urbanities are seen as significant ‘stops’ along 
people’s many and diverse cross-border relations (Sinatti 2009:62–63). 
Simultaneously, the translocality concept has influenced the 
methodological debate about mobile ethnography. Pointing to the 
importance of place-to-place relations, Hannerz (2013) develops an 
argument for a ‘translocal’ rather than ‘multi-sited ethnography’, 
because for him it is the conjunctions, interconnections, associations 
and juxtapositions among sites and places that matter most. Such an 
understanding of translocality has paved the way for an agency-oriented 
approach towards phenomena of mobility and connectedness, which 
helps to explore how mobile and immobile actors engage in translocal 
social fields, which are characterized by uneven power relations. 
Translocality thereby allows us to highlight the social experiences of 
mobile and immobile actors who negotiate and struggle over positions 
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through the transformation of various forms of capital that are valued 
differently across different scales (Greiner and Sakdapolrak 2013:375), 
a phenomenon that has also been discussed as ‘transnational habitus’ 
(Kelly and Luis 2006). 
The list of how translocality is used and conceptualized to explain 
cross-border mobility and other types of connectedness between 
places could go on. Most striking, however, is that many of these 
conceptualizations are discussed within the boundaries of academic 
disciplines instead of stimulating dialogue across them. Accordingly, 
most of the studies referred to so far exclusively address economic, 
political, or cultural processes; they discuss translocality as a matter 
related only to processes of twenty-first century globalization. In 
contrast, the groundbreaking volume Translocality: An Approach to 
Connection and Transfer in Area Studies by Freitag and von Oppen (2010) 
draws on sustained conversations between historians, anthropologists, 
linguists and area studies specialists to advocate an understanding of 
translocality as a cross-cutting field for researching spatial relationships 
from a ‘Southern perspective’. With its focus on non-elitist mobile actors 
and the attempt to ground their movements and connections across 
borders in multi-scalar figurations of socio-historical entanglements in 
and beyond Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, their volume challenges 
the dominant Eurocentric historical narrative about post-/colonial 
modernity as a linear and monocentric process. Contributing a notion 
of ‘alternate globalities’ that predates twenty-first century globalization, 
the work of Freitag and von Oppen allows us to explore alternative 
epistemological avenues towards a new social history ‘from below’. 
Following the idea of translocality as a cross-cutting perspective, the 
present volume assembles anthropological, historiographical, and 
sociological case studies as well as studies drawing from human 
geography and urban studies. Arranging them around the four main 
topics ‘crossing boundaries’, ‘travelling ideas’, ‘economic and social 
movements’ and finally ‘pious endeavours’, the volume aims to bring 
different disciplinary approaches into conversation with each other. 
The case studies employ translocality as a descriptive tool to capture 
practices of mobility and movement, exchange and transfer across 
Central Asia, the Caucasus, Eurasia, China, and the Middle East, as 
they have been shaped under the conditions of Soviet colonialism, 
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post-Soviet transformations, global capitalism and cultural globalization 
in the region. Furthermore, the authors make use of translocality as 
an analytical perspective to discuss their empirical data in light of 
historical and ongoing processes of local and global transformation that 
connect concrete localities shaped by complex historical configurations, 
and by a wide range of social-spatial relations that non-elite actors 
engage in. Linking translocality with a wide range of current themes 
in academic writing on Central Asia and the Caucasus such as identity, 
ethnicity, Islam, the state, and the informal economy, this volume seeks 
to understand the dynamic, often competing, meanings and lived 
realities of these concepts beyond the epistemological normativity of 
spatial containers such as nation-state or area. Moreover, this volume 
approaches locality as a relational concept rather than a geographic or 
territorially bounded unit. From that angle, the contributions examine 
how localities are constructed and produced by social as well as spatial 
practices and relations; thereby addressing aspects of temporality, 
virtuality, materiality, and emotionality. 
Although the empirical case studies assembled here speak to each 
other in very different ways, some more explicitly than others, this 
introduction highlights those findings that most strikingly reveal the 
benefits of a translocal perspective for studying movements, transfers, 
and exchanges beyond Central Asia and the Caucasus. We continue 
to elaborate on this in the following paragraphs, beginning with the 
suggestion that understanding translocality as lived experience can help 
to explore both the existential dimension of spatial movement and the 
uneven ways that processes of globalization are grounded in and beyond 
the regions under study here. With alternative spatialisations we critically 
address the pitfalls of methodological nationalism and regionalism and 
instead argue for alternative readings of socio-spatial configurations 
beyond Central Asia and the Caucasus. With translocal livelihoods we 
further elaborate a concept we have introduced elsewhere, and that 
draws on material and immaterial aspects that facilitate the processes of 
institutionalizing mobility (Schröder and Stephan-Emmrich 2014).
Furthermore, we invite the reader to follow the socio-spatial relations 
of student travellers, mobile traders, and businesspeople from Tajikistan 
to the Arab Emirates and Kyrgyzstan to China in order to address the 
epistemic limitations that arise when the lives of people from Central 
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Asia or the Caucasus are perceived only within a framework of post-
Socialism or Soviet colonialism. Elaborating the term transtemporalities, 
we then argue that translocality as both a condition and a lived reality 
is always bound to both space and time. This volume’s focus is merely 
on mobility in the Soviet and post-Soviet era, and that of post-Cold-War 
globalization. However, we are fully aware that many of the socio-spatial 
relations discussed herein built upon travel trajectories and spatial 
relations that date back to early or pre-Soviet time, and that have formed 
spaces of interaction and exchange across and beyond the borders of 
what we nowadays refer to as ‘Central Asia’ and ‘the Caucasus’ (see 
Nathan Light’s foreword to this volume). Finally, many contributions in 
this book point to the ambivalences around state borders and state policies by 
tracing how transgressions of national borders and other boundaries are 
accompanied by processes of translation, during which the practitioners 
of translation undergo change, as do the particular localities where such 
translation occurs. With these clusters of themes, this volume expands 
the growing body of works dealing with the politics and lived realities 
of mobility, connectedness, and exchange in and beyond Central Asia 
and the Caucasus (Mostowlansky 2017, Marsden 2016, Alff and Benz 
2014, Darieva 2013, among others). 
Translocality as lived experience
Each of the contributions in this volume tackles translocality as a social 
reality, thereby illustrating different ways in which translocal practices 
and experiences are tied to physical or imagined localities. These 
grounded social realities include, for example, spiritual encounters in a 
Tablighi Jamaat mosque in Bishkek, informal trade practices in Georgia’s 
borderlands, economic and cultural exchanges across the Kazakh-
Chinese border, and the production of a ‘new Kyrgyz history’ from 
the desk of a private home in Kyrgyzstan. This confirms our previous 
observations that translocal contexts emerge from the practices and 
relations that mobile as well as non-mobile subjects engage in, as part 
of which they absorb, (re-)interpret and pass on new social, cultural, 
political, and religious contexts through time and space (Schröder and 
Stephan-Emmrich 2014). Accordingly, Mirzoev and Stephan-Emmrich 
in Chapter Two of this volume address the social networks of Tajik 
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migrants in the Arab Emirates in order to show how translocality as a 
social reality is institutionalized, while Alff depicts in Chapter Five how 
circulating notions of Chinese modernity as a model of development is 
translated into local contexts in Kazakhstan. 
In migration and mobility studies related to Central Asia and beyond, 
the movements of people and ideas are usually among the core topics 
of interest. To complement this research agenda, some contributions in 
the present volume explicitly consider the handling of material objects, 
which we here understand in a wider material and metaphorical sense 
(see Appadurai 1988). This includes the daily relevance of smartphones 
as devices to store and trigger spatial religious experiences; sacred 
genealogies within the wider Central Asian region, which have 
been preserved and transmitted orally or in writing, and nowadays 
are recreated and presented via the internet; printed texts on the 
management of water distribution systems that ‘travel’ from ‘the West’ 
to rural Uzbekistan; or the production and consumption of literature 
that contributes to new methods of Kyrgyz history-making extending 
as far as the United States. Beginning from such an examination of the 
‘social life of things’ (Appadurai 1988), some chapters illustrate how 
translocality, as a lived experience, is articulated, represented and 
mediated materially, while at the same time material objects may become 
agents that facilitate or constrain people’s spatial movement and social 
mobility (Svašek 2012). From such a perspective, this volume scrutinizes 
a wide range of themes such as the impact of nation states, transnational 
Muslim movements, and new media technology on mobile trajectories 
and identity formations, formal or informal economic activities in a 
post-Socialist capitalist environment, and, finally, the reproduction of 
social inequality through bureaucratic regimes. 
Simultaneously, understanding translocality as a social reality 
provides insights into how actors from Central Asia and the Caucasus 
engage in ‘multiple modernities’ and various processes of globalization. 
With its focus on the lived experiences ‘on the ground’, this volume 
follows Ferguson (2006:23), who argues that scholars should focus 
discussions about the global less ‘on transnational flows and images 
of unfettered connection than on the social relations that selectively 
constitute global society’ (see also Jackson 2013:193). This enables the 
provision of ‘experience-near accounts […] of the existential aspects of 
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migration’ (Jackson 2013:194, Graw and Schielke 2013:16). At the same 
time, putting more emphasis on the ‘everyday’ allows us to follow the 
stratified, multi-scalar, and non-linear ways in which globalization is 
experienced in the regions under examination, which are somewhat 
obscured by the prominent notions of ‘flows’ or ‘scapes’. Therefore, 
approaching translocality as an everyday experience also helps to capture 
the concise meanings and the particular situatedness of those political, 
economic, and other macro-dynamics, which have been framed as the 
globalization of Central Asia (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013). The authors 
of this volume do so by associating local change in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus with larger scale phenomena such as labour migration, 
cross-border trade, the globalization of scholarship, and the circulation 
of concepts such as ‘modernity’, ‘development’ and ‘Islam’. Thus, our 
volume picks up what Africa historian Frederic Cooper has identified as 
the shortcomings of globalization theory: the limits of interconnection 
as well the specificity of the structures that are necessary to make spatial 
relationships work (Cooper 2001:189–90). When tracing how movements 
and connections that transgress conventional borders and boundaries 
link to individual agency and the institutionalization or consolidation of 
cultural, political, and social structures, we respond to Freitag and von 
Oppen’s pledge to develop a historical perspective that goes far beyond 
the era of the nation state and thus may embrace both transnationalism, 
globalization, and historical entanglements. 
‘Alternative spatialisations’ and new 
epistemological avenues
The different ways in which the authors in this volume employ 
translocality either as a research perspective or object of research 
itself opens up a wide range of epistemological avenues that may 
challenge received methodologies or ontological assumptions about the 
anthropology, history, and sociology of Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
In Chapter Four, Elena Kim uses translocality as a lens to capture how the 
livelihoods of poor female landowners in rural Uzbekistan are shaped 
by the country’s involvement in the global cotton trade. Drawing from 
micro-level observations of everyday negotiations, the author illustrates 
how poor rural households are systematically excluded from a system 
34 Manja Stephan-Emmrich and Philipp Schröder
of community-based water management, which officially subscribes to 
international standards for improving social equality in Uzbekistan. For 
the institutional ethnographer, Kim argues, the translocality concept 
helps to unmask existing technologies of uneven power relations that 
inform institutional processes of water governance but remain mostly 
covert. 
Svetlana Jacquesson argues that in modern historiography a 
translocality perspective ensures a better analytical grasp of non-
elite actors who are involved in the production of a new, evidence-
based ancient history of the Kyrgyz people. Tackling the intellectual 
endeavour of non-professional historians in Kyrgyzstan as a translocal 
field, Jacquesson’s chapter (Chapter Six) shows that globalization can 
also be understood as the individual capacity to consider oneself as 
part of larger entities through being connected with other, previously 
separated places in the world and their respective histories. Thus, the 
author illustrates how Kyrgyz amateur historians voice their claims for 
agency in a world history that is still largely Eurocentric. Even more, 
such unexpected research outcomes may contradict the commonsensical 
expectations of what globalization should bring, as it invites a reflexive 
engagement with the researchers’ sources, methods, and the ways in 
which academic knowledge is produced.
Obviously, a translocal perspective may help to reveal alternative 
spatialisations, which emerge from mobile actors’ social relations and 
practices in and between very concrete places, and which transcend 
predominant academic notions of Central Asia and the Caucasus as fixed 
geographic or nation-/empire-bound territories. In that way, we aim to 
situate this volume in the field of new area studies, i.e., as a project that 
seeks to replace the container term ‘area’ with ‘flexible definitions of 
spatial figurations, allowing for permeability and movement’ without 
abandoning the notion of area entirely (Houben 2017:204). Similarly, 
van Schendel’s work on Geographies of Knowing and Ignorance (2002:658) 
argues for a move away from ‘trait’ to ‘process geography’, which 
again opens up a new understanding of areas not as pre-given, ‘static, 
timeless containers of historicity’, but as socially constructed. In Central 
Asia Studies, several attempts have been made to match these claims. 
Canfield’s (1992) idea of ‘Greater Central Asia’ as an extended, cross-
border region or single zone, which covers the political, economic, 
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and cultural interconnections among the population of Central Asia, 
China’s westernmost province Xinjiang and its neighbors Afghanistan, 
Iran, and Pakistan, is in line with these thoughts, but still remains 
limited to the newly emerged geopolitical formations in the post-Cold-
War era. In a more recent attempt, the inter-university Competence 
Network Crossroads Asia, which is based in Germany, has elaborated 
a new, promising understanding of ‘area’. Accordingly, the concept 
of Crossroads Asia seeks to transcend geographic and geopolitical 
definitions and instead understands the region, which stretches from 
eastern Iran to the western parts of China and from northern Kazakhstan 
to the northern parts of India, as a ‘multiply interconnected space’. This 
space emerges out of interactions, movements, and flows that cross 
and transcend spatial, social, and cultural boundaries (Crossroads Asia 
Working Group Migration 2012/2014: 1). The succeeding remarkable 
bulk of transdisciplinary works has initiated a wide range of new 
conceptual, theoretical, and epistemological perspectives that stress 
the importance of the local, intimate, contextual, and material forms of 
connectivity and the lived geographies these are entwined with (Alff 
and Benz 2014, Kreutzmann and Watanabe 2016). With an emphasis on 
the institutionalization and historical depth of cross-border relations, 
Crossroads Asia’s argument for a dynamic and permeable socio-spatial 
and historical configuration of exchange and connectedness takes into 
account the complex ways in which mobility is related to people’s 
identities, and to political and economic situations (Marsden 2011:1–2).
Following the contributions to this volume, we can identify a wide 
range of such complex socio-spatial configurations, which result from 
cross-border networks and the related circulations of people, things and 
ideas, and challenge, for example, the colonial narrative of territorial 
boundedness. Among these configurations, for example, is the spatial 
Muslim concept of dar ul-Islam; i.e., the idea of a Muslim territory that 
transcends the political borders of the Southern region of the early 
Soviet empire and Afghanistan, and that becomes the very concrete 
emplacement for the rather abstract notion of the supranational 
community of Muslim believers, the umma. Exploring how religious 
doctrines have triggered a well-defined cross-border movement out 
of the Soviet empire (hijra), and giving colonized Muslim subjects a 
voice to explain their migration trajectories, Kamoludin Abdullaev’s 
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contribution to this volume presents a counter-narrative to Soviet and 
Western historiographies. Replacing the dominant lens of methodological 
Soviet nationalism with that of translocality, the author shows how 
colonial policies have turned cross-border mobilities of Central Asian 
Muslims into ‘transnational migration’ and thus constructed emigration 
from the Soviet territory as political action directed against a colonial 
regime. Using translocality as a descriptive tool, Abdullaev unmasks 
the common simplification of a complex phenomenon. Speaking 
implicitly to other chapters in this volume, his study helps to identify 
how old colonial resentments against the mobile tradition of Islam in 
the region continue in the negative evaluation and stigmatization of 
Muslim travellers in the political and public sphere in both postcolonial 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (see also Malikov and Stephan-Emmrich in 
Chapters Two and Nine of this volume). 
Another example of how socio-spatial ties across national borders 
link historic and contemporary communal belonging is presented in 
regard to Dungan identity. Henryk Alff traces in Chapter Five how this 
ethnic group’s positioning has been newly articulated in reference to 
the Eurasian land bridge between Central Asia and China, but how it 
is also based on the historical roots that this Chinese-speaking ethnic 
minority of Kazakhstan traces back to China. Examining how Dungan 
economic leaders successfully engage in local development through 
their translocal networks, Alff discusses alternative socio-spatial 
relations that may help to overcome established territorial notions (such 
as ‘methodological nationalism’); binary conceptualizations of space 
(such as ‘urban-rural’ or ‘centre-periphery’); and finally, perspectives 
that are restricted to the local ‘boundedness’ of resources and people. 
Other authors in this volume show how spaces of cultural proximity 
evolve from the Soviet experience that Kyrgyz traders in Novosibirsk 
share with the Russian majority there (Schröder, Chapter Eight), or from 
the shared Persian culture that enables Tajik entrepreneurs in Dubai to 
integrate into established Sunni-Iranian and Afghan business networks 
in the Arab Emirates (Mirzoev and Stephan-Emmrich, Chapter Two). The 
spatial dimension of cultural proximity reminds us that encountering 
difference or engaging with realities of globalization in urban settings 
does not occur unfiltered but takes place in ‘nested’ contexts (see Kirmse 
2011). These may consist of shared cultural or religious experiences, 
which allow the articulation of multiple belongings outside national 
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frameworks (Stephan-Emmrich, and Alff, Chapter Nine and Chapter 
Five, respectively). But such contexts can also refer to new claims of 
agency, such as when rewriting world history from the Kyrgyz vantage 
point draws on the ‘nested’ framework of postcolonial nationalism 
(Jacquesson, Chapter Six). 
At the same time, alternative spatialisations are practiced in virtual 
relations associated with the way mobile actors use the internet, social 
media, and new media technologies. Thus, carving out translocality as 
an intermediary concept, some contributions in this volume address 
how virtual spaces facilitate the articulation of multiple belongings, 
the emotional attachment to particular places, or an elusive homing 
instinct towards an ancestral home place. Working towards a translocal 
ethnography, Schröder asks in his ‘epistemographic’ notes what, in 
fact, research on highly mobile economic actors such as his Kyrgyz 
interlocutors in China and Russia ‘can know’. Reflecting on his own fluid 
positionality as a researcher in regard to the complex situatedness of his 
interlocutors in different localities in Eurasia, he identifies various social 
and other boundaries, called ‘house-rules’ of fieldwork, which shape 
the very contours of producing anthropological knowledge in highly 
mobile field sites. Like Stephan-Emmrich in Chapter Nine, he argues for 
a stronger turn in Central Asian and Caucasus Studies towards virtual 
lifeworlds, in order to explore how translocality can be the result of, and 
part of, reality, while moving in(-between) virtual fields of economic 
transaction, identity and cultural consumption, belonging and home 
(see Ibold 2010, Kirmse 2013). 
Another form of alternative spatialization is addressed in Emil 
Nasritdinov’s anthropological study of the spiritual transformation of 
middle-aged Kyrgyz men, who after the chaos of the post-independence 
era in the 1990s became followers of the global Muslim Tablighi Jamaat 
movement. Discussing hijra as a spiritual, inner journey without spatial 
movement, the author links the ‘trans’ in translocality to a person’s 
individual transformation towards becoming ‘a better person’: someone 
who is embedded in a complex environment of flows, folds and 
obstacles of space, time and society, and thus eventually changes his 
own notion of a very physical place, i.e., in Nasritdinov’s case study, 
an urban neighborhood in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan’s capital city, where 
his main interlocutors dwell. With this focus on what Setha Low (2009) 
has described as ‘embodied spaces’, Nasritdinov offers an interesting 
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alternative perspective on post-Soviet transition and urban change in 
contemporary Kyrgyzstan. 
The complex realities of ‘translocal livelihoods’
With our particular emphasis on how emotions, memories, and 
belongings produce alternative spatialisations, we have argued 
elsewhere for a broader understanding of livelihood as a concept that 
embraces both material (i.e., economic) and immaterial (i.e., social, 
cultural, and spiritual) concerns in order to understand how mobility 
and connectedness may be institutionalized (see Schröder and Stephan-
Emmrich 2014:5). With such a widened focus, eventually, translocality 
can be apprehended and portrayed in its full complexity. A broader 
notion of ‘translocal livelihood’, for example, allows for a more open 
and flexible approach towards ‘mobile’ people’s social experience and 
thus scrutinizes narrower understandings of migration as simply an 
economic practice and a relocation to ‘where the money is’. Tracing how 
‘place’, or a certain idea of it, is constructed when people (and their 
multiple belongings) move through space and time, some authors in 
this volume detect the entwinement and overlap of different modes 
of mobility, revealing the multifaceted reality of Muslim travel as a 
social and moral action (see Eickelman and Piscatori 1990) that may 
simultaneously encompass knowledge travel, labour migration, 
emigration, and pilgrimage. In this way, Stephan-Emmrich locates 
the emotional geographies of Tajik migrants in Dubai in the religious 
imagination of their ambitious piety projects. The positive or negative 
evaluation of the places where the migrants dwell or have dwelt before 
as ‘good’ or ‘bad Muslim places’ is associated with emotions, and with 
aspirations for accumulating new religious or other capital. Thus, both 
the emotional geography and religious makeup of these mobile agents 
trigger new forms of movement such as migration for work, pilgrimage 
(hajj) or Muslim emigration (hijra). Stephan-Emmrich shows, similarly 
to Abdullaev in Chapter One, how piety can mobilize people to migrate 
and provide a resource to make spatial movement and geographic 
place and space meaningful at the same time (see also Conermann and 
Smolarz 2015, Silvey 2007). 
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While many other contributions in this volume point to the positive 
effects of spatial mobility, which eventually may lead to economic, 
spiritual, or social success, Susanne Fehlings in her study on female 
petty traders in Chapter Seven emphasizes its negative effects. The 
socio-economic crisis in post-Soviet Georgia has produced ‘marginal 
mobilities’ that do not facilitate stories of personal achievement but 
became markers for poverty and lack of access to resources. Unfolding 
a gendered perspective on translocality, she shows how mobility can 
become a poor woman’s way of life, and as such is indicative of stasis 
rather than movement and development. Furthermore, her chapter 
illustrates that success in trade tends to limit the women’s involvement 
in mobile livelihoods and instead leads to immobility as a choice. 
Moreover, the economic success of these petty traders can replace 
spatial movement with a ‘virtual mobility’, i.e. engagement in internet-
based trade.
Most of the contributions, however, make clear that translocal 
livelihoods facilitate both positive and negative experiences of spatial 
movement. Translocality thus also serves as an analytical tool with 
which to trace how the dialectic process of mobility and emplacement 
produces a wider range of ambivalences and contradictions (see also 
Barak Kalir’s Afterword). 
Finally, for some authors in this volume, translocality serves as an 
analytical instrument for scrutinizing the limits of the core academic 
concepts they work with. Fehlings argues that the mobile practices of 
female petty traders in Tbilisi are never clearly ‘formal’ or ‘informal’. 
Tackling the ‘everyday’ of those mobile women for whom crossing 
the Georgian border is a core economic strategy, the author clarifies 
that petty trade practices and places are simultaneously ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’, and that transgressions of the ‘formal’ as defined by others, 
i.e., the state, are gradual. Moreover, in her chapter she points out that 
Georgian women’s trading practices and their support networks can, 
if institutionalized, create new structures beyond national horizons 
that weaken the role of the nation state and its regulation regimes. 
This notwithstanding, Fehlings argues that national borders and 
institutions still are relevant and that the petty traders have to deal 
with them creatively. 
40 Manja Stephan-Emmrich and Philipp Schröder
Ambivalent state borders
The complex social experience of translocal livelihoods becomes most 
obvious when the authors in this volume address the permeability 
or durability of social, economic, ethnic, religious, and political 
boundaries. Obviously, state borders and border regimes are of major 
concern. The state is extremely relevant to the understanding of both the 
dialectic process of movement and emplacement and the related spatial 
configurations and new identities in, beyond, and across Central Asia and 
the Caucasus. But we neither want to favour the practice of privileging 
state borders, nor do we attempt to use the nation state as a natural lens 
to study identity, ethnicity, or religion, as many studies on Central Asia 
and the Caucasus do. Our aim is thus to avoid the trap of what Kalir 
(2013:312) has termed a ‘pervasive methodological nationalism’, which 
would have meant approaching our research locations, interlocutors, 
and questions from ‘stagnant paradigms’ that we would have carried 
with us even when ‘travelling with’ the mobile subjects of our studies. 
Instead, we stress in this introduction that a translocal perspective 
may help us to look at political systems of mobility through the eyes of 
those directly involved in them. In other words, it may encourage us to 
consider how non-elite mobile actors perceive, assess, and experience the 
role of states, and cause us to scrutinize the contexts in which national 
belonging becomes an important matter. This accords with Reeves’ 
recent argument for a spatial-relational approach to state borders, 
which puts emphasis on how the state, through situated practices of 
border work, is temporarily and contextually done, undone, invoked 
or ignored (2014:12–13). Tracing how borders in the Kyrgyzstani part of 
the Ferghana Valley appear, disappear, and materialize at certain times, 
Reeves unmasks academic representations of the state as a static, empty 
container or elusive agent. The author thus takes the approach of other 
recent anthropological studies that consider ‘the state’ as constructed 
by discourses and everyday practices in unruly and contradictory 
ways (Sökefeld 2016). Moreover, she scrutinizes the impact of the 
colonial or post-colonial state on mobility and spatial relations in its full 
complexity as dynamic and relational. Accordingly, some contributions 
to this volume reveal a striking ambivalence in the effects of Soviet or 
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post-Soviet border policies in Central Asia and the Caucasus. On the 
one hand, state actors and policies continue to have a strong impact in 
regulating and hampering cross-border mobility. On the other hand, 
these policies trigger mobility, and they are involved in shaping mobile 
experiences and new identities outside state-led definitions to a striking 
extent. In early Soviet Central Asia, colonial border policies created 
obvious interruptions in the everyday mobility of people in the region. 
But simultaneously, as Abdullaev illustrates in Chapter One, they have 
triggered new forms of movement such as Muslim emigration (hijra). 
Moreover, looking through the lens of translocality, the author shows 
that spatial movement was only one response to Russian colonialization. 
In contrast, the emerging Basmachi movement mobilized religion-based 
resistance among those Muslims who stayed in the Soviet empire’s 
territory. Accordingly, the Russian colonialization of Central Asia is 
presented by Abdullaev as a project that triggered diverse cross-border 
movements (Dagyeli 2014, Abdullaev 2009).
Alff develops a similar argument in Chapter Five. But he suggests 
that the Soviet Union’s breakdown has created an ambivalent context 
for both the mobility and immobility of borderland communities 
such as the Dungans, whose settlements criss-cross the Kazakh-
Chinese border. Kazakhstan’s post-Socialist nationalism accelerated 
the reconsolidation of the then-permeable national border in the early 
years after independence. The resulting disconnectedness and limited 
mobility of Dungans and other Central Asians in the region fulfilled a 
core undertaking of Soviet political control and consequently hampered 
cross-border trade with neighboring Central Asian countries (see also 
Kosmarski 2011). Simultaneously, the relaxation of travel and foreign 
trade regulations opened up new avenues of mobility for Dungans in 
Kazakhstan, in particular to China. Dungans recognized this early on 
and became pioneers of an innovative cross-border business that in 
the meantime has facilitated the exchange of construction technology 
and agricultural innovation with China, as well as innovations in 
ethnic tourism and international education, thereby paving the way 
for the further entangling of cultural-economic ties between these two 
countries.
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The virtual articulation of belonging that is addressed in certain 
contributions to this volume can be identified as a highly ambivalent 
practice as well. Often, the internet serves as a new translocal identity 
space, which may help to overcome state restrictions (Ibold 2010, 
Mcglinchey and Johnson 2007). However, Philipp Schröder clarifies 
in Chapter Eight that the ethno-national orientation of the younger 
generation of Kyrgyz in Novosibirsk is expressed through a virtual 
homing instinct, which connects youth to an ancestral homeland and 
thus essentializes features such as shame to be ‘typically Kyrgyz’ while 
interlocutors are far from their ancestral homeland.
The ambivalence of nation-state projects in the post-Soviet area 
and beyond reveals that state borders and other boundaries may be 
temporary as well as permeable. This elucidates how the transgression 
and penetration of state territory, or of other social or cultural spaces, 
happens according to different degrees. It is essential to scrutinize how, 
when and why state borders and boundaries matter to our interlocutors’ 
mobile and spatial experiences, and scaling turns out to be a helpful 
methodological instrument in order to make visible the various existing 
boundaries within the flows, circulations, and cross-border movements 
of people, things, and ideas. This allows for a restructuring and rescaling 
of spatial arrangements to further an understanding, for example, of 
how local transformations speak to global processes. Translocality as a 
research perspective underlines that our global world is not borderless, 
but that territories, pathways, and places still matter since they are both 
constituted by, and result from, very concrete social processes. Following 
anthropologist and geographer Neil Smith (2010:31), scaling provides 
‘a metric for drawing social, political and economic boundaries in the 
landscape’ (cited in Houben 2017:199–200). This becomes strikingly 
obvious in Elena Kim’s analysis of the powerful technologies of state 
bureaucracy, which materialize in the need to possess a stamp in order 
to be granted access to regulation patterns of water flowing through the 
plough land of dispossessed rural Uzbek households. 
Scrutinizing how state regimes may mobilize or restrict people’s 
movement and mobility, a translocality approach may also help to 
illuminate how the state itself is embedded in, and formed by global 
assemblages, or how globalization occurs through the state (Heathershaw 
2011:148, Adams 2010). 
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Transtemporalities
As result of the mobilities paradigm and the spatial turn, an increasing 
body of literature in the humanities deals with aspects of mobility and 
cross-border connectivity. In this way, the humanities have shifted 
from producing modernist narratives of linearity and history to 
investigating how the complex realities of social relations and practices 
in a globalized world are related to space and spatial figurations. Many 
of this volume’s contributions, while addressing the negotiations of 
socio-spatial practices between and within places as they are subject to 
the agency of certain actors’ strategies and choices, demonstrate that 
peoples’ lives are highly relational and contextual in regard to their 
situatedness in both space and time. While the concept of translocality 
is overwhelmingly used to depict processes of circulation or transfer as 
well as spatial configurations across borders, time is often neglected as a 
crucial category for observation. Many of the contributions in this volume 
instead illustrate in various ways how time matters. More precisely, 
they show how the translocal spaces, identities and transformations 
of the people and places under study are embedded in distinct time-
to-time relations and temporalities. Accordingly, this volume argues 
for an understanding of time as an integral part of translocality. For 
example, the sacred genealogies preserved by khoja families during the 
Soviet era (Malikov, Chapter Three), or the photographs that Muslim 
travellers store in their smartphones (Stephan-Emmrich, Chapter Nine), 
freeze time and fixate ‘transtemporalities’, i.e., movements that cross 
and connect times on different, yet ‘jumping scales’. Insofar as the 
translocal realities of the mobile and immobile actors described in the 
contributions to this volume cut across mythical or ancient times, the 
period of Soviet colonialism, and the post-Soviet transformation period, 
they also embrace subjective times of memory, dream, and illusion. The 
nationalist attitude of new Kyrgyz historians, as discussed by Jacquesson 
(Chapter Six), relies heavily on a ‘transtemporal’ imagination that 
stretches from the very local to the very global arena. This imagination 
implies the capacity to relate to abstract ancestors far distant in time, 
of whom no or few material traces remain. This includes multi-scalar 
references to ancient empires, historical events, and places in Europe, 
America, and China. Therefore, by claiming that Kyrgyz warriors 
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reached as far as Europe and have left their imprint there, such as in the 
architectural symbolism of Berlin’s Brandenburger Tor, these non-elite 
knowledge brokers make sense of Kyrgyz identity in world history and 
advocate for their nation’s core role in shaping it. 
Other chapters in the volume, by contrast, approach transtemporality 
through memory and a nostalgic attachment to geographic sites, and 
examine them as constitutive markers of translocal connectivity and 
multiple belongings. The memories, as well as possible future lives 
associated with ‘far off, ideal Muslim places’, which the Tajik student 
migrants in Stephan-Emmrich’s chapter imagine or dream of, constitute 
a major resource for articulating emotional geographies that span 
places of previous residence in Tajikistan and the Middle East, across 
political, social, and cultural boundaries. Stephan-Emmrich reveals that 
the conditions of the post-Socialist transformation in Tajikistan produce 
very individual temporal narratives of progress and development. This 
is in line with Jackson’s observation that everyday lives ‘do not unfold 
in straight lines and that there are many temporalities in history and 
subject times such as the reverie of dream, memory or crisis’ (Jackson 
2013:198). These subject times are often obscured by cause-and-effect 
models of linearity and history, but they can, as we argue here, be 
rediscovered through the lens of a translocality-cum-transtemporality 
approach. 
While the Tajik student travellers through their nostalgic renderings 
of the past preserve a sense of locality and thus articulate their desire 
for ‘belonging somewhere else’, young members of the Kyrgyz diaspora 
in Novosibirsk base their transtemporal imagination on notions of an 
ancestral ‘homeland’ (Schröder, Chapter Eight). Representing a ‘home 
away from home’ (Smith 2011:195), the internet serves these youths 
as a virtual vehicle to mobilize an elusive ‘homing desire’ (Brah 1996) 
towards an ethno-national territory rarely visited in person. Schröder’s 
contribution thus shows that such a form of nostalgic attachment is not 
merely an expression of regret for the passing of a joyful or glorious 
past. In contrast, he locates the agency of the second generation of 
young Kyrgyz in Novosibirsk in making sense of their families’ mobile 
(trader) biographies. Kyrgyz youth in Novosibirsk thus translate the 
nostalgia of their parents’ generation into new translocal identities, 
which embrace both a rather essentialized notion of ‘Kyrgyzness’ and a 
claim to belong to Russia. 
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Such a patriotic commitment is quite in line with the ‘globalizing 
ethno-nationalism’ of Jacquessons’s Kyrgyz amateur historians. 
Connecting Kyrgyz history with places and people outside Kyrgyzstan, 
the writings of these alternative historians can be seen as the result of 
an intellectual practice of ‘placemaking in the world’, which feeds a 
nostalgia that enables the readership to connect to their ancestors and 
claim the Kyrgyz people’s participation in ancient civilizations and 
powerful past empires. 
Following another reading of ‘transtemporality’, some chapters in this 
volume demonstrate that translocality and its related transformations 
are possible without spatial movement at all, but with movement 
through time. Emil Nasritdinov, in Chapter Ten, traces the biography of 
a place. Providing an ethnography of the actual transformations of an 
urban neighborhood’s spatial properties and its associated meanings, 
Nasritdinov, by adopting Deleuze’s concept of the fold, argues for a 
new approach towards socio-spatial relations that enables the depiction 
of the ongoing, complex, and multi-directional becoming of a post-
Soviet urban place through different time periods. He therefore shows 
that locality is not only a spatial but also temporal category (Freitag 
and von Oppen 2010:10). The religious transformation of members 
of the Botanika neighborhood in Bishkek reflects very local politics of 
‘placemaking’. These local politics materialize through the construction 
of a mosque, which becomes the social and religious centre of the newly 
established local branch of the global Tablighi Jamaat community. This 
religious appropriation of urban spaces transforms the identity of a 
particular place from a Soviet youth and post-Soviet adult space into 
a new, translocal space of religious belonging that serves the spiritual 
demands of the now grown-up residents, and also allows for individual 
readings of modernity, progress, and development. However, and 
going beyond Nasritdinov’s ethnographic case study, the new religious 
identity of some Botanika residents may at the same time create a sense 
of local displacement among those who remained in the neighborhood 
after its transformation (Smith 2011:195), but did not become pious 
members of that novel mosque community. 
Both Stephan-Emmrich’s and Nasritdinov’s contributions can be 
read as two different examples of a spatial biography, which evidences 
how the transformation of place, or at least the transforming notion 
of a place and its spatial properties, can coincide with the personal 
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transformation of residents through time; i.e., during an individual life-
course. Tracing the religious becoming of both mobile Tajik students and 
a single urban neighborhood in Kyrgyzstan’s capital through ‘spatial 
narratives’, both chapters also unfold how the personal memories of 
both the ethnographer and his or her research partners are embedded 
in and bonded to place (Casey 1987). Simultaneously, such spatial 
narratives are comprehensible as both border-transgressing and border-
generating spaces of Muslim encounter, experience, and identification.
Besides biography, a transgenerational perspective might help to 
trace the transformation of a particular place through time. Comparing 
the relatively short-term development of the Tajik Dubai business since 
the early 2000s with that of a Kyrgyz (traders’) diaspora in Novosibirsk, 
which was established in the early 1990s and covers a number of trading 
generations (Schröder, Chapter Eight), a transtemporal approach may 
clarify that transformations of people and places happen at different 
speeds and with different scales of volatility or sustainability. While 
well-established Kyrgyz trader networks led to the institutionalization 
of cross-border mobility between Kyrgyzstan and Russia, and finally 
the establishment of a ‘vibrant’ ethnic community abroad, the more 
recent history of the Tajik Dubai business has not yet established a 
similarly sustainable socio-cultural environment away from home. In 
contrast, precarious working conditions in Dubai have increased with 
the new generation of migrant workers, stimulating the search for new 
destinations. 
Translocality and translation
Mobility across space and time induces various forms and processes of 
translation. Dealing with a wide range of boundaries (political, linguistic, 
cultural, religious, ethnic), some of the translocal actors examined in 
this volume take the roles of translators who quite literally ‘carry across’ 
embodied and materialized meanings, values, skills, and ideas from one 
context into another. In these ways, they introduce ‘newness’ into the 
localities to which they come to dwell while usually staying connected 
to their ‘original homes’. Drawing on the etymological meaning of the 
Latin term translation as ‘movement’, ‘disruption’, or ‘displacement’, 
the term is used here to capture the cultural practices of transfer that 
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occur in the various translocal contexts explored in this volume. We 
thereby follow an anthropological reading of translation as a process 
of transporting specific understandings of reality across boundaries 
of time, place, and culture (Tambiah 1985). So far, this reading is in 
line with how translation is depicted in area studies, i.e. as a process 
that involves practices of ‘shifting into a different system of meaning’ 
(Houben 2017:206). Translation in these terms becomes apparent for 
example in the writings of Kyrgyz amateur historians that transgress 
a wide range of boundaries: linguistically through the translation of 
core texts into or from English, as well as metaphorically in the sense 
that a non-academic work is based on scholarly methods of handling 
sources to produce alternative readings of a ‘global ethnogenesis’ of the 
Kyrgyz nation. Thus, Kyrgyz historians transfer and translate different 
knowledge repertoires from one context into another, i.e., from academic 
to lay readership, and from Western to (post-)Soviet epistemologies. 
According to the chapters by Abdullaev, Schröder, Mirzoev, and 
Stephan-Emmrich, which address experiences of labour migration and 
forced mobility within and beyond places and regions in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus, processes of translation are best understood as the 
repositioning of ‘a foreign interpretative horizon into a new locale’ that 
causes various interactions resulting from encounters between different 
interpretative horizons (Conway 2012:270). This observation agrees with 
that of Longinovic (2002:6–7), that mobile people come to understand 
their identities through their displacement and the experience of being 
different. Mobile experiences therefore open up a horizon for a new 
performance of cultural or other identities, while translation can make 
a journey or a mobile livelihood project seem meaningful and stimulate 
processes of reworking national, religious, and other identities (Schlehe 
and Lücking 2016). At the same time, agents who translate can operate 
outside of prevailing cultural and political logic, as Homi Bhabha (1994) 
has suggested with his concept of a third space. Such a reading, for 
example, invites consideration of the material, and in particular visual, 
displays of a flexible and new Muslim identity among Tajiks in Dubai 
as a means of political intervention that interrupts hegemonic narratives 
of national identity (Buden and Novotny 2009). Also, Tajiks’ heightened 
mobility within competing religious traditions can be understood as 
a challenge to the narrow state-led official version of a homegrown 
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and national Tajik Islam, which excludes and stigmatizes the new 
Muslim piety of student travellers as ‘foreign’, ‘imported’ and therefore 
‘dangerous’ (Stephan 2006). 
With an emphasis on the agency of translocal actors who rework 
identities and belongings, the practice of translation also involves the 
individual’s capacity to deal with change, difference, strangeness, and 
the ambivalent experience of coping with the prevalent distinctions 
between ‘here’ and ‘there’. This can simultaneously produce openings 
and closures, possibilities and constraints, joys and sorrows, as some 
of the chapters in this volume show. However, cultural translations are 
above all a prerequisite for successful translocal livelihoods. As some 
chapters reveal, migrants transfer knowledge, ideas, language skills, and 
forms of multiple belonging into various translocal economic strategies, 
which are elsewhere described as integral aspects of a migrant’s 
‘transnational habitus’ (Kelly and Lusis 2006). Schröder in Chapter 
Eight, for example, illustrates how border transgressions happen via 
internet-based business practices in China. According to Azamat, an 
interlocutor of Schroeder, Mandarin language skills and knowledge of 
local search engines are key resources for the first generation of Kyrgyz 
businessmen to navigate China’s state-censored virtual landscapes. By 
definition, in his profession as a middleman who facilitates business-
deals between Chinese manufacturers and his various Russian-speaking 
clients from Central Asia, the Caucasus or Russia, Azamat’s primary 
task and skill is translating. This translation work, if successful, bridges 
multiple gaps between borders, languages, and forms of knowledge.
The role of language as a crucial resource for translation is also 
stressed in Mirzoev and Stephan-Emmrich’s study on the Tajik Dubai 
business. By way of their ‘polyglotism’, Tajiks in Dubai are able to attach 
themselves to multiple business networks and translate their cultural, 
symbolic, and spatial capital into different economic contexts. In their 
capacities as middlemen they engage with other Muslims across cultural 
differences (Arabs, Iranians, Afghans), different business sectors (trade, 
tourism), and different markets at ‘home’ and among their counterparts 
in the Middle East and Eurasia. 
Translation abilities also form a crucial part of the Dungans’ cross-
border group identity. According to Alff in Chapter Five, Dungans in 
Kazakhstan position themselves as intermediaries between Kazakhstan 
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and China as part of the transfer of models of economic development, 
and they thus make sense of their cross-border group existence in 
between these two countries. The Dungans’ particular socio-spatial 
situatedness as middlemen entails their translating knowledge, skills, 
and ideas of social change. At the same time, their role as brokers 
informs and is produced by the Dungan sense of multiple belonging 
and cultural embeddedness in both the Chinese and Kazakh contexts. 
Ultimately, the mediating role of Dungans is articulated in their self-
representations, which are performed in relation to state-led official 
discourses, which both in China and Kazakhstan have been focusing on 
building a ‘modern Silk Road’ or ‘Eurasian land bridge’.
Processes of translation are also closely entwined with practices 
of placemaking. Carrying across language skills, cultural knowledge, 
religious values and patterns of identification, the Tajiks and Uzbeks who 
were forced by the Soviet colonizers to leave their places of origin have 
appropriated distant places in neighboring Afghanistan (Abdullaev, 
Chapter One). Appropriating these destinations as their new home, 
Muslim migrants from Central Asia became agents of change, while at 
the same time they underwent change themselves when they became 
Afghan citizens. 
With a focus, for example, on the introduction of new agricultural 
technologies to the Tajiks’ and Uzbeks’ places of resettlement in 
Afghanistan, on the successful transcultural business of Tajik migrant 
workers in Dubai, or on young and dynamic Kyrgyz entrepreneurs 
in China, particular chapters of this volume emphasize the positive 
outcomes of translocal mobility. Translation thus may turn out to be the 
capability to cope with uncertainty, difference, and diversity in places 
far away from home. Accordingly, migration opens up opportunities to 
accumulate and transform different forms of capital and thus translate 
skills, meanings, values, and other mobile properties into economic, 
spiritual, or social progress. In this regard, the digital conversations that 
Stephan-Emmrich (Chapter Nine) had with Tajik student travellers in 
the Arab Emirates illustrate how her research partners mediate their 
spiritual progress (a heightened mobility across divergent Islamic 
traditions) through the publicly performed usage of smartphone apps 
and digital photo albums, i.e., through prestigious consumer goods that 
simultaneously demonstrate the economic success of their translocal 
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livelihoods. Obviously, the benefit of the translation concept for the 
volume is that it serves as a suitable prism to enable us to bring into 
focus the agency of people who act or think translocally and discuss 
how these people find room to manoeuvre and address those issues 
they consider most salient (Kathiravelu 2016:97).
However, the mobile agents examined here are also constrained 
in their ability to transfer knowledge, ideas and meanings from one 
context into another. Depending on a variety of social, political, and 
historical circumstances, they thus ‘operate within a bounded horizon 
of possible choices’ (Conway 2012:277, see also Vertovec 2010:9). Relying 
on a ‘shared Sunni-Persian tradition’, the careers of male Tajiks in Dubai 
depend upon good relations with Afghan traders and businessmen 
from Baluchistan. Whilst this facilitates translocal spaces of cultural 
and religious proximity within which the Tajiks of Dubai easily move 
and pursue their economic projects, access to Emirati citizens, Arab 
residents, and members of the long-established Iranian diaspora in 
Dubai seems almost impossible. Consequently, their business networks 
create an ‘institutional coziness’ (Finke 2014) that enables and filters 
but also limits the ways in which Tajiks in Dubai experience what they 
describe as belonging to the ‘global’ umma. But can border-transgressing 
movements occur without translation? Following the spatial movements 
of petty traders and various border regions in Georgia, Susanne Fehlings 
(Chapter Seven) points out that although the women’s precarious mobile 
livelihoods are embedded in multi-scalar and spatial connectivities and 
flows between the Caucasus region and places in Turkey, Russia, and 
China, their translocal experiences are nevertheless limited to specific, 
and often small-scale, spaces of interaction. Being confined to the realms 
of household or local market might not, then, foster economic success 
and may prove detrimental for individual social mobility. The marginal 
mobility of her research partners therefore does not entail processes and 
practices of significant cross-context translation and in consequence 
does not facilitate the emergence of new translocal identities. 
Even more, Elena Kim’s chapter (Chapter Four) impressively shows 
what may happen when translation processes fail or become interrupted 
by powerful state interventions. Tracing the everyday governance of 
water resources in rural Uzbekistan through water union associations 
(WUA), her contribution depicts how well-intended local managerial 
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work, which aims at implementing the global and efficient technologies 
of corporate capitalism, ultimately becomes counterproductive and 
instead entrenches social injustice and produces highly precarious 
rural livelihoods that depend on the labour migration of male family 
members. Receiving a stamp to signal legal WUA membership turns 
into an unachievable prerequisite for many poor farmers as the state 
limits far-reaching access to scarce water resources in order to purse its 
own monoculture cotton-cultivation projects. A legacy from the Soviet 
era, cotton cultivation is among the few ways the Uzbek state can gain 
a foothold in the global economy. Translation, therefore, turns out to 
be the process of ‘localizing’ globalized ideas of equality, democracy, 
and development into the specific framework of Uzbekistan’s agrarian 
sector. Using translocality as an analytical lens, Kim uncovers the 
state’s weakness or unwillingness to mediate between institutionalized 
forms of equality and development management ‘from outside’ and 
the internal needs of farmers. Although the latter were the intended 
beneficiaries of the water management programs, the farmers are 
hampered by bureaucratic obstacles to participation in the state-led 
project of cotton cultivation. 
Finally, this introduction and the contributions assembled in 
this volume allow us to understand translation as an observable 
practice through which mobile and immobile actors can deal with the 
permeability of state borders and other boundaries; they can negotiate 
the uncertainties, limitations, and opportunities of their ‘translocal 
livelihoods’, which are structured by various mobility regimes, and they 
can connect and give meaning to different places through time and space 
as part of emergent ‘alternative spatialisations’ or ‘transtemporalities’ 
beyond conventional academic and other containers. The examination 
of the processes of cultural translation thus may help us to break down 
abstract concepts, such as translocality itself, into observable patterns and 
contextualize these empirically within specific local-to-local relations 
(see Ferguson 2011). Accordingly, and as the following contributions 
will exemplify, translocality is a condition as much as a process, which 
simultaneously gives shape to and is shaped by the lived experiences 
of migrants, refugees, mobile traders, Muslim travellers, and amateur 
historians. At the same time, the complex ways mobility, movement, 
connectedness, and transfer are negotiated by people from Central Asia 
52 Manja Stephan-Emmrich and Philipp Schröder
and the Caucasus requires us to consider both the opportunities and 
restraints that promote or hamper cultural translations. This reveals 
the relational character of translocality and should allow us to avoid 
‘the teleological trap’ of ‘using the concept as a normative category’ 
(Bromber 2013:65) that emphasizes either the positive outcomes or the 
political and other constraints of migration, cross-border trade, global 
scholarship, and student travel. 
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PART 1  
 
CROSSING BOUNDARIES:  
MOBILITIES THEN AND NOW

1. Emigration Within, Across, and Beyond 
Central Asia in the Early Soviet Period 
from a Perspective of Translocality
Kamoludin Abdullaev
Any consideration of the movement or migration of people triggers 
a number of fundamental questions: who migrated and how did they 
migrate, where from, where to, and why? How many migrated? What 
impact does mass exodus have on the environment, demography, and, 
most importantly, the socio-political life of society? What are the effects 
on the people who are left behind, on those who are living at the migrants' 
destination, and beyond? Despite the importance of these questions, 
however, Soviet historiographers avoided them. In the Soviet Union, 
historians were tasked with constructing an image of the new territorial-
cultural region called ‘Soviet Central Asia’, which was quite separate from 
the neighboring regions that were known as ‘Muslim’, ‘Turkic’, ‘Iranian’, 
etc. This artificial construct was aided by an impenetrable political border 
erected along the Amu Darya River and across the Turkmen steppe, 
and by the establishment of a scientific framework with its associated 
institutes and set of academic concepts. The study of outmigration from 
Soviet Central Asia was less a subject of scholarly investigation than a 
form of political history in which those who migrated from the USSR were 
identified as opponents of the Soviet regime — counter-revolutionaries 
whose influence needed to be eradicated (Zevelev 1981).
Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the paradigm of ‘class struggle’ 
has been replaced by one of ethnic determinism. Newly independent 
Central Asian nations realized that most of the political borders drawn 
during the Anglo-Russian delimitation in the late nineteenth century 
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and the national delimitation of Central Asia in 1924–1936 were an 
artificial construct and were not ethnologically grounded. After the 
fall of the ‘iron curtain’ this realization brought with it a romantic 
interest in ‘compatriots abroad’ in all Central Asian states, which set 
in motion an independent state-building process from the ruins of the 
Soviet empire. All presidents of independent Central Asian states were 
declared leaders of ‘co-ethnics (Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyz) of the world’, 
but this unity was short-lived and very soon an ethnic- and state-based 
nationalism emerged. As a result, there are only a few scholars in 
Central Asia today who are writing a history of the region as a whole. 
Rather, official historiographies focus on ‘national histories’, i.e. on 
separate ‘nationalities’ with distinct ethnogenesis, cultures, languages 
and territory (see Jacquesson in Chapter Six). 
Despite the predominance of national histories, theories of 
transnationalism have started to emerge, inspired by the realization 
that the study of Central Asia must transcend national borders and 
challenge existing concepts of nationhood. Those who study the region 
have started to consider this issue more carefully and to undertake 
diaspora studies (Abdullaev 2009; Mendikulova 1997). Similarly, 
by taking a transnational approach as a starting point for further 
exploration, this chapter attempts to overcome the limitations of long-
established approaches to the study of Central Asian emigration dating 
back to the early Soviet period. Transnational research is defined here 
as comparative research between populations of two or more countries. 
The study of emigration within, across, and beyond Central Asia is 
spatially expansive. It covers the history shared by Central Asia and 
the neighboring areas of Afghanistan, Western China, and part of 
Iranian Khorasan. This common past connects Central Asia with the 
destinations of its outmigrants, which include Afghanistan, China, Iran, 
and India. Later, in the years between the First and Second World Wars, 
many exiled Central Asians also took refuge in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 
Poland, Germany, and other states, including the Americas and the Far 
East (Balci 2009). The arrival of Central Asians during the 1920s and 
1930s had an important impact on the history of those countries. 
The study of the migration of almost one million Central Asians, 
exiles of Bolshevism, has generally focussed on general political trends, 
the movement of peoples and on the elites who led these outmigrations. 
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These leaders include charismatic tribal insurgents (or Basmachis) such as 
Ibrahimbek Loqay (Fraser 1987a-b; Abdullaev 2009); the toppled emir of 
Bukhara Alim Khan and his entourage; the leaders of secular Turkestani 
nationalists; and the pan-Turkic general Enver Pasha (Yamauchi 1991; 
Andican 2007; Abdullaev 2009). Those who didn't belong to the political 
elite either remained marginalized or were disadvantaged and therefore 
invisible. This contribution tries to fill these gaps.
Another way to explore translocal connections in the region is to 
consider the significance of religion. The exodus of Central Asians 
during the first and second decades of the twentieth century can be 
viewed as a characteristically Muslim form of travel known as hijra. For 
exiled Central Asians, religion served as an important source of support 
to cope with the ostracism they experienced in their host country, 
as well as a means to depart from the strictly local, in territorial and 
cultural terms, and embrace more extraterritorial and translocal world 
views and imaginations.
Fig. 1.1  Group of Basmachis of Eastern Bukhara in the mid-1920s. State Archive of 
Film and Photograph Documents of the Republic of Tajikistan. Public domain
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Fig. 1.2  Ibrahimbek Laqai, arrested in 1931. State Archive of Film and 
Photograph Documents of the Republic of Tajikistan. Public domain
Mapping Central Asia
Living at the crossroads of East-West and North-South trading routes, 
Central Asian peoples moved freely within their tribal and ethno-cultural 
areas for centuries. After the Anglo-Russian delimitation, however, 
boundaries became barriers to such movements. In the nineteenth 
century, the area turned into a sphere of rivalry between three empires: 
Russia, Britain and, to a much lesser extent, China. This political contest, 
often referred to as the ‘Great Game’, pitted against each other three 
powers that, at first glance, had dissimilar interests. 
The British, who were primarily concerned with India, arrived 
in Central Asia indirectly through their control of Afghanistan. Their 
sphere of influence, however, was limited to the plains north of the 
Hindu Kush Mountains in Afghanistan, both because of a political and 
diplomatic backlash from Russia, and fierce Afghan resistance. The 
three bloody Anglo-Afghan wars dampened Britain’s colonial zeal. 
These circumstances were fateful for the peoples of Movarounnahr (first 
and foremost for Tajiks and Uzbeks), who were involuntarily absorbed 
into the Russian orbit. 
Russians invaded Central Asia in the nineteenth century. After 
defeating the Kazakhs, incorporating the steppe and occupying 
Tashkent, the Russians moved south, where they occupied the right 
bank of the Amu Darya. The Emir of Bukhara became a Russian vassal 
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in 1869. Russia also conquered the Central Asian states of Khiva and 
Kokand (Khuqand) and incorporated them into Turkistan General-
Gubernatorial, with the capital at Tashkent. 
Strictly-marked borders that divided two states and were drawn 
along indisputable lines were a constant preoccupation for colonial 
European powers in the nineteenth century. The major mapmakers 
were Russia and Great Britain. London sought to restrain the Russian 
advancement toward Britain’s Indian frontiers. The ‘Afghan buffer’ and 
its northern edge, the Amu Darya’s1 course from Lake Victoria (Zor Kul) 
in the Eastern Pamirs, served as a natural line of defense between the 
empires. At that particular time, the Amu Darya, a clear demarcation, 
was more useful than mountain ranges to decide who controlled what. 
From a ‘scientific’ or historical point of view, mountain ranges were more 
appropriate boundaries, but the Europeans found these were difficult to 
map accurately. Many Britons of the ‘scientific frontier’ school saw the 
Hindu Kush as the natural defensive boundary of India, though British 
authorities disagreed (see Dacosta 1891). Had the British divided the 
territories along the Hindu Kush, the region of Eurasia would perhaps 
look completely different. 
Negotiations for the division of the Russian and British spheres of 
influence concluded with the Russian-British Agreement of January 
1873 and the consequent Demarcation of 1895. According to these 
agreements, Russia could not claim any territories south of the Amu 
Darya. Clarity of demarcation took precedence over any local concerns. 
As a result, the new frontiers were artificial and not grounded in the 
ethnological realities of the region. 
Through this process of drawing borders, Central Asia was alienated 
from its own cultural, historical, and economic traditions to serve the 
interests of distant powers playing a ‘Great Game’. Local rulers, emirs 
of Afghanistan and Bukhara, not to mention the peoples of the region, 
played only a passive role. The interests of Bukhara were ‘promoted’ by 
Moscow, while London provided support for Kabul. In search of new 
territories, the Afghan feudal lords turned their gaze to their northern 
neighbors — the khanates of Southern Turkestan, parts of which were 
under the nominal rule of the Bukharan Amir. In the 1850s and 1860s, 
1  The Amu Darya, from its upper stream in the Pamir Mountains to its confluence 
with the Vakhsh River, is called the Panj River.
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Afghans, with the active support of the British, conquered the bordering 
khanates of Balkh, Shibirgan, and Herat. In 1883, the independent Pamir 
governorates of Rushan, Shughnan and Wakhan, situated along both 
coasts of the Amu River, became part of Afghanistan with the help 
of the British. The Russian government strongly objected, pointing 
out that the transfer violated the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1873. 
Following drawn-out diplomatic negotiations, military expeditions 
and skirmishes, the khanates of Rushan, Shugnan, and Wakhan located 
on the right bank of the river were definitively transferred to Russia 
(and then to Bukhara). In other words, Britain and Russia drew up the 
Afghan-Bukhara borders along the Amu Darya according to the 1873 
agreement. 
The Amu Darya became the dividing line between Russia proper 
and Afghanistan and no bridges were built across it. Up until the early 
twentieth century, the river served as the main artery of the region. 
Steamship lines were only developed in the lower stream between 
Termez and Chardjui.2 The Afghan conquest of South Turkestan and 
their enslavement of local populations led to an economic crisis. The 
cities on the left (Afghan) bank of the Amu Darya gradually became 
deserted. After Afghans settled in Tashkurgan, which once had twelve 
thousand inhabitants, only about seven thousand remained. The rest 
fled to Bukhara. 
As far as Chinese border policy in Central Asia is concerned, 
the Chinese never intended to rule this region directly, unlike the 
Russians, who regarded Central Asia as Russia’s trophy. The Chinese 
maintained a clear distinction between tributary areas and China 
proper. Chinese control over its northwestern frontiers was established 
by the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), which gradually extended Chinese 
influence westward into the area of what is now the Xinjiang-Uighur 
Autonomous Region, also known by its historical name, Eastern (or 
Chinese) Turkistan. China at the end of the nineteenth century was too 
weak to compete as an equal rival with Russia and England in Central 
Asia. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the border between China 
and the territory of today’s Tajikistan and Afghanistan was not clearly 
delineated. The Russian and British foreign ministers did not draw the 
2  Today in Termez, the Soviet-built Friendship Bridge crosses the river to connect 
Uzbekistan to Khairatan in Afghanistan.
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line eastward to meet the Chinese boundary in mountainous Wakhan, 
which borders not only China, but also the northwestern outermost tip 
of British India. The sides finally decided that their frontiers should not 
converge, providing Afghans with access to China. Wakhan formed a 
narrow wedge (a panhandle, fifteen kilometers wide in certain areas) 
separating Russian territories in Pamir from the northwestern borders of 
India (Hunza, Chitral, and Gilgit). As one of the senior British diplomats 
noticed, the Afghan Wakhan became ‘the long, attenuated arm of 
Afghanistan reaching out to touch China with the tips of its fingers’ 
(Habberton 1937:67). On the outermost eastern tip of the Wakhan 
corridor lie the Little Pamirs — an uninhabited alpine region — where 
the Hindu Kush, Pamirs, Karakoram, and Himalayas, as well as three 
empires, those of Britain, Russia, and China, met. Today the Wakhan 
corridor is an Afghan territory sparsely inhabited by traditional Tajik 
and Kyrgyz pastoralists that separates Tajikistan’s southern border 
from Pakistan’s north.
The borders established in the late nineteenth century are still 
maintained, although the states themselves have changed. The various 
Russian-British demarcations in 1895 created a Russian-Afghan frontier 
with a total length of 2,330 kilometers. With the establishment of the 
Soviet Union in 1924–1929, this boundary was transformed into the 
Afghan-Turkmen (802 km), the Afghan-Uzbek (140 km) and the Afghan-
Tajik (1,334 km) borders. The Peking Treaty of 1860, which demarcated 
a line between the Russian Pamirs and Chinese Xinjiang, created the 
Russian-Chinese border. With the fall of the Soviet Union, this line was 
recognized as the legal boundary between China and Tajikistan (430 
km). 
By the end of nineteenth century the region was relatively peaceful, at 
least until the early years of the twentieth century, when the escalation of 
British-German and Russian-German disagreements led to increasingly 
tolerant relations between London and Moscow. The British-Russian 
agreement of 1907 was the second step on the way to completing 
the separation of spheres of influence. It laid the foundations for the 
creation of a military-political bloc between Russia, France, and Great 
Britain — the Entente.
While the compromise among the empires proved to be satisfactory 
in terms of preserving international security, the outcome for the local 
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peoples who inhabited the territories was more problematic. First of 
all, the compromise was designed to maintain the stability of the three 
colonial empires established by China, Russia, and Britain. Each part of 
Central Asia was expected to develop peacefully within its own imperial 
sphere. Naturally, none of the leaders who struck these agreements 
considered the possibility that changes might bring about the demise 
of their respective empires, and all were opposed to any developments 
that would allow independence and the creation of national ethnic 
states in Central Asia.
Until the ‘Bukharan revolution’ in September 1920, which resulted 
in the establishment of Soviet power in the region, the Afghans and 
Bukharans maintained close relationships. Until the arrival of the 
Bolsheviks in late 1920 Afghan subjects — merchants, laborers, and 
others — lived in Bukhara and Turkestan. Afghan labour migration to 
‘Russian’ Central Asia at the beginning of the twentieth century was 
linked to the revival there of trade and economic growth as a result 
of Russian capital flow into Turkestan and Bukhara. However, the 
Soviet invasion and military strife forced these Afghans to return to 
Afghanistan.3 The central government of the Soviet Union established 
a firm monopoly on foreign affairs and no Central Asians were allowed 
to have contact with their Afghan brethren.
Constructing Central Asia 
Translocality focuses on ‘place’ as the setting for movement. There 
has never been a fixed understanding of Central Asia as a place. 
Western and Russian explorers introduced the term ‘Central Asia’ to 
political and geographical terminology in the mid-nineteenth century. 
According to Yuri Bregel, in cultural and historical terms, Central 
Asia is the western, Turko-Iranian part of the Inner Asian4 heartland, 
3  However, some Afghans remained in Tajikistan, contributing to its development. 
One of them was Nisar Muhammedov, a Peshavar-born Pashtun-Yusufzay, who 
was People’s Commissar (minister) of Education of the Tajik Soviet Republic 
from 1926–1930 and professor of the Central Asian State University in Tashkent 
in the 1930s. He was arrested on 8 October 1937 and died (or was killed) during 
interrogation on 22 October 1937. One of the streets of Dushanbe bears his name.
4  Inner Asia consists of vast territories situated between the heartland of China and 
Russia stretching from Manchuria in the east to Mongolia, to the Ural mountains, 
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the indigenous population of which consisted of various Iranian 
peoples. The majority of this population has been Turkified, while the 
growing Turkic population has, to various degrees, assimilated into 
the region’s indigenous Iranian culture. In geographical terms, Central 
Asia stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to the Altai Mountains 
(Russia) and Turfan oasis (China) in the east, and from the limits of the 
Kazakh steppes and Southern Siberia in the north to the Hindu-Kush 
range (Afghanistan) in the south (Bregel 1995:viii).
During the Cold War, Central Asia was mostly associated with 
the five Soviet Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. In more recent studies of 
the region, some experts have also included Eastern Iran, Northern 
Afghanistan, and the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous province of China 
as parts of Central Asia. 
Historical narratives often refer to Central Asia as Turkistan (i.e., 
‘Land of Turks’). This is something of a misnomer, considering the 
local population spoke mostly Iranian languages in medieval times. In 
the ninth and tenth centuries, Arab writers applied the term Turkistan 
only to the area north-east of the Syr Darya (modern-day Kazakhstan). 
Afterwards, however, the number and influence of Turkic tribes in the 
region increased. They formed powerful ruling dynasties, most notably 
the empire established by Tamerlane in the fifteenth century. 
In the nineteenth century, the British and Russians adopted the 
expression Turkistan (or ‘Turkestan’) as a geographic term to indicate 
their assets in Central Asia. This was further subdivided into ‘Western’ 
or ‘Russian’ Turkistan (which is post-Soviet Central Asia), ‘Southern’ 
or ‘Afghan’ Turkistan (northern Afghanistan) and ‘Eastern’ or ‘Chinese’ 
Turkistan (the southern part of Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region of 
China). 
In recent times, a new term, ‘Greater Central Asia’, has been 
introduced to identify the region under study. This is more a policy-
oriented rather than a geographic term and was proposed by American 
scholars (Canfield 1992). At its core is the idea of the US-led creation of 
a new region that integrates post-Soviet Central Asia with South Asia 
to the Tibetan plateau, to Xinjiang, and finally to Central Asia including northern 
Afghanistan and Eastern Iran. Inner Asia was originally populated by non-Russians 
and non-Chinese.
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via Afghanistan. The ‘Greater Central Asia Partnership for Afghanistan and 
its Neighbors’ project, run by the Central Asia Caucasus Institute and 
Silk Road Studies Program, proposes the transformation of Afghanistan 
and the entire region into a zone of protected sovereignties that share 
practical market economies, secular and open systems of governance 
with respect to civil rights, and positive relations with the US (Starr 
2005). However, most Central Asian and, especially, Russian politicians 
and the expert community at large were sceptical about the Greater 
Central Asia project, pointing out to the differences in cultural identity 
and lack of cooperation between the Central Asians and the people of 
South Asia in the past.
The Cold-War definition of Central Asia as five Muslim-populated 
Soviet Republics east of the Caspian Sea is no longer valid due to the end 
of the Soviet order. Prior to the imposed Soviet borders, the people of 
‘Central Asia’ had significant freedom of movement within and across 
the various Emirates and Khanates that made up the political units of 
the region. In the post-Soviet period, the region has been defined as 
five post-Soviet ‘stans’ plus northeastern Iran, northern Afghanistan, 
the northernmost part of trans-Pamirian Indo-Pakistan and the 
northwestern part of China. This definition is almost identical to the 
one Russian and British authorities introduced more than one hundred 
years ago. It is the right moment to bring it back to the international 
vocabulary. 
The end of a ‘stateless’ Central Asia
Colonization put an end to the stateless ‘free ride’ in Central Asia in 
the nineteenth century. Urban and oasis dwellers mostly accepted the 
establishment of the Russian administration, while rural, tribal segments 
of Central Asian society showed fierce resistance.5 One might argue 
that rural resistance was Islamic in nature: it was local jihad by tribes 
for whom Islam has always been intertwined with tribal networks. 
Others argue that these tribal elements would have resisted any form 
of government — native or foreign. Both arguments — culturalist and 
constructivist — are valid. The establishment of effective state control 
5  For example, the uprising in Ferghana led by Madali, or Ishani Dukchi in 1898.
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in the vast Central Asian territories was a prerequisite for the new 
European-dominated world order, which required the formation of 
nation states with clearly-defined and rigid borders in order to protect 
national sovereignty and reinforce national symbols and values. In the 
early twentieth century this Westphalian6 legal and political framework 
for modern inter-state relations did not apply to Muslim-populated 
territories, as colonizers did not see a ‘basis on which principles 
of national self-determination can [be] buil[t]’7 in those territories. 
For the first time in history, Central Asian Muslims were subject to 
the jurisdiction of non-Muslims, who imposed a secular vision that 
contradicted a Muslim sense of being in the world. This governance 
undermined the customary way of life, erecting political borders and 
putting restrictions on migration. 
At the same time, the establishment of Russian rule in the region 
launched the consolidation of disparate tribal, local, and ethnic 
identities into larger identity groups that later formed the backbone 
of modern nation states. Most Central Asians became citizens of the 
Russian Empire. Because they were non-Slavs and non-Christians, 
the Tsarist government discriminated against them by labelling them 
as unorthodox (inorodets). They shared this status with other minority 
peoples in the Russian Empire, such as the Kalmyks (the indigenous 
peoples of Siberia), Jews, and other non-Slavic peoples. This status 
limited their access to educational institutions, military or state service, 
and places of residence. However, the Tsarist regime attempted to win 
over the tribal and patrimonial leaders or local aristocracy by granting 
them special privileges. This gradual incorporation of ungoverned tribes 
into proto-national units played an important role in nation-building in 
Central Asia. 
Dividing Central Asia into three spheres was an afterthought of 
colonial expansion and it just happened to succeed. Because these areas 
were primarily buffer zones, there was no direct collision between Great 
Britain, Russia, and China in Central Asia during their two centuries of 
rivalry. In other words, the participants of the Great Game in Central 
Asia played peacefully and according to the rules they established by 
6  The Westphalian system of sovereign states was established in 1648 as part of the 
Peace of Westphalia.
7  India Office Library (IOL)/P&S/11/142.
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themselves and for themselves. Conflicts rarely amounted to anything 
more than short-term military expeditions. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the vast strategic buffer 
zone between the empires encompassing Manchuria, Mongolia, 
Xinjiang, Afghanistan, and Central Asia was formed. Russian Central 
Asia (Turkestan, Bukhara, Semirechie, Khiva, Turkmenia) proved too 
rich in human and natural resources for the Tsarist colonial regime to 
develop fully. Moscow was unable to transform the culture of large 
populations with their own historically established identities. As a 
result, the incorporation of Central Asia into the Russian Empire was 
weak, both politically and economically. Russian cultural influence in 
Central Asia was not as pronounced as it was in the Caucasus, where 
close cultural ties between the colony- and parent-state had begun to 
take shape by the nineteenth century. In Central Asia, Russians limited 
themselves mainly to the establishment of structural means of control in 
the region, such as building railways and other infrastructure projects. 
Only a small group of the local elite (mainly Kazakhs, Russia’s closest 
neighbors) adopted the Russian culture. Major urban centres remained 
divided into two unrelated parts: Russian-dominated centres and native 
‘old cities’. 
These artificial boundaries served colonial powers by preventing 
ethnic and religious unity and the mobilization of peoples with common 
interests. Some argue that the main Muslim response to colonialism in 
Central Asia was a military one: a call to clash with the enemy, the West 
(see for example Alimova 2000:167, Ziyoev 1998). Others argue that 
there was an internal crisis in Islamic society that was only exacerbated 
by the encounter with colonial Europe (see Ayni 1987, Fitrat 1988). The 
colonization of Muslim states was not therefore a treacherous Christian 
incursion, but a rational response by the emerging empires to weakening 
neighbors and former adversaries. According to this view, the main 
reasons for colonization were situation- and network-dependent; they 
did not stem from ideology or deep-seated animosity between religions. 
However, this is not to say that the concept of a ‘clash of civilizations’ 
(Huntington 2000) is not applicable to interrelationships between 
the empires in Central Asia. The Russians and British invaded these 
territories with a Eurocentric project of ‘modernization’. According to this 
simplistic model, the southern borders of Central Asia were considered 
 731. Emigration in the Early Soviet Period
the frontier between a capitalist Russia, as the eastern stronghold of the 
Christian West, against a feudal Muslim world. This confrontation had 
its roots in the West’s historical memory of the nomads of Central Asia 
as aggressive ‘barbarians’ bent on the destruction of urban civilization 
and the image of the ‘fanatic Muslim’ as an enemy.8 The imagined threat 
of what was later called ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ was created and 
fanned by the empires that took part in the Great Game. In light of this 
‘clash of civilizations’, Russia appeared to be the defender of the West 
from the ‘wild’ East, even though in other contexts Russia itself was 
often condemned as a bulwark of ‘eastern’ autocracy and despotism.
The inhabitants of the region paid the price for peace between the 
empires. Imperial policies resulted in the fragmentation of historic, 
political, national, and social relationships that accelerated the decline 
of Central Asia. Thus, at the end of the nineteenth century, the region 
became politically and economically dependent on the West, and the 
seeds were planted for future conflicts, social shocks, and population 
movements that would create complex socio-spatial dynamics to 
transcend these externally imposed boundaries.
Central Asia’s first international migration 
The Russian revolution, the invasion of the Red Army in 1917–1920, 
and the collapse of the state, followed by a violent conflict and political 
pressures, triggered various movements of the Central Asian population 
that were undertaken for a variety of motivations, over a range of 
distances, and over different periods. These movements created complex 
interactions between the social and spatial flows of people and things that 
deeply changed the environment and society in this part of the world. 
Central Asia saw two waves of emigration during the two decades 
following the Russian Revolution of 1917. The first phase of flight started 
8  In the aftermath of World War One the British did not believe that Bolshevism as 
a political doctrine could be installed in the region. ‘A more serious danger lies in 
the possibility of a general Muslim uprising against Bolshevik excesses, and the 
attempt to create a series of independent Muslim States out of the ruins’, stated the 
British officials in Delhi in a memorandum to the Paris World Conference held in 
1919. Finally, in 1918 the British decided to leave the region of Central Asia under 
Russian/Bolshevik control. See The British Library, India Office Records and Private 
Papers, IOR: L/P&S/ll/142. 
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with the establishment of Bolshevik rule in Tashkent in November 1917 
and continued with the downfall of the nationalist Kokand government 
in February 1918, the defeat of Kolchak’s9 White Armies in Siberia, and, 
finally, the fall of Bukhara in 1920. For Bukharans, the day the Emir 
Said Alim Khan ran away from Bukhara is remembered as a separation 
day (ruzi firoq) that was preceded by what is described as ‘a small end 
of the world’ (qiemati asghar) (Baljuvoni 1994:61). This first wave of 
emigration ended with the arguable elimination of Basmachism10 in 
Tajikistan in mid-1926 when Ibrahimbek Chakobai Ughli, Tajikistan’s 
Basmachi leader in 1921–1932, crossed the Soviet-Afghan border. He 
was a descendant of the Uzbek Laqai tribe, a son of the tribal chief in the 
Ishon Khoja family.11 
The first outflow of Central Asian Muslims was caused directly by 
the Red Army invasion of the Bukharan Emirate and mainly affected 
the population of frontier regions, mostly nomadic and semi-nomadic 
Uzbek and Turkmen tribes. Together with the Emir of Bukhara, they 
escaped the military advancement of the Bolshevik forces. The Tajiks 
composed the third largest number of émigrés after the Turkmen and 
Uzbeks. According to the Red Army investigations, Tajiks were the 
dominant ethnic group in Eastern Bukhara (today: central and southern 
Tajikistan and southeastern Uzbekistan), composing 60 percent of the 
whole population, while the Uzbeks accounted for 30 percent. The 
national composition of Eastern Bukharan Basmachi groups, however, 
shows the reverse: Uzbeks made up 60 percent and Tajiks 30 percent.12 
Similarly, there were a greater number of Uzbeks in exile. It seems this 
was due to differences in social and political status between the two 
9  Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak (1874–1920), a commander in the Imperial Russian 
Navy, established an anti-communist government in Siberia during the Russian 
Civil War. He was recognized as the ‘Supreme Ruler’ by the other leaders of the 
White movement. Kolchak was captured and executed by the Bolsheviks in 1920. 
10  Basmachis: Muslim guerrillas who fought against Soviet power in Central Asia 
during the early Soviet period.
11  Laqai is an Uzbek-language ethnic group in Tajikistan. Laqais are descendants 
of semi-nomadic Turkified Mongols from the Kazakh steppes who migrated to 
Bukhara in the 16th century. The Laqai population fell drastically after the Bukharan 
Revolution of 1920, as most Laqais sided with the Basmachi and fought Soviet rule 
under the command of lbrahimbek. Consequently, many Laqais were killed or 
exiled to Afghanistan. In 1924, about 25,000 Laqais were registered in Tajikistan, 
mostly in Hisor and Baljuvon (Kulob). In the 1990s, the Laqais enjoyed a cultural 
revival and created a cultural center in Tajikistan. The 2000 census recorded 51,000 
Laqais in Tajikistan.
12  Archive of the Communist Party of Tajikistan (ACPT), fond.1, opis.1, delo.63, list. 39.
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population groups. The Uzbek minority occupied a high social position 
and historically the Uzbeks had used their power to politically dominate 
the less militarized Tajik majority. As a result the Tajiks were more likely 
to look favorably on the new power that had dismantled the existing 
Uzbek tribal-feudal supremacy.13 Besides, Tajiks led a settled way of 
life (they were peasants and urban dwellers), while many of Eastern 
Bukhara’s Uzbeks and Turkmen were nomadic and semi-nomadic 
stockbreeders. Tajik peasants owned only the land that they cultivated 
and this could not be taken along when emigrating, but livestock was 
relatively easy to move from one place to another.
Nonetheless, after the establishment of Soviet rule in Bukhara, during 
first wave of emigration, some Tajiks did flee, not only to Afghanistan 
but also to the remote Tajik-populated mountainous regions of 
Qarategin (Gharm), and Darvoz. The Soviets moved into these areas in 
the summer of 1923 with a large-scale military attack by the Red Army. 
In total according to the information given by the government of the 
Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (TASSR), 44,000 families, or 
206,800 people14 had abandoned Eastern Bukhara by the end of 1926. 
This constituted 25 percent of the general population, and 33 percent of 
all families in Tajikistan. The overwhelming majority of émigrés were 
Uzbeks and Tajiks from Qurghonteppa, Kulob, and Hisor provinces 
(veloyats). Only half of the total population was left in the Qurghonteppa 
region. Forty-nine villages (qyshloqs) that had been completely 
abandoned were found in Qurghonteppa veloyat by the governmental 
commission. Fields, gardens, and melon fields were overgrown. Homes 
and other structures were destroyed and ruined; duvals (fences made of 
clay) were levelled to the ground (Abdullaev 1995:20). The Tajiks did 
not only flee the territory of Tajikistan, they also abandoned the region 
of Surkhan-Darya in Uzbekistan. In the early 1920s, 40,000 Tajiks and 
Uzbeks moved from Surkhan-Darya to Afghanistan. These included 
13  This did not mean that Tajiks supported the strife against the Uzbeks and Turkmens. 
The unity of the peoples of Central Asia was strengthened by their affinity to Sunni 
Islam, to the Hanafi School of law and to traditions of long-lasting and peaceful 
coexistence, all of which deterred national rivalry. In general, Tajiks often served as 
ideological leaders of the resistance. The majority of Bukharan clergy were Tajiks 
and many of them migrated to Afghanistan. In an interview conducted in Dushanbe 
on 24 August 2006, Bashir Baghlani told me that among these Tajik clergymen was 
Ishani Bulbul (Dovud) Kulobi, the mulla-imam (confessor) of Ibraghimbek. Ishani 
Dovud died in the 1970s in Afghan Badakhshan.
14 The average number of people in a family is calculated as 4.7 persons.
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Kyrgyz emigrants, with 1,300 families from Qarategin and the Vakhsh 
valley, and over 1,000 Kyrgyz people from eastern Pamir passing over 
the border to Afghan Badakhshan and Qataghan in the first half of the 
1920s (Abdullaev 1995;20).15
The flight of almost 20,000 Russian Cossacks and about 50,000 
Russian peasant colonists from Semirechie (today’s southeastern 
Kazakhstan and northern Kyrgyzstan) to Xinjiang in 1920 was not 
directly connected to jihad and the exodus of Muslims; it was also a 
political phenomenon caused by the victorious Bolshevik advance and 
defeat of the White Russians.16 
The second wave of outmigration began immediately after the first 
during the second part of the 1920s. It reached its peak between 1929 
and 1932, during far-reaching economic, social, political, and cultural 
changes that included collectivization, cruel anti-Islamic policies, 
‘cultural revolution’, and forcible female emancipation aimed at 
the demolition of traditional society in Central Asia. A new wave of 
refugees fled from the restrictions, severe enforcement practices, and 
suppression of dissent that characterized Soviet rule. During the second 
phase of migration, people of different origins from all parts of the 
region, including the neighboring mountainous Bukharan territories, 
moved abroad. These migrants were known as muhajeers that is, those 
who performed hijrat, or escaped in order to protect, to preserve, and to 
further develop their religious identity.
In the first half of the 1920s, hundreds of thousands of Central Asian 
emigrants rushed to Afghanistan settling along the northern border 
from Badakhshan in the east to Herat in the west. In fact, modern 
Central Asia experienced its first refugee crisis during the second 
decade of the twentieth century. At the end of this crisis in 1932, there 
were roughly one million Central Asian refugees, mostly in northern 
Afghanistan and Western China but also in India, Iran, and Turkey. One 
in four inhabitants of Tajikistan in 1925, for example, became a refugee 
(Abdullaev 2009). The actual number of emigrants is probably rather 
15  Tsentralnyi Gosudarstennyi arkhiv Uzbekistana (TsGA Uz), f. 8–17, op. 3, d. 19, l. 
105–08.
16  The Russians of Xinjiang lived mainly in Ili, and partly in Kashgar, Kucheng, 
Tarbagatai and Altai regions. The Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz, the Dungans, the Uzbeks, 
the Tatars and other former Russian citizens, in addition to Russians themselves, 
migrated to China (Abdullaev, 2009).
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higher than noted. Small emigrant settlements were also established in 
Kabul, Peshawar (India), Mashhad (Persia) and in some other towns of 
Afghanistan, India and Iran. Statistical research done by the Soviets in 
Central Asia in 1922, 1924, and 1926 concludes: ‘Depopulation as the 
result of emigration characterizes the whole region. But the greatest 
emigration was from Tajikistan’s pre-frontier territory’.17
Mass migration was not the only response to the Russian Revolution. 
Why did the majority of Central Asians choose not to migrate? A 
negative approach to the Soviet past that portrays Russian rule as 
despotic is widespread in Western, as well as modern Central-Asian 
historiography, but this interpretation cannot adequately describe 
the raw force of the Revolution of 1917; therefore, it cannot explain 
how Soviet power survived this early period. Was it only because of 
the weakness of Basmachism, which derived from fragmentation, 
mismanagement, and its limited social base of resistance? Or did the 
reason lie in the failure of the West, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan to aid 
Basmachis? In fact, several aspects helped the Bolsheviks to strengthen 
their position in the region and weaken the fierce Basmachi resistance, 
particularly:
1. In the ‘Reds versus Whites’ Russian dispute that was at the core 
of the revolution and the civil war, most Central Asians took the 
part of the former, as they promised land, freedom, and peace for 
all people irrespective of nation and religion. 
2. By the end of the 1920s, the Soviets had established themselves 
as the only real, effective — if unjust — government. Emirs, 
Khans, and the Russian provisional government had failed 
and discredited themselves in the eyes of the majority of the 
population. Long-lasting civil strife and disorder was responsible 
for a tradition of political resignation and submission among 
Central Asians.
3. The Bolsheviks defined themselves as anti-imperialistic and 
not exclusively pro-Russian, and neighboring Eastern countries 
regarded them as allies in their struggle for independence. The 
Bolsheviks reestablished Russian rule in Central Asia in part 
because Turkey and Afghanistan saw them as a bulwark against 
17  Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Tadzhikistana (TsGA Tadj), f. 21, op. 7, d. 2, l. 66.
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Western imperialism. Neither Afghan Emir Amanullah, nor 
the first president of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, provided 
significant support to the Basmachis. The international isolation 
of the anti-Soviet resistance strengthened the position of the new 
authorities among Central Asians.
These factors contributed to greater calm in the region and weakened 
outmigration from Central Asia.
The story of these ‘exiles of Bolshevism’ ended in the middle of 
the 1930s, by which time the USSR had consolidated its power in the 
region and established secure, closed borders with Afghanistan and 
other southern neighbors. The decline of the muhajeer and mujahed (jihad 
fighter) in the second half of the 1930s coincided with the transformation 
of Central Asian politics. In Afghanistan, the influence of the universal 
(supranational) religiosity of the non-governmental ulama and of 
traditional Islamic forces on the one side, and of the idealistic secularist 
reformism of Amanullah-like leaders on the other, had waned, clearing 
the way for more stable modus vivendi between the state and tribal or 
local powers. 
In Soviet Central Asia the national delimitation of 1924, the growth 
in economic development, the successes of mass secular education, 
state provision of health care, and the emancipation of women had also 
changed the situation. This inevitably involved the separation of religion 
from the political sphere and the separation of the Qur’an-based muhajeer 
and mujahed concepts from the emerging Central Asian realpolitik, which 
resulted in an era of relative stability, in which the Muslim community 
moved in the direction of political quietism and submission to political 
authority (despite the latter’s non-Islamic practices). The creation of 
centralized ‘stans’ in Central Asia and the stabilization of Afghanistan 
in the beginning of the 1930s was accompanied by a gradual rise 
of nationalism, the emergence of official state-sponsored religious 
institutions, and the co-option of the religious class into state structures. 
These years of ‘muted Islamic politics’ (Brown 2000:111) were 
followed by the reanimation of the ‘Islamic factor’ in identity formation, 
which began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, putting 
an end to a period of relative stability and leading to another phase 
of politically-defined mass international migration in Central and 
Southern Asia. 
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Fig. 1.3  A group of Soviet activists in Hisor (Tajikistan) in the  
mid-1920s. State Archive of Film and Photograph Documents of the 
Republic of Tajikistan. Public domain
Religious identity formation  
that transcends boundaries
When studying Central Asian emigration, the question of why the 
majority of exiles moved to economically underdeveloped Afghanistan 
is key. There are several answers: its geographic location, an open 
frontier free of troops, and shared historical and ethnic identities. The 
strongest pull, however, was a shared religion.
Most of the exiled Central Asians were Muslims. Their exodus fits 
within categories of Muslim travel. These movements include the Hajj 
pilgrimage (hajj), travel for learning and other purposes (rihla), visits 
to shrines (ziyara), and emigration (hijra). These were not just physical 
actions, but involved spiritual practices as well. Qur’anic hijra (which 
means ‘to abandon’, ‘to break linkages with someone’, or ‘to migrate’ 
in Arabic) began with the migration of the Prophet Muhammad and his 
followers from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD. Later, hijra, the obligation 
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to migrate from lands where the practice of Islam is constrained to those 
lands where, in principle, no such constraints exist, became one of the 
fundamental precepts of Muslim doctrine. 
When the Bolsheviks captured Bukhara during the 1920s, Muslim 
preachers advised Central Asians,  ‘the hijra is a holy obligation 
now’ (‘Hijrat fard va vojib ast’).18 Muslims accept that if the political 
environment is not conducive to the exercise and propagation of Islam, 
then one must declare his country an enemy territory (dar ul-harb) and 
wage a holy war (jihad) against it until it is restored as an Islamic state 
(dar ul-Islam). If not, one should migrate (perform hijra) and leave the 
country altogether (Masud 1990:29).
Ideally hijra is the transition of the mind from a state of dishonesty 
to one of purity (see Emil Nasritdinov in Chapter Ten). The crucial 
impetus behind hijra is to maintain one's religious and cultural identity; 
pragmatic motivations must be secondary to this desire. Ideally, the 
exiles or muhajeers should migrate to the holy cities of Mecca and 
Medina. In the first half of the twentieth century, the religious elite of 
Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Afghanistan often found shelter near 
Muslim shrines in these holy cities (See Balci 2009). Doctrine and practice 
do not always precisely coincide, and the exercise and significance 
of the Islamic faith in any given historical setting cannot readily be 
predicted from first principles of dogma or belief (Masud 1990:18). 
Dale Eickelman proposes the idea of flexible Islam, arguing that ‘the 
motives for action in general, as for (Muslim) travel in particular, are 
inevitably mixed — a combination of holy reason and social, economic, 
and political concern’ (Eickelman and Piscatori 1990:5). In this context, 
hijra is a ‘normal’ migratory process and social action operating in an 
Islamically-determined cultural context.
Most Central Asian migrants fled to Afghanistan. After the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire in 1918–1923, many considered independent 
Afghanistan to be the only legitimate Islamic state in the region. In 
the 1920s the country served as a place of refuge for the Muslims of 
18  This information was recorded in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in February 1991 during 
my interview with Bashir Baghlani. His father Kasir, being the head of the one of 
the first Soviet collective farms (kolkhoz) in Kulob, migrated to Afghanistan in 1929. 
Bashir Baglani was born in 1931 and in the 1980s headed the Ministry of Justice of 
Afghanistan. He returned to Dushanbe in 1989, after the Soviets withdrew their 
troops from Afghanistan, and later migrated to Germany.
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Central Asia, as well as for some 20,000 co-religionists from British 
India, who constituted the Hijrat movement (Minault 1982). The poor 
Afghan country could not offer muhajeers any economic benefits, only 
the restoration (real or false) of a spiritual balance violated by external 
oppression. 
In other words, it was a religiously imagined ‘journey of the mind’ 
across geographical and political lines, an escape from reality, a reflection 
of the deeply cherished popular utopia of dar-ul Islam,19 the imagined 
‘golden village’, an ideal home for Muslims. In exile, between muhajeers 
and ansars (hosts, in this case the Afghan Muslims) a new bond of unity 
(mu’akhat) was established. 
This universal, supranational religious identity that transcends 
political borders has survived in spite of colonial divides and the 
introduction of the secular concepts of the nation state and nationalism. 
Relatedly, it is worth mentioning that doctrinally hijra is at odds with 
a secular understanding of emigration and diaspora formation, as 
it rejects the concept of the nationalism of a particular ethnic group, 
and that of the homeland as a territory where the group resides and to 
which it is culturally bound. Ideally, hijra would encourage Muslims to 
separate from those who rejected migration from dar ul-harb. Religious 
doctrine would unite muhajeers with a new state on a supranational, 
i.e., religious, basis. Meanwhile (secular) diasporas cherish the memory 
of the state of origin. Diasporas never completely abandon the idea 
of returning to a historical homeland. In contrast to muhajeeri groups, 
diasporas are inclined to identify themselves more with the abandoned 
mother country than with a new host state. 
While in exile, the muhajeers faced many difficulties, including 
differences in language, culture, race, and nationality that inevitably 
existed inside the Islamic community or umma. They had to accept the 
fact that every state, including an Islamic state, cannot be absolutely 
protected from wars, revolutions, rebellions, and other violent conflicts. 
19  In fact, this utopia has pre-Islamic roots. It is worth mentioning the imagined 
country, ‘Chambuli Maston’, taken from the Tajik-Turkic epic ‘Gur Ughli’, which 
gave shelter to the weak and defeated and provided them with justice and 
happiness. In Soviet times a Tajik popular poet, Mirsaid Mirshakar (1912–1993), 
created a powerful image of the Soviet state as a ‘Qyshloqi Tilloi’, that is, a ‘Golden 
Village’.
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In spite of this, Central Asian muhajeers and exiled mujaheeds saw 
their religion as a source of agency and emancipation, as it helped them 
to find a safe haven in Afghanistan and facilitated common ground with 
local Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other Afghan groups. Muslim faith 
and piety, as symbolic capital, strengthened muhajeers’ social status and 
self-confidence. Local Afghans treated them simultaneously as exiled 
co-religionists and as foreign people, known as ‘beyond the river’ 
(poridarya). Belonging to the imagined Muslim brotherhood (umma), that 
rejects political, geographical, and ethno-national borders as well as to 
a temporal, Uzbek-Tajik (Bukharan or Ferghanan) community ensured 
material wellbeing, cultural continuity, and emotional balance among 
refugees and émigrés. In this light, the region under study emerges as 
a place where new forms of identity are formed, which do not fit the 
customary understanding of nationality and ethnicity.
Members of Central Asian diasporas and irredentists constitute a 
very large part of the Afghan population today. The appearance of half 
a million Central Asians during the 1920s and 1930s had an important 
impact on the history of Afghanistan. In spite of their ethnic multiplicity, 
these ‘minorities’ have always been to a certain extent aware of their 
group identity as different from the Pashtun majority of Afghanistan 
and related to abandoned compatriots ‘beyond the river’. This 
connectedness is emerging with increasing intensity. Islamic and ethnic 
solidarity in Central Asia, where frontiers are not ethnographically 
grounded, has been a significant cause of political destabilization, 
weakening centralized power and loosening international control on 
both sides of the Amu Darya. It has always been a crucial prerequisite 
for Central Asian insurgency that Afghanistan is available as a potential 
place of escape, since it is loosely controlled by central government 
and populated by fellow Muslims of similar ethnicity. Such a situation 
existed in the USSR in the early 1920s, in Afghanistan at the end of that 
decade and the beginning of the 1930s, and in the recent past: in the 
beginning of the 1990s, government authority collapsed once again 
and civil wars began in Tajikistan and Afghanistan simultaneously. 
The frontier between these two countries again became a maelstrom 
of regional instability, with the arrival of a great number of migrants 
seeking a chimerical ‘state of purity’. 
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Translocality and the emergence of 
multidirectional networks 
Islamist ideologies that have recently shaken the entire world were 
not created in a vacuum. The appearance of hundreds of thousands 
of Muslim refugees in the Central Asian region in the 1920s created 
a loss of confidence and sense of frustration with both the West and 
with weak, corrupt indigenous governments. At the same time, it gave 
a strong impetus to an Islamic reawakening. Central Asian mujaheds 
and muhajeers served as a symbol of sacredness, and of submission to 
Muslim ideals, which became associated with the Afghan resistance 
against the Soviet invaders. During the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s, 
forums for mujaheed groups were created and books and magazines 
were published by the Afghan jihadi parties in Pakistan that presented 
their resistance to the Soviets as a continuation of the Basmachi course 
(see Moruvat 1983). Later, the second Chechen war (1999–2009) was 
interpreted as part of the jihad that started in Central Asia in the 1920s 
by ideologues who championed anti-Russian resistance.
In the 1980s, some Central Asian muhajeer communities took an 
active part in the fight against the Soviet army. For example, Azad Bek, 
one of the leaders of the Islamic Union of the Northern Provinces of 
Afghanistan, was a great grandson of Nasriddin, the last Khan of the 
Khanate of Kokand (who ruled from 1875–1876). Azad Bek did succeed 
in enlisting the support of some Uzbek, Tajik, and even Turkmen field 
commanders, notably Uzbek muhajeers from Soviet Central Asia, such 
Khaluddin of Kunduz and Ait Murad from Barqa (Baghlan province). 
According to the Indian scholar K. Warikoo, this grouping of Afghan 
mujaheds was backed by the Pakistani government and aimed to 
‘[bring] together all the Turks of Afghanistan and then to liberate Soviet 
Turkestan’ (Roy 80). Warikoo stressed that it was not a mere coincidence 
that Pakistan’s aggressive policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia at that 
time was pursued by Mirza Aslam Bek, the former Chief of Pakistan’s 
army, who was a descendant of a Central Asian muhajeer and was also 
related to Azad Bek (Warikoo 1995, Andican 2007).
These kinds of speculations portray Central Asia and Afghanistan 
as a dangerous hotspot, permanently fomenting the ‘Islamic threat’ 
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and representing a danger to ‘infidels’. There is no doubt that today 
Central Asia’s Islamism emerged partly within a tradition rooted in the 
1920s. However, it would be a mistake to equate Basmachis and modern 
mujaheds, or jihadis. The Central Asian resistance movement against the 
Bolsheviks was unique. More recent mujaheds, as byproducts of the Cold 
War, were mostly clients of outside forces (Pakistan, Iran, Russia, the 
US, etc.). Basmachism was one of the last purely Muslim movements 
with few influences from outside the Muslim community.
Translocality and transformations of the physical 
and natural environment in Central Asia
The translocality perspective elaborated in this volume helps us to 
understand the role of mobility in connecting and transforming places, 
as well as in circulating practices, skills, and competencies across the 
region (see in particular Henryk Alff in Chapter Five). 
Immigrants of Central Asian origin were able to make notable 
contributions to the development of the economies, cultures, and 
environments of their host countries. The exiled Bukharan elite, mostly 
the Jadids, supported King Amanulla Khan in his efforts to modernize 
Afghanistan. Some of them, including the Ferghanan qurbashi 
(commander) Shermuhammad (Kurshermat) even defended Amanulla 
from the attacks of insurgents in 1928–1929. The exiled Basmachis 
of Bukharan origin under the leadership of Ibrahimbek, however, 
supported the opposite side, that of the new Amir of Afghanistan, 
Habibulla Bacha-i Saqqao. More traditional Persian-speaking (Tajik) 
Bukharans chose Afghanistan, while Turkestani Turks (mostly Uzbeks) 
opted for Turkey as their host country. The second generation of exiled 
Bukharans had ensured Afghanistan’s cultural progress in the 1960s 
having founded the practice of journalism, modern pedagogy, and the 
study of the history of Persian literature in Afghanistan (Abdullaev 
2009:451–70). In Turkey, the Turkestani émigrés took an active part in the 
foundation of Ankara University, especially its agricultural department.
Many Central Asians with extensive Russian contacts, especially 
those from the second wave of emigration of 1926–1934, were more 
educated than the local Afghans and Xinjiangies, and took a more 
modern approach to life. These migrants fostered the cultivation of corn 
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and beets, introduced silk-making, enlarged the herds of the famous 
Hisor lambs, and developed carpet weaving in Afghanistan (Abdullaev 
2009:451–70, 510–12). Soon after the Soviets began cotton production 
in Southern Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the young Afghani Abdul Aziz 
Londoni, realizing that Qataghan had similar natural conditions to the 
best cotton producers in Central Asia, bought up lands populated by 
émigrés in the Qunduz area and later established a company called Spin 
Zar (White Gold, in Pashto) giving a big boost to cotton production in 
Afghanistan (Shalinsky 1993:27–29). These emigrant activities changed 
the societal, economic, cultural, and natural environment of Afghanistan. 
At the same time, the development of Northern Afghanistan eased the 
introduction of Central Asians to life in exile and transformed their 
mentality towards modernization within the framework of a Muslim 
state, and towards becoming Afghan citizens, thus widening the gap 
between them and their former compatriots from the Soviet part of 
Central Asia. 
The international migration of the early Soviet period contributed 
to important changes in demography, ethnic composition and, 
subsequently, the political landscape of the entire region of Central and 
Southern Asia. The majority of those who escaped from Central Asia 
were Uzbek semi-nomads from the pre-frontier zone of Tajikistan, and 
Uzbeks from other provinces of Soviet Central Asia who emigrated 
during the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s. In Afghanistan, they 
joined the local Uzbeks (in particular the Qataghani tribe), who were 
subjugated by Pashtuns during the 1860s. Together, Afghan Uzbeks 
formed the third-largest ethnic community and one of the strongest 
political and military forces during the Soviet-Afghan war and the 
Taliban period.
Simultaneously, on the other side of the border, in the Tajik south, 
the flight of semi-nomadic Uzbeks, whose tribal chiefs, before the arrival 
of Red Russians in the 1920s, used to control and even to oppress local 
Tajik sedentary peasants, allowed the movement of land-hungry Tajiks 
from Hisor and other internal provinces to this area. Not surprisingly, 
they were sympathetic to Soviet rule, as they saw the Soviets as 
liberators and and viewed their arrival as an opportunity for economic 
gain. The liquidation of Basmachism by the mid-1930s put an end to 
the Uzbek control of Tajik-populated Eastern Bukhara and allowed 
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for the irrigation of the Vakhsh Valley and the cultivation of a much-
needed thin fibre (grey) cotton to secure the strategically vital ‘cotton 
independence’ of the Soviet Union.
Summing up, the large-scale Muslim migration processes from 
Bukhara, Russia and the USSR in the early Soviet period had a crucial 
impact on the reconfiguration of Muslim society and culture in what we 
know as ‘modern South Asia’ and ‘the Middle East’. The migration of the 
‘exiles of Bolshevism’ was caused by the invasion of the Red Army and 
subsequent military conflict and it brought suffering and deprivation 
to the region. However, from a translocal research perspective, this 
migration emerges as a complex phenomenon that challenges the state-
based static vision of history that is commonly accepted in Central Asia, 
which relates identity to a distinct, unique, and fixed culture, ethnicity 
and territory. This migration provided major actors with more social 
power and more options, and enhanced their ability to realize various 
life schemes and societal goals; it did not leave them as helpless refugees 
and defeated insurgents. People, ideas, symbols, and skills were able 
to transgress conservative political, ‘civilizational’, national, regional, 
technical, and other boundaries.
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2. Crossing Economic and Cultural 
Boundaries: Tajik Middlemen in the 
Translocal Dubai Business Sector
Abdullah Mirzoev and Manja Stephan-Emmrich
Introduction 
Thirty-seven-year-old Firuz visited Dubai for the first time in December 
2007. He came to celebrate the New Year with many other tourists 
in front of the Burj Khalifa tower. Firuz worked for a construction 
company in Moscow, but after his Dubai trip he left Russia to join a 
friend who was running a business exporting second-hand cars from 
the United Arab Emirates to Tajikistan. In Dubai, Firuz had quickly 
come to appreciate the better living conditions and business-friendly 
environment that would allow him to earn money in culturally familiar 
surroundings, able to move around the city and live his life free from the 
migrant deportation regime in Russia. After his vacation, Firuz bought a 
Japanese-made car from Dubai and thus became involved in his friend’s 
export business:
‘From the first time, when I came to Dubai, I found this environment 
much better than Moscow. People everywhere were speaking Persian 
(farsi) and Russian and the main clients of Tajiks in Dubai are Russian 
tourists here […] many shop owners and vendors are Iranians or 
Afghans, who speak in a language I do understand. Here in Dubai, a 
big number of Tajik migrants collaborate closely with our Afghan and 
Iranian fellow brothers. And everyone is friendly. Being a tourist and 
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working in a small business, I am walking in the streets, beaches and 
near hotels, offering various stuff to tourists to get a commission. This 
is not hard work and I am not worrying about being stopped by the 
police like in Moscow. I am free (ozod). I am not dependent on anyone 
and my monthly income now is much higher than in Moscow’ (Dubai, 
2012).
Like Firuz, many Tajiks try to get a foothold in Dubai’s vibrant economy. 
When Dubai’s growing popularity reached Tajikistan’s markets and 
households in the late 1990s-early 2000s, many Tajiks were attracted 
by the United Arab Emirates’ brand of ‘autocratic Islamic governance 
combined with neoliberal economics’, which suggested a post-Western 
form of modernization (Kathiravelu 2016:39). They longed for Dubai 
as an alternative and ideal place abroad that promised to help them 
overcome the precarious conditions of Tajikistan’s and Russia’s 
economic sectors. 
Based on the results of our long-term, multi-sited ethnographic and 
fieldwork in Tajikistan and the United Arab Emirates between 2010 and 
2014, this chapter explores how Tajiks capitalize on their university 
degrees in economics, international relations, agriculture, and 
engineering, as well as on their language skills and social connections 
(svyazi, aloqa) in both Tajikistan and Russia, to integrate into Dubai’s 
booming global tourism and transregional trading sector.1 Both areas 
are dominated by established Iranian companies, Iranian entrepreneurs, 
and Afghan traders and businessmen, most of whom quickly came to 
appreciate the cultural skills and business connections of Tajiks, who 
provide ways to communicate with Russians and can move flexibly in 
and across different cultural settings. 
As a result, and as the ethnographic case study of Dilshod and 
Rustam in this chapter will illustrate, Tajiks working in Dubai’s informal 
economy turn into middlemen who connect different economic actors in 
1  This chapter is the outcome of collaborative fieldwork in Dubai in winter 2012/13. 
Although both authors pursued their individual research projects within the 
framework of the overarching ‘Translocal Goods’ project, they share an interest 
in the religious dimension of the Tajik Dubai business, and the related translocal 
religio-economic transfers and interactions between Tajikistan and the Arab 
Emirates.
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different business sectors and effectively mediate among their Tajikistan, 
Russia, and Dubai-based business networks. They thereby create a 
translocal space of connectedness and belonging, which transgresses 
cultural and economic boundaries, crosses different regions, and links 
Russia’s growing middle-class tourism and post-Soviet history as a 
migration destination with the different trading traditions and business 
cultures of Afghans and Iranians. These translocal spaces, socio-spatial 
religions and economic practices form what we call the translocal 
‘Tajik Dubai business’, by analogy with the Kyrgyz ‘China Business’ 
Philipp Schröder describes in Chapter Eight. Although articulated by 
our interlocutors as an alternative or exit option, we argue that the 
Tajik Dubai business does not create ruptures with previous economic 
activities and environments in Tajikistan and Russia. In fact, Dubai, 
with its vibrant economic sector, becomes a pivotal spatial knot of a 
larger socio-spatial configuration, which creates a ‘cultural nestedness’ 
or ‘cosiness’ (Finke 2003) that enables Tajiks to involve themselves 
successfully in, as well as shape, new fields of economic activity. In 
this capacity, Tajik middlemen enrich the interregional history of the 
emirate’s merchant cosmopolitanism (Osella and Osella 2012, Ahmed 
2012). Furthermore, since they can draw on their cultural familiarity 
with Afghans, with Sunni-Hanafi Iranians mostly from Baluchistan, 
and with Russian (or Russian-speaking) tourists, Tajik middlemen in 
Dubai have become creative and innovative agents of globalization as 
the case studies of Rustam and Dilshod will illustrate.
Studies on migration from Tajikistan focus more broadly on labour 
migration to Russia (Olimova 2013, Khusenova 2013, Roche 2014, 
among others). Therefore, they obscure the fact that each of the post-
Soviet states (CIS), including post-Soviet Tajikistan, has connected 
with the global scene in very different ways, and that the global 
trading business and tourism sectors in the vibrant urban centres of 
the Gulf have made an important contribution to this phenomenon; 
not least as a promising ‘Muslim’ alternative to Russia’s exploitative 
and Central Asia’s limited and unstable labour market (Stephan-
Emmrich 2017). In this chapter we want to complement our previous 
focus on how Muslims in Tajikistan have become involved in the 
global market of Islamic lifestyle consumption (Stephan-Emmrich and 
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Mirzoev 2016) by shifting our anthropological gaze from Tajikistan 
to Dubai’s vibrant mercantile and migration economy, as well as to 
the urban places where translocal economic actions, connections, and 
relations take on a spatialized form, i.e., the migrant guesthouses in 
the neighborhood of Dubai Deira. Thus, we are driven by our interest 
in how Tajiks actively shape the complex, dynamic, and multifaceted 
nature of Dubai’s informal economy. 
By conceptualizing Tajiks working in Dubai not as one-dimensional 
‘migrants’ but showing how they act as ‘middlemen’ (posrednik, 
kamak)2 we also want to point to the shortcomings of the United Arab 
Emirates’ hegemonic discourse about ‘foreign migrant workers’ 
that frames Tajiks, like other foreigners in the Gulf, solely in regard 
to the labour they do and the economic outcomes they estimate 
from it, and thus reduces them to homo economicus only (Ahmad 
2012). Moreover, understanding Tajiks’ position in Dubai’s informal 
economy as that of middlemen and mediators, we emphasize their 
capacity to capitalize on their cultural and social skills and resources 
in order to pursue successful livelihoods, thus making sense of 
their precarious life conditions and the mobility regimes they have 
to deal with. Furthermore, the concept of middlemen opens up new 
epistemological avenues for understanding ‘livelihood’ not merely in 
economic terms but, more broadly, as a concept that links economic 
strategies with forms of longing and belonging and the assessment 
of wellbeing (Schröder and Stephan-Emmrich 2014). This includes, as 
Firuz described above, the experience of economic freedom and safety 
when moving in public, as well as the possibility of a transnational 
lifestyle that enables the combination of living in an attractive tourist 
site with pursuing a successful business, while staying connected 
with ‘home’ (Pelican 2014). Finally, as we will show, the ‘middlemen’ 
concept highlights the capacity of Tajiks to leave the centre of their own 
networks, to cross various boundaries, and to deal with difference, 
thereby translating different cultural and economic contexts. 
2  Although the Tajik Dubai business is not solely a male issue and also involves 
businesswomen, female traders and employees, this chapter presents male 
perspectives only. Accordingly, the term ‘middlemen’ refers to male actors. 
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Avenues into the translocal ‘Dubai business’
Tajikistan’s integration into Dubai’s economy began with the first 
official visit of President Rahmon to the United Arab Emirates 
in December 1995. Since that time, the Tajikistan-Dubai business 
relationship has developed, and now covers different forms of state and 
non-state collaborations in the fields of trading, technology, investment, 
and tourism. A striking interrelationship between tourism and trade 
existed from the very beginning. Although economic avenues into the 
Gulf were initiated first by the government and economic elites, the 
Tajikistan-Dubai business relationship is to a large extent sustained, 
developed, and expanded by traders as well as small and middle-scale 
entrepreneurs and middlemen, whose business relations, cooperation, 
and activities can be situated in the grey zone between formality and 
informality (see also Fehlings in Chapter Seven). 
In the early 1990s, Tajikistan’s then political elite discovered Dubai 
as an exclusive tourist destination and simultaneously established 
a cargo business trading luxury cars. Later, small-scale traders and 
entrepreneurs discovered Dubai’s and Abu Dhabi’s markets for their 
businesses. They began to import luxury clothing, home decorations, 
fashionable fabrics and clothing, and mobile phones to Tajikistan. Such 
consumer goods became especially desirable because they were branded 
as dubaiskiy; i.e., made in or imported from Dubai and thus considered 
high-quality and prestigious lifestyle products. Others, like Firuz and his 
friend Rustam, started to import second-hand cars from the United Arab 
Emirates to Tajikistan. Increasing trade with Dubai goods also fuelled 
the travel aspirations of Tajikistan’s upper and middle-class and, thus, 
caused tourist companies to expand their travel destinations into the 
Gulf region. In the early 2000s, Tajikistan’s tourism sector experienced 
a Dubai boom, and many Tajikistani tourist companies started to 
maintain collaborations with Dubai-based Iranian tourist agencies. This 
trend accelerated when flydubai opened up a flight route to Tajikistan 
and enabled middle-class business travel, tourist trips and labour 
migrants’ mobility at affordable prices. Furthermore, in the last decade, 
Dubai’s famous city skyline has become a priority location for music 
video shoots among famous Tajik pop artists. These artists created links 
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between Tajikistan’s pop music industry and Dubai’s spectacular image 
of post-Western modernity (Kathiravelu 2016), thereby contributing to 
the involvement of Tajikistan’s Muslims into a growing global Islamic 
consumerism and simultaneously feeding the lifestyle aspirations of the 
new urban middle class (Pink 2009).
Dubai’s appealing radiance as the city of possibility is further 
enhanced by Tajikistan’s overall economic instability, the dominance 
of regimes of corruption, nepotism and arbitrariness, and the dearth of 
professional opportunities for well-educated and economically aspiring 
entrepreneurs. The specific combination of globally mediated economic 
opportunities in the Gulf and the political and economic constraints at 
home encouraged many Tajiks to establish or get involved in translocal 
businesses in the United Arab Emirates. Among them were well-
educated young men such as the two middlemen Rustam and Dilshod 
who will be introduced later, and who left the country due to the lack 
of enticing employment opportunities. In the Arab Emirates, they were 
able to capitalize on their Russian, Persian, Arab, and English language 
skills, university degrees, travel experiences, and aura of urban 
sophistication and began successful economic careers as middlemen. 
In the last five years, many entrepreneurs suffering from adverse 
conditions in the non-state economy have been attracted to Dubai’s 
business-friendly environment. To run a successful business in 
Tajikistan, entrepreneurs must have informal ‘access’ (kanal), or 
‘connections’ (svyazi, aloqa) to government officials. In recent years, 
these costly connections and the corruption linked to them, together 
with the overall economic crisis in the country, have caused difficulties 
for entrepreneurs struggling to cover their business expenses. In 
addition, the decline of migrants’ remittances due to the financial crisis 
in Russia3 critically affected Tajikistan’s economy. As a consequence, the 
government increased taxes and thus jeopardized small- and middle-
scale entrepreneurial and business enterprises (Mullodjanov 2016). The 
informal economy is additionally hampered by constant surveillance 
practices through local authorities and elite groups who seek to 
monopolize the trading and bazaar business. Fires in the central bazaars 
of both Dushanbe and Kulob destroyed many vendors’ property. 
3  The country depends heavily on remittance from migrants in Russia, which 
provides an equivalent of half of the country’s GDP (Malyuchenko 2015).
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These vendors were mainly uninsured, making them ineligible for 
compensation for their lost property.4 It is important to note that the 
insurance system in Tajikistan is neither well-developed nor trusted. 
Many of the affected traders used bank loans to reopen their business. 
Banks in Tajikistan offer loans at extremely high interest rates5 and 
overburden borrowers with a lot of confusing bureaucratic paperwork. 
Eventually, many vendors transferred their business to the United 
Arab Emirates in order to pursue their economic interests without the 
pressure to get involved in corruption, the need to pay bribes, or the 
high risk of being targeted by the government’s arbitrary surveillance 
and regulation regime in the informal economy.6 
Furthermore, the integration of Tajiks into Dubai’s global trade and 
tourism business cannot be understood without considering the role 
of Russia and its changing migration policy, as well as the emergence 
of a new consumer-friendly and status-oriented urban middle class in 
Russia and the countries of Central Asia, such as Kazakhstan, that have 
been enjoying tourist trips to the Gulf since the early 2000s. 
In recent decades, migration from Tajikistan has significantly 
increased due to the country’s uncertain socio-economic situation. Of 
the total amount of Tajik migrants, about 90% go to Russia, while the rest 
migrate to Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, South Korea 
and some overseas countries (ILO 2010). Due to Russia’s citizenship 
law, educated and highly qualified foreigners enjoy certain privileges, 
such as the right to acquire Russian citizenship after some years of 
work in Russia. Therefore, the emigration of Tajik intellectuals and 
entrepreneurs to Russia has significantly increased during the last ten 
years.7 However, due to growing Russian nationalism, many Tajiks, like 
other migrants from Central Asia and other foreigners, are increasingly 
facing racism in their everyday life in Russia (Habeck and Schröder 
4  See http://news.tj/en/news/tajikistan/incidents/20120314/damage-caused-qurghon-
tepppa-s-central-bazaar-fire-estimated-312000-somoni, http://www.rferl.org/a/
kulob-bazaar-fire-market-sahovat-shops/25465601.html
5  In 2016, the bank rate was 29% to 32% for Somoni, and 22% to 35% for USD. See 
http://fmfb.com.tj/ru/legal/loans/
6  See https://www.ukessays.com/essays/economics/barriers-to-entrepreneurship-
development-in-tajikistan-economics-essay.php
7  For instance, Tajiks have been resettled in Russia’s Tambov Region within the 
Russian voluntary resettlement program — including twenty high-qualified 
medical doctors and their families (Pastrova 2014). 
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2016:10f, 12f).8 For example, many struggle with structural exploitation9 
in the workplace (Ryazantsev 2016:5–6). Violent xenophobia in Russian 
society has diminished their overall wellbeing, and when the economic 
crisis hit Russia, many Tajiks left for the Emirates, while others were 
deported back to Tajikistan and later followed their more successful 
relatives to Dubai. 
Although Dubai is for many Tajiks an alternative migration 
destination to escape the precarious working and living conditions 
in Russia, in the Gulf they nevertheless retain links to Russia’s socio-
economic development, as well as to the shared Soviet past (see Philipp 
Schröder in Chapter Eight). On the one hand, they profit from the influx 
of Russian middle-class tourists to Dubai’s tourism sector. On the other 
hand, many Tajiks who maintain and cultivate close relations with the 
Tajik migrant diaspora in Russia are able to expand their Dubai-based 
businesses into markets in Russia and wider Eurasia.
Fig. 2.1  ‘Mexa, shuba!’: fur-coat shops for Russian tourists in Dubai 
Deira. Photo © Manja Stephan-Emmrich (2013), CC BY 4.0
8  See http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1304096,00.html
9  See for instance the widespread practice of non-payment of salaries or residency in 
poor living conditions (Olimova 2013, p. 72). 
 972. Crossing Economic and Cultural Boundaries
Al Nasr Square: Russian tourists, Iranian and 
Afghan business partners
The best way to meet Tajiks in Dubai is by walking around Al-Nasser 
Square, a public place nearby the Baniyas underground station in Dubai 
Deira. As a meeting place for both tourists and foreigners (Elsheshtawy 
2008), Al Nasr Square forms the spatial centre of the Tajik Dubai business. 
Like other migrant workers from CIS countries, Tajiks jokingly refer to 
Al Nasr Square as mini Cherkiz bazaar.10 
Deira, a vibrant urban district located in the heart of Dubai, offers 
plenty of shopping malls, market halls, hotels, and restaurants. 
Surrounding the Dubai Creek River with its city port, Deira is the 
main shopping district in Dubai’s historic quarter. Russian and other 
tourists have access to a wide variety of popular fashion shops, brands, 
and restaurants, as well as the offices of numerous trading, cargo and 
shipping companies. Additionally, there is an extensive selection of 
electronic, cosmetic, jewelry, and toy stores, and the majority of Dubai’s 
fur coat shops are located around Al Nasr Square.11 
Historically, the Deira district, located between the Creek side and 
Al Nasr Square, was the commercial centre of Dubai. However, when 
revenues from the oil industry and tourist sectors soared over the last 
two decades, Dubai expanded from a mere two square kilometers in 
1950 to 1,000 square kilometers in 2015, moving the centre of the city 
to Sheikh Zayed Road and the Business Bay districts with their high-
rise commercial buildings. Nevertheless, Deira remains one of the main 
business centres, a popular destination for tourists, as well as a dwelling 
area for foreign migrant workers and residents from Asia and Africa 
who work in construction, hotels, the care sector or in one of the city’s 
many malls and street markets. Deira is therefore also known as Dubai’s 
‘migrant quarter’. 
Due to the high density of hotels booked by tourists and businesspeople 
from Russia and other post-Soviet states in Eurasia, many Tajik workers, 
10  Cherkiz bazaar was one of the biggest international bazaars in Moscow, were many 
Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Azerbaijani migrants worked, until it was closed by the 
city administration in 2008.
11  Also known as Jamal Abd el-Nasr Square, close to the Dubai underground station 
Baniyas square.
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businesspeople, and entrepreneurs locate their offices, work, and living 
places around Al Nasr Square. Above all, the area is the workplace of 
about 300 to 500 kamak,12 street brokers who invite tourists from Russia 
and other CIS countries to visit the fur-coat shops they work for and 
later share the commission they get from the purchase. Tajik kamak, like 
those from other post-Soviet countries, have their own gathering points 
around Al Nasr Square, thereby following the spatial segregation of 
the local fur-coat business along ethnic and national lines. They wait in 
small groups in front of hotels, tourist shops, and restaurants, trying to 
find clients and offering them their shopping services. Like many other 
Tajiks in Dubai who work as vendors in souvenir, smartphone, or fur 
coat shops, as tourist guides or small-scale entrepreneurs and traders, 
they pursue their business interests in the grey zone between formality 
and informality. While only a minority of Tajiks, i.e., those working in 
shops or companies, have employment contracts that allow for long-
term residence and family settlement in the United Arab Emirates, the 
majority are seasonal workers staying during the peak tourist season, 
from October until April. When the tourists leave, the workers return 
home to Tajikistan or Russia, where they wait until the new tourist 
season starts. Long-term residence is tied to an employment contract 
with a Dubai-based company, which requires connections (wasta) to 
informal networks around business elites and the Arab kafala system of 
sponsorship, which is the system by which foreign migration is managed 
and governed in the United Arab Emirates (see Gardner 2012, Vora 2009). 
Tajik kamak, while trying hard to become ‘connected’ to the business or 
social network around a kafeel (an Arab sponsor) through knowing the 
‘right’ people and having the ‘right’ knowledge, work on the basis of 
tourist visas. The latter, however, allow for short-term residence but do 
not include a work permission. Tajiks are therefore often involved in 
illicit economic practices and street work activities. 
12  Due to the undocumented status of kamak, work statistical data or official numbers 
do not exist. The number above reproduces our main Tajik interlocutors’ estimation 
of Tajik kamak working around Al Nasr Square in Dubai Deira between 1010 and 
2014. Kamak is a Greek word referring commissioners, i.e. people who introduce 
potential customers to a specific business and in return receive a commission of 
10–15% of the total sale from the owner. However, since the fur coat business in 
Dubai depends on Greeks, the term kamak only refers to commissioners working in 
the fur coat trade.
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Tajiks are newcomers in Dubai’s economy. Nevertheless, many 
Tajiks successfully integrate into the emirate’s global tourist and 
trading business simply because they are able to capitalize on their 
close cultural ties with Iranian and Afghan traders, entrepreneurs, and 
businessmen. Cultivating relations to the established Afghan or Iranian 
diaspora in the emirate, Afghan traders and Iranian businessmen have 
an influential position in the transregional trading business in the UAE 
and simultaneously invest in the real estate sector and Dubai’s booming 
middle- and upper-class tourist sector (see Elshashtawy 2008, Parsa and 
Keivani 2002). For Tajiks, they are therefore potential doorkeepers to 
relations (wasta) around potential Arab sponsors (kafeel), and, as such, an 
important prerequisite to upgrade one’s one status as ‘foreign migrant 
worker’ through moving from the informal to the formal economy; i.e., 
to gain formal employment with a Dubai-based company. 
‘We trade with whom we trust’ is a core principle ruling not only the 
Tajik Dubai business. It first of all points to the importance of ethnicity- 
and kin-based business networks and the leading role family members 
play as ideal business partners because they ‘would never cheat you’. 
However, the cultural proximity of Iranians from Baluchistan and Dari-
speaking Afghans turn them into ‘trusted familiars’ instead of ‘strangers’ 
(Osella and Osella 2012:128). Belonging to the Sunni-Hanafi branch of 
Islam and sharing their rootedness in Persian culture, literature, and 
history, Tajiks perceive Afghans, Baluch, and other Sunni Iranians 
as ‘brothers’ (barodar) and claim to belong to ‘one people’ (yak millat) 
and share one historic-cultural identity. It is therefore no surprise that 
Tajiks consider Sunni Iranians and Dari-speaking Afghans as ‘culturally 
closer’ (nazdik) than Turkish speaking Central Asians or Uzbeks from 
Tajikistan. Another important factor, however, is the Sunni-Shia 
divide. Although a common claim among Tajiks we met in Dubai was 
that they do business ‘with everyone as long as he is a Muslim’, our 
interlocutors simultaneously emphasized that they ‘would never share 
their accommodation with a Shiite!’ Strikingly, religious and cultural 
belonging has a great impact on how Tajiks adapt to the city, integrate 
into Dubai business sectors and articulate unity, sameness, and 
difference (see also Landa, 2013:3). 
We thus argue that Tajiks pursue their Dubai business projects in a 
flexible space of ‘cultural nestedness’. This allows for leaving the centre 
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of one’s one ethnicity- and kin-based network, crossing over its natural 
boundaries. It also means involving oneself in the production of what 
Finke, in his study on the Kazakh minority in Mongolia, has called 
‘institutional cosiness’; i.e., the institutional production of ideas about 
appropriatedness that include the longing for ‘a geographical and social 
environment with which one is familiar, knows the rules of the game, 
and feels at home’ (Finke 2003:178).
Figs. 2.2 and 2.3  Dubai Deira around Al Nasr Square: Commercial Center and 
‘Meeting Place’. Photos © Manja Stephan-Emmrich (2013), CC BY 4.0
Migrant guesthouses as a ‘meeting place’ 
The main places where the ‘cultural nestedness’ or ‘cosiness’ of Tajik 
networks in Dubai become spatialized are the temporary migrant 
accommodations situated in and around Al Nasr Square. By residing 
in a migrant guesthouse or in one of the low-budget hotels around Al 
Nasr Square, Tajiks adapt to Dubai’s urban everyday life, get involved 
into new economic sectors, and enlarge the scope of their businesses. 
Understanding migrants’ accommodations as a place of ‘entanglement, 
the meeting up of different histories many of them without previous 
connections to others’ (Massey 2006:46–71), we argue that migrant 
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guesthouses serve as pivotal urban meeting place, where Tajiks engage 
in different forms of temporary conviviality, migrant solidarity, and the 
exchange of business knowledge across cultural, national, and other 
boundaries. Furthermore, the vibrant and cross-cultural living spaces 
of migrant accommodations challenge Tajiks’ capacity to deal with 
differences, to manoeuvre through different systems of meaning, and to 
utilize different cultural registers in order to be economically successful 
(Vertovec 2010). In a nutshell, Tajiks’ career as middlemen in the 
Dubai trade and tourism business sector usually starts in the migrant 
guesthouses where they reside.
The area around Dubai Deira offers different categories of 
guesthouse. The low-budget, overcrowded, and poorly equipped 
guesthouses provide an affordable residence option for the majority 
of Tajik migrants working seasonally as kamak or vendors in tourist or 
smartphone shops. Job contracts and employment in a Dubai-based 
company allow for longer residency and enables Tajiks to eventually 
move to more expensive but better-equipped guesthouses, which offer 
more space and comfort. Only a minority of Tajiks manage, like Rustam, 
to buy an apartment in the neighboring emirates of Sharjah or Ajman, 
enabling them to bring their families in the United Arab Emirates and 
to reside in the country for longer periods. These economic actors stay 
closely connected with Tajikistan through regular visits or business trips 
home or by including family members in their translocal businesses. 
The four guesthouses we13 stayed in during our fieldwork are owned 
and managed by Afghans who rent three- or four-bedroom apartments 
in Deira’s residential areas situated near the main business sectors, to 
traders, middlemen, and businesspeople from Afghanistan, Iran, and 
Tajikistan. A guesthouse’s landlord is responsible for his tenants’ safety; 
he supervises the maintenance of the house rules, and he sometimes 
also stores and manages the migrants’ cash income. The guesthouses 
we stayed in were equipped with a separate safe where the tenants 
13  For reasons of legibility, we continue using ‘we’ here, although it should be noted 
that migrant guesthouses in Dubai Deira are male-dominated, ‘bachelor’ spaces. 
Consequently, only the male co-author of this chapter had permanent access to the 
guesthouses Tajiks dwell in, while the female co-author visited migrant guesthouses 
only when invited for common lunch or dinner. Otherwise she stayed in hotels 
nearby or lived with the families of long-term-resident Tajiks in their apartments in 
the emirate of Sharjah.
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kept their documents and the money they earned. Afghan landlords in 
Deira also employ a cook (often an Afghan as well) who is responsible 
for lunch and dinner, operates as room cleaner, facility manager and 
sometimes stores the migrants’ earnings.
The guestrooms we stayed in were always overcrowded. Six or 
seven people lived in each room and new guests often had to sleep on 
the floor. Although there was a constant flow of people, the Tajiks we 
met had their fixed place in a single guesthouse, where they would stay 
during every trip to Dubai, often with other Afghan or Baluch tenants 
whom they have known for many years. Following their own business 
during the daytime, all residents meet daily in the guesthouse for 
common lunches and dinners. Eating and relaxing together, this time 
off from work creates a social space for debating politics, economics, 
and religion, exchanging business knowledge about trading conditions, 
prices, contacts and visa regulations, and sharing their latest family 
stories and the joys and sorrows of mobile life. Eventually, many of 
the after-lunch or dinner conversations result in new business ideas 
and relationships, thereby creating new spaces for articulating and 
imagining a Muslim business community that traverses national, ethnic, 
and other boundaries (Stephan-Emmrich 2017). 
Tajiks’ preference for Afghan-owned guesthouses are 
overwhelmingly articulated in religious and cultural terms. However, 
as demonstrated by our own experiences gaining access to guesthouses 
where our Tajik interlocutors resided, besides cultural closeness, trust 
plays a pivotal role. Placing an emphasis on social contacts, who may 
serve as middlemen and thus gatekeepers to favorable guesthouses, 
as well as access to financial resources and personal qualities such 
as reliability and a good social reputation, Tajiks are involved in a 
system of ‘informal sponsorship’ and the ‘right connections’ that 
institutionalizes the overlap between living and doing business in 
Dubai. In order to get permission to stay in the guesthouse of one of 
our key Tajik interlocutors, we had to find someone who trusted us 
and accepted the responsibility of paying the monthly rent on our 
behalf in case we were not able to pay for ourselves. 
Ideally, the ‘informal sponsor’ runs a sustainable business on the 
basis of long-term residency and a work contract with a Dubai-based 
company. Alternatively, gatekeepers to a guesthouse-based residency 
in Deira are often close ‘contacts’ (business partners or relatives) of the 
 1032. Crossing Economic and Cultural Boundaries
guesthouse landlord, or of the owners of the tourist or phone shops 
that Tajiks typically work for. Our eventual gatekeeper and informal 
sponsor was a Tajik who, working as consultant for Russian and Arab 
tourists in an Iranian supermarket for many years, has cultivated long-
term connections in the mobile Afghan trading community and had the 
necessary links to the Afghan owner of the guesthouse.14 
Acting as middlemen in very different contexts, Tajiks in Dubai cross 
culturally varied spheres of living and working, and thus form networks 
among ‘trusted familiars’ who may even share their business profits 
and clients. This is exactly what Boissevain (1974:28) terms ‘linkages 
between persons in a network’, which ‘may be examined in terms of their 
structural diversity, the goods and services exchanged, the direction in 
which these move, and finally the frequency of interaction’. Linking 
ethnicity- and kin-based business networks in the Emirates with those 
of Afghan and Iranian co-tenants, Tajiks actively create opportunities 
for the pursuit of a successful career as middleman, agent, vendor, or 
sales consultant far from their Tajik homes or Russia’s precarious labour 
market regimes. Through their Afghan and Iranian business contacts, 
they enlarge the ‘institutional cosiness’ of their Tajik networks in Dubai 
and are thus able to move outside the restrictive social responsibilities 
and structures of their ethnicity- and kin-based networks. They are 
therefore able to take advantage of the economic freedom (ozody) Firuz 
pointed to earlier in his assessment of Dubai as a ‘good’ and business-
friendly place. 
Simultaneously, participating in everyday life in migrants’ 
guesthouses, we gained insight into the hierarchies, dependencies, and 
constraints that Dubai’s trade and tourist economy create and that Tajiks 
have to cope with. On the one hand, in their position as newcomers to the 
Dubai business realm, Tajiks are dependent on their better established 
and connected Afghan and Iranian business partners or roommates. 
Tajiks therefore tend to accept, yet are subordinate to, the often-claimed 
cultural superiority, economic competence, and leadership of Iranian 
business partners and roommates. Due to the rather flexible notion 
of ‘Afghanness’, Afghans consider themselves as having been part of 
14  It should be mentioned here that the male co-author of this article worked for 
several years in the Dubai tourism business. Our access to Tajik migrant guesthouses 
therefore heavily relied on his previously-established business contacts with an 
Iranian supermarket in Dubai Deira.
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the Soviet Union (see Marsden 2015) and thus claim a shared Soviet 
experience with their Tajik partners, while Iranians see Tajiks as ‘little 
Soviet brothers’, who, due to their isolation from the wider Muslim 
community during the Soviet period, have a profound lack of cultural 
and religious knowledge. Tajiks become therefore frequent targets of 
an aggressive religious and cultural proselytization. For example: 
one of our main interlocutors, a young man who spent some years 
studying Islamic subjects in Riyadh, left the room, when in one of the 
numerous after-lunch discussions his Iranian roommate boasted of the 
cultural sophistication of the Iranian people and their crucial role in 
shaping Islamic civilization. He later explained: ‘Iranians always boost 
their culture. I don’t like it. […] I [also] don’t share [his roommate’s] 
religious conviction (Arab aqīda). What he says about women in Islam, 
for example, is not right. But he’s the best friend of my employer. So, I 
keep quiet, or leave the room’. 
Situating themselves in the social, cultural, and religious hierarchies 
of their business networks, Tajiks in Dubai face a wide range of 
limitations and constraints that they have to accept, cope with, and try 
to overcome. Therefore, as the following paragraphs illustrate, Tajiks 
successfully act as social mediators, economic middlemen, and cultural 
translators. In this regard, Iranian and Afghan business projects, 
enterprises, and companies obviously profit from their Tajik employees’ 
social contacts and their capacity to connect, recruit, and expand their 
trading businesses into new economic fields, as well as new markets in 
Central Asia, Eurasia, Europe, and the United States.
Tajik middlemen in the ‘Dubai business’: 
connecting, expanding, translating 
Working as kamak, shop vendors, or traders around Al Nasr Square, 
many Tajiks, including our respondents Firuz, Dilshod, and Rustam, 
additionally operate as economic middlemen (posrednik). Speaking the 
Russian language and being familiar with the habits of Russians and 
their culture they also share common cultural, linguistic, and religious 
traditions with Sunni-Hanafi Iranians and Afghans. Equipped with 
these cultural capacities, Tajiks serve as a bridge between Afghan 
and Iranian business activities and the Russian tourist market. They 
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therefore often switch between undocumented and legal work. 
Moving in and across culturally and ethnically different local settings, 
Tajiks as middlemen are able to combine economic success with an 
assessment of wellbeing that is grounded in the experience of being 
independent from the political constraints and structural exploitation 
prevalent in Tajikistan and Russia. At the same time, their economic 
brokerage position empowers Tajiks to situationally bypass the 
social obligations and structural constraints institutionalized in their 
ethnicity- and kin-related network and thereby become creative and 
innovative economic agents. 
Dilshod and the tourist business
Dilshod has worked as a tour guide for an Iranian tourist company based 
in Dubai since 2011. Prior to moving to Dubai, he was employed as a 
sales consultant in an Afghani shop in Moscow’s Cherkiz bazaar. When 
the bazaar was closed in 2008, the Afghan shop owner recommended 
Dilshod to a business partner in Dubai. Due to Dilshod’s Russian, 
English, and Dari language proficiency and his university degree in 
economics, he was hired quickly to work in a phone shop at Al Nasr 
Square, where he worked as sales specialist for Russian-speaking 
customers. Capitalizing on the idea of a ‘shared Persian culture’, Dilshod 
successfully integrated into the Afghan business community in Dubai. 
He shared apartments with his Afghan colleagues and became the best 
seller in the phone shop. However, his career was also advanced by his 
piety and the depth and soundness of his religious knowledge. Praying 
five times a day and speaking excellent Dari, Dilshod easily conveys 
his fine character and priorities, which led to an excellent reputation 
within the Afghan business community in Dubai. While working 
for the Afghani phone shop, in the course of two years, Dilshod was 
able to invest in new business connections and managed to get a job 
offer from an Iranian tourist company. As a tour guide, he utilized his 
contacts with Russian and Russian-speaking tourists and was thus 
able to explore new business contacts in Almaty, Novosibirsk, Kazan, 
Moscow, and Dushanbe. Eventually, he helped his company to expand 
their tourist business into Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eurasia. Due 
to his successful networking, Dilshod became a respected and trusted 
staff member, but simultaneously maintained his old connections to 
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the Afghan business community. When we met him in winter 2013, 
he worked both as a tourist guide and as a sales consultant and had 
started to connect Russian clients interested in mobile phones with the 
Afghan phone shop he used to work for. As an economic broker, he also 
expanded his own business activities in different directions and also 
opened up new avenues for his Iranian tourist company into Dubai’s 
Russian tourist market. While the company used to focus merely on 
Iranian and Indian tourists, with the business Dilshod brought in, they 
were able to raise their profits during the tourist season by nearly fifteen 
percent. 
By connecting different trade and tourist sectors through his business 
ties, Dilshod simultaneously increased his own material and immaterial 
profits. Drawing on his connections with other Tajik middlemen in 
Dubai, Dilshod started to organize informal shopping tours for his clients 
to shopping malls and markets where his partners were employed, 
allowing them to benefit from this deal through commissions. Dilshod 
was also able to invest in the social ties that link him with his family at 
home: he brought his cousin from Tajikistan and managed to find a job 
for him in Dilshod’s former workplace, i.e., the Afghan phone shop. 
Fig. 2.4  Loading cars and other commodities: Iranian companies 
and the car cargo shipment at Dubai Creek. Photo © Manja Stephan-
Emmrich (2014), CC BY 4.0
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Rustam and the UAE car market 
Rustam’s story shows that Tajiks are also active as middlemen in the 
United Arab Emirates’ booming new and second-hand car market, a 
business sector in which many Afghan traders and dealers and Iranian 
cargo companies invest and are active (Paterson 2005:16ff.). Profiting 
from the established free-trade zones, the United Arab Emirates’ 
car business stretches from the regions’ port cities via the Hormuz 
corridor to Iranian port cities such as Bandar Abbas, and from there 
further afield to markets in Europe, Asia, and the US (Ali and Keivani 
2002). Due to their multiple middlemen competencies, Tajiks act as 
intermediaries between Iranian cargo companies and Afghan dealers 
in the Arab Emirates and clients, dealers, and sellers in Central Asia 
and other parts of Asia, Russia, the Caucasus, wider Europe, and the 
United States. As Rustam’s case study illustrates, the booming car trade 
facilitates successful entrepreneurial projects that allow Tajiks in Dubai 
to engage in translocal lifestyles and to pursue a livelihood based on 
living simultaneously ‘here’ and ‘there’, benefiting from both ethnicity- 
and kin-based business ties at home, in Russia, and in the United Arab 
Emirates. Building on trust and a good reputation, Tajik middlemen 
increase their social status both at home and in the business community 
in Dubai. 
Rustam is a middle-scale entrepreneur in the car cargo business, who 
shifted his business base from Dushanbe to Dubai in 2009. Before that, 
he undertook several business trips to the Gulf in order to establish ties 
with Afghan and Iranian entrepreneurs and to become involved with 
their business networks. When his efforts began to pay off, he moved to 
Dubai and opened a car showroom there and a small spare-parts shop 
in the neighboring emirate, Sharjah. He also bought a two-bedroom 
apartment in the Ajman emirate and eventually brought his family to 
the United Arab Emirates. Within five years, he was able to expand his 
business ties further to South Korea and the US and link them to his 
existing business networks in Tajikistan, Russia, and the Emirates. He 
currently imports new and used cars from the US and spare car parts 
from South Korea and ships them as cargo via Dubai Deira and Bandar 
Abbas to his business partners in Tajikistan, Russia, and elsewhere. 
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‘I have been involved in the car trade business since 1997. Until 2002, I 
brought Russian-made cars from Russian markets, mainly from Samara 
and Tolyatti, to Dushanbe. When the demand for Japanese cars increased 
in the Tajikistani market, we started to specialize in Japanese cars and 
invested in contacts in the UAE car market. In the beginning, we just 
exported cars from Dubai, and by 2009 I had done several shipments 
of new and used Japanese cars to Tajikistan. In 2009, we expanded our 
business through a good connection (kanal) to the USA and South Korea. 
For this purpose, I moved to Dubai and opened up a local office in 
order to manage the retransmission of cars and spare parts (via Dubai) 
to Tajikistan. Why Dubai? For example, if we send one container of 
car spare parts from South Korea to Tajikistan, we have to pay 15,000 
USD, plus we have to up- and download the cargo several times and 
therefore sometimes loose goods. Besides, it takes a long time to deliver 
the commodities. If we transmit the same container via Dubai we don’t 
lose a lot of time for delivery and we are able to reduce our expenses by 
35–40%’ (Dubai, 2012). 
While Rustam has been very successful in expanding his transregional 
and crosscultural business networks into new markets in Russia, the 
CIS, Iran, and Afghanistan, he simultaneously ‘invests’ in the Tajik 
migrant community in Dubai. For example, he has good relations with 
Tajik kamak. Acting as ‘business marketers without payments’, kamak 
advertise Rustam’s goods among their own tourist clients. In return, 
they use Rustam as a bank, i.e., he stores and manages their cash earnings 
and sends cash to Tajikistan via his business contacts in Dushanbe. This 
is obviously a profitable deal for both sides, again built on trust: both 
sides avoid paperwork and save remittance fees, and Rustam can work 
with their money while it travels to Dushanbe. For example, he uses it 
in Dubai to purchase goods for his shop in Dushanbe while that amount 
is later replaced by the relatives working in Rustam’s shop in Dushanbe. 
Supporting kamak, Rustam at the same time accumulates social prestige 
in the Tajik community in Dubai, which he re-capitalizes into further 
business networks. 
Rustam’s car business also involves Tajik friends and relatives. 
Firuz, whom we introduced above, works as a middleman for Rustam. 
He systematically acquires new clients for Rustam’s car showroom 
and the spare-parts shop and gets a commission from their purchases. 
Rustam also employs family members. He organized a visa for his 
younger brother who is now managing his shop in Dubai, and he also 
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transferred the responsibility for his spare-parts shop in Dushanbe to 
another brother. Thus, Rustam keeps close ties to his relatives and with 
their help has managed to maintain Dushanbe as second base for his 
cargo business. Like many other Tajiks, Rustam utilizes his relatives as 
a local channel to expand the repertoire of his Dubai export goods to 
include clothing, computer technology, and other prestigious lifestyle 
commodities advertised as dubaijsky, and thus enables these relatives to 
integrate into the global Dubai trade business ‘from home’. 
By moving in, as well as creating, culturally familiar spaces of 
economic activity, as economic middlemen Tajiks like Rustam or 
Dilshod can combine entrepreneurial activities with professional and 
educational careers (see also Pelican 2014:299). They thereby amass a 
kind of ‘freedom’ (ozody) and independence that forms an integral part 
of their self-understanding as ‘businessmen’ or ‘entrepreneurs’. This 
is in line with Pelican’s observation that the lack of flexibility and the 
structurally exploitative work and salary conditions in the United Arab 
Emirates has motivated Cameroonian migrants to switch from formal 
employment to the cargo business, or to combine formal employment 
with informal activities (Pelican 2014:280).
Challenges, changes, constraints
While both Rustam and Dilshod have built successful careers as 
middlemen in the Dubai business community, we do not want to 
one-dimensionally celebrate the opportunities that result from Tajiks’ 
involvement in the Dubai business. The flexibility Tajik middlemen 
show while pursuing their entrepreneurial strategies and finding their 
niche in the vibrant Dubai business scene is subject to the precarious and 
uncertain conditions set by rapidly shifting global markets and changing 
(trans-)national migration regimes. Stressing the ‘translocal’ dimension 
of the Tajik Dubai business, in this chapter we explicitly want to point 
to the complex interplay of opportunities and limitations that shape 
the livelihoods of Tajik middlemen in the Dubai business community 
(Bromber 2013, Freitag and von Oppen 2010). In this context, migration 
studies have extensively discussed transnationalism and translocality 
as a lived reality shaped by the migrant’s multiple situatedness or 
connectedness in, or with, ‘here’ and ‘there’ (Smith 2011). This may lead 
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eventually to the individual’s engagement in transnational lifestyles, or 
‘habitus’ (Kelly and Lusis 2006). This gives Tajiks the opportunity to 
move flexibly in and across the United Arab Emirates and Tajikistan, to 
link family with business partners, and thereby enables them to ‘[try] to 
make the best of their stay in Dubai, while focusing on investments back 
home and expanding their business networks’ (Pelican 2014:294–95). 
Tajiks also respond directly to their precarious status in Dubai as 
‘foreign migrants’. As mentioned above, this status is structurally 
promoted by the kafala sponsorship system and an immigration regime 
that excludes non-Emiratis from access to citizenship and defines all 
foreigners in relation to ‘labour’ only (Ahmad 2012). Tajiks are therefore 
only ‘temporary visitors’ in Dubai, whose long-term residence is tied 
up with access to formal employment (Vora 2009, Gardner 2012). 
Consequently, the Dubai business is a highly volatile field. After it 
was announced that Dubai will host the next World Expo in 2020, the 
police intensified their street raids around Al-Nasser Square to clear 
street workers (kamak) without a working licence from the area in order 
to make it more tourist-friendly. This action led to a rapid increase of 
deportations of Tajiks and other Central Asians in the winter of 2013–
2014 and fuelled the fear of deportation for Tajiks working in Dubai. At 
the same time, the current economic crisis in Russia has led to a striking 
slump in the number of Russian tourists and thus forced many Tajiks 
working in the tourist sector to look for new job opportunities outside 
the Emirates.
Struggling with these problems, Tajiks in Dubai simultaneously 
have to cope with a new wave of migrants from Tajikistan and Russia, 
who stimulate the ‘homegrown’ urban fear of ‘ruralization’ through 
the arrival of migrants from remote areas to the urban setting of 
Dubai. Due to the economic crisis in both Tajikistan and Russia, many 
unskilled and badly educated young men from rural areas try to become 
successful in running a business in Dubai. While some of the young 
men use their family connections, others utilize their social networks 
(odnoklasnik) and move directly from Russia to the Emirates. Still others 
come to Dubai after having been deported from Russia. Badly skilled, 
inexperienced, and without the necessary language proficiency, they 
face difficulties in gaining a foothold in the established Dubai business 
world and overwhelmingly become involved in undocumented street 
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work as kamak. The Russian tourist sector, therefore, has become a 
highly competitive field. Many established middlemen complained to 
us about the youngsters’ crude and ill-mannered behavior, as these 
relative newcomers hang around in large groups in front of hotels and 
shops and lack the work ethic of the Tajik community that operates 
in Al Nasr Square. Thus, they fear that the newcomers could frighten 
away the tourists and jeopardize the good reputation Tajik middlemen 
have among Afghans and Iranians in the Emirates, or, as a concerned 
middleman working as kamak and tourist guide at Al Nasr Square has 
put it: 
‘We Tajiks are everywhere! But everywhere our reputation (obrū) is very 
low (past). In Russia, they call us churky (wooden stump). Many of us 
come from rural areas. We are (a) poor (nation). Many (Tajiks) came to 
Dubai also in the hope to get respected […] as Muslims, because Dubai 
is an Islamic country. […] we worked hard to gain standing here. We are 
educated, have good manners (odob), we are urbanites (shahry). That’s 
why Afghans, Iranians, and even Arab migrants (migranty) show us 
respect. They trust us and do business with us. But now they (the newly 
arrived Tajik youngsters) come directly from the villages. They’ve never 
lived in a city, they aren’t educated, they speak with loud voices and 
shout, are dressed like farmers (dehqonho), and they violate our rules […]. 
They will destroy our businesses and tarnish our reputation’ (Dubai, 
2013).
As a consequence, many Tajik middlemen seek to leave the kamak 
business and instead increase their investment in Afghan or Iranian 
business connections. In this context, the perceived shame of Tajik 
identity is increasingly detrimental to Tajiks’ self-perception as 
economic middlemen in the Dubai business world and eventually led 
to a heightened identification as ‘Muslim’, rather than ‘Tajik’. 
On translocality
This chapter has explored the translocal livelihoods of well-educated, 
mobile Tajiks working in the United Arab Emirates ever since the Dubai 
boom that reached Tajikistan in the late 1990s and connected local 
markets and households with the global flows of wholesale and retail 
trade, as well with the thriving Gulf tourism industry. Tracing how 
our interlocutors operate as economic middlemen and mediators, this 
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chapter has depicted the economic mobility of Dubai’s Tajiks between 
their ‘homes’ in Tajikistan, the migrant community in Russia, and 
various formal and informal business sectors in the Gulf. As the three 
selected ethnographic case studies have illustrated, Dubai is a key site 
of economic linkages spanning national and cultural boundaries, and it 
offers a wide range of work availabilities for Tajiks, particularly in the 
tourist and trading sectors. Pushed by Russia’s recent attempts to restrict 
residency status for Tajik and other Central Asian migrants who are 
not citizens of a member-state of the Eurasian Economic Union, Dubai 
has become an alternative destination for many skilled and unskilled 
Tajiks. As we have shown, Tajiks invest their cultural and social capital 
in multiple ways and they successfully integrate into various economic 
sectors. As they are familiar with the Russian language and culture, they 
connect Afghan and Iranian entrepreneurs with the booming Russian-
speaking tourist market in the United Arab Emirates. Crossing cultural 
boundaries through their language proficiency, translocal business 
networks, and religious identity as Sunni-Hanafi Muslims, many Tajiks 
connect people, places, and markets at ‘home’ with those in the Middle 
East and Eurasia. In their brokerage position, they create as well as 
move in translocal spaces which can facilitate economic success, social 
mobility, and the amassing of wellbeing and belonging. This creates a 
setting in which Tajiks creatively and innovatively involve themselves 
in processes of globalization (see also Henry Alff in Chapter Five). 
However, local migration regimes such as the United Arab Emirates’ 
limited residency permits for ‘foreign migrant workers’, as well the 
fragile economic situation at ‘home’, push many Tajiks in Dubai into the 
status of undocumented workers facing uncertainty and vulnerability. 
We therefore argue that the livelihoods of Tajik middlemen in Dubai 
are characterized by complex processes of negotiation between multiple 
opportunities and constraints. Thus, translocality is a possibility, i.e., 
an urban setting that facilitates the pursuit of a livelihood outside the 
limitations created by economic, migration, and deportation systems. 
But the Dubai business is at the same time a highly volatile field that 
creates new, uncertain, and precarious working conditions for Tajik 
migrants. Translocality is therefore both produced and experienced by 
our Tajik interlocutors as a social reality that is formed by the creative 
and flexible combination of economic strategies, mobile experiences, 
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and cultural competencies by which Tajiks in the Gulf try to ensure 
the sustainability and success of their mobile livelihoods shaped by 
incomplete post-Soviet nation-building projects and the precarious 
outcomes of the global economy. 
Conceptualizing ‘translocality’ as a research perspective also 
allows us to critically scrutinize hegemonic theories of migration and 
globalization. As a consequence, this chapter has put emphasis on how 
translocal connections and transfers between Central Asia, Russia, and 
the Gulf are socially constructed by non-elite and non-state actors, 
who in the academic literature are often one-dimensionally portrayed 
as peripheral actors moving in marginal urban spaces (see Smith 
2011). Emphasizing their capacity to connect, mediate, and expand, 
we have explored how Tajiks in Dubai play a pivotal role in shaping 
the circulation and transfer of consumer goods, people, knowledge, 
and ideas. Obviously, Tajiks’ involvement in the global trading and 
tourist business is not a unidirectional transfer process from the 
Gulf to Tajikistan. The Tajik Dubai business covers multidirectional 
transfer processes, in which Tajik middlemen substantially contribute 
to the transcultural and transnational urbanism and cosmopolitanism 
of Dubai’s city spaces and business sectors. Hence translocality as 
a research perspective opens up new epistemological avenues into 
understanding globalization not merely by focusing on macro- or meso-
level processes termed as ‘Gulfization’ or ‘Dubaization’ in the fields of 
the economy and urbanization (Wippel et al. 2014). With its focus on 
Tajik middlemen, this chapter has instead argued for a ‘social history’ of 
the Tajik Dubai business ‘from below’ (Freitag and von Oppen 2010:5) 
written from the perspective of actors who are not integral parts of the 
Gulf’s interregional economic and social past (Osella and Osella 2012, 
Vora 2013), but who, through their cultural and business ties, actively 
connect to it. Furthermore, by becoming involved in and expanding the 
Russian tourist business, Tajik middlemen become influential actors in 
shaping translocal relations in Dubai’s informal economy. This leads 
us to support Neha Vora’s critical response to dominant academic 
representation of the Gulf as ‘exclusively Middle Eastern’ (Vora 2013:3). 
Finally, we have argued that the Tajik Dubai business is ‘translocal’ 
because the economic activities Tajik middlemen are involved in are 
embedded, yet also ‘emplaced’ in a complex configuration of spatial 
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relations between people, places, and markets in Central Asia, Eurasia, 
and the Gulf. These configurations also include Tajiks’ spatial experiences 
tied to these places. We thus associate being a middleman with the 
capacity, and the awareness of the capacity, to cope with uncertainty 
and volatility in geographic settings far from ‘home’. Showing a cultural 
competence, or ‘a built-up skill in manoeuvring more or less expertly 
with a particular system of meanings and meaningful forms’ (Hannerz 
1990:239), Tajik middleman open up new economic paths into the 
vibrant Dubai business. In the process, they connect, mediate, transfer, 
and translate their academic and business knowledge into culturally 
and economically different local contexts.
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TRAVELLING IDEAS:  
SACRED AND SECULAR

3. Sacred Lineages in Central Asia: 
Translocality and Identity
Azim Malikov
Introduction
One of the striking aspects of Central Asia is its cultural and ethnic 
diversity from ancient times until today. In the pre-Soviet period, group 
identities including tribal, clan, local, and family identities were more 
important for the Central Asian population in determining loyalties 
than ethnic origin (Baldauf 1992:5). A complex of multiple identities 
was intimately intertwined with the social and economic conditions 
of the region. Social identity is therefore conceived of as open, flexible, 
multiple and contextual in place and time.
While ethnic groups have been the main focus of study among 
ethnologists interested in Central Asian social identity, I contend that 
the examination of lower-level social units such as clans and lineages 
is also important to understand identity-formation processes. For 
example, the same clan can often be found in more than one ethnic 
group (Schlee 1994). 
Out of many different social, tribal, and regional groups in Central 
Asia, so-called ‘holy groups’,1 or sacred lineages,2 whose identity was 
1  By ‘sacred lineage’ or ‘holy group’ I mean privileged groups that have high social 
status and claim to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, his companions, the 
first caliphs and Sufi saints.
2  A lineage is usually taken to be a group of people who trace descent unilineally 
from a common ancestor through a series of traceable links (Holý 1996:74–75).
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transformed during the twentieth century, are the focus of this chapter. 
At present, due to different models of nation-building and social and 
cultural shifts in countries of the region, new changes in their identity 
are taking place.
The Kazakhs, Karakalpaks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Uyghurs and Uzbeks 
in Central Asia share some distinct ‘holy groups’ including the Khoja,3 
Sayyids,4 and Ishon.5 Some of these lineages feature among two or 
more of these ethno-regional groups. The ways these ethnic groups 
conceptulize membership of the Khoja or Sayyid lineages provides an 
excellent case study of the translocal dimension of these groups’ links 
and relations. 
The term translocality refers to a complex and multi-faceted 
phenomenon. Tenhunen (2011:416) defines translocality as relations that 
‘extend beyond the village community’. Other scholars use translocality 
as a descriptive tool that refers to the ‘sum of phenomena which result 
from a multitude of circulations and transfers’ (Freitag and von Oppen 
2010:5). One aspect of translocality is the visualisation and imagining 
of linkages between places, what Brickell and Datta (2011:18) refer to as 
‘translocal imagination’. Translocal approaches are applied to enhance 
the understanding of various phenomena, covering such issues as 
identity formation, media usage, and knowledge transfer.
Understanding processes of identification requires familiarity with 
the contexts in which they occur. ‘Such contexts include particular 
geographical and infrastructural conditions, the actors who live 
under such conditions, a wide variety of institutions, different kinds 
of social relations, material resources, and also the kinds of symbolic 
and discursive resources that we call collective identities’ (Donahoe et 
al. 2009:10). Various identities become applicable in various situations. 
Collective identities are articulated with reference to different 
3  The terms Khoja, Khwaja, Khodja, Qozha which mean ‘master’ in Persian have been 
taken to imply, variously, descent from ‘Arabs’, descent from the Prophet or Ali, 
descent from the first caliphs, or descent from Islamizing saints (DeWeese, 1999). 
There is also the term Ahl Al-bayt (‘People of the House’, meaning the household of 
Prophet Muhammad).
4  The Sayyids are a group of people who claim direct patrilineal descent from the 
Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima.
5  Ishon was a title or a name given to respected religious figures — the heads of Sufi 
brotherhoods of various levels and their descendants.
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dimensions (nationality, ethnicity, kinship, language, religion, local or 
regional origins, etc.). In some situations we want to note distinction, 
and in others we look for something in common or a general affiliation. 
Groups in certain conditions can keep their clan identity after an ethnic 
reaffiliation (Schlee 1994:234). The history of Central Asian ‘holy groups’, 
their genealogy and identification has been studied by O. Sukhareva 
(1960), B. Karmysheva (1976), A. Muminov (1996, 1998, 2011), D. 
DeWeese (1995, 1999, 2008), B. Privratsky (2001, 2004), S. Abashin (2001a, 
2001b, 2005, 2006), Z. Ibadullaeva (2001), B. Babajanov (2006), Yayoi 
Kawahara (2012), Morimoto Kazuo (2014), K. Abdullaev (2008:373–80), 
and K. Kalonov (2005) and others. A significant proportion of these 
studies, however, deal with local societies. 
Abashin studied the sacred lineages of the Ferghana Valley, the 
relationships between them, and what he considers the area’s ‘holy 
groups’ as part of the larger group of ‘the descendants of the saints’ in 
Central Asia (Abashin 2005:70). Kazakh researcher Ibadullaeva studied 
the Khoja in southern Kazakhstan. She also analyzed the oral history 
of this holy group and their kinship networks in some provinces of 
Uzbekistan (Ibadullaeva 2001). According to Finke, in the southern part 
of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm ‘a few interlocutors assigned Khoja the 
status of an ethnic group, but this has not been officially recognized. 
Most people in above mentioned regions would probably disagree with 
such a claim. This second interpretation unites Khoja across different 
ethnic groups, in particular Karakalpaks, Kazaks and Uzbeks’ (Finke 
2014:122).
Some ‘holy groups’ fulfilled eminent religious and social duties in 
pre-Soviet Central Asian society and were held in very high esteem by 
everyone (Sukhareva 1960:66–68). Members of these lineages performed 
religious services at ritual celebrations, acted as healers, and helped 
settle disputes. Some were also the caretakers of Sufi shrines (DeWeese 
1999). During the Soviet period, state policies on restructuring society 
and local identities in Central Asia led to the transformation of sacred 
lineages. Khojas lost their previous religious status as mediators between 
local communities, because the Soviet authorities denied their legal and 
economic privileges, persecuted, and repressed them (see Abdullaev in 
Chapter One).
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My previous research on the Khoja of Central Asia6 has established 
criteria for the study of the translocal communications of ‘holy groups’. 
I examine how members of these ‘holy groups’ create, discursively 
perform and renegotiate the boundaries of their own group on various 
scales (local and translocal), and how they thereby refer to very different 
symbols and markers of identity. Acknowledging the heterogeneity that 
exists across Central Asia, my examples are based on two regions, namely 
the Turkistan region of Kazakhstan and Tashkent city of Uzbekistan. 
My goal is to study the transformation of the translocal links 
between, and the identities of, the ‘holy groups’ over the past 110 years, 
including the following periods: the Russian Empire (1867–1917), the 
Soviet period (1917–1991), and the post-Soviet period. Each interval had 
its own peculiarities and a different degree of influence on ‘holy groups’ 
and their identification. The largest transformations of society took 
place during the Soviet period. Nowadays, the influence of ideological 
development on post-Soviet countries as well as the broadening effects 
of globalization are more tangible. 
This chapter marks, to my knowledge, the first application of the 
concept of translocality to the study of ‘holy groups’. Some of these 
groups can be called ‘translocal communities’, because they relate ‘to 
a group of (translocal) households, whose members live in diverse 
locations, which are connected through functional interdependencies’ 
(Lohnert and Steinbrink 2005:98). These ‘holy groups’ demonstrate 
multiple identities, one of which is translocal in nature, i.e., it goes 
beyond a single village, region, country, or social group. I studied Khoja 
and Sayyid groups in Tashkent, a context that, prior to this, has not been 
studied specifically, and I examined ‘holy groups’ in two regions, and 
within different social and cultural contexts. The data I shall present 
was collected during multiple short-term field-research trips between 
2010 and 2015, mainly to Tashkent city in Uzbekistan, as well as to the 
Turkistan region of Kazakhstan.7 
6  For more detailed analysis of the history of Khoja lineages in the Turkistan region 
see Malikov and Khoji (2014) and Malikov (2013a).
7  Most of my data from the Turkistan region was collected with financial and scientific 
support from the Max-Planck Institute for Social Anthropology during my field 
trips in 2010 and 2011; additional data from the Tashkent province of Uzbekistan 
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In this chapter I employ a conceptual framework based on the 
notion of ‘translocality’, and a methodological framework based on the 
combination of multi-sited ethnography with an oral history approach. 
I trace the flow of ideas and imagined translocal links between ‘holy 
groups’ and investigate differences in the practical meaning and uses of 
Khoja, Sayyid, and other identities in the above-mentioned communities. 
I examine the translocal relationships between sacred lineages that have 
different language and regional affiliations. Thus, my research covers 
two Central Asian countries with different models of nation-building, 
ideology, etc. 
My choice of Tashkent province and the Turkistan region as my 
objects of study is far from random. Tashkent is known as a city where 
representatives of ‘holy groups’ had high status in the past and created 
their own state at the end of the eighteenth century. The Turkistan region 
of Kazakhstan is the biggest religious centre in the country. There, 
many Khoja and Sayyids of various lineages and ethnic affiliations are 
concentrated. These localities are meaningful for my analysis because 
of their sacred value as historically relevant junctions of transregional 
pilgrimage, and within scholarly and other networks. As such, they are 
relevant for the formation of certain social and religious identities. In the 
past, translocal communications took place between particular sacred 
lineages who lived in different regions, driven by several mutually 
overlapping reasons: family ties, leadership or membership in Sufi 
brotherhoods, visiting shrines such as the graves of ancestors, etc.
I argue that the Soviet policy to modernize and homogenize society 
in Central Asia and to create national identities did not eliminate 
ancestral identities in the region. Despite the Soviet nationalities policy, 
some families belonging to ‘holy groups’ preserved a kind of ‘hidden 
identity’. I observed a wide array of ways to identify members of 
sacred lineages in Central Asia depending on geographic, social and 
was collected with financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation’s project 
‘Translocal Goods — Education, Work, and Commodities between Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, China, and the Arab Emirates’ in 2015. I would like to express 
my gratitude to Manja Stephan-Emmrich, Philipp Schröder, Nathan Light, Jeanine 
Dagyeli, Tricia Ryan and anonymous reviewers for comments and suggestions on 
this chapter.
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cultural contexts. In the pre-Soviet period, the criteria used to recognize 
different groups of Khoja and Sayyid were genealogy and the name of 
an ancestor who was a Sufi figure; now, from our point of view, it is 
advisable to use criteria such as linguistic affiliation to better understand 
how changes occurred, especially after seventy years of Soviet rule and 
the development of national republics, national ideologies, and national 
histories.
This chapter consists of six parts: the introduction above, an 
overview of the theoretical framework, a historical review, descriptions 
of research in the Turkistan region of Kazakhstan and in Tashkent in the 
Republic of Uzbekistan, and my conclusions.
Theoretical approach
A translocal perspective captures the diverse and contradictory effects 
of interconnectedness between places, institutions, and actors (Freitag 
and von Oppen 2010:1, Greiner and Sakdapolrak 2013:3–4). The study 
of borders between locality and translocality from the points of view of 
geography, time, and social groupings is also important. It is necessary 
to take into consideration the factors that change social relations and 
local places due to the arrival of electronic media and the consequent 
breakdown of barriers around space, place, and culture (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1992).
This chapter conceptualizes identity and belonging through the lens 
of translocality and we should therefore examine this concept in several 
aspects: 1) translocality is clearly understood as interrelation and 
connectedness between different geographic places; 2) translocality is 
also applied to study the use of media and the circulation of knowledge 
and ideas in globally operating networks; 3) the concept of translocality 
also refers to symbolic flows such as movements of ideas, images, and 
symbols (Greiner and Sakdapolrak 2013:5); 4) I use the term ‘translocal’ to 
explore the overlapping relational identities that emerge within, and the 
multi-directional dynamics of, ‘holy groups’. Accordingly, translocality 
is understood as an imaginary bridge between the past and the present, 
and as the circulation of ideas between different chronological periods 
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and geographical locations. Translocal imagination is a kind of place 
perception, linking locality to a broader set of processes. 
The concept of translocality allows us to better understand three 
aspects of the relationships between ‘holy groups’ in Central Asia: 
interregional connections, links between different timescales, and 
relationships between the ‘holy groups’ located in different cultural and 
political environments. The collected empirical material allows us to 
make a contribution to the discussion about the concept of translocality 
given the complexity of social, cultural, and genealogical relationships 
between the groups of sacred lineages, as well as the transformation 
of identities through different historical periods. Comparative analysis 
between the two above-mentioned regions allows the application of the 
translocality concept to four contexts: rural, urban, interregional and 
interstate. The translocations in these two latter contexts are intertwined. 
Historical review
The ‘holy groups’ (Sayyid, Khoja, Ishon etc.) had a particular position 
in the social hierarchy of Muslim communities in Central Asia. As in 
many other Muslim societies, they have long enjoyed a privileged 
status. Scholars have come to the conclusion that the Sayyids or Alids 
emerged as one of the local elites in Central Asia in the late ninth century 
(Bernheimer 2005:44). 
The terms Khoja or Khwaja (which mean ‘master’ in Persian) were 
first mentioned in written sources in the tenth century; they were 
applied to some government officials (Rezvan 1991:280). Apparently, 
the use of Khoja as the name of a group of religious descent started 
in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Different groups of Khoja use 
various explanations for their origin. Some Khoja groups are believed to 
be the descendants of the first caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali 
(excluding his descendants from the daughter of Prophet Muhammad, 
Fatima) (Rezvan 1991:280), whereas some other groups claim to be 
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. It is worth mentioning that in 
some areas the term Khoja has various meanings today; for example, a 
teacher, a mullah, a title of honour, etc. 
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In Central Asia, the so-called ‘holy groups’ also differ in their names: 
Khoja, Qoja, Ovlat, Sayyid, Khan, Mir, Mahdum-zada, Shaykh, Ishon, 
Tura, etc. According to Muminov, the descendants of Ali ibn Abi Talib 
from the Prophet’s daughter Fatima (Sayyid, Sharif) in some Central 
Asian societies have equal status with the Khoja groups, and sometimes 
are less revered than these families (Muminov 2011:26). According to 
my observations, in some regions of Central Asia the term Sayyid is a 
synonym of Ishon, which means ‘they’ in Persian, while in some areas 
Sayyids and Ishons are perceived as different groups. The designations 
given to ‘holy families’ are very diverse; for example, some of them refer 
to the titles of rulers (Shah, Khan, Amir), others refer to the upper class 
of society (Tura, Ishon, Mahdum, Khwaja, Sayyid); ‘the descendants of the 
saint’ (aulad, Mahdum-zoda, Ishon-zoda), etc. Researchers call them by the 
generic term ‘descendants of saints’ (aulad-i awliya) (Muminov 2011:26).
Before 1917, Uzbek and Kazakh societies were divided into two 
hereditary social groups, named Oqsuyak or Aksuyek (White Bone) 
which included ‘holy groups’ (Sayyid, Khoja, Ishon etc.) and Qorasuyak 
or Qarasuyek (Qoracha, Black Bone), the term used to denote commoners. 
In different regions there are smaller gradations of ‘holy groups’ and 
there were various criteria that determined the position of certain ‘holy 
lineages’. According to Abashin, in the Fergana Valley, the first rank of 
nobility took Tura, the second Eshon (Ishon), the third Khoja, and the 
last Makhsum (Abashin 2006:269–71). The degree of nobility of ‘holy 
groups’ depended on marriages with political leaders and the sanctity 
of those families. One man could have several or even all of the above 
titles. He could be a Khoja, and in some cases at the same time he could 
be a Sayyid, i.e., the Prophet’s descendant. He could have a right to the 
titles of Ishon and Sheykh as well (Abashin 2001a). 
In general, the ‘holy groups’ follow the cultural traditions of the 
majority of the population among whom they live. However, they have 
some traits that mark them out from the rest of population. Frequently, 
the members of these families add the titles of Khoja, Sayyid and Khon 
to their names (Muminov 2011:27). According to written sources, in the 
nineteenth century Sayyids were included in the composition of the 
Khoja; nevertheless, the Kazakhs gave them higher status than other 
‘holy groups’ (Beysenbayuli 1994:95). Among experts in genealogy, 
there are different versions of the classification of lineages of the 
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Kazakh-speaking Khoja (see Muminov 2011). According to one version, 
just seventeen clans (ru) of the Kazakh Khoja are specified as equal in 
status (Muminov 2011:26).8
The name and authority of the holy Sufi leader Khoja Ahmad Yassavi 
is used in different ways at the consecration of the alliances of different 
Khoja families. For example, among the Kazakh-speaking Khojas of Alty 
shaykh balalari, the succession continues only by patrilineage through 
Ahmad Yassavi’s brother, Sadr-khoja, and among the contemporary 
Uzbek-speaking Khoja of Turkistan, through the line of his daughters 
(his biological daughter, Gaukhar Shakhnaz, and foster daughter 
Djamila-bibi). Their descendants are the following groups of Khoja: 
Shaykh al-Islam, Nakib, Shaykh-‘azlar (DeWeese 1999:514). 
In other regions of Central Asia, one can find other classifications 
of ‘holy groups’. For example, Sadriddin Aini (1878–1954), who was 
one of the Bukharian reformist intellectuals (jadids), gave a panoramic 
overview of rural life in Bukhara during the nineteenth century in his 
unfinished Reminiscences. He considered the Khoja as a distinct regional 
group and gave the classification of Khoja to his village, Soktare, which 
was near the town of Ghijduvan in the modern Bukhara province of 
Uzbekistan. Khojas of this village constituted four clans: Mirakoni, 
Sayyid Atoi, Ghijduvoni, and Soktaregi (Aini 1998:31–32).
Gellner (1995:160) mentions that in northern Africa the distinction 
between religious orders and holy lineages is a loose one. Religious 
orders are led by holy lineages, and in turn successful holy lineages 
may expand their following into tariqa, an order (Gellner 1995:160). 
One can say the same thing about the Central Asian Khojas or Shaykhs, 
who became leaders of the Naqshbandi and Yassavi Sufi orders in the 
region (DeWeese 1999). Not all Khojas were mullahs even in pre-Soviet 
times. Many Khojas were simply peasants, some nomadized with the 
Kazakhs, and others, as in Tashkent, were successful merchants. Also, 
not all members of the Khoja or Sayyid groups were socially equal; some 
families were very rich, others not. For the male non-Khoja and non-
Sayyid it was not possible to become a member of a Sayyid or Khoja 
group that had hereditary rights (Sukhareva 1960:66–67). 
8  Among others, these include Akorgandik, Akkoja, Baksayis, Khorasan, Duana, 
Seyit, Qilishti, Sabult, Qilavuz.
Fig. 3.1  Genealogical links of the descendants of Khoja Ahmad Yassavi.  
Map data © Google (2018), all rights reserved
Fig. 3.2  Family tree of the descendants of Khoja Ahmad Yassavi.  
Photo © Azim Malikov (2010), CC BY 4.0
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In the pre-Soviet period, the Khoja (Qoja) title was widespread among 
the sacred lineages of Kazakhs and Uzbeks in the Turkistan region. 
Kazakh-speaking Khoja groups are comprised of lineages operating 
as components of complex, segmented societies. Most ethnic Kazakhs 
belonged to one of three ‘hordes’ (djuz). While these Kazakh tribal 
confederations were regarded as the ‘Black Bone’ (qara süyek), the Khoja 
(as well as the Tore, the offspring of Genghis Khan) were considered 
honour groups belonging to the ‘White Bone’ (aq süyek). Accordingly, 
the Khoja and Tore groups are not included in numerous Kazakh 
genealogies (Qazaq shezhiresi) (Privratsky 2004:167). 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the most famous 
and noble lineages of Khoja in the Turkistan region of Kazakhstan 
consisted of many groups: Sayyid Ata, Qilishti khoja, descendants of the 
third son of Caliph Ali, Muhammad Khanafiya, descendants of Khoja 
Ahmad Yassavi etc. (Sukhareva 1960:66–67). Before 1917, genealogy 
had several purposes. It was the main legal and symbolic record of 
sacred lineages and it granted these groups certain rights; in some cases 
it was confirmation of the special status of the lineage. According to 
Sukhareva’s research, particularly ‘noble’ Khoja lineages maintained 
written genealogical records (shajara) (Sukhareva 1960:67–68). 
When studying the Khoja in Kazakh society, it is necessary to 
distinguish those groups that formed independently in the Kazakh 
steppes from groups of representatives of famous Khoja lineages 
already known and politically influential in the Central Asian states. For 
example, Mahdumi Azam9 (1461–1542), an outstanding theologian and 
Sufi leader of the sixteenth century, had thirteen sons, each of whom 
became progenitors of Khoja lineages among Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, 
and the Uyghur. Kazakh sultans and biys invited Khoja to control 
religious rituals and customs such as wedding ceremonies, funeral 
ceremonies, circumcisions, etc. 
Similar to the ideas of Donahoe and Schlee about how trans-ethnic 
groups emerged in Eastern Africa and Siberia (2003:79–80), translocal 
Sayyid identity in Central Asia was formed in two different ways. 
Firstly, Sayyid predates the emergence of the ethnic identities Kazakh 
and Uzbek. Secondly, after the boundaries between modern ethnic 
groups had started to come into being, individuals or groups crossed 
9  Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Khwājagī Kāsānī ‘Mahdūm-i Aʻẓam’.
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them and affiliated themselves with another ethnic group. In the cases 
in which they started to follow a nomadic lifestyle, they did not give up 
their original affiliation. These collective adoptions did not supersede 
the older clan relationships by descent or putative descent, particularly 
in urban areas and adjacent territories. 
According to Abashin, each family of the ‘descendants of saints’ 
was fixed to a particular territory, a particular group of the population, 
of which they have been trans-generational spiritual leaders (pirs). In 
Tashkent, the pirs of local rulers were descendants of Shaykh Hovand-i 
Tokhur, who lived in the fourteenth century (Abashin 2001b:127). Some 
Khoja and Sayyid lineages have links with local shrines, which constitute 
an important symbolic resource for them. A shrine for a Khoja is first 
of all a place of memory, i.e., the memory of an ancestor’s historical 
activity. These major shrines act as symbols for the imaginary translocal 
communities of Khoja. Thus, the role of shrines as a geographic place or 
locality, and also as a sacred site, can be conceptualized with reference 
to ‘translocality’.
In the pre-Soviet and early Soviet period (the 1920s), Sufi shrines 
in Central Asia played a strong role as concrete physical or material 
‘places’ within the more geographical places of the oases or regions; i.e., 
they served as ‘mediators’ or ‘communicators’ of ideas and practices, 
or as nodes in the connections between the different geographic places. 
In the pre-Soviet period, cemeteries, shrines and tombstones of some 
outstanding Khojas with a tugh (top of a banner which was attached to 
the grave of famous saint, i.e., a wali) (Babajanov, Nekrasova, 2006:384–
85) were among the symbols of Uzbek-speaking Khoja. In general, Sufi 
actors, groups, and networks have had a big impact on the history of 
Islam in Muslim Central Asia (Sukhareva 1960).
The main shrines of Central Asia were located in Samarkand 
(the shrine of Qusam ibn Abbos and the shrine of Mahdumi Azam 
in Daghbit, Samarkand province), Tashkent (the shrine of Shaykh 
Hovandi Tokhur), Turkistan (the shrine of Khoja Ahmad Yassavi), and 
Bukhara (the shrine of Bahauddin Naqshband). Thousands of pilgrims 
from the different parts of Central Asia visit these shrines annually. The 
graves of the ancestors of some groups of Kazakh-speaking Khoja are in 
Samarkand (Mahdumi Azam, his sons), and some shrines of the Uzbek-
speaking Khoja are located in the Turkistan region. 
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Some Khoja and Sayyid studied in the Bukhara’s and Samarkand’s 
famous Islamic schools (madrasa). Besides their religious activities, 
members of sacred lineages migrated from one region to another due to 
economic reasons. Those involved in Sufi practice often had thousands 
of disciples in different parts of Central Asia. Moreover, Uzbek-speaking 
Khoja and Ishons usually had disciples among Kazakhs in border 
territories. 
The following elements united the Khoja and Sayyid of Central Asia 
into one translocal group and formed a sense of ‘translocal imagination’: 
the shared idea of an origin from the Prophet, the first caliphs, or a Sufi 
saint; shrines; a shared sacred genealogy; and commoners’ perceptions 
of the group as sacred. The stories about holy ancestors were spread 
through oral narratives passed on from one generation to another as 
well as through religious books. Later, Soviet national identity policies 
played an important role in destroying these translocal communications. 
According to Barth, the state is ‘a specifiable third player in the processes 
of boundary construction between groups, rather than confound 
the regime, and its powers and interests, with the more nebulous 
concepts of state and nation’ (1994:19). In 1924, the existing political-
administrative organization was broken up by the national delimitation 
of Central Asia and replaced by ethnically defined Soviet republics. This 
national delimitation was seen as the implementation of the people’s 
right to self-determination. Language was viewed as the central criteria 
for affiliation to an ethnic group (Fedtke 2007:21–24). The formation of 
Soviet republics laid the structural foundations for a reformulation of 
the parameters of identity in modern Central Asia (Akiner 1998:12–13).
Accordingly, Soviet state policy also had a great deal of influence on 
the identity of ‘sacred lineages’ and it had dramatic consequences for 
many Khojas in Central Asia. Khoja communities lost their property and 
their sources of income. In the 1920s and 1930s, a significant proportion 
of Central Asian Khoja intellectuals were arrested and killed, especially if 
they were mullahs and teachers of Islam (Privratsky 2001). Nevertheless, 
according to Schoeberlein-Engel: ‘Later, during the 1960–1980s in some 
areas descendants of religious elite groups were well-represented in 
the local KGB, police force, and positions of authority controlled by 
the Communist party. Members of this group were maximizing their 
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benefit from structures of significance that contribute to the construction 
of legitimate elite status’ (Schoeberlein-Engel 1994:259). 
In Central Asia, ‘the descendants of the saints — despite the strength 
of both nationalism and fundamentalism — has not dissolved into 
modernized society, but on the contrary, has preserved its position to a 
great extent’ (Abashin 2005:70). This is despite the fact that some Tashkent 
Khoja families sacrificed their religious identity in order to announce 
themselves ‘bearers of national consciousness’ and ‘the intellectual elite’ 
(Abashin 2005:78). There were also changes to marriage traditions in 
the Soviet period, meaning that more Khoja families formed marriage 
alliances with the non-Khoja elite (Abashin 2005). Additionally, a 
transformation of identity and the loss of the social and economic status 
of the holy families occurred during the Soviet period. Pilgrimages 
to shrines were prohibited, and pilgrims were prosecuted by the 
authorities (Muminov 1996:366). Many sacred places were destroyed, 
abandoned or turned into museums on the orders of the Soviet state. 
Any transfer of ideas of sainthood through books and manuscripts was 
rigorously prosecuted. 
During the first years of the post-Soviet period, a new interest in local 
history was supported by a revival of sacred places and the publication 
of books on the history of sacred lineages. Since the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian republics in 
1991, the Khojas, particularly in Kazakhstan, have recovered some of 
their former prestige. The Soviet policy of societal homogenization in 
Central Asia and the creation of national identities could not eliminate 
some specific groups in the region. Despite the strictures put in place 
by Soviet ideology, some Khoja families kept alive their memory of the 
past and maintained the symbolic capital of shrines and genealogies 
during the 1980 and 1990s. 
The scale of the translocal relations (or even translocal imagination) 
of sacred lineages differed. I distinguish several levels: between villages, 
between rural and urban areas, across regions, and between states. It 
should be noted that not all groups of the sacred lineages of the pre-
Soviet period can be called ‘translocal societies’. It was common for a 
few Khoja families to live in one village, and they had to seek marriage 
partners belonging to their ‘sacred group’ in other villages.
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Turkistan region
The Turkistan region lies on the frontier of the settled oasis culture of 
Transoxiana to the south, and the world of the former steppe nomads 
to the north. It is the homeland of the holy Sufi leader Khoja Ahmad 
Yassavi, who lived here during the twelfth century and is buried in the 
town. In 1930, more than 200 families in the city of Turkistan considered 
themselves the descendants of Khoja Ahmad Yassavi (Masson 1930:19).
Turkistan is a part of the South Kazakhstan province of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, which borders Uzbekistan’s Tashkent province. The 
population of Turkistan city is more than 152,000.10 In 2016, almost 73% 
of the population of South Kazakhstan province were Kazakhs; the 
second largest population were Uzbeks, comprising 16.8%. In terms of 
population, the South Kazakhstan region is the largest in Kazakhstan, 
being 2,841,000.11 
Turkistan is inhabited by various ‘holy groups’, including Khojas 
(Privratsky 2001). Traditionally Kazakhs belong to the Sunni branch 
of Islam, which is influenced by Sufism. South Kazakhstan traditions 
differ in some respects from the central parts of Central Asia, mainly 
related to the localization and interpretation of certain Qur’anic subjects 
(Muminov 1996:356). 
After independence in 1991, the political elite of Kazakhstan 
started elaborating a new national ideology to create patriotic feelings 
towards the new state. The search for balance between the multiethnic 
and multiconfessional nature of the population and the development 
of the Kazakh nation began. This double process encompassed both 
nationalization in favour of representatives of the titular nation 
(‘Kazakhization’) and promotion of a civic Kazakhstan identity 
(‘Kazakhstanization’) (Davenel 2012:19). Scholars believe that this 
process influenced all spheres of social life, which, to some degree, is 
a continuation of the policy of ‘rooting’ (korenizatsia) that occurred in 
the Kazakh Soviet Socialistic Republic in the 1960s (Davenel, 2012:19–
20). From some researchers’ point of view, although Kazakhstan is 
10  http://meta.kz/novosti/kazakhstan/777107-samymi-bystrorastuschimi-gorodami-
v-rk-za-poslednie-10-let-stali-turkestan-zhanaozen-i-kaskelen.html
11  http://www.stat.gov.kz/faces/wcnav_externalId/publBullS14-2016
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a multiconfessional state, the elite use Islam to encourage citizens 
to identify with state support of religious institutions (Cummings, 
2005:88). The state ideology propagandizes Khoja Ahmad Yassavi and 
his shrine as the national spiritual and religious centre. Indeed, this 
policy is aimed at building the nation and forming a national ideology.
One can observe a reconstitution of lineage-based identities, in 
large part due to local initiatives. ‘The ru and zhuz-based genealogies 
experienced a revival as traits that distinguished ethnic Kazakhs from 
the non-titular citizens of independent Kazakhstan’ (Schatz 2000). 
The existence of so-called lineage-based identity, which favours the 
preservation of the local and translocal identities of separate groups 
of Khoja in South Kazakhstan, is significant to social processes. The 
stories of local saints emphasize the presence of the Khoja throughout 
Kazakhstan’s history. Graves of saints, local and translocal, are 
important for the authentication of this past. These places bear evidence 
of days gone by and are important mediators between past and present. 
Local traditions are preserved by the descendants of sacred lineages 
in the form of the revival of shrines, the publication of the literature 
on saints and shrines, and the organization of festivals at the shrines 
(Sattarov 2010).
Sacred lineages of the Turkistan region consist of two linguistic 
groups: Uzbek-speaking and Kazakh-speaking. Uzbek-speaking Khojas 
claim to be descendants of Khoja Ahmad Yassavi or his relatives and 
disciples, including Gaukhar ana, Ali Khoja, Sadr ata etc. According 
to other legends, they are descendants of the people serving at the 
shrine of Khoja Ahmad Yassavi. Among Uzbeks in Kazakhstan, internal 
differentiation has traditionally been organized according to regional 
origin, i.e., Turkistonlik, Qarnoqlik, etc. Regional identities still play a 
more important role than ethnic identities (Malikov 2017:80). According 
to oral traditions, some Khojas came from Bukhara in the nineteenth 
century.12
Until the 1950s, the Uzbek-speaking Khojas in Turkistan strictly 
followed endogamous marriage practices. They never allowed daughters 
to marry qoracha — commoners. In some cases, they intermarried with 
Kazakh-speaking Khojas.13 The latter differ from Uzbek-speaking 
12  Interview with Uzbek-speaking Khoja, native of Turkistan, 55 years old, 2010.
13  Ibid.
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Khojas due to their specific lineage names. Some examples of these 
include Khorasan14 Khoja or descendants of Khorasan Ata (Abdujalil 
Bab), Duvana Khoja, Qilishti Khoja, etc. 
In my case studies, one can differentiate identities on various levels, 
including ethnic identities (e.g., Kazakh, Uzbek, Arab), civic identities 
(e.g., Kazakhstani), regional identities, tribal and clan identities or 
Khoja lineages and sub-lineages, particularly among Kazakh-speaking 
Khojas. Locality, as well as other aspects, can be a significant factor in 
forming identities.
During my interviews, some Khoja were often confused about ethnic 
categories. Some respondents doubted that Kazakhs have Khoja groups, 
and vice versa; some Kazakh-speaking Khoja did not understand 
questions about Uzbek Khojas. Turkistan Khojas had close relationships 
and marriages with Samarkand and Tashkent Khojas in the past. In the 
1930s, many of them left Turkestan for Samarkand and Tashkent. As one 
of my interlocutors mentioned, ‘There are no Kazakh or Uzbek Khojas, 
all of them belong to a single Khoja group. So-called ‘Uzbek’ and 
‘Kazakh’ Khojas are a result of the Soviet nationalities policy’ (Malikov 
2013a:105). In elaborating specific Kazakh-Khoja qualities, some Khoja 
very often seek to distinguish themselves from Uzbek Khojas, as the 
following statement by an interlocutor exemplifies: ‘The Kazakh-Khojas 
know their seven ancestors; they have higher moral values and sincerity. 
The “Uzbek Khojas” are completely different people’ (Malikov 2013a: 
105). Aside from the purely genetic explanation for the specific Khoja 
qualities, some Khojas also mention their particular history and their 
religious values. 
In Kazakh and Uzbek societies, some existing groups of Khoja 
interpret the shrines as their symbolic capital. There are Khojas 
today who retain traditional roles as caretakers (shiraqshi) of the 
mausoleums of their ancestors, for instance the shrine of Khorasan-
ata in Uzgend, Kazakhstan. For Khojas, a shrine is first of all a place 
of memory: the memory of an ancestor’s activity in history. According 
to my observations, for some Khoja groups living in different regions 
14  Khorasan comes from the name of a historical region in Southern Central Asia and 
Northern Iran. Perhaps the ancestors of Khorasan Khoja arrived in the territory of 
modern Kazakhstan from this historical region. Currently, Khorasan Khojas speak 
the Kazakh language, and in some areas they know Uzbek and Russian languages.
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and even countries, particular shrines are the main symbols of their 
past and culture. For example, the shrine of Khoja Ahmad Yassavi 
in Turkistan (Kazakhstan) is the general place of worship for some 
families of Khojas from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, who suppose 
themselves to be descendants of Khoja Ahmad Yassavi. Some families 
speak only in Uzbek and other families of Khojas speak native Kazakh. 
Therefore, in some cases the shared reverence for a holy man as their 
ancestor unites these groups. Translocality exists in the intersection of 
national, ethnic, and even geographic borders. Most Khoja know at least 
the rough outlines of their genealogy from the oral tradition of their 
kinship network. Among Kazakh-speaking Khojas the idea that each 
person should know his or her lineage for seven generations (jetty ata) 
is widespread. 
Some Khoja groups in Kazakhstan had links with sacred lineages 
in Tashkent city and province before 1917. In the 1990s, the Kazakh-
speaking Khoja of southern Kazakhstan tried to establish connections 
with related Khoja groups in the Samarkand and Tashkent regions. 
They invited related Khojas from Uzbekistan to festivals to Turkistan. 
Kazakh-speaking Khojas and Uzbek-speaking Khojas visited the shrines 
and mausoleums of their ancestors together. In the 1990s, a particular 
Kazakh-speaking Khoja family invited craftsmen from Samarkand 
province to construct Khoja shrines in southern Kazakhstan.15
During our interview, one of the Kazakh-speaking Khojas repeatedly 
stressed his respect for such cities as Samarkand and Bukhara. These 
cities were considered traditional centres of Islamic education and of 
magnificent Islamic architecture, where the sacred lineages lived and 
live. This articulated a cultural translocality, which was not simply 
expressed verbally but also in material terms. In the 1990s, craftsmen 
from Samarkand were invited to construct a shrine for one of the 
Khojas, and they used their local architectural style. But why did they 
invite craftsmen from Samarkand, and not from Turkistan, Shymkent, 
or Tashkent, which are closer to their shrine? Perhaps because one of the 
major figures of this Khoja family was buried in Samarkand, making it a 
holy city. Unfortunately, I could not talk with the Khojas who organized 
the construction of the shrine to find out their motivation for engaging 
15 Interview with a Kazakh-speaking Khoja, native of Turkistan, 65 years old, 2010.
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Samarkand craftsmen for construction. Based on my observations, this 
case is not typical in Kazakhstan.
Translocality can also be also applied to study the use of media and 
the circulation of knowledge and ideas in global networks. The post-
industrial, information-based world we live in today is dominated by 
computer-linked technology and exists in an age of globalization, which 
is characterized by increasingly interconnected societies, according to 
Macionis and Plummer (2008:42). The internet is an instrument to create 
and shape relations across time and space, and it enables and facilitates 
translocal links between sacred lineages in different parts of Central 
Asia, especially in Kazakhstan. The internet, the influence of which is 
particularly tangible in Kazakhstan, became a powerful way to spread 
the history of holy lineages and their symbols. The flow of information, 
ideas, and opinions through the internet, and its influence on identity 
formation, shows how young Khojas in Kazakhstan use online forums 
to construct and negotiate their identities as Khojas alongside their 
identities as Kazakhs. The role of the internet in producing ‘translocal 
relations and imageries’ is also present in Kazakhstan. For example, 
certain Khoja groups from different parts of Kazakhstan use websites 
such as kazakh.ru,16 which are devoted to Khoja history and are used 
to organize various events. The internet thus provides a new virtual 
technology that facilitates changing patterns of translocal communication 
among ‘holy groups’ in Central Asia in the modern globalized world.
Tashkent City
Tashkent, the capital city, is the largest city of Uzbekistan with a 
population of approximately 2.4 million as of 2016 (Demograficheskiy, 
2016:25). Tashkent is a megalopolis, where representatives of 
different nationalities and regional groups live. In this context, sacred 
lineages belonging to the city exist in an environment surrounded by 
representatives of different regional and ethnic groups that influence 
their identity and status. 
In the city and the area around Tashkent, an important centre of 
interaction between nomadic and settled cultures, the phenomenon of 
16  http://www.kazakh.ru
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sacred lineages manifested in a specific way. Each of the four blocks 
(daha) of the city was dominated by members of certain lineages: 
the descendants of Qara-Khan, the descendants of Shihab al-din 
al-Suhrawardi, the descendants of the Shaykh Hovand-i Tokhur, 
descendants of Yuvash Bab, his brother Ishaq Bab, and the successors of 
the line of Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiya. A total of seventy-three Khoja 
clans lived and operated in Tashkent in Soviet times, and some leaders 
of these families played a prominent role in public and cultural life 
(Muminov 2011:57).17
During my research in Tashkent, I interviewed members of the 
sacred lineages of different ages and occupations, both Uzbek-speaking 
and Kazakh-speaking. Thus, I was able to observe the diverse nature 
of Khojas’ emic identification depending on the geographic, social, and 
cultural specifics of the region. There is some kind of hierarchy in the 
minds of Uzbek-speaking Khoja intellectuals. Strikingly, knowledge of 
most of the saints who were members of other groups (Khoja, Sayyid, 
Mir, Ishon) in Tashkent is very limited. My respondents tend to be able to 
name only their own relatives and those with whom they communicate, 
such as neighbors, colleagues, and friends.
The next criterion for the categorization of ‘holy groups’ is their 
lineage affiliation established through genealogy, linking them with 
the Prophet or the first caliphs. In Tashkent, elderly and middle-age 
Khojas differentiate Shayhontokhur Khojas, descendants of the famous 
Sufi leader Ahmad Yassavi, and Kazakh-speaking Khojas. Here, ‘holy 
groups’ consist of two linguistic categories: Kazakh-speaking and 
Uzbek-speaking groups, which in the past were closely connected 
with the Ferghana Valley and the Turkistan region. Nowadays these 
links are considerably weakened and expressed through the visiting 
of shrines. There is insufficient data on the relationships between the 
sacred lineages of Tashkent and Turkistan after the Russian conquest in 
1865, i.e., the time when they began to deteriorate. During the Stalinist 
repressions, a considerable number of Khojas from Turkistan escaped, 
mainly to the Tashkent oasis, in order to survive.18
17  For example, Ziauddin mufti Babakhanov (1908–1982) the head of the Spiritual 
Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM), 
1957–1982.
18  Interview with Kazakh-speaking Khoja, native of Turkistan, 65 years old, 2010. 
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The descendants of different sacred lineages of Tashkent live 
dispersed in different quarters of the city. I found one significant 
feature: some representatives of the older generation possess relatively 
deep knowledge of the history of the sacred lineages, names of groups, 
and their cultures. In the Soviet period, an attempt was made by the 
government to create a new translocal imagined society — the Soviet 
people (homo sovieticus). However, according to my observations, this 
idea did not become popular among sacred lineages in Central Asia.
The younger generation (aged between 18–35) know only what they 
observe in life and what they read in post-1991 publications. When I 
talked with young people, I found out that by participating in traditional 
festivities such as weddings, wakes, etc., they became acquainted with 
other representatives of the sacred lineages of such cities as Tashkent 
and Turkistan.19 Thus, public events, to a certain extent, contributed to 
an expansion of their views of sacred lineages in such cities as Tashkent 
and Turkistan. But in many cases, it was ‘not the origin but the social 
status and personal relationships of people [that] are more important’.20
It is important to note that the representatives of the sacred lineages, 
once they had migrated from Turkistan to Tashkent, were divided by 
Tashkent’s inhabitants into two groups: the first group, the Turkistanis, 
were former Tashkentis, who moved from Tashkent to Turkistan 
130–150 years ago, and then returned. The second group, the so-called 
indigenous people of Turkistan, included the Khoja and non-elite 
groups.21
Representatives of the Kazakh-speaking Khoja from southern 
Kazakhstan often take wives from the Kazakh-speaking Khoja of the 
Tashkent oasis because ‘they believe that their families more strongly 
follow traditional values and were less westernized than the population 
of southern Kazakhstan’.22 Meanwhile, representatives of sacred 
lineages from more northern regions, such as the Kyzyl-orda province 
of Kazakhstan, claimed that the ‘Kazakh-speaking Khoja of the Tashkent 
oasis are more ‘Uzbekized’ and have lost some original Kazakh values. 
19  Interview with Uzbek-speaking Khoja, native of Tashkent, 32 years old, 2015.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Interview with a Kazakh scholar, native of Tashkent, 48 years old, 2015.
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For example, they do not follow exogamous marriage rules’.23 Thus, in 
this case, one can observe manifestations of locality and the influence of 
official ideology applied to the formation of an image of the nation with 
certain features and values. It can be assumed that certain cultural and 
social features of the Kazakh-speaking Khoja in Tashkent have changed 
as a result of acculturation among the Uzbek population. 
In the 1990s, an overall process of cultural restoration, including 
the restoration of sacred lineages, was initiated by local activists, and 
attempts to establish lines of communication between enthusiasts of 
the sacred lineages of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were made. The 
crucial evidence is the organization of joint meals as though these were 
meetings of the representatives of one group, members of which lived in 
different regions and even countries. ‘These meetings aimed to acquaint 
relatives with each other and to circulate books telling their history. In 
some cases, richer relatives furnished financial assistance to indigent 
members of their group’.24 However, according to my observations, 
since 2000, this process is not as active as it was before, probably due 
to the strengthening of the state policy against transnational so-called 
‘radical’ religious groups. 
An interlocutor from Tashkent province supposed that in the past, 
Khojas were descendants of sakhoba — missionaries of Islam and the 
local aristocracy in the region. Also, marriages were endogamous, many 
of them were blood marriages, but there were some marriages with 
‘qoracha’ (Black Bone). He did not know his ancestry seven generations 
back, as opposed to the Kazakhs. In pre-Soviet and Soviet times, the 
main occupations of my interlocutor’s own ancestors were agriculture 
and construction. Up until the 1950s, some members of his family were 
doctors or worked as imams25 among the local Kazakhs.26 According 
to a popular legend among the Khojas of his village, his folks were 
descendants of Khoja Ahmad Yassavi. However, his family did not have 
formal genealogical records. He supposed that such records were kept 
only among the intelligentsia and clergy, and these documents meant 
23 Interview with a Kazakh-speaking Khoja, native of Turkistan, 65 years old, 2010.
24 Ibid.
25  Imam is the title of a worship leader of a mosque and Muslim community.
26  Interview with Uzbek-speaking Khoja, native of Tashkent province, 60 years old, 
2015.
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nothing for craftsmen, or that they were lost during migration. In 
his perception, the society of Khojas appeared as follows: ‘the Tajik-
speaking Khojas are the closest due to similar cultures, customs (urf-odat) 
and mentality, although the language is different. Previously close ties 
with such regions as Turkistan in Kazakhstan and the Fergana Valley 
existed’. According to him, Khojas from Turkistan claimed descent from 
Khoja Ahmad Yassavi.27 
In the post-Soviet period, the Khojas of Tashkent have published 
a series of books on their origin and genealogy (Iskandarov 2004, 
Nusratov 2010). One of them describes their family history and explains 
the concept of Khoja: 
Khojas are a well-educated, cultured and highly esteemed people notable 
for honesty, firmness and decency. Traditions of Khoja at that time were 
not to espouse and to marry off children out of their kin. Every Khoja was 
proud to have the right to add the word ‘Khoja’ or ‘khon’ to their names 
like the French ‘de’ and the German ‘von’. The majority of them inhabited 
the centre of Tashkent in quarters of ‘Sheikhan-Taur’, ‘Mergancha’ and 
‘Koryogdi’. The Uzbek ‘mixed’ with the Arab — descendants of the first 
two just caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar ibn al-Hattab were named Khoja. 
Both of them were the Prophet’s father-in-law and inherently Khoja was 
the Prophet’s remote kinsman. (Nusratov 2010:22)
The author of another book on Khoja family history asserts that the 
goal of the book is to fulfil the ‘duty of a descendant to an ancestor’, 
to revive the genealogical roots of his family of Khoja so that relatives 
can discover each other and their ancestors back seven generations 
(Iskandarov 2004:3–6). The author collected materials about his relatives 
for twenty-five years, starting in the late Soviet period (1979), and he 
started his genealogy from his forefather Uzbekkhon Khoja, whose 
descendants were gunsmiths. The author did not mention the direct 
links with the family of the Prophet Muhammad or the first caliphs. 
He found out that there were three brothers, whose offspring live in 
three regions: Tashkent, Khodjent (Northern Tajikistan), and Qurama 
(Tashkent province) (Iskandarov 2004:3–6). According to the author, 
representatives of Khoja families are distinguished by their integrity, 
spiritual purity, and high morals. According to his point of view, this 
27 Ibid.
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was the basis for endogamous marriages (ibid.). Analyzing the author’s 
ancestors’ names, one can assume that they were likely Sufi, because 
their names had the prefix Ishon. However, the author himself avoided 
this issue and the religious aspect of the history of Khoja in general. 
Thus, in this case, the history of sacred lineages is represented by the 
author as having translocal lines, in that they all originated in various 
regions, but the author does not link these groups with more global 
parallels (with other groups of Khoja, Sayyid, and the Islamic world). 
Translocal communications remain at the level of marriage between 
some ‘holy groups’ of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, especially in border 
territories.28 Here, ‘translocality’ is clearly understood as the interrelation 
and connectedness between different geographical places.
Conclusion
Based on multi-sited fieldwork in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and 
combining classical historical research with anthropological methods, 
this chapter has examined the complex ways in which ‘sacred groups’ 
in Central Asia have been negotiating, articulating and reconfiguring 
group identity and multiple group belongings through history. A 
‘translocal’ approach has helped me to develop a cross-cutting research 
perspective on ‘holy’ or ‘sacred groups’ that critically scrutinizes 
‘methodological nationalism’ in scholarship on Central Asia, according 
to which religious identities are viewed as naturally embedded within 
and fixed by the boundaries of the Soviet and post-Soviet nation state. 
This chapter has taken a contrasting approach, paying attention to a wide 
range of non-hierarchic interactions, configurations and institutions, 
and exploring how these interactions and configurations facilitate 
translocal knowledge transfer and the circulation of religious ideas and 
symbols among ‘holy groups’. Obviously, knowledge transfer, identity 
formation and media usage among ‘sacred groups’ in Central Asia 
traverses places, regions, social groups, generations, language barriers 
and nation-states, as well as connecting and crossing different periods 
in history.
28  Interview with Uzbek-speaking Khoja, native of Tashkent province, 60 years old, 
2015.
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Until now, ‘translocal communication’ and ‘imagination’ among 
dispersed ‘sacred groups’ revealed itself through such practices as 
worshipping at the graves of ancestors, which have been perceived as 
sacred places. The preservation of written genealogies, linked with local 
saints or Sufi figures, the Prophet Muhammad, or the first caliphs, is 
also common in the regions discussed. There are regional differences, 
however. In Kazakhstan, digital communication via the internet is used 
more widely than in Uzbekistan to connect members of holy families, 
who increasingly use this medium to gather information about their 
past or to organize regular meetings among youth who share a saintly 
ancestor. In addition, young people of both sexes and from different 
parts of the country take part in online forums. These processes reinforce 
translocal ideas about a common history, a common past, and a common 
Khoja culture, regardless of the place of residence of representatives of 
different Khoja groups in the vast territories of Kazakhstan and Central 
Asia. Accordingly, investigating how sacred groups ‘go online’ opens up 
a new research field to analyze how sacred groups’ translocal identities 
are reconfigured and renegotiated in a globalized world. 
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4. Explicating Translocal  
Organization of Everyday Life:  
Stories from Rural Uzbekistan
Elena Kim
Introduction 
In this chapter I adopt Dorothy Smith’s theoretical framework of 
the ‘social organization of knowledge’ (Smith 2005:10) and a related 
method of inquiry, institutional ethnography (ibid.:14), to illustrate how 
the everyday existence of people living in the poorest areas of rural 
Uzbekistan is shaped by invisible but powerful processes, which I call 
translocal ruling relations. Institutional ethnography tells us that no local 
activity in the contemporary world takes place in isolation from larger 
social and institutional arrangements, but is always coordinated from 
outside the local space (Smith 1987:1–30). This investigation produces 
empirical insights that develop our understanding of ‘translocal’ as an 
analytical and a methodological concept. 
I focus on the events taking place in a village located in the 
northwestern part of Uzbekistan, where, similar to many other places 
in Central Asia, most Uzbek families have experienced profound 
change as a result of the large-scale migration of the male population 
in search of paid work. Female-headed households live in precarious 
conditions, as the remittances from their male partners are unreliable 
and often insufficient. These women’s own sources of livelihood, which 
come primarily from small-scale agriculture, are made precarious by 
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reduced irrigation resources and the difficulty of accessing them. Using 
my chosen methodological framework, I begin from these people’s 
stories and identify traces of the powerful forces that have shaped their 
lives. I ask: why were these men were forced to leave their homes? 
How do these rural women organize their lives and negotiate their 
material and immaterial resources? What influences their experiences, 
choices, and coping strategies? I seek to answer these questions by 
focusing on implicit but identifiable mechanisms and technologies in 
which translocal institutions, ideologies, and discourses infiltrate local 
settings. Hence this chapter offers a concrete illustration, in a specific 
place in Uzbekistan, of the operation of translocal power, expressed 
in institutional discourses and ideological practices that shape these 
people’s experiences. 
By mapping translocal relations in my research, I find that the 
operation of local community-based irrigation management is aligned 
with the interests of the state agricultural export industry and, as such, 
fails to recognize certain categories (mostly, smallholder households) 
of land- and water-users as legitimate recipients of state-supported 
irrigation. Eligibility for agricultural support and services from the state 
is established based on a specific understanding of efficient agricultural 
management. Institutional eligibility is indicated by documents and 
other text-based practices produced by professionals at the many levels 
of the state management of agricultural export. As a result, many poor 
households are deprived of opportunities to secure agricultural inputs 
such as irrigation services and, subsequently, suffer lower production, 
which impacts on their quality of life. Ultimately, men are forced to 
seek alternative sources of income outside the agricultural sector and 
outside their villages. These men often find themselves in insecure 
and risky work conditions with unreliable and/or insufficient income 
(Zanca 2011:45). Women, as is customary, are left at home to engage in 
the everyday struggle to support their families (Kim 2014:106–20).
An institutional ethnographic framework can and has been used by 
scholars to study migration-related topics as well as a variety of other 
research questions, including those related to environmental policy, 
education and health reforms, international development, economic 
reorganization, etc. To provide just a few examples, Naples (2009:14–20) 
explored the migration of Mexican citizens to rural North America and 
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described how socially constructed problems of migration, immigration 
and economic restructuring impacted community-based practices and 
contributed to an exclusionary regulation of citizenship. Ng’s (1996:81–
89) institutional ethnography of Canadian immigration policies 
demonstrated that state discourses about ‘immigrant women’ from the 
global South framed them as ‘dependents’ and thus informed working 
practices that reproduced gender and race inequalities. The research of 
Kim and Campbell (2013:195–201) on non-governmental organizations 
in Kyrgyzstan showed how global peace-building initiatives shaped 
the everyday work of local women’s groups and affected the quality of 
services these could offer to their beneficiaries.
However, this chapter does not focus on the mobility of people per 
se. Rather, it expands on existing and highly regarded scholarship on 
connectivity across research sites, albeit on a different conceptual basis. 
Specifically, I concentrate on the mobility of ideas, discourses, texts, 
and practices and their influence on the everyday reality of largely 
immobile people. Indeed, female smallholders live within a traditional 
gender hierarchy that fixes their place within the private spheres of their 
homes: they have limited access to public space in their villages and their 
migration abroad is nearly impossible. However, this chapter, like many 
other institutional ethnographies, demonstrates that, notwithstanding 
this lack of mobility, in today’s globalized world even the most immobile 
subjects can be seriously impacted by processes, people, institutions, 
and ideologies located outside their own environment.
The concept of translocal ruling relations helps us to understand 
how this impact is achieved and maintained. Smith understands 
translocal ruling relations to be ‘expansive, historically specific 
apparat[i] of management and control that arose with the development 
of corporate capitalism and support[s] its operation’ (Devault 2006:259). 
The concept of the translocal is derived from the understanding that 
no activity, regardless of its location in the contemporary world, takes 
place in isolation from larger social and institutional arrangements, but 
is always coordinated from outside of the local space, i.e., translocally 
(Smith 1999:80–92). Institutional ethnographies focus on discovering 
the exact processes by which such coordination is accomplished, 
paying attention to the consequences resulting from the ruling relations 
(Campbell 2006:94). Empirical observations demonstrate that translocal 
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power, seen in technologies of social control, is increasingly textual and 
discursive (Smith 1999:80–92). In an organizational setting, texts such 
as charts, strategic plans, monitoring sheets, reporting matrices and the 
like are the mechanisms that coordinate and connect work processes. 
These connections are called ‘social relations’ and people doing their 
everyday work are drawn into them, aligning their activities with the 
institutional interests expressed in these texts but not necessarily with 
their own, personal, interests. People are often ruled by the assumed 
power of texts and discourses. This chapter aims to look at a specific 
setting in rural Uzbekistan in order to identify, describe, and analyze 
the processes involved in making this rule possible. This undertaking 
has important social implications in helping us to detect how and where 
well-intended managerial work becomes counter-productive.
Also deserving of attention is the larger political and historical context 
in which the research took place. Today, Uzbekistan is the largest and 
most populous nation state in Central Asia, with a population of nearly 
thirty million people (World Bank 2015). In 2014, the estimated gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita was 5,600 USD. The unemployment 
rate stood at 4.9 percent in 2014. Uzbekistan has abundant natural 
resources such as large deposits of gold, silver, zinc, uranium, lead, 
copper, and molybdenum. The country’s energy resources include 
natural gas and deposits of coal and oil. About sixty-five percent of the 
population are rural settlers. Nearly twenty-six percent of the labour 
force work in the agricultural sector, which accounts for more than 
eighteen percent of GDP (ibid.).
During the Soviet era, Moscow forced Uzbekistan to produce cotton 
as a monoculture. This crop was unsuitable for the area, mostly due to 
the fact that seventy percent of the country’s territory was desert and 
only eleven percent of its area was arable land (Herbst et al. 2006:306). 
Excessive use of water from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers, which 
feed the Aral Sea, led to drastic social and environmental consequences. 
The depletion of the Aral Sea led to widespread salinization of the soil 
throughout the already arid region. Additionally, the use of pesticides 
and fertilizers in the agricultural sector raised soil and water toxicity. 
Since independence, the government has made little progress toward 
mitigating environmental degradation (World Bank 2015). Today, 
pressing concerns include untreated wastewater, lack of clean drinking 
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water, and air pollution from heavy industry. However, even though 
some progress toward agricultural diversification has been made, the 
country remains one of the largest exporters of cotton in the world (The 
National Cotton Council: 1) and continues to rely heavily on imported 
food. 
According to the 1991 constitution, Uzbekistan is a secular, democratic 
republic. Political power is vested in a president who can serve multiple 
five-year terms and is elected by direct vote. In reality, political power 
has been maintained through state-backed violence and elections, none 
of which have been deemed free or fair by the international community 
(CIA World Factbook:1). The ruling party believes in enacting harsh 
measures as a means of avoiding civil wars and other conflicts (ibid.). 
The country is often classified as a hard authoritarian regime with 
limited civil rights (United States Department of State 2013:1–5) in 
which violations of virtually all basic human rights are widespread 
(International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 2004).
In terms of territorial administration, Uzbekistan is comprised of 
twelve provinces. Among them, the Khorezm region has been the worst 
hit by the Aral Sea crisis. Khorezm is surrounded by two deserts, the 
Qaraqum in the south and west, and the Qyzylqum in the north and 
east (Kehl-Bodrogi 2006:235–37). The inhabitants of the province are 
predominantly Uzbek along with a small number of Turkmen ethnic 
groups, and its Uzbek residents speak a dialect not widely understood 
outside the region. Nearly eighty percent of the population lives in the 
countryside, making a living from irrigation-based agriculture (ibid.). 
Its disadvantageous position, 400 kilometers south of the Aral Sea 
alongside the lower course of the Amu Darya River, the major source of 
irrigation, creates a number of serious problems for agriculture (Kehl-
Bodrogi 2006:235–37). In addition to this, grave ecological issues caused 
by a high water table and soil salinization hinder smooth agricultural 
production (Herbst et al. 2006:306). A large proportion of the population 
is economically disadvantaged and lacks social security (Kehl-Bodrogi 
2006:235–37). 
My institutional ethnographic research took place in one of the 
villages in the Khorezm region, recognized as one of the poorest in the 
area (Abdullaev and Mollinga 2010:89–96) and located at the furthest 
tip of the Amu Darya river. Irrigated agriculture is the predominant 
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means of employment for its population of about eleven thousand 
people. Due to its unfortunate location, this village (henceforth given 
the pseudonym ‘Hayat’1) suffers from a markedly insufficient and 
unreliable water supply, especially during the frequent periods of water 
scarcity (Veldwisch and Bock 2011:581–84). 
Two types of farmers operate in Hayat: private farmers and 
smallholders. These two categories emerged during a series of national 
land reforms in 2006, 2008, and 2010 (Djanivekov et al. 2012:1106–20). 
These reforms, intended to restructure a cumbersome agricultural 
administration in response to new political and economic conditions, 
nonetheless maintained many features of the old system. To provide 
a brief historical overview: four years after Uzbekistan became part 
of the Soviet Union in 1924, it actively enforced the agrarian policy of 
‘collectivization’ (Kandiyoti 2002). This policy required the consolidation 
of individually owned land into communal farms, i.e. collective farms 
and state farms, with the expectation that this would lead to increases 
in agricultural exports, supplies of raw materials for industry, and food 
provision for the urban population. As a result, by 1932, nearly 80% of 
all rural households had been incorporated into 9,734 collective farms 
and 94 state farms (ibid.).
Collective farms were typically organized by merging small 
individual farms into a cooperative structure, whereas state farms were 
created by the state on the land confiscated from former large estates. 
The workers on state farms were recruited from among landless rural 
residents. The work within collective and state farms was internally 
divided among working groups, known as ‘brigades’ and headed by a 
brigade’s leader or ‘brigadier’ (Veldwisch and Bock 2011:581–84). The 
workers on collective and state farms used to receive a small piece of 
‘private’ land for their own food production (about 0.25 ha) as part of 
their payment and in order to keep the workers bound to the collective 
farm (ibid.).
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Uzbek 
government, wishing to transition to a market economy, introduced a 
reverse process of ‘de-collectivization’ within which agricultural land 
1  In order to protect my interlocutors’ integrity the real name of the village has been 
replaced by this pseudonym.
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was privatized and redistributed (Djanivekov et al. 2012:1106–20). 
De-collectivization led to the establishment of a new agrarian category 
of ‘private farms’. Local administrations selected leaders of the former 
communal farms (ibid.) to become private farmers; they were leased 
land for cultivation. Private farmers were expected to hire the rest of the 
rural population, yet in practice they employed only a small number of 
workers, thus leaving many families jobless. Scholars recognize that this 
agricultural reform was largely unsuccessful (Abdullaev et al. 2005:115) 
and its social impact was extremely harmful. When unemployment and 
poverty became widespread among the rest of the former workers of the 
communal farms and food security was at risk, the government granted 
additional small plots of land (0.12 ha) to each smallholder household. 
Formally, this land policy created a new category of ‘smallholding 
peasants’ (here, referred to as ‘smallholders’). 
Agrarian land reforms were followed by changes to irrigation 
management policy. Regional water resources were depleted due to 
decades of intensive cotton production as well as inadequate water 
management institutions and outdated water allocation mechanisms 
(ibid.). To tackle these problems, policy makers introduced Water User 
Associations (WUAs), to form a democratic and community-based water 
management organization that would not only practice efficient and fair 
distribution of water for irrigation, but would provide ‘social assistance to 
the most vulnerable groups’ (Asian Development Bank 2011:11) through 
improved agricultural activities. Globally, WUAs are recognized as 
grassroots initiatives led by water users, and organized on the principles 
of equity and efficiency in the distribution of water and the use of irrigation 
and drainage systems (Zavgorodnaya 2006). Since 2005, hundreds of 
WUAs have been established in Uzbekistan, many in accordance with 
the so-called ‘Uzbek’ model, whereby government departments (mostly 
within the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan) designed and set up WUAs with little involvement from 
water users, who were supposed to be the initiators of these processes. 
The WUA leaders and their technical employees were appointed under 
the close supervision of local authorities and regional departments of the 
ministry (Zavgorodnaya 2006).
At the time of my fieldwork, the village had already undergone these 
reforms and 29 private farmers were appointed as farm leaders from 
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among the former collective. Additionally, more than 2,000 households 
had attained the status of smallholder farms (Zavgorodnaya 2006). 
All of the 29 private farms produced cotton and were headed by men. 
In the majority of smallholders’ families, life was rather fragmented. 
The men were absent for long periods of time working as migrant 
laborers in Russia, Kazakhstan, and urban areas of Uzbekistan. Women 
became the heads of the households and assumed all of the farming 
work in addition to their traditional domestic chores (Kim 2014:106–
20). Maintaining agricultural production became one of their main 
responsibilities. In the vast number of these emerging female-headed 
households, their main source of livelihood, small-scale agriculture, 
was continuously endangered by reduced irrigation resources and the 
difficulty of accessing them (ibid.). All this took place in the presence of 
a local WUA, which consisted of a chairman, an accountant, and five 
water engineers. The WUA took responsibility for all matters related 
to irrigation within the village, and their role became more prominent 
during the years in which water was scarce, because regional water 
regulation forced villages to queue for water. The village received water 
once every 2 weeks for about 2 to 3 days (and nights).
As a point of entry into my study I researched the experiences 
of smallholders, investigating why, even after the state’s policy to 
counteract unemployment and hunger, these men were forced to leave 
their homes. Furthermore, why did rural women who were left behind 
continue to experience challenges in securing water to sustain their 
families even with the existence of a WUA? Questions such as these, 
which arise from listening to local people and shape the course of the 
ongoing inquiry, are called ‘the problematic’ in institutional ethnography 
(Smith 2005:68–80). My problematic emerged from ethnographic data 
revealing that water scarcity presented persistent challenges to the entire 
village population. I sought to understand how it was possible that, after 
having received additional agricultural land and in the presence of the 
WUA, smallholder families continued to endure insecure livelihoods 
and are forced to send family members abroad for income. This chapter 
seeks to provide answers these questions by rigorously applying an 
institutional ethnographic approach. 
The organization of village life is not only a matter of personal choice, 
or ineptitude, but is impacted by people and institutions situated outside 
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the local context, whose actions are not directed at that particular village. 
By investigating the workings of these institutions, their operation and 
activities, and the connections between them, this chapter uncovers the 
translocal coordinating power of national policies of foreign agricultural 
trade and commerce and their impact on an individual village. By 
examining the implicit but identifiable mechanisms and technologies 
through which translocal institutions, ideologies, and discourses 
infiltrate local settings, I argue that rural Uzbek people’s realities, which 
are characterized by uncertainty and increasing economic insecurity 
that is exacerbated by deteriorating environmental conditions, are not 
‘just happening’ but result from national agricultural trade policies. I 
reveal the various material connections and interactions between the 
state and the individual smallholders, and the consequences of these 
dynamics.
Conceptual framework
The term ‘translocality’ has come into vogue over the past two or 
three decades (Greiner and Sakdapolrak 2013:373–76). It is used by 
scholars from different disciplinary fields such as geography, history, 
area studies, cultural studies, anthropology, and development studies. 
In 1996, Arjun Appadurai argued that this concept could be used to 
understand what he termed the reproduction of the local in the context 
of transnational mobility (1995:216). He argued that migrants actively 
reproduced their own localities outside their home countries in the 
sites of their new residences and such ‘production and reproduction 
of locality, in which ties of marriage, work, business and leisure weave 
together various circulating kinds of “locals” are increasingly complex’ 
(ibid.). Challenging the accepted notion of transnationalism with its 
focus on national borders, he argued that translocality is a contemporary 
feature of globalization that offers a different perspective on the relations 
between apparently insular locales (Greiner and Sakdapolrak 2013:373–
76). Increasingly, the notion of translocality has been theoretically and 
methodologically helpful to scholars who seek to capture much more 
nuanced local connections across national boundaries (Appadurai 
1995:216–22). 
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A review of the existing literature on the concept of translocality 
reveals the wide use of the term. Translocality involves mobility, space, 
connectedness, and associated knowledge. In discussing the analytic 
use of translocality, this chapter does not focus on the stories of mobile 
subjects, but on the interactions between global ideas, discourses, 
ideologies, and local experiences. In doing so, I follow Stephan-Emmrich 
(Chapter Nine) and concur with Hage’s understanding of translocality 
as an analytic ‘double gaze’ to argue that local environments and global 
dynamics are inherently interrelated (2005:464–70). Like her, I argue that, 
in today’s world, in which social realities are shaped by globalization, the 
‘double gaze’ needs to be able to capture lived experiences and the forces 
that structure them. In agreement with Burawoy’s theory of a ‘global 
ethnography of space’ (Burawoy et al. 2000:35–42), this chapter suggests 
that local experiences can connect to wider geographical processes and 
spaces and that certain methodologies, like his ‘extended case method’, 
help researchers to explore how to reach out from micro processes to 
macro forces and thus link the local to the global. One important aspect 
of institutional ethnography is its commitment to an empirical method 
of tracing and mapping the multiple connections between local lives 
and global powers. All of these connections, or ‘social relations’, are 
material and discoverable rather than dialectic or theoretical, especially 
when it comes to explanations of the global modality of the local (Smith 
2005:68–80). 
The term ‘social relations’ does not refer to interpersonal relationships 
but to how various connections between different sites of experience are 
made. These sites are not necessarily connected by people who know 
each other and exchange something, as they do in social networks. In 
fact, institutional ethnographers argue that in many cases different sites 
are connected by people who do not know about each other’s existence 
but are connected through the use of the same ideas, work sequences, 
routine responsibilities, etc. In contemporary institutions, defined as 
complexes of activities organized around a distinctive function such 
as migration policy, international trade, etc., activities are initiated 
and designed as a means to fulfil institutional functions (ibid.). People 
located in different positions in an institution carry out these activities 
following guidance and instructions developed elsewhere, usually in 
texts, within the institutional structure (ibid.). Through such textually 
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circulated instructions, organizational rules, forms, standardized 
procedures, etc., people participate and contribute to the maintenance 
of institutions and to institutional knowledge, resources and purposes 
(ibid.). People’s everyday lives play out within such social relations, 
called ‘social organization’, which integrate their local experiences into 
wider institutional regimes (ibid.). I will show later in my analysis how 
the everyday work of the rural water managers in Uzbekistan is socially 
organized, through texts and rules, to facilitate state-led agricultural 
export. Resource management experts have recognized some aspects of 
this system as good governance. It involves both private farmers and 
smallholders, but it envisages different purposes for each and impacts 
them differently.
Returning to the theoretical framework of institutional ethnography, 
translocal social relations are defined by Smith as ‘coordinated chains 
of action that connect embodied experiences, which occur at a specific 
local site, to work that is performed at other sites’ (ibid.:38), a statement 
that emphasizes the extent to which social relations within an institution 
can shape and direct people’s work. Smith refers to translocal ‘ruling 
social relations’ which ‘reach beyond and coordinate what a particular 
person is experiencing locally’ (ibid.:34). Further research is needed to 
fully explain the work practices that connect people who have no direct 
knowledge of each other and who live in different locations. These 
connections are material and not theoretical, because institutionally 
designed and implemented activities affect the actions of people in local 
settings. Therefore, in any institutional ethnographic project ‘translocal 
forms of coordinating people’s work are explored as they are to be 
found in the actual ways in which coordination is locally accomplished’ 
(ibid.:38). 
Institutional ethnographic analysis shows that people are typically 
unaware that their everyday lives are organized across space, time, and 
institutions, which connect them to a range of people, texts, and work 
practices. Invisible, translocal relations can nevertheless be uncovered 
by researchers who can describe and track them from local to extra-local 
sites. In other words, these relations are identifiable in people’s socially-
organized work activities because they are objectively present. Here, in 
agreement with Alff (in Chapter Five), I argue that contextual factors 
influence the agency of actors and the outcomes of their strategies. 
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Institutional ethnographers put forward a more radical argument, 
claiming that the strategies and choices, including resistance, in which 
individual people engage are shaped, often invisibly, by translocal 
ruling relations. 
This is not to say that people’s activities are not of interest to 
institutional ethnographers. On the contrary, people as actors always 
remain central to research, and the analysis of what people do every day 
to put their lives together allows institutional ethnographers to identify, 
track, and explain how particular translocal relations work in specific 
settings. An investigation typically begins by exploring the experiences 
of those involved in an institutional setting; the analytical goal is to 
discover and map linkages between everyday life, organizations, 
and translocal processes of power (Devault and McCoy 2006:18). The 
researcher gets to know what happens in a setting, learning from the 
people themselves and identifying a research problematic — usually 
concerned with dislocations between ruling ideas and local people’s 
experiences and knowledge. But how does this work in practice? The 
researcher’s analytical framework provides a sense of socially organized 
knowledge guiding local actions; a belief that nothing ‘just happens’ but 
rather is made to happen.
In institutional ethnography the analysis of institutional texts is 
important. ‘Texts’ can be documents or any form of representation that 
has a ‘relatively fixed and replicable character’ (Deveau 2008:9) and 
that people routinely use in the conduct of their work. These include 
organizational charts, work manuals, reporting guidelines, monitoring 
sheets, logical frameworks, etc. Institutional texts travel in various forms 
and are passed from one set of users to another, where they are read as 
instructions and written as records. Smith uses the metaphor of DNA to 
illustrate how socially organized knowledge produced in one location 
becomes packaged in texts and then replicated either electronically or in 
hard-copy format in multiple locations, becoming a blueprint to regulate 
local activities and organize social relations among people (ibid.:4). It is 
precisely in these texts that traces of ruling relations can become visible. 
Texts operate as material carriers of ruling relations because the latter 
‘rely on textually based realities to produce, reproduce and stabilize 
institutions, because texts have the capacity to preserve meaning in the 
absence of local context’ (Smith 2005:103). 
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However, not all documentary materials and texts form part of 
institutional ethnographic research, only ‘active’ texts. In other words, 
the texts are treated as ‘data’ if people use or ‘activate’ them in their 
everyday work and if their engagement with these texts coordinates 
their actions (Campbell and Gregor 2002:82–90). Ethnographers ask 
who uses which texts, how the texts are used, what is focused on and 
what is ignored, and how people align their work with texts. In this way 
researchers can identify the text’s capacity to orient people’s activities 
in the directions that are institutionally relevant. Smith calls human 
engagement with texts a ‘text-reader conversation’ in which the reader 
‘responds to, interprets, and acts from it [the text]’ (Smith 2005:105) 
and in doing so becomes an agent of this text. Language coordinates 
the reader’s consciousness and exerts control over her response. Such 
textual mediation becomes the practical or material form through which 
ruling relations enter the local setting and order its routines (ibid.). 
Understanding how this happens in any particular case is an essential 
part of institutional ethnographic research projects. 
Methodology 
Institutional ethnography is both a theoretical framework, deeply 
concerned with the political and economic processes in which everyday 
lives are lived, and also a methodological approach to research 
(Eastwood and Devault 2001). Institutional ethnographers use a variety 
of research methods, such as in-depth and semi-structured interviews, 
focus groups, participant observation, and textual analysis to examine 
social relations (Campbell 2006). In my research project, data collection 
involved unstructured and semi-structured interviews, direct and 
participant observations, and text analysis. 
Exact empirical processes in institutional ethnography cannot be 
predicted beforehand because researchers ‘know what they want 
to explain, but only step by step can they discover who they need to 
interview and what texts or discourses they need to examine’ (Slade 
2008:83). The data collection process is iterative and can be divided into 
three stages, beginning with entry into the research site. My research 
project began with an inquiry into the everyday lives of smallholder 
households through participant observations and in-depth interviews; 
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I visited participants’ homes and also lived with a local family, which 
helped me to formulate questions about their experiences. Adopting 
their standpoint, I then formulated a narrative about their everyday lives, 
work, worries, challenges, etc., and identified gaps in my understanding 
to be pursued further. These missing pieces of information indicated 
possible explanations for the difficult experiences of smallholders. 
The main aim of this first stage was to formulate the problematic of 
my study — the question of how the smallholders’ everyday lives, with 
their struggles and increased workloads, were socially organized. 
In the second stage, using this data I mapped connections between 
the institutions of water management and agricultural administration. 
I also conducted semi-structured interviews with relevant institutional 
actors and directly observed their work. In institutional ethnography, 
data collection and analysis are not completely distinct phases; in my 
research the initial extensive interviews were used both to identify the 
translocal social linkages that existed in people’s everyday lives and to 
direct my ethnographic gaze toward the next steps of data collection. 
During the interview process I paid extremely close attention to whether 
my interviewees mentioned specific names, people, institutions, 
government agencies, etc., as I tried to understand what linked these 
people or institutions to the respondent’s experiences. 
These newly-identified interlocutors included private farmers, 
members of local committees, employees of the local WUA, etc., whom 
I subsequently interviewed. When interviewing them, I paid careful 
attention to any textual documents they used and, through interviews 
and direct observation, I inquired into exactly how they engaged with 
these texts during their work. These new data allowed me to further 
refine my research goals. The core idea at this stage of research is that 
what the interlocutors do, know, and tell is coordinated by the ruling 
relations of the institution. The task is then to extend the interlocutors’ 
own knowledge by uncovering the local coordination that is structured 
by the ruling relations. This takes place in the third stage of the research, 
which involves analyzing the institutional texts that were revealed in the 
previous stage. Here, I focused on identifying the origins of the working 
texts, which, I discovered, coordinated the work of local institutional 
actors. This process involved mapping out different documents and 
the connections between them and, finally, uncovering the social 
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organization of ruling relations governing the work of agricultural 
management. 
The pool of data used for this analysis consisted of forty in-depth and 
semi-structured interviews. I began with a conversation with a water 
engineer who used a specific document to plan and sequence irrigation 
in the village. I learned that this document was part of a body of texts 
that facilitated the implementation of the same national policy, itself a 
component of Uzbekistan’s national cotton export programme. In what 
follows, I describe this institutional map.
Discovering translocal connections between local 
experiences and global trade
As mentioned earlier, Uzbekistan remains one of the world’s largest 
cotton producers. This is the result of the prioritization of cotton 
cultivation ordered by the central Soviet administration throughout 
its period of governance (Abdullaev et al. 2005:113). The Soviet 
administration wanted to make the USSR self-sufficient and forced 
some of its republics to become highly specialized producers of certain 
commodities for consumption both within the internal and export 
markets (ibid.). Thus Uzbekistan became a territory of intensive cotton 
cultivation, producing seventy percent of the entire Soviet supply (ibid.). 
This industry employed about forty percent of the republic’s total labour 
force and accounted for more than sixty percent of its total economic 
input (ibid.:115). By the early 1980s, the USSR had become one of the 
major exporters of cotton, accounting for more than a fifth of world’s 
production and only lagging behind China (ibid.). 
In contemporary Uzbekistan, the Soviet legacy has been preserved 
in both the cotton monoculture and the high level of state control of 
the industry. The production and international trading of cotton is 
strictly regulated by the government (Rudenko 2009:285) with cotton’s 
contribution accounting for twenty-five percent of Uzbekistan’s 
gross domestic product (Muradov and Ilkhamov 2014:11) and total 
agricultural exports accounting for more than forty percent of total 
exports (World Food Programme 2008). State control in the post-Soviet 
era operates through imposing quotas on ‘output and area, a state 
purchase system and price, quantity of production, and controls on 
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farm outputs’ (Abdullaev et al. 2005:115). Directly after independence 
in 1991, all agricultural produce, except that grown in kitchen gardens, 
were required to be sold to the state. Five years later, state quotas were 
removed for some agricultural crops but not for cotton (Abdullaev et 
al. 2005:115). After a series of agrarian land reforms, described at the 
beginning of this chapter, private farmers (or ‘fermers’ in the local 
language) became the sole suppliers of cotton, although cotton farms 
remain state property. Today, private farmers are mandated to plant 
cotton and they must sow a certain area of land with the plant, else 
they are penalized (Abdullaev et al. 2005:115). Furthermore, private 
farmers are obligated to supply all of the cotton they grow (with a 
quota on the minimum required) to the state at a pre-determined rate. 
Needless to say, the internal purchasing price for cotton is almost 
half the international market price  (Rudenko 2009:285–60). In return 
for their cotton, farmers are entitled to free land tenure and receive 
support from government-sponsored agencies in the form of seeds, 
fertilizers, machinery and irrigation. In legal terms, becoming a private 
farmer meant that an individual selected or appointed by the local 
administration was registered as such and signed a contract with the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources of Uzbekistan where all 
the described quotas and government-sponsored services were laid out.
In contrast, smallholders (or dehkans in the local language) came into 
existence very differently, in response to the breakdown of the centralized 
Soviet system when millions of rural people lost their livelihoods due 
to decreases in production, shortfalls of basic food products, and lack of 
previously-provided social infrastructure (Kandiyoti 2002, Abdullaev et 
al. 2005:115). In 1994, to increase food security and respond to growing 
poverty, the government withdrew some land from collective farms and 
distributed it among the rural population, formally describing these 
owners as dehkans who were granted permanent and inheritable rights 
to the land (Zayforodnaya 2006). 
There are thus two distinct sets of goals and expectations for private 
farmers and for smallholders: to provide the state with a crop required to 
maintain the national export industry; and to respond to the apparently 
inefficient agricultural governance with a quick and effective solution to 
an unexpected side-effect of the agrarian reforms. In both cases, however, 
the availability of irrigation, a controversial issue in Uzbekistan, is key. 
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WUAs were established to address the problem of irrigation scarcity and 
distribute water equally and democratically. However, as my findings 
show, the reality fails to live up to this promise. I argue that WUAs are 
an integral part of the policy that supports the large-scale production of 
cotton by private farmers and exists to help these farmers increase their 
productivity, rather than to assist the most vulnerable groups. 
The vulnerability of smallholders was evident from the outset of the 
research. I soon learned that agricultural produce from their gardens 
and small plots of land are absolutely essential for food and for animal 
breeding. In most cases these families do not have any other source 
of income, except anything that male family members who have left 
the village can send back. The majority of families have been broken 
up by labour migration, and the remittances sent home by these men 
provide the only source of meaningful cash income. ‘There is no job for 
our men here in the village’, a female smallholder told me. This puzzled 
me because the cultivation of 0.13 ha of land, breeding animals, and 
selling crops and livestock appeared to provide enough work for entire 
family. However, as I later discovered, generating hard cash revenue 
from their plot is so labour-intensive that going abroad as a migrant 
worker becomes a much more attractive option financially, despite the 
costly price these men have to pay on a personal level. As a result, I 
observed highly feminized smallhold agriculture characterized by the 
increasing difficulty of securing the necessary support for agricultural 
production, chiefly irrigation. At the same time, my interviews with 
the male private farmers indicated that they suffered no limitations in 
terms of the provision of water and services (Kim 2014:68–80). Neither 
did their family structure seem to have been affected by outmigration. 
This brought me back to my research problematic and my consideration 
of the different impacts a social organization can have on different 
constituencies, i.e., the smallholders versus the private farmers.
As I looked more closely at the everyday work of the irrigators in the 
local WUA, I realized that giving precedence to the irrigation needs of 
the private farmers over those of the smallholders was not something 
that these professional irrigators ‘just did’. On the contrary, their work 
was socially organized and coordinated by institutional texts such as 
irrigation schedules, monitoring, and report forms. Water engineers 
did their jobs professionally and responsibly by using these forms in 
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their everyday work. Below (in Figure 4.1) I provide an example of a 
monitoring sheet used by all water engineers in the WUA called ‘kontur’.
Fig. 4.1 Kontur (monitoring sheet) translated by the author.  
Image © Elena Kim (2014), CC BY 4.0
In the words of water engineer Ikram,2 he ‘controls the number of the 
watered hectares [and] looks at the kontur. They have numbers that 
correspond to the fermers’ land. [He] marks which land has been watered 
and informs the WUA’.
If we attend to the column in the kontur called ‘Kontur Number’ we 
see different numbers each corresponding to a specific piece of land in 
the village. Once a piece of land is numbered by the land surveyor, it 
is marked as a kontur. From Ikram, we learned that these konturs mark 
only the land cultivated by private farmers. In my second interview 
with him the WUA chairperson supported this observation, as he stated 
that ‘myrabs [water engineers] use the konturs of the farmer’s land only’.
This is an example in which a text directed the attention of the WUA 
to a particular category of water user. Using the kontur, water engineers 
ensured that efficient provision of water was only provided to the 
2 Here and hereafter pseudonyms are used.
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selected areas. I tracked the use of konturs in the WUA and discovered 
that the information they provided fed into a standardized reporting 
form, which itself contained the sub-heading ‘Fermer’s land’. I learned 
that the standardized reporting form and the kontur were, in fact, 
appendices to the WUA’s Charter. The Charter itself states that its main 
areas of activity are the delivery and distribution of water among its 
members. Membership is acquired by signing an agreement with the 
WUA. As the WUA chairperson told me, the ‘agreement is the most 
important; if there is an agreement, there is water; no agreement means 
“no water”’.
However, he also indicated that not everybody is eligible to sign. As 
WUA staff explained:
An agreement with smallholders cannot be signed because they do not 
have a stamp, while farmers have the contract with the State. They have 
cotton and wheat […], while they (smallholders) do not have a stamp. 
All the private farmers were in a position to sign such an agreement with 
the WUA because they were already legal entities who had a contract 
with the state to provide cotton. For this reason they were equipped 
with their own stamps, without which they could not be private farmers 
at all. The situation of smallholders was entirely different in this respect. 
Their existence as a category of agricultural producers was the result of 
a forced measure and an ad hoc decision rather than a strategic choice; 
their crops provided subsistence rather than contributing to state 
commerce. Since smallholders did not have to supply the state with 
their crops and did not have to enter into contracts with the state, they 
were not recognized as legal entities and were not granted stamps. The 
WUA was organized to operate as a ‘closed club’ with membership 
limited to private farmers, thus failing to address the needs of the 
poorer smallholders. As an institutional ethnographer, I understood 
that the exclusionary practices of the WUA developed not because of 
deliberate efforts by individuals but because they were translocally 
incentivized: the WUA Charter and its rules on  membership and 
eligibility, which directed the work of its employees, was part of a larger 
institutional system. It was therefore important to focus my analysis on 
the institutional origins of the WUA Charter. I found out that what was 
happening locally was linked, through a number of translocal, textual 
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and discursive connections, to Uzbekistan’s global cotton trade. The 
policy of the WUA establishment in Uzbekistan formed an inherent part 
of the state’s agricultural reforms that aimed to increase agricultural 
productivity. This policy was put into practice in an appendix document 
regulating the set up of private farming entities throughout Uzbekistan. 
This appendix, which included the definition and roles of WUAs, 
was accompanied by the documentation needed to set up this type of 
organization, such as blueprints for the Charter, agreements, reporting 
forms, konturs, etc. This package was circulated throughout Uzbekistan, 
and the village I studied also relied on it for its everyday operations. 
Thus the activities of individual water engineers in the village were 
directed by a sequence of texts that were coordinated by the state with 
the aim of maximizing produce for international trade. Their everyday 
work, with its unintended negative impact on smallholders, was thus 
translocally coordinated.
Translocal organization of water management  
and its unjust consequences
Uzbekistan participates in the global cotton trade to sustain its economy 
and its regional and international influence. The government have 
initiated a number of policy efforts, which they claimed were intended 
to mitigate the negative social effects of monoculture production on the 
poorest groups. These included the 1994 land reform and the promise 
of democratic water management through the introduction of WUAs. 
However, in practice, these apparently benevolent policies supported 
commercial interests, which affected individual farms in a systematic 
way. The need to sustain the trade in cotton resulted in land reforms that 
were intended to increase agricultural production, as well as methods 
of irrigation management that supported this. WUAs were (and still 
are) part of the state’s regulation of agriculture and, through texts such 
as konturs, established the regime’s priorities and neglected those who 
did not directly contribute to cotton production, i.e., smallholders, who 
became institutionally invisible. Smallholders were not listed among 
the beneficiaries of the improved water distribution by the WUA when 
its policies were drawn up, and therefore they could not appear in the 
WUA’s statutory, regulatory and operational texts as legitimate water 
 1714. Explicating Translocal Organization of Everyday Life
users. Their absence from the kontur restricted water engineers from 
providing them with irrigation services and as a result smallholders 
cannot easily access water to irrigate their plots. 
Smallholders ‘will find water by themselves’, the water masters 
told me when I asked them how peasant households were expected 
to receive irrigation services. Having been trained to use WUA 
texts in their work, their attention is routinely directed away 
from smallholders’ needs. Smallholders do indeed ‘find water by 
themselves’ to maintain their farms and feed their family members, 
but they do so at the considerable expense of their time, health, and 
labor. For male smallholders, for whom working in the fields used to 
be a full-time job, inefficient agricultural practices were compounded 
by the unreliable water supply and this created a powerful incentive to 
travel to Russia for work. These men often live precarious lives full of 
uncertainty, anxiety, unreliable sources of income, and even violence, 
in pitiable living conditions. They lack social security and suffer the 
constant fear of deportation (Khajimukhamedov 2008). 
For female smallholders, the exclusion from irrigation systems often 
means a tremendous increase in their workloads. In my previous work 
I described in detail the devastatingly difficult living conditions of the 
female smallholders who remain in the village while their male partners 
are working abroad (Kim 2014, Kim et al. forthcoming). These women 
are expected to do the work of three people in order to sustain their 
families and households: domestic work, their own farming activities, 
and, now, the agricultural labour of their husbands. In addition to their 
traditional tasks of maintaining the house, working in the field, rearing 
children, and taking care of elderly family members, they have assumed 
new responsibilities such as soil fertilization, planting, irrigating and 
harvesting, and they are forced to manage their time to accomplish this 
intensified workload. My ethnographic observation notes from just one 
day living with a smallholder family record: ‘that day, talking to Norida 
was almost impossible because of her all-consuming work, the shouting 
of the children around her’. Without even basic house and garden 
equipment, time-consuming and physically complex work becomes 
even more so. For instance, breadmaking is done from scratch using a 
mud stove heated by brushwood that the women must gather, and the 
preparation of food for canning is accomplished manually by following 
a dozen carefully sequenced procedures.
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Fig. 4.2  A peasant woman working in her field.  
Photo © Elena Kim (2014), CC BY 4.0
I discovered that these women had to undertake even more work to 
ensure sufficient access to water, which was taking up more time 
than they could afford. Since water only arrived in the canals once or 
twice per month for two or three days, women had to engage in time-
consuming labour to find out if it was available so that they could open 
their canals and irrigate their fields. Many physically traveled to the 
canal, which might be a journey ranging from fifty meters to more than 
several kilometers of unpaved roads. My ethnographic notes describe 
what it means for many women to monitor water availability:
Nargiza takes two hours by her donkey-harnessed cart to reach her 
field and look at the canal. If the water is not flowing, this long journey 
is undertaken in vain. If the water is there, she queues with other 
smallholders and waits until she can open her ditch and let the water 
flow into her plot of land. Depending on the water pressure, irrigating 
one plot takes from forty minutes to five hours. This adds up to long 
hours of work, added to the additional hours of the journey back and 
forth to the village. Norida walks or uses her bicycle to go to the canal. By 
bicycle it takes her twenty minutes to reach the place and she has to do 
this once every two or three days during the vegetation season.
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These smallholders often failed to irrigate their land because they 
did not have timely information, or they were absent when the water 
arrived, or else it was already used up. All of this threatens their 
basic livelihood and wellbeing, because smallholder families must 
subsist almost entirely on what they grow in their fields while the 
remittances from their male partners can be unreliable and insufficient. 
The lack of recognition of smallholders families in the WUA is thus 
especially problematic. Although WUAs were inspired by inclusive 
and democratic principles (Abdullaev and Mollinga 2010:85–100), my 
analysis of the translocal organization of water management shows that 
even the most well-intended social and managerial policy can routinely 
produce unexpectedly harmful consequences. 
The translocal organization of smallholder families’ livelihoods in 
Uzbekistan is invisible to them, yet it systematically affects their lives. 
Regardless of the individual choices these families make every day, their 
experiences are shaped externally by forces that are not immediately 
obvious to them, preventing them from fully understanding the 
challenges they face. Translocal power is coordinated by, and operates 
materially and discursively through, institutional texts and the 
institutional actors who use them. This is how translocal institutions 
shape the day-to-day realities of those on whose behalf they claim to 
function. Water governance then, as a routine work process, is based on 
exclusionary practices that lead to increased vulnerability, uncertainty 
and profound social inequality among smallholders.
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5. A Sense of Multiple Belonging: 
Translocal Relations and Narratives of 
Change Within a Dungan Community1
Henryk Alff
Introduction
The so-called ‘Forum for Culture and Science’ organized by the 
Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, a major legislative body nominally 
chaired by President of State Nursultan Nazarbaev was attended by 
numerous leaders of the country’s ‘diasporas’. Held in September 
2011 in one of Almaty’s most prestigious restaurants, its entertainment 
program consisted of ‘traditional’ dance performances accompanied by 
various signature dishes belonging to the different groups that are part 
of multi-ethnic Kazakhstan, alongside national delicacies. However, 
Husey Daurov, a successful businessman and head of Kazakhstan’s 
1  The research for this chapter was funded by the German Federal Ministry for 
Education and Research (BMBF) in the framework of the competence network 
‘Crossroads Asia’. I would like to thank both BMBF and Crossroads Asia for 
their generous support during the research process. Furthermore, I am grateful 
for the open discussion of an earlier version of this chapter at a workshop of 
the Volkswagen-Foundation-funded project ‘Translocal Goods’ of Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin, held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in April 2015. I especially want 
to thank Philipp Schröder and Manja Stephan-Emmrich as well as Barak Kalir, 
Nathan Light and the two anonymous reviewers of the volume for their valuable 
input, which helped to improve the argument.
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Association of Dungans, a group of Chinese-speaking Muslims, 
used the event as a venue for negotiating business deals rather than 
celebrating culture and science. Trade entrepreneurs seeking support, 
as well as phone calls to and from China, constantly interrupted my 
interview with Daurov, an interview that took place on the sidelines 
of the larger meeting. As Daurov clarified, excusing himself for the 
frequent interruptions, Dungan connections built over the past three 
decades between Central Asia and China far exceed the level of mere 
commerce. They include a range of exchanges regarding education 
and innovation that facilitate the Dungans’ role as political and socio-
economic mediators across what is presented from the state perspective 
in both Kazakhstan and China as a newly emerging ‘Silk Road’.
Originating predominantly from the Chinese provinces of Shaanxi 
and Gansu, Dungans in Central Asia are descendants of refugees who 
were forced to leave the late Qing Empire in the course of what has 
become known as the Hui revolts (1862–1877). Following these events 
they established themselves in the Russian Empire and later in Soviet 
Central Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the 
second half of the twentieth century, Dungans were negatively affected 
by the Sino-Soviet divide that, in 1963, led to the closing of the border 
between the two Communist powers. However, starting with the Sino-
Soviet rapprochement and increasingly so since the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, many of Kazakhstan’s Dungans have managed to establish 
relations with Huizu2 and Han Chinese business networks and position 
themselves favorably in cross-border exchanges between coastal China, 
Xinjiang, and post-Soviet Central Asia. Dungans value the position of 
socio-spatial liminality they occupy, and they often attribute particular 
meaning to the places their practices connect. It is therefore worthwhile 
to investigate the relational and translocal production of place and the 
sense of multiple belongings that occur as a result. Notably, during 
interviews in Russian, my Dungan interlocutors referred not only to 
themselves but also to their perceived co-ethnics in China, as Dungan, 
even though Hueitsu is in widespread use as a common emic label or 
ethnic self-denomination in the ‘Dungan language’. 
2 The Huizu are an ethnic group; the word is used in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) collectively for Chinese Muslims. They are one of the fifty-six officially 
recognized ethnic groups in the PRC.
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This chapter explores the relations and practices among the people 
of coastal China, Almaty, and south-eastern Kazakhstan and the impact 
they have on notions of belonging and social change within a Dungan 
community. It takes an ethnographic approach to examine how the 
socio-economic and socio-cultural changes in interrelated places are 
perceived, represented, and narrated and how they both shape and are 
shaped by the actors’ social practices. The focus of this inquiry, therefore, 
is on issues of human interaction and translocal flows of ideas and how 
they influence the production of a particular sense of place. I argue that 
because of their discursive positioning between ‘rising’ China and post-
Soviet Kazakhstan, the Dungans perceive themselves as belonging to 
multiple groups. I will then investigate how the translocal socio-spatial 
positioning of a group impacts on the exchange of goods and people, 
as well as the appropriation or translation of particular ideas of social 
change between interconnected places. 
Field research for this study was conducted between September 2011 
and May 20143 in the large village of Shortobe, about 200 kilometers 
from Almaty, and in the Barakholka bazaar agglomeration in Almaty. 
My ethnographic methods included semi-structured interviews with 
residents and participant observation. 
My initial engagement with the Dungan community of Kazakhstan 
was facilitated by Husey Daurov, the most prominent community 
leader and businessman in Almaty. Since travelling to the People’s 
Republic of China in search of family links for the first time during the 
1980s, Daurov has remained the main facilitator of Dungan cultural 
and political exchanges between Central Asia and China. As one 
interview partner said: ‘Husey Shimarovich [Daurov] has done a lot 
for the Dungans, in particular for those here in Shortobe. In fact, all of 
the people doing business with Chinese partners have received contacts 
and built their business through him’. Daurov therefore served as a 
crucial resource for my inquiries into Dungan history. He was also a key 
point of entry into the Dungan community, helping me to identify other 
interlocutors, including students and entrepreneurs in Shortobe and 
Guangzhou. The twenty respondents I selected were predominantly 
entrepreneurs, running their own trade businesses in Almaty, but the 
3  These periods of field research were complemented by a short stay in Guangzhou 
in December 2014.
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group also included local representatives of the Association of Dungans, 
several high-school teachers, and college students in Shortobe and the 
neighboring Dungan-populated village of Masanchi. In addition to 
these more formal interviews, I enjoyed many informal conversations 
with Dungans in Kyrgyzstan, as well as three interviews with Dungan 
students in Guangzhou, Southeast China.
This method of acquiring contacts enabled translocal research. 
However, my reliance on Husey Daurov as a gatekeeper resulted in 
interlocutors who were close to the community leaders. Facilitated 
by this ‘snowball system’, but also due to the self-proclaimed pious 
Muslim identity of the Dungans, my interlocutors belonged exclusively 
to the well-connected and highly mobile male Dungan community. This 
introduces a certain amount of gender and (im-)mobility bias to the 
current study,which reflects the fact that the vast majority of Dungan 
women do not take part in either trade operations or educational 
exchanges with China.
This chapter comprises six parts in total: a brief section on the 
socio-cultural and historical background of Kazakhstan’s Dungans, 
followed by an outline of the theoretical background of this research. 
The remainder of the chapter explores Shortobe’s Dungans and their 
relations, socio-spatial boundaries and narratives of multiple belongings, 
ending with some concluding remarks on my analysis.
Historical and socio-cultural background
Kazakhstan’s Dungans, a group of Chinese-speaking Muslims about 
56,000 strong, predominantly live in a cluster of compact settlements 
in the Zhambyl oblast in the southeast of the country (Agenstvo po 
statistike 2012). They also form one of the largest minority groups in 
the Chuy and Issyk Köl oblast of neighboring Kyrgyzstan. Yet, while 
Dungans in the Central Asian republic (and in China, where they are 
subsumed under the ethnic category of Huizu)4 are widely considered 
to be a more or less coherent ethnic group, those originating from 
the Shaanxi and Gansu provinces of China speak different dialects of 
4  See the extensive work by Dru Gladney (1991, 1996, 2004) for thorough ethnographic 
research on the Huizu in China.
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Mandarin5 and often inhabit distinct settlements (Jimenez Tovar 2013). 
In Kyrgyzstan, those claiming their origins in Gansu province dominate 
among the 60,000 Dungans and form the intellectual elite.6 
Fig. 5.1  Shortobe and the Dungan-populated villages in South Eastern 
Kazakhstan. Map © Henryk Alff (2014), CC BY 4.0
The 20,000 Dungan inhabitants of Shortobe, as well as those forming the 
overwhelming majority of the populous nearby villages of Masanchi, 
Bular Batyr, and Aukhatty, are almost exclusively descendants of 
refugees hailing from the Chinese province of Shaanxi. During the late 
1870s, they left Qing China under the guidance of Muhammad Ayub 
Biyanhu, one of the military leaders of the Hui Revolts (Vansvanova 
2000). Having escaped annihilation in the Qing Empire, the Dungan 
refugee groups were settled by Tsarist authorities a few kilometers 
north of the garrison of Tokmak (Shushanlo 1967), now a regional centre 
5  In Dungan studies, as well as by the Dungans themselves, their language, however, 
is regarded not as a form of Chinese, but as a language proper, see for example 
Svetlana Rimsky-Korsakoff Dyer, ‘Soviet Dungan Nationalism: A Few Comments 
on Their Origin and Language’, Monumenta Serica, 33 (1978): 363–78.
6  The chair of Dungan Studies (dunganovedenie in Russian) at the Kyrgyz Academy 
of Sciences is the only scholarly institution in the former Soviet Union dedicated to 
the study of the Dungan language, history, and culture. It is also responsible for the 
editing of Dungan school textbooks, which are based on the Gansu dialect of the 
Dungan language.
182 Henryk Alff
across the border in Kyrgyzstan with a sizable Dungan community. 
Along the fertile valley of the Chu River, the Dungan refugees cultivated 
former pasture land and established irrigated farms, making use of their 
advanced agricultural skills and the seeds they brought from China.7 
On the basis of Dungan-dominated settlements, collective agricultural 
production units were formed in the early Soviet period. Some of 
them, like the collective farm ‘Kommunisticheskiy’ in Shortobe, were 
renowned for their high productivity in growing corn, potatoes, and 
garden vegetables throughout the Soviet period.
The dismantling of the Soviet Union and subsequent independence 
of the republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as sovereign states 
in 1991 brought about fundamental changes to Shortobe’s Dungan 
population. On the one hand, loss of state subsidies and the gradual 
solidifying of the Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan border in the early 1990s 
meant that collective farming and the distribution of their products, 
which was the main source of employment and subsistence for the 
majority of the population, was heading towards disintegration. 
On the other hand, Shortobe’s Dungans were among the first rural 
dwellers in Kazakhstan to gain from the relaxation of travel and 
foreign trade regulations across the newly opened Sino-Soviet 
border. Drawing on their ethno-linguistic (and religious) affiliation 
with Huizu and Han Chinese, Dungan community leaders from 
Shortobe started to form close interpersonal relations with partners 
across mainland China (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2012:123) and even as 
far as Malaysia. Unlike adjacent, mostly Kazakh-populated villages, 
Shortobe continues to expand and thrive thanks to intensive high-
yield agriculture, catering for the markets and for Dungan restaurants 
in the major cities of Kazakhstan. Trans-Eurasian trade and transport, 
linking manufacturing centres in China’s seaboard, Xinjiang, with 
the post-Soviet states, is the community’s second source of income. 
Furthermore, dozens of Dungan students now study at the universities 
or are employed in Xi’an and Lanzhou and in the manufacturing 
centres of coastal China.
7 See Kamol Abdullaev’s discussion in Chapter One about Tajik refugees in 
Afghanistan for an example of the ‘flow of agricultural innovation’ in the early 
Soviet period.
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The end of the Soviet Union, however, has also brought about a 
religious revival and an exchange of ideas about Islam among the 
Dungan population of Shortobe. Over the past two decades, eighteen 
mosques were constructed there and in the neighboring Dungan-
populated villages, with at least one in what is locally called the 
‘Chinese style’, referring to the curved gable construction of the roof. 
Shortobe’s Dungans consider themselves pious Muslims and usually 
follow their religious obligations more strictly than their Kazakh 
co-villagers. In interviews Dungans often described themselves as 
following the strict rules of Islam, in contrast to their neighbors. Thus, 
one of my interlocutors in Shortobe joked that Kazakhs consider 
themselves Muslims only three times in their entire life: when they 
are born, when they marry, and when they die. For Dungans, on the 
contrary, Islam is fundamental to their lives and religious duties are to 
be discharged on an everyday basis.8 Dungans in Shortobe regularly 
engage in the prescribed five-times daily prayer; travel for hajj at 
least once (but often twice);9 and abstain from alcohol and tobacco, 
substances that have been banned from sale in local shops by the 
community’s elders. 
Islam plays an important role in Dungans’ self-identification and 
has certainly contributed to the expansion of Hui-Dungan business 
relations, as a strict self-definition as pious Muslims among both 
Dungan and Hui has generated mutual trust based on a shared 
belief in their mutual honesty.10 However, this is accompanied by a 
general tightening of state control, particularly in China, but also in 
Kazakhstan, over what some government leaders perceive as religious 
extremism and the establishment of suspicious religious networks. 
However, given the sensitivity of this topic, the religious aspects have 
not been studied in great detail in the present study. 
8  Interview, 20 May 2014, Shortobe.
9  Hundreds of Dungans from Kazakhstan leave for hajj every year on charter flights, 
taking up a considerable proportion of the government quota for these journeys.
10  Cross-border Muslim solidarity among Dungan groups plays out, for example, in 
the organization of hajj tours. During an interview on 4 April 2012, a female director 
of a Bishkek-based Dungan travel agency explained how she arranged journeys 
predominantly for Dungans from Xinjiang, making use of the comparatively 
relaxed religious policies in Kyrgyzstan and bypassing the limited annual state 
quota for hajj travel in China. 
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The relational thinking of place  
and the concept of translocality
In this section, I outline how places are constituted through complex 
sets of human interactions, negotiations of socio-spatial relations, and 
flows of ideas and meaning, or ‘alternative spatialities’. This approach 
stems from the paradigmatic changes throughout the social sciences 
since the 1980s, in particular the ‘spatial turn’, i.e., the recognition of 
the constructivist, multidimensional character of spatial production. In 
particular, I shall refer to Doreen Massey’s oft-cited conceptualization 
of relational placemaking (1991, 1998, 2004) and Zoomers and van 
Westen’s concept of translocal development (2011). 
Massey argues that people’s identities have a decisive impact on the 
production of particular places and vice versa. This insight implies that 
the specific meanings, feelings and values that people associate with a 
location invoke what John Agnew has called ‘a sense of place’ (Agnew 
2008). We must therefore go beyond physical qualities to consider the 
imagined values and symbolic attachments that places can possess (for 
additional discussion of this symbolic meaning, see Manja Stephan-
Emmrich in Chapter Nine). Yet, while these qualities appear to be 
properties of a specific place, they may instead result from, and possibly 
be expressed because of, human connections to other locations (Castree 
2008). Local identities may be based in particular places, but they are 
rarely bound to them (ibid.). Thus, Massey argues rightly that it is ‘routes 
rather than roots’, the flows of meaning, that matter for the production of 
a sense of place (Massey 1998), and these routes also characterise distinct 
feelings of belonging in the Dungan case, as I shall suggest.
Massey also argues that places should not be conceptualized as static, 
predetermined (essentialized), and bounded (territorialized) spatial 
entities, but rather considered according to their ongoing production, or 
what Gilles Deleuze has termed the process of ‘becoming’ (Deleuze 1995) 
(see also Emil Nasritdinov in Chapter Ten). Thus places are constructed 
through their entanglements with other places, and these interrelations 
are created by human interactions, processes of exchange, and mobility 
(Massey 2004). This understanding of places as ‘nodes in networks’ or as 
‘meeting places’ implies a certain degree of unevenness and inequality, or 
what Massey has called ‘power geometries’. Scalar thinking in the social 
sciences often results in the suggestion that ‘local inequalities are caused 
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by global interlinkages’ (Castree 2008:165–66), thus assuming a nested 
hierarchy. However, the negotiation of socio-spatial relations between 
and within places is, to a considerable degree, subject to the agency of 
actors and their strategic choices and practices. Individual relationships 
are always situated in time and space and are, therefore, highly contextual.
Recently, the concept of translocality has gained considerable 
prominence in socio-spatial theory,11 both as an object of enquiry and 
as a research perspective. Freitag and von Oppen define translocality 
in a descriptive sense as ‘the sum of phenomena which result from a 
multitude of circulations and transfers. It designates the outcome of 
concrete movements of people, goods, ideas and symbols which span 
spatial distances and cross boundaries, be they geographical, cultural 
or political’ (Freitag and von Oppen 2010:5). Similar to other theoretical 
contributions on translocality, Freitag and von Oppen describe and 
explain the multiple and heterogeneous ‘interactions and connections 
between places, institutions and concepts’ using the concept of networks 
(ibid.). They consider interactions to be the central constitutive element 
of connections, and interactions can be broadly summarized as intense 
processes of movement, communication, and exchange between 
particular places and/or situated actors (Alff and Benz 2014:9).
It must be noted that the movement of people, goods, and ideas 
from one place to another (and from one context to another), which is 
inherent to the process of interaction, is a central feature of translocality, 
further contributing to its relational character. The notion of translation, 
especially regarding the movement of ideas, identities, and meanings 
between places, implies a moment of transformation or innovation during 
a process of reconfiguration (De Lima Costa and Alvarez 2014:557). At 
the same time, paradoxically the ‘trans-’ in translation and translocality 
suggests a particularity to locality that contributes to the maintenance of 
distinctive dynamics or orders. Consequently, Freitag and von Oppen 
point out that translocality ‘focuses neither exclusively on movement, 
broadly conceived, nor on a particular order, real or imagined. Rather, 
it investigates the tensions between movement and order’ and thus 
‘attempts to cope with transgression and with the need for localizing 
some kind of order’ (Freitag and von Oppen 2010:8, emphasis theirs).
11  For the extensive literature in the social sciences on translocality see Freitag and 
von Oppen (2010), Brickell and Datta (2011), Zoomers and van Westen (2011). For 
ethnographic accounts of translocality in China see Oakes and Schein (2006).
186 Henryk Alff
As an important extension to the general translocality concept, 
Zoomers and van Westen (2011) have suggested the notion of ‘translocal 
development’, which contributes to my analysis of the Dungan case. 
This concept highlights the impact that local-to-local relations and flows 
of capital, goods, people, and information can have on transformations 
that occur in interconnected places (ibid.:377). Conceptualizations 
of ‘translocal development’ thus seek to overcome established 
territorializations (‘methodological nationalism, regionalism, localism’), 
binary spatial dichotomies (rural-urban, central-peripheral) and an 
analytical assessment that is restricted to the local ‘boundedness’ of 
resources and people in separate places (ibid.).They allow ‘alternative 
spatialisations’, which challenge the significance of topographical 
distance and of borders, thereby contributing to an understanding of the 
place- and actor-based production of space that occurs daily. Zoomers 
and van Westen rightly argue that globalization is ‘connecting people 
and places that are distant in space but linked in such ways that what 
happens in one place has direct bearing on the other’ (ibid.:379). This 
focus on translocal connections that are established through mobilities 
and exchanges is not intended to downplay or ignore the importance 
of local dynamics or place-based historical formations in processes of 
change. Nevertheless, ‘the translocal links might generate additional 
perspectives for “local” development’ (ibid.:380). 
The following two sections reflect upon the ways in which 
interpersonal relationships across space and translocal flows of meaning 
between different places contribute to socio-spatial transformations in 
Shortobe, and how this affects the sense  of belonging felt by the Dungan 
population. 
Negotiations of socio-spatial relations and flows of 
people, goods, and meaning
In Kazakhstani society during the late Soviet era, Dungans were 
considered a distinct and tight-knit ethnic community12 of successful 
12  The inward-looking nature of the Dungan community, revealed in their 
conversations with trade entrepreneurs in Almaty, was often linked to their short-
lived demands in the early post-Soviet period for political autonomy in the Korday 
district.
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and particularly hard-working agriculturalists (Hong 2005:138). Some 
of the most productive irrigated vegetable farms in the south of the 
Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) were the collective farms 
located in predominantly Dungan-populated rural settlements such as 
Dunganovka (on the outskirts of the city of Taraz) and the cluster of 
villages around Shortobe (in the Korday District of Zhambyl oblast). They 
acquired in-depth knowledge of, and access to, distribution networks 
by providing agricultural produce to formal state organizations, and 
they supplied the surplus goods to informal farmers’ markets in large 
cities in Soviet Central Asia and Siberia. These relationships were key to 
their status as one of the central groups in the private trade sector after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the 1990s, state-
controlled provision schemes were replaced by private wholesale and 
retail bazaars, such as the Dordoi bazaar in Bishkek and the Barakholka 
agglomeration in Almaty. Dungan entrepreneurs from rural places, 
led by Husey Daurov, actively facilitated this process by strategically 
extending and rebuilding business relations with China.
Fig. 5.2  Dungan vegetable farming in Shortobe.  
Photo © Henryk Alff (2014), CC BY 4.0
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The Dungans of Shortobe consider themselves ancestors of a group of 
refugees that left the Qing Empire in 1877. While some households still 
retain pieces of cloth, jewelry, and even walking sticks13 from their ancestors’ 
flight, passing them down from generation to generation, ancestral links 
to China have gradually deteriorated over the past 140 years. Rimsky-
Korsakoff Dyer (1978:356) notes that during the Soviet period there was 
almost no contact between Dungan groups in Soviet Central Asia and 
Huizu groups in the People’s Republic, a fact she does not connect to the 
conflict between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the PRC during that 
time, but rather to almost a century of separation between Dungans and 
their kin in China. With the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the late 1980s, 
communication with and travel to China became less restricted. Husey 
Daurov, a former history teacher in Shortobe’s secondary school and then 
the secretary of Shortobe’s collective farm ‘Kommunisticheskiy’ was the 
first to build up new ties with Huizu and Han political and economic 
circles, first in Xi’an, the capital of Shaanxi province, and later in other 
places across China. Daurov thereby became a pioneer and retains great 
influence over the extensive social networks that currently link Shortobe 
with China, as one of my interlocutors in Shortobe stated: 
‘Husey Shimarovich [Daurov] has done a lot for the Dungans, in 
particular for those here in Shortobe. In fact, all of the people running 
business with Chinese partners have received contacts and built their 
business through him. He is the moral authority of our people’ (2014, 
Shortobe).
A sense of cross-border solidarity and loyalty, based on ethnic and 
linguistic affiliation, exists between Dungans and their Han Chinese 
business partners, which has contributed to the establishment of 
enduring, trusting, and often exclusive commercial and political 
alliances. These were stronger than the ties between their Kazakh, 
Kyrgyz, and Uyghur competitors and the evolving Chinese business 
sector (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2012:123). Dungan groups in Kazakhstan 
are being appropriated by the Chinese state as an ‘overseas Chinese 
ethnic minority’ (shao shu min zu hua qiao hua ren in Chinese), which 
gives them particularly favorable access to social benefits offered by 
the Chinese authorities, e.g., to cultural and educational exchange 
programmes and university grants (Jiménez Tovar 2013, 2016).
13  Interview with Husey Daurov, 12 May 2014, Almaty.
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Fig. 5.3  Translocal connections between Central Asia and China forged 
by Shortobe’s Dungans. Map © Henryk Alff (2015), CC BY 4.0
The export of scrap metal and Soviet-era industrial installations to 
China in the 1900s was the first economic activity that arose from these 
connections between Dungan and Han entrepreneurs. The outflow of 
labourers from Shortobe and the neighboring villages to Bishkek and 
Almaty was facilitated by the organization of transport schemes between 
coastal China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia and by the highly 
profitable wholesale import of Chinese-made consumer goods such as 
textiles, shoes, and household items to Kazakhstan, which flourished in 
the second half of the decade. Today, in up to eighty percent of Shortobe’s 
households, one or more members are reported to be self-employed in 
the urban trade sector,14 especially in wholesale and larger retail trade 
based at Almaty’s Barakholka bazaar agglomeration, complementing the 
agricultural economic orientation of the village. Those people running 
14  Fieldnotes based on a conversation with a local Dungan businessman, 18 May 2014, 
Shortobe.
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the trade business travel to China for supplies — either to Urumqi or 
directly to the manufacturing centres on China’s eastern seaboard — 
on a regular basis. Yet, many of them return to Shortobe during the 
weekly day off at Almaty’s Barakholka, from Sunday evening to Tuesday 
morning. During a taxi ride with Dungan retail traders from Shortobe 
to Almaty’s Baisat bazaar in October 2012, one of them explained the 
evolution of his business:
‘I moved from Shortobe to help out my elder brother with his business 
back in 2002. Bazaar trade became a highly profitable way of making 
a living, as Kazakhstan recovered from the 1998 financial crisis. I soon 
could buy a sales container on my own and started to travel to Urumqi 
almost every two months for supplies of household appliances using 
the contacts my brother had established. Sales went well, nowadays 
they have slowed, but still I was able to buy a new house in Shortobe 
a year ago, although retail prices in Shortobe have reached the level of 
Almaty.’15
The connections to China fostered the increasing mobility of Dungan 
trade entrepreneurs and the circulation of goods and capital, but also 
the exchange of innovative ideas that often accompanies these translocal 
flows. In the mid-1990s Husey Daurov, then the head of the privatised 
farm ‘Shaanxi’ in Shortobe, imported agricultural innovations from 
Xi’an, such as basic greenhouse and mushroom-growing technology, 
to generate income for the village in the late autumn and early spring 
months. These technologies later spread to other parts of southern 
Kazakhstan. Rapid housing construction triggered the constant 
expansion of Shortobe16 and its neighboring villages, and small-scale 
brick and paint production facilities were built in the neighboring 
villages of Bular Batyr and Aukhatty using Chinese technology and 
expertise17 to satisfy local demand. During a visit to the paint factory 
in May 2014, a Dungan foreman emphasized that the half-mechanized 
production is the only industrial facility in the Korday district. The 
15  Fieldnotes, 8 October 2012.
16  One of my interlocutors in Shortobe named these extensive new quarters on the 
fringes of Shortobe ‘micro-districts’ (microrayon in Russian), pointing to their 
increasingly urbanized character.
17  The small-scale paint factory in Aukhatty is currently run by a Han Chinese manager 
from Fujian province, employing around thirty workers from surrounding villages.
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products are currently sold across Kazakhstan and are always in high 
demand due to the lack of serious domestic competition.18
Fig. 5.4  Paint production facility in Aukhatty.  
Photo © Henryk Alff (2014), CC BY 4.0
As a way to ‘develop’ Shortobe, Daurov proposed a project of 
‘community-based tourism as seen in many parts of China nowadays’ 
to attract larger numbers of Chinese visitors, who seek to experience a 
highly folklorized version of ‘traditional Hui culture’ that has vanished 
in China after the Cultural Revolution.19 According to Daurov’s vision, 
inviting Chinese people to stay in Dungan homes and participate in 
‘traditional Dungan wedding ceremonies’, as well as constructing an 
ethnographic village with ‘ancient Dungan-style houses and Kazakh 
yurts’, promote Chinese-Dungan dialogue and interaction and 
provide new modes of income (ibid., see also Laruelle and Peyrouse 
2012:121–23).
18  Fieldnotes, 19 May 2014.
19  Interview, 9 October 2012, Almaty.
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A Dungan tendency towards history-making and self-
mythologization is evident in such ethno-tourism, as they explain 
their contemporary existence as a Chinese-speaking group in 
Kazakhstan with reference to a reimagined (folklorized) past (see 
also Svetlana Jacquesson in Chapter Six). Several of my interlocutors 
in Shortobe outlined that not only have Chinese tourists arrived in 
increasing numbers in search of what they imagine as their lost selves, 
but journalists, film crews, and social anthropologists from mainland 
China have also visited Shortobe for investigation or field research. 
This strategy of historicizing present, everyday reality in Dungan 
settlements apparently serves to attract attention from China and tap 
new sources of income for the rural Dungan population. It is part of a 
project that exploits (and appropriates) images from the past to build 
a prosperous future.
Social change in Shortobe and other Dungan settlements during the 
past two decades was entangled with state-led modernisation across 
China. This is particularly true with respect to agricultural innovation 
in Shortobe and the simultaneous increase in more urbanized economic 
activities such as international trade, tourism, and manufacturing, 
which all contribute to what is perceived as modern society. The influx 
of ideas for development together with these new entrepreneurial 
activities is vividly expressed by my Dungan interlocutors’ descriptions 
of particular elements of China’s modernisation ideology. A member 
of Shortobe’s local branch of Kazakhstan’s Association of Dungans on 
one occasion said: 
‘In China, the advancement of people and society is given highest 
priority. The Chinese government supports unity, equity, and dialogue 
in society though various measures, because this comes as a pledge 
for societal improvement and wellbeing. As Dungans in Kazakhstan’s 
society, we also retain a high degree of respect for our compatriots’ 
(2011, Shortobe).
The importance of dialogue, harmony, and equity in society as a 
precondition for positive change and, at the same time, a major goal 
thereof, seems to be influenced by the notion of ‘social harmony’ (hexie 
shehui in Chinese), which is prominent in the Chinese modernisation 
discourse (Brox and Bellér-Hann 2014). However, the reference to 
‘social harmony’ is not the only aspect of ‘Chinese modernity’ brought 
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up during conversation by Dungans in Shortobe. The ability to flexibly 
and pragmatically react to changing socio-economic conditions, 
e.g., to adapt their supplies to the demand for products or services, 
or to adjust cross-border trade and transport networks to navigate 
changing modes of regulation and to trade effectively, are considered 
quintessential entrepreneurial qualities. 
Thus, among my Dungan interlocutors there is a positive sense of 
symbolic connectedness to the flow of ideas and forces of development 
in China, on the one hand, and their impact on modernisation in 
Shortobe, on the other. In fact, Shortobe’s Dungan population has 
a certain fascination with development in China. As I have stated 
elsewhere in more detail, it appears that by promoting particular ideas 
about development across borders, Chinese state elites will eventually 
be able to use the Dungan population for their own purposes by 
inspiring translocal developments that are favourable to China and are 
forged by key actors and communities within the Dungan population 
(Alff 2014, Jiménez Tovar 2016). 
Fig. 5.5  Miniature version of Astana’s Baiterek Tower in a Dungan 
village. Photo © Henryk Alff (2014), CC BY 4.0
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While this policy has elicited predominantly positive feedback among 
my interlocutors, who often agree with Chinese ideas about modernity, 
they have also tended to assert their ‘Kazakhstaniness’ and therefore 
their position in the post-Soviet societal order. Many of my respondents 
explicitly emphasized that Dungans belong to Kazakhstan’s multi-
ethnic population, a claim that is reinforced by the extensive use, even 
by Central Asian standards, of Kazakhstani state symbols in Shortobe’s 
public spaces, for example the erection of miniature versions of Astana’s 
Baiterek Tower in schoolyards and central junctions of Dungan-
populated villages (see fig. 5.5 and also Koch 2010).20 Dungan elites, at the 
same time, have offered themselves as go-betweens to the Kazakhstani 
government, which has allowed them to rebut the impression that they 
have been co-opted by China and to enhance their own influence in 
commercial exchanges. Thus, Dungan business people often quite 
literally act as translators for government delegations to China, while 
gaining from lucrative business deals. In the following section I shall 
examine how these interconnections between China and Kazakhstan 
foster translocal development and a sense of multiple belongings.
Translocal development and multiple belongings
As has been outlined above, the dynamic transformation of place 
occurs in human interactions that shape and are shaped by socio-spatial 
relations as well as flows of people, goods, and ideas. Such exchanges 
position the village of Shortobe as a ‘node in networks’ rather than a 
strictly-bounded entity in space. In the Dungan case, this is nowhere 
more apparent than in the socio-spatial effects of educational migration. 
Over the past couple of years, several hundred Dungan students21 
in Kazakhstan, predominantly from Shortobe and the surrounding 
villages, have left to attend long-term Chinese language courses or to 
gain higher education in universities across China. These universities 
20  Another example is the Dungan gold medal winners at the London 2012 Olympic 
Games, Zulfiya Chinshanlo and Maya Maneza (recently deprived of their medals 
due to alleged use of doping) who were widely praised in Shortobe as Kazakhstani 
idols, despite having been trained in China. See also Jiménez Tovar (2013:1).
21  According to a local member of the Association of Dungans, 200 students were 
sent in 2013 alone for one-year language courses and undergraduate studies (my 
fieldnotes, 18 May 2014, Shortobe).
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provide stipends22 to Dungans who are officially deemed ‘Overseas 
Chinese ethnic minorities’; thus higher education in Xi’an, Lanzhou, 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, has become accessible to the rural 
Dungan population. This spatial mobility for educational purposes 
fosters a certain degree of social mobility, but in a selective way. The 
prospect of a career in business thanks to the relationship between 
Kazakhstan and China, and in particular thanks to the investment of 
Chinese state corporations in Kazakhstan’s economy, has increased the 
popular demand for these scholarships among the Dungan population.23 
It has also driven initiatives that provide Putonghua, or Chinese-standard 
language training, in Shortobe and neighboring villages at the secondary 
school level. A major outcome of improved Chinese language training 
in, and increasing educational migration from, Shortobe is a stronger 
awareness of the potential of the Dungans’ cultural-historical and socio-
economic links to China, particularly among the younger generation 
(Allés 2005).
During a research stay in the thriving southern Chinese metropolis 
of Guangzhou in December 2014, I met two Dungan undergraduate 
students from Shortobe who, having transferred from Shaanxi Normal 
University to the prestigious Sun Yatsen University in Guangzhou, 
praised the socio-economic opportunities that China’s major commercial 
centre has to offer. During a dinner in one of Guangzhou’s numerous 
Huizu-owned restaurants one of them said: 
‘I first studied in Xi’an. I then came to Guangzhou to continue my 
studies about a year ago. As Guangzhou is continuously expanding 
and booming, naturally there are many more opportunities here than 
in Shortobe or even in Xi’an for earning extra income. There was not 
much to do [in Xi’an]; when we came home from school, we went to 
have a nap. Here, when a trade fair is coming up or a business delegation 
from Kazakhstan is due to arrive, we get a call from Husey Shimarovich 
[Daurov] and are hired as interpreters’ (2014, Guangzhou). 
The two students outlined the seemingly endless possibilities that China’s 
rapid development offered to them as Dungans, especially in places like 
Guangzhou. They pointed out that their origins in a Dungan village 
22 These stipends are allocated by Kazakhstan’s Association of Dungans.
23  The allocation of grants is allegedly not always carried out in an entirely transparent 
way, leading to complaints by some applicants, which I once witnessed.
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in Kazakhstan and their lengthy stays in Xi’an and Guangzhou were 
particularly beneficial in allowing them to make use of the opportunities 
offered by China’s rapid development. In common with several of those 
returning from China, whom I interviewed in Shortobe and Almaty, 
they emphasized their Dungan, Russian, Kazakh, and Chinese language 
skills and their in-depth knowledge of local conditions in both places as 
crucial for their daily life as well as for future plans.24 They highlighted 
their desire to contribute to the prosperity of their families back home in 
Shortobe, as they expected to become employed in well-paid positions 
in branches of Chinese corporations in Kazakhstan upon their return.
The interviews in Guangzhou revealed, moreover, that it is not only 
Dungan students’ knowledge of several languages, local customs, and 
business culture that has contributed to their favorable position as 
intermediaries, but also their embeddedness in Kazakhstani Dungan-
Chinese political networks. The students had direct connections to the 
leaders of the Association of Dungans and its regional offices in China. 
This resulted in relatively tight social control from above regarding their 
academic achievements and their housing, but it also provided direct 
access to influential business circles and even to official government 
delegations for ‘our Dungan students’, as Husey Daurov called them. 
What becomes clear from the students’ case, first and foremost, is the 
impact of cross-border (educational) mobility and local-to-local relations 
between geographically distant, yet socio-spatially interconnected 
places. The changes occurring in one place are therefore understood to 
a considerable degree through translocal human interaction, as in the 
case of Dungan educational migration between Shortobe and Chinese 
university cities. Through the allocation of Chinese-funded stipends to 
Dungan students in villages in Kazakhstan and the continued interest 
of Kazakhstani business circles in benefitting from the know-how and 
embeddedness of Dungans in Guangzhou or other manufacturing 
centres, these local-to-local connections become visible and relevant for 
analysis. Secondly, the intermediary socio-spatial or brokering position 
of the Dungans between China and Central Asia has become evident. As 
Husey Daurov, during one of our meetings, emphasized:
24 For another example of the valorization of the use of language as cultural capital 
see Abdullah Mirzoev and Manja Stephan-Emmrich’s contribution on the socio-
economic strategies of Tajik migrants in Dubai in Chapter Three.
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‘China with accelerated velocity draws closer to the US […]. Dungans, 
who know the local mentality and realities, speak both Russian and 
Kazakh, share commonalities in culture and language with the Chinese, 
should use the historical chances China’s rapid development has to offer 
in any way they can’ (2012, Shortobe). 
According Daurov, Dungans are expected to occupy an intermediate 
position in what he calls China’s path towards development and global 
leadership (see also Gladney 1996:454–58). Described as ‘relational 
alterity’ by Gladney (1996:454), the Dungans’ strategic practice of 
positioning themselves as intermediaries between China and Kazakhstan 
highlights the way in which they make sense of their group’s existence. 
The pronounced socio-spatial situatedness of Dungans as middlemen 
entails the translation of knowledge, skills, and particular ideas of social 
change, as has been outlined above, and as has also been referred to 
by Philipp Schröder in his study of Kyrgyz traders and by Abdullah 
Mirzoev and Manja Stephan-Emmrich in their chapter on Tajik migrants 
in Dubai (Chapters Eight and Three, respectively). Their role as brokers, 
moreover, both informs and is produced by what could be called a 
Dungan sense of multiple (translocal) belongings and embeddedness 
within the different socio-spatial contexts of China and post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan. Interestingly, Dungans of different social backgrounds 
have pointed this out during my interviews and conversations. 
In fact, numerous conversations with interlocutors in Shortobe 
revealed that the city of Xi’an in Shaanxi province was commonly 
referred to as the historical homeland (istoricheskaya rodina in Russian) 
of the Dungans. This calls to mind the concept of ‘native place’ (guxiang 
in Chinese), which derives its significance not from its ‘localization’, 
but rather from historic and ongoing processes of identification (Oakes 
and Schein 2006:19). The crucial symbolic position of Xi’an in Dungan 
discourses of belonging has been strengthened over the last few 
years by the multi-purpose links forged with this city through cross-
border cultural and educational exchanges as well as the circulation of 
innovative ideas. These links were institutionalized by the establishment 
of an official partnership between Zhambyl oblast and Shaanxi province, 
which was initiated by Husey Daurov using his connections to both the 
Kazakhstani state elite and to regional authorities in Xi’an. 
The cluster of villages around Shortobe, on the other hand, was often 
posited as the nucleus of the Dungan population in Kazakhstan. The 
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unique nature of this cluster, which is rapidly developing and much 
more prosperous than surrounding Kazakh-inhabited settlements, 
was often proudly highlighted. Furthermore, several interlocutors 
emphasized Dungans’ strong social attachment to the places where 
they settle. While the demand for building plots remains high, with 
real estate prices in Shortobe approaching those in Kazakhstan’s largest 
cities, much private investment is dedicated to the maintenance and 
improvement of local infrastructure. 
Along with these claims of multiple belongings (see also Jiménez 
Tovar 2016) the emphasis on the Dungans’ role as brokers has been 
expressed by widespread self-representations of their existence as a 
product of exchanges (both of people and religious values) along the 
historic ‘Silk Road’.25 This claim finds its contemporary extension in the 
position of Dungan entrepreneurs within the state-led political discourse 
in China and Kazakhstan, as they discuss the creation of a modern 
‘Silk Road’ or ‘Eurasian land bridge’. Several of my interlocutors in 
Shortobe as Chinese Muslims traced their ancestry to the century-long 
flows of people and values along the ‘Silk Road’, thereby connecting 
their past ideas with their visions of ongoing social change. Husey 
Daurov explicitly references the powerful political ambition to rebuild 
a modern ‘Silk Road’ when he praises the contemporary and future 
opportunities that Dungans should grasp to promote their community’s 
socio-economic advancement (Alff 2014).
Conclusion
This chapter has drawn attention to the particularities of the constitution 
of place(s) through the lens of socio-spatial connections rather than 
through the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 2008) in the case of the Dungan 
village of Shortobe in southeastern Kazakhstan. Dungans, previously 
exclusively regarded as a close-knit group of farmers in Soviet-era 
public discourse in Kazakhstan, have strategically expanded their 
connections to Hui and Han Chinese groups across China in the last 
two decades. By so doing, they have positioned themselves favorably 
as mediators in the trade between China and Kazakhstan, as well as 
in the processes of exchange along what is often conceived from a 
25 Svetlana Jacquesson’s study of popular historiographies in Kyrgyzstan in Chapter 
Six may be another good case in point for this process of the ‘invention of history’.
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state perspective as a newly emerging ‘Silk Road’. At the same time, 
Shortobe’s Dungan population has experienced a sense of multiple 
belongings thanks to the increasing level of translocal interaction for 
educational and business purposes between Shortobe, Almaty, and 
the booming cities of the Chinese seaboard. The Dungans’ multiple 
belonging evolves from both top-down (appropriation) and bottom-up 
(self-definition) processes.
Analysis of the Dungan case reveals that it is largely through the 
mobility of people and the dynamically changing flows of goods, ideas, 
and meaning that Shortobe’s transformation over the last two decades 
literally ‘takes place’. Thus, it is not (or at least not alone) the rootedness 
or boundedness of distinct meaning in place, as Doreen Massey has 
rightly argued, but the intersecting flows of meaning through human 
interaction and exchanges between places that forge a particular ‘sense 
of place’ among actors. The construction of a ‘sense of place’ can be 
seen in the modernisation rhetoric that has followed the introduction 
of agricultural innovations in Shortobe and the promotion among its 
population of ‘more modern’ means of making a living. Thus I have 
argued, following Massey’s concept of place as a ‘node in networks’, 
that the constitution of place needs to be explored relationally, rather 
than thinking of it as a bounded entity in space.
This approach to thinking about place through its connections 
may be further enriched by the concept of translocality, and more 
specifically with Zoomers and van Westen’s (2011) notion of ‘translocal 
development’. The central idea behind ‘translocal development’ is 
to scrutinize transformations in one place through its local-to-local 
relations with interconnected places, implying that changes in one place 
have a direct impact on the other. The case of Shortobe suggests that 
the relationships between interconnected places are far from even or 
balanced. The outcome of translocal development has been exemplified 
by the educational migration of Dungan students between Shortobe 
and university cities in eastern China. The increased yet still selective 
access to higher education abroad has increased the appreciation of the 
value of closer cultural-historical and socio-economic links to China, 
especially among the younger generation of Shortobe’s Dungans. The 
experience of a rapidly developing China has fostered hopes among 
Dungan students that they might personally benefit from these changes 
and at the same time contribute to ongoing development in Shortobe.
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PART 3  
 
MOVEMENTS FROM BELOW: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

6. ‘New History’ as a Translocal Field
Svetlana Jacquesson
Introduction
My first field trips to Kyrgyzstan date back to the late 1990s. Much 
of the fieldwork I carried out at first followed well-established 
anthropological methods: participant observation, discussions, 
eavesdropping, interviews. Though I could interact quite freely with 
my interlocutors in the field, since I had clumsy but efficient Kyrgyz 
language skills and nearly fluent Russian, I was never fully satisfied 
with my field data alone. I was curious about what Kyrgyz people 
wrote, read, or discussed when they were not interacting with an 
outsider. I believed that publications in Kyrgyz could allow me at least 
a partial access to a ‘cultural intimacy’1 I could never attain otherwise, 
no matter how much time I spent in the field. I remember visiting 
every single bookshop and avidly buying any publication in Kyrgyz 
available at the time. In the late 1990s this was still possible: publications 
1  By using ‘cultural intimacy’ here, I stretch the concept as it was coined by 
Michael Herzfeld (1997). Herzfeld conceptualizes ‘cultural intimacy’ as insiders’ 
recognition of aspects of cultural identity that are both a source of embarrassment 
and of common sociality (Herzfeld 1997:3). I also use ‘cultural intimacy’ to refer to 
aspects of cultural identity, in my case, insiders’ discussions, ideas, imaginations, 
and stories about their past. These aspects of cultural identity, however, could be a 
source of embarrassment for both insiders and outsiders, to the extent that outsiders 
might reject them outright, or contest them. As will become clear below, most of the 
claims of ‘new history’ may seem paradoxical to outsiders; for insiders, though, 
they constitute an additional source of pride, and they nourish their nationalist 
sentiments. 
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in Kyrgyz — booklets or treatises on animal diseases included — were 
not that numerous. The situation, however, evolved quickly: some 
fifteen years later, it is no longer possible to buy ‘all’ that is published 
in Kyrgyz, for the very simple reason that such publications abound.
In some ways, the growth of publishing in Kyrgyz satisfied my 
desire to access this ‘cultural intimacy’: I have discussed elsewhere 
(Jacquesson 2010) the proliferation of local genealogies and local 
histories and, though most of the people and places discussed in these 
publications were completely unknown to me, I still leaf through the 
books and enjoy a story here and there or learn something new about 
the country and its people. However, a substantial portion of the local 
writings on history engaged in intricate reconstructions of a deeper 
past. These reconstructions were about places and peoples I knew, but 
these places and peoples were connected to the Kyrgyz and their past 
in ways quite unfamiliar to me. To give but a taste of such unexpected 
connections, whereas I had an idea of ‘who’ Aryans or Indo-Europeans 
were, I had never heard or thought of the Kyrgyz as Aryans; neither had 
I read about Atilla or Genghis Khan being Kyrgyz. While I was vaguely 
aware that, in the very distant past, humans must have crossed the 
Bering Strait and settled in North America, I had never thought of these 
humans as being closely related to the Kyrgyz, and as for Germans and 
Kyrgyz sharing common ancestors, this was a stretch too far for me. 
Though it is difficult to evaluate the exact volume of such historical 
writings, they appear frequently in the pages of various news media 
outlets or on social media forums.
This brand of history — which I will refer to as ‘new history’2 — is 
produced not only in Kyrgyzstan, but also in Russia and in the other 
2  Laruelle (2012a) examines similar trends in history making in Russia under the 
category ‘alternate history’. However, alternate history is not only a very dynamic 
and defined field but also one in which science-fiction tropes (time travel, time 
splitting, crossing time) predominate. In this regard, the kinds of history making 
I examine in this chapter differ significantly from alternate history. ‘Alternative 
history’ might have been a better denomination for the kind of intellectual endeavour 
I try to analyze, especially in the way it is conceptualized by Pels (1997:168), i.e., as 
histories ‘that challenge historiographical “hierarchies of credibility” because they 
derive from street art, spirit possession, oral tradition, rumor, gossip, and other 
popular or subaltern forms of knowledge production’. But since ‘alternate’ and 
‘alternative’ history tend to be used interchangeably, I prefer ‘new history’ as a 
more neutral denomination.
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post-Soviet Central Asian countries. Local academic circles — or at least 
some of them — refer to it as the ‘mythologization of history’ and reject 
it outright (Masanov et al. 2007, Galiev 2010, Grozin 2010, Omurbekov 
2012.) As an anthropologist I am less inclined to do so, though I do not 
espouse the claims of new history. In this chapter I experiment with 
translocality in an attempt to suggest an analytical approach to ‘new 
history’ — or at least part of it — that is not limited to its outright 
rejection.3 I investigate what new history is about, who its producers 
are, and how they work. I use ‘investigate’ on purpose because I do 
not have any relationships with the authors of new history, and I have 
not received any revelations from them. Instead, I have been working 
with the ‘evidence’ they leave, i.e., their texts, and I reconstruct their 
‘crimes’ based on their methods and claims. I argue that this peculiar 
brand of history is the outcome of knowledge transfers and interactions 
that transgress a variety of borders — social, professional, national, 
and geopolitical — and that its claims as well as its social and political 
significance can be made analytically meaningful by adopting a translocal 
research perspective (Freitag and von Oppen 2010). When approached 
as a ‘translocal field’, new history provides a telling example of the 
ways in which new connections between histories, concepts, and actors 
that were formerly separated in time and space may yield unexpected 
and controversial results that go against widely assumed ideas about 
globalization and its effects. As such, new history is an alternative to 
mainstream global or world history, and demonstrates that the activity 
at the ‘periphery’ of globalization may bring about novel agencies and 
outcomes. 
I will start by providing some samples of new history from 
Kyrgyzstan. I will then analyze its methods, content, and claims, as well 
as the social background of its authors. In each of the analytical sections 
I will foreground those aspects of new history that are best captured 
by adopting a translocal perspective, or the translocal processes 
and practices that are at the core of new history. In conclusion I will 
advance some ideas on the epistemological value of new history, and 
on the insights it provides for a fuller and deeper understanding of 
globalization and its variations.
3 I disagree here with the late Nurbulat Masanov, who maintained that a serious 
discussion of this kind of history is impossible (2007).
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Cases
In an otherwise outrageously critical interview from 2013, Anuar 
Galiev — a senior researcher at the Kazakh State University of Law, 
whose Ph.D. explores the mythologization of history in Central 
Asia — acknowledges that new history owes its success to the writing 
skills of its authors and that new history is much more enjoyable to 
read than most of the existing history schoolbooks. I am a little bit more 
sceptical about the literary qualities of the Kyrgyz new history I have 
explored: some of the pieces are well-written and read smoothly; others 
are excessively wordy and convoluted, larded with manifestations of 
erudition, and so overtly rhetorical that the stories they try to convey 
are difficult to follow, and even to understand. What I provide here are 
snapshots that explore some of the claims of new history and how these 
claims are substantiated.
In 2010, Anarbek Usupbaev — former head of Kyrgyzstan’s 
communist party and current leader of the country’s Tengrist 
movement4 — published the history of his own clan under the title The 
True History of the Kytai Clan from the Left Wing of the Kyrgyz, or the Backbone 
of Their Genealogy.5 This ‘backbone’, which supports all of Usupbaev’s 
claims, is a statement by a renowned local biologist6 according to whom 
the high frequency of two haplotypes among Kyrgyz — called ‘Paleo-
European’ (R1a1) and ‘East-Asian’ (C3) respectively — can be explained 
by the fact that the ancient Europoid populations of the Sayan-Altay 
region, the Dinlin, are among the ancestors of the Kyrgyz of the Left 
Wing, while the Kyrgyz of the Right Wing have as their ancestors 
populations of East-Asian origin. In his True History, Usupbaev relates 
this genetic data to local genealogical narratives (sanjyra) and concludes 
that the descendants of the Dinlin are referred to as Ak uul or Left Wing 
4  The Tengrist movement is a pan-Central-Asian religious and political movement 
promoting an allegedly native religious system — Tengrism. Based on the 
harmonious co-existence of mankind and nature, these religious beliefs often 
conflict with the teachings of Islam. Tengrism took shape after the fall of the 
Soviet Union and is an example of the various identity-building movements that 
characterise Central Asia in the post-Soviet period.
5  The True History was first published as a self-published book (samizdat) initially 
printed in 100 copies. It was then serialized in the pages of Fabula, one of the most 
popular newspapers in Kyrgyzstan.
6  See Aldashev (2009).
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by Kyrgyz genealogies while the descendants of the Huns are called Kuu 
uul or Right Wing.7 In making this argument, he substitutes the well-
known Huns for the unnamed East-Asian populations and defends this 
substitution by claiming that Hun is the same as Kün, ‘East, Orient’ in 
Kyrgyz. As for the backbone of the genealogy of the Kytai clan, it takes 
the following shape: 
Now, let me provide some more information from historical sources. 
In his book Kyzyl Kyrgyz Tarihi (The Red History of the Kyrgyz), volume 
1, page 23, the renowned Kyrgyz historian and writer Belek Soltonoev8 
mentions that the Kyrgyz descend from forty women. He refers on this 
occasion to the works of Radlov9 and to the annals of the Yuan clan [sic] 
of the Moghuls [sic]. These annals mention the Kyrgyz, i.e., the Kyrk 
Usun. The Usun are the same as the Kyrgyz Saruu clan, they descend 
from the Dinlin. Kyrk Usun married forty girls from the Kytai. Here 
Kytai does not stand for Chinese, but for the Kyrgyz Kytai clan which 
is the same as the Huns. The union of the Kyrk Usun and the Kytai gave 
birth to the Kyrgyz. Kyrk Usun is the same as kyrk ösö and this is where 
the name Kyrgyz comes from. Such a conclusion was also reached by 
Aristov,10 see page 45 in his work. […] In one word, isn’t it clear that the 
Kyrgyz have come into being through the association of the Kytai clan, 
which is of Hun origin, with the Saruu clan, which is of Usun-Dinlin 
origin, and that this has happened at least 8,000 years ago.
7  Left Wing (Sol Kanat), Right Wing (On Kanat) and Core (Ichkilik) are the major 
genealogical branches among the Kyrgyz, partially overlapping with the 
geographical and political north-south divide.
8  Soltonoev Belek Soltonkeldi uulu (1878–1938) is the author of the first ‘modern’ 
history of the Kyrgyz, called Kyzyl Kyrgyz Tarykhy (History of Red [i.e., Bolshevist] 
Kyrgyz). Soltonoev’s History is a compilation of oral traditions, European Orientalist 
writings on the Kyrgyz and the author’s own ethnographic notes.
9  Vasilii Radlov (1837–1918), born Friedrich Wilhelm Radloff, is celebrated in Russia 
and Central Asia as one of the founders of Turkic studies. He was the first to publish 
the runic inscriptions of Orkhon and a comparative dictionary of Turkic languages 
in four volumes. In Kyrgyzstan he is best known for his 1868 recording of the 
Manas epic. 
10  Nikolai Aristov (1847–1903) was a high-level official in the Tsarist administration 
who dedicated much of his life to completing Carl Ritter’s volume on Asia in 
Comparative Geography (1816–1832) by collecting data on the history of the western 
Tian Shan. Aristov was the first to suggest that the Usun are the ancestors of the 
Kyrgyz in an 1894 article published in Zhivaia Starina, the ethnographic journal 
of the Russian Imperial Geographical Society. Although Aristov’s hypothesis on 
the relationship between Usun and Kyrgyz has been criticized ever since it was 
formulated, in 2001 his works were republished without any annotations by the 
Soros Foundation in Kyrgyzstan.
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The Kytai then descend from the Huns. Next, Usupbaev brings in 
further evidence from Belek Soltonoev as well as from the Manas epic 
itself and claims that the epic’s eponymous hero belongs to the Kytai 
clan.11 The might and glory of Manas are proved by a long list of places 
in the world whose names, allegedly, are based on the name of Manas 
and, thus, demonstrate the worldwide span of Manas’ as well as the 
Kytai clan’s fame.12 Usupbaev explains this worldwide span by arguing 
that all Kyrgyz clans had to struggle for their existence and that in the 
course of these struggles they found themselves dispersed between 
the four corners of the world. Thus, factions of the Kytai clan settled 
in Mongolia, China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Moldavia, 
and Romania. Serbians and Macedonians, too, descend from the Kytai 
and, as far as the Russians are concerned, their ancestor Ilya is none 
other than Yelu Dashi — a Kidan or Khitan khan — and, thus, a Kytai, 
i.e., Kyrgyz. Usupbaev delights in mentioning that somewhere in 
North or South Dakota in the United States there is a place inhabited 
by 56,000 people who claim to be Kytai (Cathay) and not Chinese. 
Finally, Usupbaev turns to Tacitus. He asserts that in his Germania 
Tacitus indicates that the Germans have come from the East, that they 
ride horses, drink their milk as well as fermented millet, and that they 
worship Germanus. After explaining that Germanus is derived from 
Herr and Manus, and declaring that Herr Manus is a distortion of the 
Kyrgyz Er Manas, ‘Manas the Brave’, Usupbaev concludes that the 
Germans have also been exposed to the civilizing influence of Manas. 
11  The evidence is encapsulated in just the following sentence: ‘According to 
oral traditions, the ancestors of Manas had some relations with Kytai, and the 
Karakhanid’ (Soltonoev 1993:II,143). It is worth emphasizing that it is not clear 
whether Soltonoev means China, the Chinese, the Khitan or the Kytai clan among 
the Kyrgyz since one Kyrgyz word — Kytai — refers to all of them. Much of 
Usupbaev’s history is based on the assumption that Kytai stands only for the Kytai 
clan, and that Kytai refers to the same group as Kidan (also known as Khitan) 
and Karakhanid (known also as Kara Khitai), an assumption that most historians 
strongly disagree with.
12  This list seems to have been first drawn up by Dastan Sarygulov, the oldest active 
member of the Tengrist movement and a prolific history writer. Sarygulov’s Origin 
of the Kyrgyz (Kyrgyz kachan jana kaydan chykkan) published in 2008 — containing 
the list of ‘Manas’ toponyms — was serialized by the Kyrgyz language biweekly 
Alibi and this in part explains the popularity of the list. Since some of the places 
included in Sarygulov’s list are little known to the wider public, the list is both 
shortened — by the omission of these little-known places — and extended by the 
efforts of amateur historians who discover better and new correspondences. On 
amateur historians, see Light (2016).
 2116. ‘New History’ as a Translocal Field
As proof of this statement, he invites any Kyrgyz who visits Berlin to 
have a closer look at the quadriga adorning the Brandenburg Gate: this 
quadriga, Usupbaev emphasizes, is exactly the same as the carts that the 
ancestors of the Kyrgyz used to ride, and the woman on the quadriga 
holds not an iron cross but the top (toono) of a Kyrgyz yurt (which is 
also the symbol of Tengri, the master of the universe in the Tengrist 
tradition).
One year after Usupbaev’s True History, Amangeldy Bekbalaev — 
professor of philology and dean of the Faculty of Humanities at the 
Kyrgyz Russian Slavic University in Bishkek13—claimed that the 
Huns were Kyrgyz as was their leader Atilla, and that Kyrgyz and 
Germans — or their ancestors, the Huns and the Goths — share a common 
linguistic and cultural heritage (Bekbalaev 2011). The disappearance of 
the ethnonym Kyrgyz from Eastern written sources from the 2nd to the 
4th centuries BC, according to Bekbalaev, could not be explained except 
by the Kyrgyz — also called Hunno-Kyrgyz or proto-Kyrgyz — leaving 
Central Asia to rule in Europe and then, at the death of Atilla, returning 
to the Tian Shan, i.e., to the territory of present day Kyrgyzstan. 
Bebalaev’s work, as published on the web portal Novaia literatura 
Kyrgyzstana (New Literature of Kyrgyzstan), spans more than seventy 
pages. His method, as he himself explains it, consists in ‘bringing facts 
(evidence) from various sciences to support my claim’. These various 
sciences include history, archaeology, comparative linguistics, folklore, 
musicology, and genetics. Bekbalaev’s work therefore abounds in 
references to European,14 Russian,15 and Kyrgyzstani scholarly works.16 
The compilation of evidence is made reader-friendly by long excerpts 
13  According to local news media, Bekbalaev is also a member of the Russian 
Academy of Pedagogic and Social Sciences, a member of the New York Academy of 
Sciences, and honorary professor of International Relations and World Languages 
at Kazakhstan’s University.
14  Among them: Altheim Franz and Haussig Wilhelm Hans, Die Hunnen in Osteuropa. 
Ein Forschungsbericht (1958); Wolfram Herwig, Die Goten (1990); Schreiber Hermann, 
Die Hunnen (1976); Bona Istvan, Das Hunnenreich (1991).
15  E.g. historians Vasiliy Bartol′d (1869–1930) and Aleksandr Bernshtam (1910–1956), 
and linguists Igor Batmanov (1906–1969), Nikolai Baskakov (1905–1955), and 
Edkhiam Tenishev (1921–2004). Bekbalaev is a fan of Lev Gumilyov (1912–1992) 
and refers repeatedly to his Hunny (1960) and Geografiya etnosa v istoricheskii period 
(1990). He also refers to another well-known Eurasianist, Nikolay Trubetskoy 
(1890–1938), author of Nasledie Chingizkhana: vzglyad na russkuyu istoriyu ne s Zapada 
a s Vostoka (1925). On Russian Eurasianism, see Laruelle 2012b.
16  Some of these works are quoted below.
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from Germanic, Nordic and Kyrgyz legends about Atilla and the 
Huns, long quotes from historical novels on the same topics,17 and the 
reproduction of multiple paintings reconstructing Hunnic lifestyle 
and warfare as well as some photos from contemporary Kyrgyzstan 
demonstrating the similarities in lifestyle between modern Kyrgyz and 
ancient Huns.
A substantial portion of Bekbalaev’s work is dedicated to the 
description of the might and glory of the Huns. The Kyrgyz can lay 
claim to this glorious past and its heritage because to this day they share 
a range of linguistic and cultural features with the Germans, or with 
their ancestors the Goths. By comparing the German and Kyrgyz words 
for people, objects, and animals as depicted in a 1976 reconstruction of 
a Hunnic camp by Hermann Schreiber, Bekbalaev claims that Germans 
and Kyrgyz have the same words for ‘camp’ (aul/ayil), ‘woman’ or 
‘spouse’ (gattin/katyn), ‘father’ (atta/ata), ‘man’ or ‘warrior’ (herr/er), 
‘camel’ (kamel/kaymal), ‘saddlecloth’ (schabrake/chüpürök), ‘cattle’ (ockse/
ögüz), etc., and that they have inherited this shared vocabulary from 
their common ancestors. He also emphasizes that beyond this common 
vocabulary there exist approximately five hundred corresponding 
words between Hun/Kyrgyz and Gothic/German, which can be 
found in the trilogy about the Huns by Ammian von Bek.18 In the final 
section of his work, Bekbalaev shames the Kyrgyz for not being proud 
of their Hun ancestors and showcases the Kazakhs who — though 
incorrectly — ‘tell their children wonderful stories about their ancestors 
the Huns’. He finds the ‘shyness’ or ‘irresolution’ of Kyrgyzstani 
historians regrettable. Germans themselves, according to Bekbalaev, 
believe that the Huns are the ancestors of the Kyrgyz, as shown by a 
photo from present-day Kyrgyzstan that illustrates a catalogue of an 
exhibition on Attila and the Huns held in Stuttgart in 2007 and bearing 
the caption: ‘The nomadic lifestyle of contemporary Kyrgyz dates back 
to their ancestors the Huns’.19
17  Mainly from the Russian translation of John Man’s Atilla the Hun (2005) and from 
Ammian von Bek’s trilogy Gunny (2009). Ammian von Bek is in fact the literary 
pseudonym of Bekbalaev himself. The trilogy he refers to is, in his own definition, 
a ‘historical novel’ (Bekbalaev, aka Ammian von Bek 2009).
18  On Ammian von Bek, see note above.
19  Attilа und die Hunnen: Begleitbuch zur Ausstellung (Stuttgart, 2007). This and the 
previous two quotations are from Bekbalaev, 2011.
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Zamir Osorov is a journalist who until recently was working for MSN, 
one of the most influential Russian language newspaper in Kyrgyzstan. 
He is also a prolific writer and a poet, and his works — mostly in 
Russian, with some curious pieces in ‘Google-Translate English’ are 
available online.20 The two pieces that I will discuss here are taken from a 
collection of 230 works. The first, entitled Kyrgyzy i Indeitsy (Kyrgyz and 
Native Americans, 2012),21 elaborates on the work of Frederick Louis 
Otto Roehrig (1819–1908), a German-born philologist fascinated by the 
study of North American languages. In the late nineteenth century, 
Roehrig foregrounded the similarities between the Dakota Indian 
languages and Turkish.22 Osorov, who discovered Roehrig’s work via 
the Tatar linguist Abrar Karimullin,23 claims to be well acquainted with 
the works of several other Western scholars24 who have engaged in the 
comparative study of Turkic and North American languages, as well 
as with all the Soviet scholarship on American Indians25 and Thomas 
Maine Reid’s and James Fenimore Cooper’s novels. An important 
portion of Osorov’s text is dedicated to the description of his sources 
20 See https://www.stihi.ru/avtor/zamir1 and https://www.proza.ru/avtor/zamir1
21  See https://www.proza.ru/2012/03/28/1437
22  On Roehrig, see Barreiro 2012.
23  Abrar Karimullin (1925–2000) was a philologist and a bibliographer whose interest 
in Tatar history, literature, and the diaspora was not always welcome during the 
Soviet period. He was reprimanded for nationalism or Panturkism on several 
occasions, and was known to have spent five long years in disgrace before being 
allowed to defend his Ph.D. thesis on the history of early-twentieth-century 
Tatar printing in the beginning of the twentieth century. In post-Soviet Tatarstan, 
Karimullin is revered as the founder of Tatar studies. His essay on ‘Proto-Turks and 
American Indians’ was first published in Moscow in 1995. The essay, according 
to the English translation available on the web portal Turkic History (http://
s155239215.onlinehome.us/turkic/67Amerind/KarimullinPrototurks1En.htm), was 
‘the outcome of twenty years of research’. In it, Karimullin claimed that, based on 
the comparative study of American Indian and Turkic languages, the American 
Indians and the ancient Turks have a common ‘origin’. Karimullin’s claim was 
welcome by Lev Gumilyov who, in turn, argued that the Huns and the Dakota 
Indians were genetically related. For more on Karimullin, see Khaliullin 2005.
24  E.g., John McIntosh, The Origin of the North American Indians (1843); Wikander 
Oscar Stig, ‘Maya and Altaic: Is the Maya Group of Languages Related to the Altaic 
Family?’, Ethnos 32 (1967): 141–48; idem, ‘Maya and Altaic II’, Ethnos 35 (1970): 
80–88; idem ‘Maya and Altaic III’, Orientalia Suecana 21 (1972): 186–204; Osorov also 
refers to Georges Dumézil’s articles on the relationship between Quechuan and 
Turkish (published between 1954 and 1957) but I was unable to identify these.
25  Yurii Knorozov, Sistema pis′ma drevnikh Maya (1955) and Pis′mennost′ indeitsev Maya 
(1963) as well as all the ethnographic studies of Native Americans published by the 
(former) Institute of Ethnography at the Russian Academy of Sciences.
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and the life of the Indians they refer to, with a strong emphasis on 
the injustices and suffering inflicted on the latter by white settlers or 
Spanish conquistadors, and the splendor of the Mayan, Aztec, and 
Incan empires. Another important portion of his text contains lists of 
lexical correspondences between various Native American and Turkic 
languages and descriptions of lexical similarities. In his conclusion, 
he deals with the importance of this ‘genetic relationship’ and why it 
continues to be ignored to this day.
As far as lexical correspondences are concerned, the Turkic 
language most often referred to is Tatar — which seems to indicate 
that these correspondences are mostly borrowed from the work of 
Karimullin — though, in his comments, Osorov repeatedly insists 
that the Kyrgyz words are closer to Native American than the Tatar 
ones, because Kyrgyz is the oldest and purest of the Turkic languages. 
Osorov’s own contribution consists in applying Turkic etymologies to 
as many place names in California and Yucatan as possible as well as 
in emphasizing that Ishi26 and Kon-Tiki27 have perfect correspondences 
in Kyrgyz: ishi is phonetically and semantically the same as the Kyrgyz 
kishi ‘man, person’ while Kon-Tiki as ‘God of Sun’ corresponds to the 
Kyrgyz Kün-Teke where kün means ‘sun’ and teke ‘billy-goat’ but also 
‘leader’.
Osorov’s ultimate concern is that if the unity of the Indo-European 
languages is uncontested (though, in his opinion, the evidence is 
overstretched) the unity of Native-American-Turkic languages remains 
unrecognized or downplayed. He asserts that the simple existence of 
five or six lexical correspondences between Native American and Turkic 
languages should have been ‘a thunder from a clear sky’ for Western 
scholars (Osorov 2012a), and slams the latter for disregarding the 
hundreds of lexical correspondences already established. Osorov insists 
that these correspondences cannot be haphazard, that they can only be 
explained by a ‘genetic relationship’ (ibid.) and reinforces this argument 
by emphasizing that Russians and Tatars have been living side by side 
26 Ishi is the name of the last member of the Yahi Indians made famous by the works 
of Alfred Kroeber and his wife Theodora.
27 Kon-Tiki is the name of the Inca God of Sun, and of the 1947 expedition of Thor 
Heyerdahl to the Polynesian islands.
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for centuries, but that there is not a single similarity between the two 
languages.
While in Kyrgyz and Native Americans Osorov remains inconclusive in 
his claims and goals, and even in the story he wants to tell, in his second 
piece entitled Supersimetriia istiny (The Super Symmetry of Truth) and 
published also in 2012, he declares that the Kyrgyz language is the 
equivalent of the Mandeleev periodic table, and that in the same way 
as the Mandeleev periodic table derives and predicts the relationships 
between the properties of chemical elements, the Kyrgyz language can 
derive and predict relationships between linguistic or cultural elements. 
After providing a list of the 170 ‘key’ Kyrgyz words that ‘encode 
the world’, he offers some demonstrations by supplying Kyrgyz 
etymologies for Achilles (akyl ‘mind’ and es ‘master’ and thus meaning 
‘master of minds’), Heracles (derived from er ‘man’ and akyl ‘mind’ and 
meaning ‘wise man’) and Zeus/Atheus (the same as the Kyrgyz atabyz 
‘our father’). He also claims that the meaning of the name Jehovah as 
understood by Jehovah’s Witnesses — ‘Helping to Become’ — is the 
same as the meaning of the name of the supreme god of the ancient 
Turks: Tengir, ‘Great but Equal’. Osorov concludes that without the 
knowledge of the Kyrgyz language it is impossible to discover the 
meaning of human civilization's oldest words and concepts. 
Analysis
Methods
Let me start with some observations on the methods of new history. In the 
first place, etymologization and lexical similarities or correspondences 
are crucial to new historians. Although etymologization and lexical 
similarities can be problematic methodologies, they are also scholarly 
tools that have been widely used for a long time now, for instance in 
establishing the unity of the Indo-European language family. Their 
validity is accepted only after systematic and critical consideration of 
sound-correspondences over time, but this is not without problems: as 
Osorov himself points out, some of the lexical correspondences within 
the big Indo-European family are incomprehensible to a non-linguist. 
However, the language correspondences established by new historians 
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are mostly ‘transparent’ to lay readers, and new historians do not rely 
entirely on these lexical correspondences to make their case. 
Another observation that strikes the reader — as can be seen by 
the time I have taken to lay out the sources on which these claims are 
based — is that new history is not properly described as ‘mythology’. 
Whether we think of ‘myth’ as opposed to ‘logos’, following the ancient 
Greeks, or of ‘myth’ as ‘a charter for the present’, or ‘an exploration 
and obliteration of social contradiction’, or ‘an explanation of origins’ 
in the way anthropologists have done (Herzfeld 2001:85), new history 
possesses hardly any of the features of myth. Insofar as new historians 
show a real concern for ‘sources’ and cite them systematically, new 
history is not invented, it is, or at least claims to be, based on other 
‘sources’, ‘histories’, or ‘stories’. James Wertsch (2000) conceptualizes 
such a way of writing history based on textual signifying relations, 
and distinguishes it from history based on object signifying relations. 
In the first case, historical narratives are produced in response to 
other narratives, by reproduction, praise, contestation, mockery, or 
distortion. In the second case, historical narratives are produced when 
new evidence or new sources are discovered. Suffice it to mention here 
that historical narratives based on textual signifying relations are not 
produced only by amateur historians, and that much nationalist history 
is written in this style.28
As for the sources used by new historians, they are diverse in 
several ways.29 First, not all of them are ‘historical’ in the conventional 
28  See for instance McNeil (1986:2): ‘Yet the limits of scientific history were far more 
constricting than its devotees believed. Facts that could be established beyond 
all reasonable doubt remained trivial in the sense that they did not, in and of 
themselves, give meaning or intelligibility to the record of the past. A catalogue 
of undoubted and indubitable information, even if arranged chronologically, 
remains a catalogue. To become a history, facts have to be put together into a 
pattern that is understandable and credible […]’. What I refer to as ‘emplotment’ 
or ‘re-emplotment’ further in this chapter is the same process as the ‘patterning’ of 
historical facts discussed by McNeil.
29  It would be instructive to compare systematically the sources used by Soviet 
historians, for instance, and the sources used by new historians. However, a quick 
look at one of the Soviet histories of Kyrgyzstan discouraged me from taking this 
on since the bulk of the ‘sources’ comprised the writings of Karl Marx and Lenin, 
together with different Party resolutions.
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sense: not only philology, linguistics, genetics,30 but also literature and 
folklore provide the material on which new historians exercise their 
skills. These texts belong not only to different scholarly traditions — the 
most recognizable ones being Western and Soviet — but also to very 
different periods, starting from medieval Chinese annals and ending 
with recently-defended Ph.D. thesis. These historians also have a 
noticeable predilection for Western sources as opposed to Soviet or 
local ones, and for older ones, as opposed to recent ones. Most of the 
sources they use are also ‘legitimate’ scholarship because they belong 
to well-established academic disciplines and can often be associated 
with well-known scholars.
Content
New history is nourished by ethnic nationalism. Yet, I suggest that 
there is something qualitatively new in the kind of ethnic nationalism 
it promotes, at least in the case of Kyrgyzstan. Nationalism in 
Central Asia shares some common features with classic or European 
nationalism — the ‘blood and soil’ variety (Verdery 1993) — in the sense 
that it seeks to fix historically documented peoples and cultures onto 
the ‘soil’ of a present state and is most comfortably endorsed by those 
who were born on this ‘soil’. This ‘blood and soil’ nationalism has been 
reinforced and legitimized by the Soviet concept of ethnogenesis, or the 
unbroken continuity between contemporary ethnic groups and their 
remote ancestors inhabiting the same territory.31 The first outburst of 
new history, and the first divorce with supposedly neatly and solidly 
established Soviet linguistic, ethnic, and national identities, happened 
in the last years of the Soviet regime and in the very first years of 
Kyrgyzstan's independence. At that time, new history was mostly 
preoccupied with the Aryan myth.32 Yet this wave of new history was 
still shaped by classic nationalism because a ‘competition for Aryan 
ancestors’ was waged among Central Asian historians who sought to 
30  The ways in which new historians use genetics to support their arguments is a 
topic worth covering at length. For other unexpected uses of human genetics, see 
Simpson 2000, Abu El-Haj 2004. 
31  On the Soviet concept of ethnogenesis, see Laruelle 2008.
32  On the Aryan myth in Central Asia, see Laruelle 2007 and Shnirelman 2009.
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appropriate, or to incorporate, the earliest Indo-European inhabitants 
of the region into separate national histories. This kind of nationalism, 
I would suggest, relies on a ‘transtemporal imagination’ because it 
implies the capacity to relate to ancestors distant in time of whom few 
or no material traces have remained.33
The kind of imagination required by new historians more recently 
is significantly translocal. This translocal imagination operates at two 
levels: firstly, by referring to places and people outside of Kyrgyzstan; 
secondly, by inviting readers to embrace the connections to ancient 
and faraway civilizations and empires, world-renowned cultural 
monuments, or the past of contemporary powerful states that the 
historians describe. China, no matter whether admired or feared, 
represents an ancient empire and an ancient civilization, and even 
ordinary Kyrgyzstanis know something about China’s history. There is 
glory in both ancient history and ancient civilization, and the idea that 
part of China’s ancient history and civilization were created under the 
rule of a Kyrgyz clan is, to say the least, exciting. So is the claim that Huns, 
and, perhaps most importantly, Germans, share common ancestors with 
the Kyrgyz. While lexical correspondences may be important, what 
seems decisive is a Kyrgyzized Brandenburg Gate in Berlin because if 
the correspondences between German and Kyrgyz words may prove 
too demanding for some readers, the idea that Kyrgyz ancestors are 
connected to one of the world’s best-known monuments34 is extremely 
appealing. So is the kind of ‘visual comparison’ offered by Bekbalaev 
between contemporary Kyrgyz camps and ancient Hunnic camps in the 
heart of Europe. Or the idea that the gods of ancient Greece — the cradle 
33  The Aryan myth and the claims for Aryan origins are still quite popular in new 
history, as some of Usupbaev’s writings demonstrate. However, new historians 
tend to promote the Aryan myth not by anthropological and linguistic comparisons, 
nor by comparisons with now extinct lifestyles, i.e., sedentary versus nomadic 
(cf. Shnirelman 2009), but rather by establishing connections to globally famous 
monuments or places. Thus, as I have shown elsewhere (Jacquesson 2016), in order 
to demonstrate that the Kyrgyz are Aryans and not Turks, Usupbaev ‘proves’ that 
the pharaohs were among the ancestors of the Kyrgyz, and that the pyramids 
were built by them. This is not only a striking claim but a flattering one, because it 
suggests that one of the best-known monuments in the world is in fact Kyrgyz.
34  The monument is familiar to Kyrgyzstanis because of the former division between 
Eastern and Western Germany, World War Two, and the fact that quite a few local 
men did their military service in Eastern Germany.
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of European democracy and civilization —  ‘carry Kyrgyz names’. 
Similarly, there is an obvious appeal to the suggestion that Native 
Americans and Kyrgyz (or Turks) belong to the same linguistic family 
and that, though remote, there is a certain Kyrgyz or Turkic essence in 
the Incan, Mayan, or Aztec civilizations and their heritage. This type 
of nationalist imagination requires the capacity to connect places and 
peoples that are separated by national and geopolitical borders. This is 
why I call new history a ‘translocal’ discipline. This belief also entails the 
idea that the sources of national pride can be found elsewhere, outside 
the territory of Kyrgyzstan proper. Yet, though distant in space, most of 
the civilizations and monuments to which translocal imagination lays 
claim are publicized and advertized by the global news media and are 
therefore perceived as familiar. 
Last but not least, this ‘translocal imagination’ also has a geopolitical 
dimension: Europe (with Germany as its epitome), the US (as the 
master of the Americas), and China (which stands only for itself) are 
major players in the present social, economic and political destiny of 
Kyrgyzstan in particular, and of Central Asia in general. These players 
are not always loved, though they are admired or envied for their 
political and economic might. And if Kyrgyzstan cannot compete with 
them in the present, new history, at least, suggests that power relations 
might have been different in the past. The last great power in the region, 
Russia, is less frequently the object of such ‘translocal imagination’, 
perhaps because Russia and Central Asia share some history and this 
history is too well-known to allow exciting re-emplotments.
Actors and networks
In this section I will focus on the translocal dimensions of the networks 
produced by new history. To start with, it is worth noticing that the 
actors who succumb to the temptation to write new history have quite 
diverse social identities: they can be well-established academics, as the 
case of Bekbalaev demonstrates; they can be writers, poets or journalists 
like Osorov; they can also be newcomers to the intellectual field like 
Usupbaev who has a degree in engineering and who, for most of his 
life, worked at a construction company. One observation, though, 
seems to be valid for all new historians known to me: none of them 
is a professional historian, or a historian holding a position in an 
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official research institution.35 Even those who are academics — like 
Bekbalaev — belong to a different discipline, philology in his case. As 
I have already emphasized while discussing its methods, new history 
involves the transgression of conventional professional or disciplinary 
borders and its style and content are, in part at least, shaped by these 
transgressions.
New history producers and their sources, or the authors whose 
works they mine for data, form another kind of network. It has both 
transtemporal and translocal dimensions. As I have already emphasized 
when discussing their methods, new history writers have a clearly 
discernible predilection for foreign sources. These foreign sources 
are appealing, first, because they have long remained inaccessible, or 
difficult to access.36 Second, they are appealing because they are believed 
to be more objective or more truthful than Soviet or local scholarship 
based on the dictates of Marxist-Leninism. In the last ten or twenty 
years a lot of these foreign sources have become accessible in various 
online formats and editions, in Russian translations or in the original. It 
would not be an exaggeration to state that the movement of knowledge 
between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’ has never been as dynamic — or at 
least as unchecked — as it is now, and new history producers benefit 
from this 'free flow'. Therefore, new historians interact — even if 
virtually — with a significant number of scholars whose works and 
ideas have been shaped in distant and different contexts. Moreover, new 
history’s sources, both foreign and local, are often old: some of them are 
as ancient as the Chinese or Mongol annals so beloved by Usupbaev; 
others are simply outdated, such as the dictionaries of American Indian 
languages used by Osorov to substantiate his claim about the unity of 
Native American and Turkic languages. Old and foreign sources offer 
the additional advantage that their authors cannot speak for themselves 
any longer. Both the transfer of knowledge and the re-emplotments of 
information that new history undertakes become thus relatively secure, 
35  Some professional historians also stray from traditional methodologies, but they 
veer more towards classic nationalism as discussed above.
36 Few Western works were translated into Russian during the Soviet period and their 
use was limited for fear of accusations of political incorrectness. Translations into 
the national languages of Central Asia were next to non-existent.
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or at least protected from the most legitimate of critiques, those of the 
scholars who have first collected and analyzed the material. 
New historians seem to have strong networks within Kyrgyzstan, 
but also across Central Asia. The interactions within this network take 
various shapes. The work of other new historians is openly praised, if 
not directly cited as Osorov and Usupbaev do when referring to the 
works of Bekbalaev and Sarygulov respectively. They borrow from 
each other’s ‘data’ whether they acknowledge it or not. For this reason 
it is not always easy to establish who was the first one to discover ‘new 
data’ or formulate a new claim, as the same ‘data’ and similar claims are 
found in the works of different new history authors. A striking example 
of this kind of cooperation is provided by Osorov and Usupbaev, who 
joined forces after several years as independent authors to produce a 
common narrative in English on the glory of Kyrgyz’ ancestors. The 
book, under the title The Origin of Ancient Kyrgyz Tribes, was published 
in July 2015 in Singapore and although it is being sold by a number of 
online retailers — Amazon included — I have been able to read only 
excerpts, which are however revealing about the goals and claims of this 
joint enterprise:37
Technically, all the modern world originated in some way or another 
from the ancient Kyrgyz tribes, which were in close relation with 
ancient civilizations such as the Sumerians, ancient Egypt, Israel, 
Greece, Rome, China, Kushan, the Ottoman Empire, as well as the 
Aztecs and Incas. Eventually, the Kyrgyz tribes will be able to unite 
the world again and achieve the long awaited peace between East and 
West, Israel and Arabs, Russia and Ukraine, China and the U.S., Shiites 
and Sunnites, Hindi and Urdu, and so on in our currently so divided 
and unhappy reality.38
Finally, new history authors in their turn are used as authorities 
or sources of inspiration by those who follow them. Osorov’s 
reconstruction of the Native-American-Turkic linguistic community 
builds upon the work of Abrar Karimullin whose writings enjoyed 
some recognition in Tatarstan, Russia and beyond since he was an 
honorary fellow of Harvard University, although his work was not 
37  This quote is written in English in the original and is therefore reproduced as 
published.
38 Osorov and Usupbaev 2015.
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uncontested. The works and ideas of Lev Gumilyov appear as another 
source of frequent inspiration among new historians.39 Last but not 
least, whether they acknowledge it or not, the works of current new 
history writers read quite often as more or less successful variations on 
Olzhas Suleimenov’s AZ i IA.40 In the context of the late Soviet period 
Suleimenov’s AZ i IA was a provocative cultural manifesto blurring 
the borders between poetry, historiography and linguistics in an 
attempt to rethink or rediscover — or as some would have it, ‘imagine’ 
or ‘reinvent’ — the place of the Turks in Soviet Eurasia and beyond. 
Suleimenov's views are encapsulated by his 1962 statement that ‘many 
obscure aspects of the history of literate peoples cannot be explained 
without some knowledge of the history of the Turks’ and that ‘at some 
point there will appear a genuine, realistic book, “the True History”, 
and that we [i.e., the Turks] too will take part in its birth’.41 These 
intellectual networks, or intellectual genealogies, can be extended 
further back into the past since Gumilyov and Suleimenov were 
borrowing information and ideas from their predecessors. Therefore, 
some of the methods, writing styles, facts and even the claims of ‘new 
history’ are not as novel as they might appear at a first glance. 
Conclusion
At the beginning of this chapter I argued that branding new history 
as ‘historical mythologization’ does justice neither to its practices and 
actors, nor to its significance as a social and political phenomenon. I 
suggested that a translocal research perspective might provide a better 
analytical grasp on its actors and practices, and on new history as an 
intellectual endeavour.
Neither medieval annals, nor Mayan nor Aztec civilizations, nor 
even the strained or fake language similarities and etymologies are 
‘myths’, according to both the common meaning of the word or from 
39  Mainly Gumilyov’s Hunny (1960) and Geografiya etnosa v istoricheskii period (1990). 
On Gumilyov, see Shnirelman and Panarin 2000, Laruelle 2000 and 2001, cf. Titov 
2005.
40  On Suleimenov’s AZ i IA, see Ram 2001, Baker 2016.
41  As quoted in Ram 2001:293.
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an anthropological perspective. All national(ist) histories are in some 
ways ‘mythistories’ (McNeil 1986). But even so, as McNeil himself 
emphasizes, the myth is more in the plot than in the facts; in other words, 
nationalist histories, or mythistories, rely on different emplotments of 
historical facts rather than on the pure invention of such facts, or on 
their outright distortion. If we accept that history is to a great extent 
about the re-emplotment of the past, it is particularly important for an 
anthropologist to investigate these re-emplotments and not to dismiss 
them as ‘myths’, or ‘fake history’. In this chapter, I have attempted to 
do exactly this — to demonstrate that new history does not work with 
myths but with facts, whether they are borrowed from other historical 
sources as in the case of Usupbaev, or from other sciences as in the cases 
of Bekbalaev and Osorov.
I have suggested that new history — at least the way it is practiced in 
Kyrgyzstan today — greatly resembles Suleimenov’s endeavour in AZ 
i IA, though it lacks Suleimenov’s erudition and writing skills. I would 
like to add here that, as distinct from Suleimenov, who wreaked havoc 
on the Soviet knowledge system, new historians have had a similar 
effect on European or Western knowledge systems. In a way, while 
Suleimenov revolted against history as designed by the Soviet state, 
new historians attempt to claim agency in a world history that is still 
largely Eurocentric, or that foregrounds some historical perspectives 
while ignoring or denying others. In this sense, new history is not 
only an attempt to emplot the past differently, but also an attempt 
to imagine the present and the future differently, as Usupbaev’s and 
Osorov’s proclamation quoted above demonstrates. New history as an 
intellectual endeavour then sheds light on the different experiences of 
globalization and on the novel agencies it generates among those who 
strive to not lag behind. 
New history, to put it bluntly, is a non-scholarly body of writings 
based on scholarly methods and sources. Its practitioners transfer ‘facts’ 
from one academic discipline to another, and from Western to Soviet or 
post-Soviet epistemologies, and in doing so, they emulate conventional 
scholarly methods. Approaching new history as a translocal and 
transtemporal field and analyzing the processes and practices that 
are involved in its production allows a better understanding of its 
epistemological status and its political stance. 
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The study of new history leads to a reflexive engagement with 
sources, methods, and different types of knowledge. New history, 
therefore, offers a favorable ground for the exercise of sociocultural 
reflexivity (Herzfeld 2001:45–52). After all, it fulfills the expectations 
of certain audiences since it is published, serialized, or disseminated 
on social media forums. It cannot therefore be ignored in the ongoing 
discussions about hierarchies of knowledge, or the nature of history, 
and how it should be narrated.
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7. Informal Trade and Globalization in 
the Caucasus and Post-Soviet Eurasia
Susanne Fehlings
Introduction
In Central Asia and the Caucasus, one can observe many petty traders, 
who travel long distances and cross international borders to complete 
their business. Even though these traders have little financial capital at 
their disposal, and even though the economic activity of each individual 
seems rather unimportant, the total effect of such agents, their trade, 
and their mobility is more than a random phenomenon. They are typical 
actors of globalization — or, more precisely, of something that has been 
theoretically framed as ‘globalization from below’ (Portes 1997, Mathews 
2011, Mathews et al. 2012), ‘grassroots globalization’ (Appadurai 2000), 
or ‘translocality’ (Freitag and von Oppen 2010, Smith 2011).
During my fieldwork in the Caucasus, conducted between 2008 
and 2010, I met many of these traders on the roads between Yerevan 
(Armenia) and Tbilisi (Georgia) and those between Tbilisi and Baku 
(Azerbaijan). I remember the day when I crossed the Armenian-
Georgian border for the first time. The minibus had just crossed the 
wild mountains and deep valleys of the Caucasus at breathtaking 
speed and some passengers had been sick. After I got my passport 
back from a serious-looking border official, I suddenly felt much like 
an adventurer — like Tolstoy, who describes the Caucasus as a remote 
and wild region — and I felt like I was in ‘the middle of nowhere’. But 
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as I understand now, this perception of the border as a remote place was 
an illusion of mine. In fact, the borders in the Caucasus (and Central 
Asia) are very vibrant places and hotspots for all kind of exchanges and 
economic activity (compare Reeves 2014, Gellner 2013). They are central 
loci, ‘nodes’, or ‘sites with a lot of transiency’ (Hannerz 1998:139) along 
the travel routes that cross the whole area, traditionally connecting 
Europe and Asia, and Great Powers like Russia and Persia. In many 
cases ‘border-markets’1 have developed in their proximity.
On the roads you can find all kinds of people: besides tourists and 
commuters, you will meet Iranian truck and Georgian minibus drivers, 
Armenian fruit and vegetable retailers, Turkish businessmen — and, 
invisible to the eyes of ordinary travellers, smugglers of drugs and 
weapons. Almost all of these people can be labelled ‘petty traders’, who 
obviously form a very heterogeneous group. My aim is to learn more 
about these people, their economic activity, and their travel routes. In 
this chapter, I shall first outline the theoretical framework and main 
research questions of my work, which is conceived as a subproject 
within the research project ‘Informal Markets and Trade in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus’, funded by the Volkswagen Foundation. I shall 
present some general objectives of the project, and discuss some of its 
central theoretical concepts such as ‘informality’ and ‘globalization’, 
which I shall then link to ‘translocality’. Finally, I shall present some 
preliminary results from my own recent research trips and my initial 
fieldwork on local markets in Georgia, which I took as a starting point to 
investigate the theoretical concepts mentioned above. One of the results 
was the identification of research units that might help to investigate 
‘translocal contexts’ and ‘translocality’ in general. Using research units 
such as location, people, mobility, goods and frequency, which are 
components of the economic activity I investigated, I describe and pay 
special attention to my target group: female petty traders, who travel 
long distances and who exist at the lower end of the scale of informal 
entrepreneurial activity.
1  For literature on ‘border-markets’ in Central Asia and the Caucasus see, for 
example, Dabaghyan and Gabrielyan (2008, 2011); Yalcin-Heckmann (2012) and 
Turaeva-Hoehne (2014).
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‘Informality’, ‘globalization’, and ‘translocality’
One general objective of the project ‘Informal Markets and Trade 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus’ is to reach a comprehensive 
understanding of the ‘informal economy’ in post-Soviet regions and 
their bordering countries. These local contexts, which reach as far as 
from Turkey to the Caucasus and Russia, and from Central Asia to China, 
have been shaped by the breakdown of the Soviet economic system 
and its opening up to the world market. The project thus starts from 
the concept of ‘globalization from below’ or ‘grassroots globalization’ 
that conflates informality and non-elite local actors with global flows, 
networks, and settings, which have become more and more relevant for 
local people and economies since the early 1990s (Fehlings and Karrar 
2016). 
‘Globalization from below’ is usually distinguished from 
‘globalization from above’ (Portes 1997, Appadurai 2000, MacGaffey 
and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000, Mathews 2011, Mathews et al. 2012). 
While the latter is defined as regulated by state institutions and large 
enterprises, ‘globalization from below’, according to the literature, 
encompasses the economic activity of individual entrepreneurs, who 
usually have little money at hand, rely on their personal networks, and 
have no formal training. As the everyday exchanges of these people are 
unregulated by the state or official law, their activity is often associated 
with ‘informality’ as defined by Keith Hart (1973). Especially in the 
aftermath of the Soviet Union, during the process of nation-building 
in the newly-established and recently-independent republics on former 
Soviet territory informal practices seem to have substituted for many 
formal (state) structures that had disappeared or were not yet fully 
established, implemented, or accepted (Giordano and Hayoz 2013, 
Morris and Polese 2013, Holzlehner 2014). 
‘Informality’, as used by academics, quite simply describes the 
absence of ‘formality’. But because it is difficult to define clear 
boundaries between formality and informality, between formal 
structure, as defined by state bodies, and the individual interpretations 
of these structures, between formal rules and socio-cultural practice, and 
between institutionalized and written codes of behavior (legal law) and 
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agency, the definition of informality (and formality) leaves much space 
for interpretation (Hart 1973, 1986, 1992, Helmke and Levitsky 2006, 
Chen 2007, Sassen 2001, Giordano and Hayoz 2013, Morris and Polese 
2013, Hardenberg and Fehlings 2016). State regulations are usually 
taken as formal (in the Weberian sense of ‘rational government’) but 
there is no doubt, as proven by many examples from Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, that states, governments and their administrative bodies 
are not only grounded in rationality and legal law regulations (compare 
Gupta 1995, 2012). In Uzbekistan, for example, the state and enterprises 
supported by state institutions extensively use informal practices such 
as social networking, which is why Kaiser (1997) and Rasanayagam 
(2011) have described this situation as an ‘informalization’2 manifesting 
at all levels of society (Hardenberg and Fehlings 2016, Iskandaryan 
2014). In contexts like these, ‘culture’, which, in economics as well 
as in public media, is often associated with ‘backward and primitive 
behavior’ is held responsible for the informal practices that, in a next 
step, are sometimes equated to corruption. Culture, in this formulation, 
is perceived as an obstacle to economic growth and welfare, which, 
according to some (Georgian and Western) economists is a reason 
for the lack of economic success of Caucasian petty traders and small 
entrepreneurs, who trust in their kinship networks instead of taking 
loans from credit institutions, and who spent their money on feasts and 
family matters rather than on reinvestment. 
From an anthropological point of view, culture and ‘backwardness’, 
same as culture and informal structures, cannot be equated but need to be 
treated as separate categories. Just as states are rarely purely formal and 
based on rational government, so are social practices and organizations, 
cultural norms and codes of behavior, rarely arbitrary or chaotic — or 
‘backward’ and illegal per se. This is why I use both terms — formality 
and informality — in a non-dogmatic way. Formality and informality, 
2  ‘Informalization’ is a concept originally developed by Castells and Portes (1989), 
describing the growing impact of informality not only in third-world scenarios but 
also in wealthier economies through, for example, labour migration. For Kaiser and 
Rasanayagam, on the other hand, the important point is that the formal structures 
themselves provide the framework within which the informal activities emerge 
(compare Sassen 2001).
 2337. Informal Trade and Globalization
in my opinion, should not be taken as strictly analytical classifications. 
They are starting points to describe the different facets of structures, of 
behaviors, of motivations and of practices on all social and spatial levels 
and in relation to each other. Thus they help to describe these structures, 
behaviors, motivations and practices as more or less controlled by 
official bodies, more or less visible, and more or less difficult to grasp 
through official statistics. From an emic perspective, people involved 
in economic activities like petty trade or bazaar vending do not at all 
distinguish between formal and informal practices. For them, their 
activity is a logical reaction or adaptation to the circumstances shaping 
the market and the marketplace. These circumstances simply have to be 
transformed into successful business. State regulations are sometimes 
perceived as unfair and therefore ignored. Sometimes, traders look for 
loopholes in the legal framework. But as long as no major crime (such 
as murder or trafficking) is committed, people (petty traders as well as 
officials) do not perceive these crossings of regulatory boundaries as 
significant. Entrepreneurs complete their business and sometimes one 
has to pay a fee. Thus, the classification of activities into formal and 
informal categories and the use of such terms are academic rather than 
practical.
From a theoretical point of view, as already mentioned, ‘formality’ 
and ‘informality’ and ‘globalization from above’ and ‘from below’ 
are related to each other in similar ways. Thus, from an analytical 
perspective, we need the same tools to understand ‘globalization from 
below’ as to understand ‘informal practices’, which are both important 
aspects of globalization as a whole. It is the mingling of the two spheres 
that interests me.
Authors such as Keith Hart (1973, 1986, 1996) have argued that 
globalization as such to some extent promotes ‘informality’, because it 
weakens the role of nation states and their formal regulations. In fact, 
geographical borders, specifically national borders, are constantly being 
transgressed and undermined though informal practices: migration, 
economic activity, tourism, and personal networks (virtual networks, 
kinship, or other) that escape state control (Portes 1997). Becoming 
at some point institutionalized, they create new structures beyond or 
within national horizons. Yet at the same time, there is no doubt that 
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national borders and institutions exist and that people have to deal with 
them (compare Reeves 2014, Gellner 2013, Harris 2013).
The term ‘translocality’ is used to engage with similar phenomena 
and problems. According to Freitag and von Oppen (2010:3), the notion 
of translocality includes the attempt to focus on actors, connections, 
flows, places, and processes that range ‘below the elite level’. Rather 
than solely taking into account the perspectives of those with power, 
researchers using a translocal lens pay attention to marginal mobilities, 
historical changes, and the dynamics of specific places through flows, 
relations between local and global connectedness, and local adaptions 
of translocal experiences. The goal is to write a ‘social history from 
below’ and to ‘understand the manifold ways in which the world is 
constituted’ (ibid.:6). 
Here, we face the same problems as mentioned above: on the 
one hand, we have to consider ‘processes of the establishment and 
institutionalization of cultural, social and political structures’; on the 
other hand, specifically in an overall situation of mobility, flows, and 
transition, ‘it seems that translocality is often marked by transient, non-
permanent and unordered spaces’ that are difficult to record (Freitag 
and von Oppen 2010:7). 
The actors, such as petty traders or migrants, are the focus of our 
interest when examining informality, globalization from below, and 
translocality, and they have a similar background and use similar 
networks and practices. But while researchers using the concepts of 
informality and globalization from below emphasize these actors 
and their specific practices, movements, backgrounds, behaviors and 
networks, researchers using a translocal perspective investigate ‘the 
tensions between movement and order’ and address ‘the attempts to 
cope with transgression and the need for localizing some kind of order’ 
(Freitag and von Oppen 2010:8). Thus, translocality, as I understand it, 
deals with new and fluid belongings, new identifications, networks, 
imaginations, ‘livelihoods’, and adapted practices. These are linked to 
the unconventional definitions of space that appear in these contexts, 
but are still rooted in localities and thus not arbitrary or unbound. As 
such, translocality, in contrast to transnationalism, takes into account 
that there are boundaries other than purely political ones. This is, for 
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example, true in the context of trade networks — such as those reaching 
from Turkey to the Caucasus and from Central Asia to China — that 
cross the region currently under our investigation (compare Freitag and 
von Oppen 2010, Schetter 2012, Schröder and Stephan-Emmrich 2014). 
However, we have to admit that conventional nation-state borders 
have not ceased to exist. Truck drivers, for example, as I could observe 
myself, spend hours at border posts. They thus physically experience 
the existence of borders. There are material blockades, administrative 
obstacles, language barriers, and, last but not least, socio-cultural 
boundaries rooted in ethnic backgrounds, social networks like 
kinship relations, religious and social practices, customs, beliefs, and 
worldviews that have to be overcome. At the same time, national 
institutions promote trade and mobility. Local governments build many 
of the roads on which the traders travel and provide the infrastructure 
that makes communication, exchange, and economic success possible.3
Therefore, the activity we observe takes place in spaces that are 
neither solely locally bound nor totally ‘translocal’; they are neither 
completely informal nor formal; they are global but usually the actors 
are embedded in local contexts. Consequently, we have to investigate 
the points of intersection and the ‘linkages of different scales’ (Freitag 
and von Oppen 2010:19), by considering a ‘plurality of perspectives’, 
making use of, for example, multidisciplinary attempts and different 
regional experiences (ibid.:18–20). 
To summarize, we must keep in mind that the economy is not an 
‘impersonal (formal) machine’ but made and remade by people in 
their everyday lives (Hart 2010). Therefore, I try to investigate the 
economy, respectively informal markets and trade, in accordance 
with anthropological tradition4 in conjunction with other realms of 
human existence such as culture, social relations, politics, and religion. 
Informality, globalization from below, and translocality are simply 
means to describe some aspects of the interrelation of these fields. 
3  The importance of infrastructure has been discussed by Cresswell (2006), 
Dalakoglou and Harvey (2012), Larkin (2013), and Nadjmabadi (2014).
4  See, e.g., Mauss (1990 [1925]), Malinowski (1935), (1972), Bohannon and Dalton 
(1962), Polanyi (2001 [1944]), Gudeman (2001), (2005), Carsten (1989), Parry and 
Bloch (1989) and others.
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Informal markets and translocal trade  
in Tbilisi and beyond
For this chapter, I have used materials from previous long-term research 
stays in the Caucasus and from two and a half months of fieldwork 
on local markets in Tbilisi in spring 2014. Based on these experiences 
and data I started to classify marketplaces, traders, forms of mobility, 
and the types of the trader’s economic activity. My first idea was to get 
in touch with traders and to travel with them in order to track their 
trade routes and observe their translocal environment, as well as their 
behavior and experiences, thus understanding the formal and informal 
context of their practices, and their socio-cultural background and 
motivation. But walking through Tbilisi and paying attention to traders, 
trade, and marketplaces, I was simply overwhelmed by the number of 
merchants and the amount of goods that flood the city. Globalization 
from above and below, and the translocal contexts of trading, become 
most obvious in the local setting of the Georgian capital. Thus, to get an 
overview, I did not follow individual traders on their travel routes, but 
tried to understand the variety of economic exchanges and the diversity 
of social groups involved in trade by investigating the places, which are, 
besides border markets, the spatial centres and the nodes of economic 
action in the region.5 
A specific group of traders attracted my particular attention: female 
petty traders who travel quite long distances, crossing international 
borders. These women usually buy a few goods, like furniture or 
clothes, which, back home, they sell for a small profit. To get a better 
understanding of the particularity of this group in relation to other 
groups of traders, I tried to identify parameters that help to describe 
different aspects of trade, the specific social groups of traders, and 
their ‘embeddedness’ in socio-cultural contexts. These parameters can 
also be interpreted as possible units for investigating formality and 
5  Compare Bestor’s (2001) investigation of the international seafood trade by 
focussing on Tokyo’s Tsukiji seafood market and the local specificity of market and 
place within a globalized urban setting.
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informality, the interrelation of globalization from below and above, 
and translocality. The parameters consist of: a) the locations where 
economic activity takes place, b) the people involved, c) their mobility, 
d) the types of goods that are traded, and f) the exchange volume and 
frequency of activity. Some additional aspects under consideration 
include historical and political dynamics. 
Location
Tbilisi is full of street vendors, bazaars, markets, small shops, malls, etc., 
and it is almost impossible to differentiate between them, as they coexist 
in close proximity without being strictly separated. One can hardly 
draw a line between territories, the different groups of people working 
there, and the various types of businesses being represented. Despite 
these challenges, I tried to understand what distinguishes them. 
Let me start with space and sales facilities. The locations of economic 
exchange in Tbilisi (and in the Caucasus in general), can, as a first step, 
be classified — even though, as mentioned above, this is a very tentative 
and problematic classification — as more or less formal or informal. 
The level of formality, in this case, usually can be defined according 
to the solidity and durability of the sales facilities and their ability to 
meet official sanitary standards. Sales facilities and displays range from 
a cloth that is placed on the soil in front of the vendor, to push carts, 
booths in roofed and unroofed bazaars of different size and importance, 
small shops and kiosks, and boutiques, supermarkets, shopping malls, 
and department stores. 
While the less formal traders use public spaces like streets, metro 
stations, or parks, the more formalized businesses are found in 
permanent locations explicitly designed and equipped for this purpose. 
For each of the different spaces of exchange there exists a particular local 
term, such as, for example, in Georgian, supermarketi, marketi, maghazia, 
bazari, bazroba, budiki, and budka; or in Armenian supermarket, khanuth, 
shuka, krapak, etcetera. 
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Fig. 7.1  Eliava’s spare parts market in Tbilisi.  
Photo © Susanne Fehlings (2014), CC BY 4.0
The different spaces of exchange have different legal statuses. Some are 
approved and supported by formal state institutions, such as Lilo Molli 
next to Tbilisi’s airport, which is the biggest wholesale and retail market 
or bazaar in the Caucasus. Here, you can find a market administration, 
hierarchical organization, and security measures, and the shops 
within the marketplace are neat, numbered, and listed on a map. The 
wholesalers and retail traders there will usually rent some space and 
thus automatically receive an official license to sell their merchandise 
on their allocated spot. When I asked the manager of a similar market in 
Tbilisi’s centre how the market was organized, the conversation quickly 
came to an end: ‘people pay, they get a booth with a certain number 
of square meters, and then everything is fine. I do not know how they 
manage the rest. This is none of my business [it does not concern me.]’.
 2397. Informal Trade and Globalization
In other spaces such as public pavements or metro entrances, trade 
is much more chaotic, only tacitly accepted by officials, or sometimes 
even prohibited. In Tbilisi there have been several initiatives, which 
were enforced by the state police, to expel street vendors from public 
spaces (Khutsishvili 2012, Rekhviashvili 2015). Similar initiatives, which 
in Tbilisi were eventually dropped by the new government, can be 
observed all over post-Soviet territories, because informally-operating 
street vendors and their goods displays are usually perceived as an 
obstacle to formal urban order and a modern city lifestyle (Stephan-
Emmrich and Mirzoev 2016). 
All the above-mentioned localities, even the more permanent ones, 
have in common the appearance of being comparatively transient and 
disordered. Indeed, the less formally controlled they are, the more 
they become, at least from the perspective of an outsider, jumbled 
accumulations of merchandise and people, or chaotic bazaars, which 
are composed of labyrinths of small corridors and tentative stalls 
overloaded with commodities. In such places the smells of food mingle 
with those of rubbish, and music from different stalls competes with 
the noises and shouts from the street. Many of these locations are in 
a state of permanent transformation. Shops, goods, merchants, and 
consumers come and go. Some shops get bankrupt, more successful 
traders open new shops, changing demand requires new merchandise, 
and consumers may develop new habits and become attracted by other 
places and types of shops.
Importance and centrality, of course, are two more key features that 
should be considered in order to understand the position of marketplaces 
within local and global geographic, political and economic landscapes, 
within networks of marketplaces and as part of trade routes both within 
and beyond the Caucasus (Dannhaeuser 1989). 
Interestingly, the women of my target group make use of these webs 
of marketplaces and profit from price differences that occur within 
them. But in many cases, they bring the merchandise from a far-away 
market directly to their clients, which is why they do not necessarily 
appear in the local markets of the Caucasian capitals. They often do not 
have a space for selling their goods, but use their villages and private 
houses as locations for economic negotiation and exchange. Invisible 
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to the eyes of outsiders and to state control, these private places can be 
interpreted as the complete opposite of formal sales facilities. 
Fig. 7.2  Traders next to the railway station and the bus stop in Tbilisi. 
Photo © Susanne Fehlings (2014), CC BY 4.0
People
In markets and shops, it is quite common for the salespersons to be 
hired simply as sellers and to be not at all involved in the process of 
importation. In other cases, producers and traders are the very same, 
for example, in the case of farmers (glechebi in Georgian), who sell their 
vegetables and fruits on Tbilisi’s streets or on the platforms of Tbilisi’s 
railway station. According to Ketevan Khutsishvili ‘their products are 
known to be extraordinarily fresh and cheap, and this is why consumers 
buy from them’.
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Some traders buy their merchandise at cheap wholesale markets 
like Lilo and re-sell them for a small profit in the city centre, as was 
the case of an old woman who I saw every day selling costume jewelry 
on Tbilisi’s central Rustaveli Street, where she used the architecture of 
public buildings as a showcase. Others travel long distances and live 
translocal lives. 
Fig. 7.3  Street vending in Tbilisi: using public buildings as a showcase. 
Photo © Susanne Fehlings (2014), CC BY 4.0
The motivations for working as a trader vary widely. Besides 
entrepreneurs, for whom their business is their ‘real profession’, 
there are many people who get involved in trade only out of absolute 
necessity. The socio-cultural background is essential to understand why 
people do what they do and how they do it. The socio-cultural context, 
for me, consists of social relations (such as kinship relations or other 
social networks) that shape society, social practices and hierarchies, 
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cosmology, beliefs, and shared values. These shape economic practice. 
In Georgia, many people, especially the elderly, grew up with a Soviet 
ideology that condemned trade, profit-making, and free-market 
economics (Mandel and Humphrey 2002). For these people, it was, as far 
as I could make out from the conversations, a hard and amoral decision 
to turn to trade. Very typical sentiments were: ‘by profession I am an 
engineer’, ‘a university teacher’, or ‘I have [X number of] diplomas’. This 
is a way to express regret about declining status as a result of external 
factors (compare Niyozov and Shamatov 2007, Schröder in Chapter 
Eight). This was the case with many female petty traders, whom I met 
at local markets or on their travels.
In the 1980s and 1990s, trade and therefore travelling became a 
strategy of survival for all kinds of people who had lost their livelihoods. 
Many of them belonged to the so-called intelligentsia, whose members 
were especially vulnerable during this time, and many of them were 
women (compare Niyozov and Shamatov 2007). These people, who 
were called chelnoki, had very little experience in the field of commerce. 
Armine, an Armenian university teacher, for example, told me about 
trade expeditions in the 1990s, which she undertook with small groups 
of students to Iran. She remembered how they veiled themselves to 
explore this unknown territory and how they crossed the border for the 
first time. 
The term ‘chelnoki’ derives from the term ‘shuttle’ (chelnok), which is 
a device used in weaving to carry the weft by moving back and forth. 
This motion recalls the back and forth of the traders’ travel (Holzlehner 
2014). Mobility, in times of crisis, became the basis of peoples’ economic 
existence. But in contrast to the widespread opinion that translocality, 
mobility, and flexibility lead to economic success (Stephan-Emmrich 
and Mirzoev 2016), many of the petty traders under consideration here 
engaged in trade for their mere survival. 
Nowadays, this group of people and their kind of economic activity 
has decreased. The women I am interested in, their travels, and their 
special kind of commerce, might be the last remnant of the chelnoki 
phenomenon. It can be classified as highly informal because it is often 
not even a permanent occupation, since it is based on personal relations, 
and — at least in large part — operates outside of the state controlled 
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sphere of formally registered business. Almost everyone else from this 
first generation tried to stop doing this as soon as there were other 
possibilities. The women of my target group, however, continue this 
business, but rarely travel very long distances (e.g., to China or India). 
The women’s new and favorite destination is Turkey, which they can 
reach easily by marshrutka (minibus). I wonder if their activity, again, 
is an outcome of political and economic crisis (in this case, the financial 
crisis of 2008). I believe this is an interesting hypothesis, which is worth 
investigating in future work. 
However, female traders, especially those who have passed the age 
of forty, belong to the lowest class of traders (and of society in general). 
They are perceived (by large parts of society and often by themselves) 
as the last remnants of the Soviet system and the transition period. 
Usually, a tragic biography and the absence of support from family 
members, which is perceived as crucial for a successful and happy life in 
Georgian society, has forced them to continue this occupation at a time 
when most other people, thanks to the recovering national economy, 
have started bigger businesses or other jobs. Thus, for example, I met 
a woman in the train from Baku to Tbilisi who had just returned from 
China. Her son and her daughter-in-law had died in a car accident. 
Having lost her family and all financial support, she had to care for her 
grandchild, which was the only reason for her to turn to petty trade. 
Another woman, Marina, who travels to China, lost her husband and 
has to feed two children, and Hasmik, who trades in vegetables from 
Turkey, which she buys in Tbilisi and sells in Yerevan, told a similar 
story.
Younger, so-called bisnesmeny have a totally different attitude. For 
them, trade and economic success is linked to prestige and a ‘modern 
lifestyle’. This lifestyle, as I observed, fits well with the ‘new’ ideology. 
It accords with the cultural orientation towards a market economy 
and a more Western European outlook, and it is also supported by 
the Georgian Orthodox Church, representatives of which present 
themselves in the guise of businessmen. In general, elderly people and 
women work in the more informal and less profitable sectors, whereas 
men and younger people more often manage to establish themselves 
in business permanently and profitably. In this context it makes sense 
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to ask, at what point does one become a successful businessmen, 
trader, or entrepreneur? This is, of course, difficult to answer. Perhaps 
the level of formalization, which manifests in owning a permanent 
location like a registered booth or shop among other signals, is an 
indicator. It is clear, however, that the traders who are forced into 
trade and an itinerant work schedule do not belong to this category. 
They are far from being able to accumulate wealth and usually not 
able to make their business grow.6
Mobility
The first discovery during my recent fieldwork was that many traders 
working in bazaars and markets do not really travel, but sell goods 
they buy from wholesalers. The more established traders, most of them 
men, buy their goods by catalogue order. For example, Levan, who sells 
furniture from China next to Tbilisi’s railway station, told me that he had 
once travelled to China and visited the factory where his merchandise 
is produced. The Chinese factory had employed a professional Russian 
translator, and once the business relationship was established, offers 
and orders for goods were placed via the internet. As soon as one 
delivery is sold out, Levan orders the next. Payment is made through 
bank transfer, and transport and payment of custom duties organized 
through globally operating cargo companies, thus limiting the risk to, 
and individual mobility of, those involved in this exchange. 
The establishment of business relations and the regularity of 
exchange call for structuring, formalization, specialization, and division 
of labour, which often leads to the outsourcing of logistics. It follows 
that personal movement is often linked to a lower degree of formality. 
Consequently, one could also classify the merchants, their informal or 
formal character, and their involvement in translocal contexts, with 
reference to their personal mobility. The farmers mentioned above, for 
example, usually bring their products from rural to urban areas to sell 
them on the public streets or in proximity to railway or bus stations. 
They usually manage their itinerary in less than one day, and hence are 
6  How modes of entrepreneurship change and which factors influence this change 
is one subject of the project ‘Informal Markets and Trade in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus’ (Fehlings and Karrar 2016).
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quite mobile. They are definitely operating on an informal level, but 
do not feel any tensions between ‘being here or there’ (Freitag and von 
Oppen 2010), or movement and order. Thus, their translocal experience 
is limited to their interactions within the marketplaces. 
Yet some farmers, in contrast, stay in Tbilisi for a few weeks or 
months to try their luck at getting more permanently involved in the 
process of exchange. The exchange volume of their transactions is very 
modest. For example, they start with a bag of potatoes that they sell for a 
few coins. They then use this money for living expenses and to buy some 
tomatoes, which they sell again to buy other products and so on. With 
a minimal profit, people can thus afford their daily survival and a dirty 
room in a shabby hostel next to the railway station, where there is no 
privacy and where they share the poor conditions with plenty of others.7 
Their day-to-day lives are transient, impermanent, and experienced as 
uncertain — and the more this is the case, the more such an experience 
can be classified as translocal and at the same time as belonging to the 
uncontrolled and unregulated sphere of informality. These people are 
generally from the lowest levels of society and are not even noticed by 
state officials, and if they are noticed, they are usually perceived as a 
blight on the urban landscape. 
Other people, especially local women from Tbilisi, buy commodities 
at Lilo Molli, which is not far from the capital. Lilo is the commercial 
centre of the region. Goods from Turkey, China, Iran, Russia or elsewhere 
are brought here and then redistributed all over the area. Thus many 
(female) traders use the minibus to bring merchandise from Lilo to the 
city centre, where they sell the goods for a small profit on the streets, or 
in smaller marketplaces or shops. 
As mentioned above, there is a kind of hierarchy of markets linked 
to importance, centrality, size, and price differentials (see Dannhaeuser 
1989). The mobility of traders and the system of markets and bazaars 
form a (global) web of interrelations, flows, and routes, which is at least 
as fascinating as the ancient Silk Road. Some traders only transport 
goods from one end of the city to the other, while others undertake 
adventurous journeys to neighboring countries or even further (see 
Karrar 2013). Thus, for example, in the early morning, Georgian 
7  The Georgian movie director Natia Arabuli-Weg shot an interesting documentary 
about these traders.
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vendors, who have just returned from shopping tours in Turkey, sell 
their merchandise to Lilo’s wholesalers, who resell the goods to traders 
and middleman, who then bring the goods to Tbilisi or other urban 
centres in the region. From here, goods travel further, as I could observe 
myself when travelling in the region as described in the introduction.8
Having some more capital at hand, long-distance traders, today, 
usually fly. For example, a friend of mine travelled to Oman by plane to 
buy some special scarves for a museum shop in Georgia, while Georgian 
traders, who do their shopping in wholesale department stores in the 
centre of Beijing or Guangzhou, all travel by air. But there are still 
people who travel these distances by bus or train, thereby economizing. 
Most of the petty traders who travel these distances and then sell their 
commodities in the Caucasus are Georgian, Armenian or Azerbaijani. 
Accordingly, Chinese factories and wholesalers in China, and Turkish 
businessmen in Turkey, have specialized in taking on these traders as 
clients and have engaged Russian-speaking translators to enable this (as 
mentioned above).9
Many people specialize in certain goods and have institutionalized 
their business, while others are less committed and only occasionally 
take the opportunity to make a quick deal. Usually, the latter are much 
more ‘mobile’ and ‘flexible’ than the former, which at the same time 
correlates with the fact that their business is an informal occupation, 
which is sometimes even combined with tourism. 
Goods
One can also distinguish traders by the kind, quantity, and quality of 
goods they sell. Usually this also determines the location of exchange 
(Gell 1982), which in turn determines the clients.10 High quantities and 
8  There is a growing literature describing this kind of petty trade in Central Asia, 
the Caucasus, and the whole post-Soviet region (for example, Werner 2004, Yalcin-
Heckmann and Aivazsishvili 2012, Turaeva-Hoehne 2014, Holzlehner 2014).
9  At the same time, foreigners come to the urban or border markets in the Caucasus. 
There are, for example, a lot of Turkish retailers, who come to Batumi, and also a 
growing community of Chinese people, who seem to establish permanent shops 
and trade relations, which they organize through their own exclusive (ethnic) 
networks.
10  Just as with traders, the group of clients has metamorphosed since independence. As 
an example, the average citizen who became impoverished during the breakdown 
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quality of goods usually point to more financial capital, more regulated 
activities, and hence to more formalized business. Small quantities 
and low quality often indicate individual initiative, a weak financial 
background, and thus less recognition by state bodies resulting in 
informal practices of avoiding regulation and flexibly adapting to 
changing frameworks. Thus, for example, it is easy (and even legal) 
to bring small amounts of goods through customs without paying 
clearance. Petty traders, who deal with small amounts, thus simply ask 
fellow travellers to carry some of the merchandise through customs 
control, thus hiding the total number of goods. In 2017, for example, I 
was asked by Giorgi, who has a small shop in Batumi, to take two furs in 
my luggage from Beijing to Tbilisi; and almost every time I crossed the 
Armenian-Georgian border, there was a petty trader who distributed 
some of his bags among the passengers. 
The quality of merchandise is often associated with its country of 
origin. Although merchandise such as shoes, handbags, and clothes from 
Turkey had a bad reputation in the 1990s, they recently became much 
more prestigious than goods from China or India. There are changing 
trends. A few years ago, for example, most of the furniture and plastic 
toys were from Asia, while nowadays many items are produced in Iran. 
Electronic equipment, computers, mobile phones, laptops, perfumes, 
and the haute couture collections are brought from Dubai, cars from 
Germany or Japan, and sweets and milk products from Ukraine. The 
most prestigious products are usually those from Europe. 
The merchandise is diverse and at the same time it is always the 
same. You will find market stalls and shops for food (e.g., fruits and 
vegetables), for clothes and shoes, for accessories (e.g., handbags, 
glasses, jewelry), for plastic and soft toys, for electronics, for repair 
parts, for furniture and building materials, for antiques (e.g., books, 
porcelain), and for items of daily use (e.g., for cooking). There are 
whole areas, like the marketplace in the city of Rustavi, where one 
can buy cars, and there are sections in bazaars, where there are about 
twenty or more stalls advertising and providing the same shoes, the 
of the political system usually bought at cheap bazaars in the 1990s. As soon as 
their financial situation recovered, they changed their consumption patterns and 
turned their attention to supermarkets and boutiques. Buying from street vendors, 
for many citizens, has turned into an act of charity. 
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same handbags, and the same winter coats. Everything looks identical 
and vending is quite competitive. Indeed, many traders I talked to in 
the bazaar told me that they sell less and less. A friend of mine told me 
that she was happy about this decline in demand: ‘It is a good sign for 
our economy, that people do not buy on bazaars anymore, but go to 
shops and buy better brands’.
One more feature that characterizes commodities is, besides their 
quality, their age. While the prices of antiquities increase with age, 
second-hand parts and clothes are less expensive than new merchandise. 
However, there are some items, e.g., some repair parts, that have the 
reputation of having been produced in a better way in former times, 
which is why consumers prefer to buy them second hand. In any case, 
the offered item tells much about the vendor and his social status.
Fig. 7.4  A bazaar in Tbilisi: a huge number of goods, which, at least to the 
author, all look the same. Photo © Susanne Fehlings (2014), CC BY 4.0
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Amount and frequency
How do all these goods come to the Caucasus? As mentioned above, 
some are simply ordered and then brought to Georgia in huge containers. 
They are, for example, shipped to the harbour of Poti, and then loaded 
onto trucks, which bring them to Tbilisi and beyond. 
The petty traders who bring the merchandise from abroad 
themselves usually transport their goods in small quantities by train or 
mashrutka (minibus). Sometimes oral agreements between the traders 
and the mashrutka drivers exist. When I travelled from Tbilisi to Yerevan 
during my field trip in March 2014, the mashrutka started about four 
hours late because the driver was waiting for a young woman, Hasmik, 
who was heavily laden with boxes of eggplants. When I asked her 
about her business, she told me that she travels regularly to Tbilisi to 
buy vegetables and fruits (which come from Turkey), because they are 
a little less expensive than in Yerevan. She did not tell me whether she 
was paying something to the mashrutka driver for helping her, but it 
was obvious that they knew each other pretty well and were ‘working 
hand in hand’. During the trip, Hasmik, who was playing the role of an 
intermediary, was constantly calling dealers from Yerevan to negotiate 
prices and to arrange the delivery of her products. Yet she seemed 
not very happy with her job, especially as she was making this trip 
twice a week. ‘You have to eat and I have two children’ was her sober 
explanation. 
Other goods are brought to the Caucasus by individuals who are 
much less regularly involved in trade than this Armenian woman. Many 
of my acquaintances told me that they use business trips or holidays to 
buy reduced-price clothing from designer shops. The dates for seasonal 
sales in Europe are common knowledge in the Caucasus: according to 
my experience, almost everybody in the Caucasus is somehow involved 
in ‘doing business’, which includes all kinds of economic activities and 
forms of economic exchange. To classify a group of entrepreneurs or 
traders it is important to clarify whether trade is a permanent or an 
occasional occupation.11 Do traders use established business relations 
11  Sometimes it is not even a professional activity but a by-product of travelling in the 
context of business or holiday trips.
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and infrastructures? Are they constantly involved in translocal networks? 
Do they run a shop and do they pay taxes? Does their exchange rely on 
contracts or oral agreements? What is the economic volume of goods? 
And do the traders trade for fun or do they live on it? 
Many people, such as the elderly women I met between Tbilisi and 
Baku, only travelled once a year, but brought as much as they could 
to make their livelihood. Their purchases filled up an entire freight 
container that had to be shipped to Georgia. Other people just bring 
a few T-shirts from abroad to sell them to their friends, classmates, or 
colleagues. It is difficult to classify this kind of ‘favour’ or exchange as 
trade, even though the agents make some profit. Many people told me 
that they used to travel once a year, usually before Christmas, to make 
some extra money for feasting expenses. The motivation and social 
background of agents in these interactions usually differ very much 
from that of the elderly women or the well-established businessmen 
working in the bazaars. 
Most of the cases described above are characterized by the small 
amount of exchange value —  at least in comparison to that of international 
trade companies. Even the economic activities at the high end of the 
scale are still managed by individuals, who usually run a business with 
only the help of their personal networks, including their kin. Dato, for 
example, who perceives himself as a successful businessman and who 
owns three shops or booths on Lilo Bazroba, still belongs to the category 
of small entrepreneurs. He and his wife run the business with the help 
of some relatives, and several times a year, Dato travels to Turkey and 
his wife to China, to buy the merchandise themselves. In Turkey, Dato 
cooperates with a Turkish businessman with whom he is friendly. His 
wife uses a similar social network to complete her business in China. 
Dato keeps the accounts, pays taxes, and is very religious. In each of 
his shops, there is a corner with icons. He regularly prays and burns 
candles in front of them, which might be one reason for his satisfaction 
in life. To be successful, these traders also need a lot of courage or a 
wide range of knowledge about global trends and local conditions, 
which are, as a rule, transmitted and communicated face to face. We can 
therefore talk of this economic trend as something I would call ‘informal 
globalization’ or ‘globalization from below’, whereby a large amount of 
goods and the overall frequency of this trading activity indicate more 
informality than does a small quantity, simply because large-scale and 
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permanent trade is more visible, less flexible, and cannot work without 
institutional support. 
Dynamics, embeddedness, gender
A problem for the investigation of the cases of economic exchange I 
have described, especially the cases of informal exchange, is the fact 
that conditions constantly change. The national and international 
political and economic situation perpetually transforms, which has a 
direct impact on local markets and exchange patterns. One outcome of 
this fact is that certain economic activities and places of exchange grow 
or shrink, that people are forced to leave one kind of business to get 
involved in another, and that people become rich or impoverished. Thus, 
for example, in recent years, the bazaars of Tbilisi were modernized 
and ‘formalized’, which means that they turned into an accumulation 
of registered shops and supermarkets (see Jaeger 2016). In a parallel 
development, many entrepreneurs who were not able to pay taxes were 
pushed into informality, resulting in a worsening of their situation 
and a growing amount of ‘wild markets’ and ‘illegal’ street vending 
(Khutsishvili 2012). 
It follows that one challenge and risk is that legal frameworks — on 
the local, national, and international level — change, which is why, for 
example, travelling to certain countries might suddenly become more 
complicated and less profitable on the one hand, while restrictions in 
the one country might make it complicated to sell the goods in the other. 
Such restrictions can take the form of conflicts and wars (which were an 
obstacle, for example, for border trade between Georgia and Abkhazia); 
visa formalities and import duties; rising taxes; or new laws restricting, 
for example, street vending or the import of certain goods (see, for 
example, Turaeva-Hoehne 2014). A good example of a law affecting a 
whole economic branch is the announced introduction of MOT (Ministry 
of Transport) certificates, which led to a panic among my interlocutors, 
since it would affect and diminish — or even eliminate — the second-
hand car, scrap, and spare-parts trade. 
At the same time, tastes and therefore consumption patterns follow 
fashion trends, which is why certain goods appear and disappear on the 
market (see Bestor 2001). The economic situation in general, however, 
and only fashion trends, determines consumption. Thus I was told by 
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a friend of mine that, ‘in the 90s all women wore the same black skirts 
from Turkey, because they were available and cheap. Today, there are 
more possibilities to create an individual look. There is more choice and 
people have more money’. 
Additionally, the ideological, the economic, the socio-cultural, and 
the historical contexts are dynamic. Central Asia and the Caucasus, 
not least because of the Silk Road, have a long tradition of trade (see, 
for example, Kalandarova 2007). Traders, trade routes, and mercantile 
expeditions, as well as commercial cities, trading posts and caravanserais, 
are part of the history and identity of the region. Despite this heritage, 
Soviet ideology has brought all kinds of economic activity into discredit. 
Traders were classified as speculators (spekulanty, galamchilveli in 
Georgian), who had a very bad reputation for being ‘immoral’ (Mandel 
and Humphrey 2002). Accordingly, it was not obvious that so many 
people would turn to commerce after the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union (Niyozov and Shamatov 2007). Today, by contrast, commerce 
has almost lost its negative connotations. To be a ‘businessman’, as it is 
called now, is an accepted professional occupation. ‘Everybody is doing 
it, currently’, I was told as a justification. However, people who are seen 
as too successful are still suspected of being corrupt or having done 
something illegal. This might be one reason why economic success in 
Georgia, as people explained to me, is seldom made public or discussed 
with others. 
Another development over the last few decades has to do with gender 
and concerns my target group. If it was mainly women who worked as 
traders in the first years of independence (see Werner 2004), which were 
years of crisis, it is now mostly men who run established shops and 
businesses. An Armenian friend of mine, Levon Abrahamian, explained 
this gender-specific development, which was often mentioned by my 
interlocutors, as follows: ‘in times of crisis people return to primitive 
modes of economy. In the black years after independence, it was the 
women who managed to feed the families. What they did, was to go 
out and to sell some homemade cookies on the streets or to trade’. 
Indeed, it seems that women were the pioneers of petty trade. This 
might be founded in the fact that the low end of petty trade is regarded 
as a low-grade (primitive) occupation and therefore associated with 
female inferiority (see Werner 2004). Some people argue that women 
are more talented at negotiating. Women’s affinity for gossip and 
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communication is often mentioned as a necessary quality for being a 
good trader, one which men lack. On the other hand, women working 
as traders, especially young women, are exposed to all kinds of risks, 
last but not least of losing their reputation as ‘proper girls’ (see Stephan-
Emmrich and Mirzoev 2016). On the one hand, they gain status through 
their contribution to family income (see Abrahamian 2007); on the other 
hand, they have to struggle with socio-cultural norms regarding gender 
roles, which they violate when engaging in trade. However, in many 
cases women were the first, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, 
to take the risk and discover unknown, unfamiliar territory. Only later, 
when relations and infrastructure were established, when trade became 
more formalized, did men take over the business. 
Fig. 7.5  Female traders at Lilo Bazroba in Tbilisi. Photo © Susanne 
Fehlings (2014), CC BY 4.0
Taking into account the above-defined research units (location, people, 
mobility, goods, etc.), most of the female petty traders of my focus 
group can be described as not being linked to specific marketplaces. 
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They usually have a social background that positions them on the 
losing side of historical (economic, political, ideological, and social) 
change. Having lost most of their previous socio-cultural capital (social 
networks, professional qualifications, prestige within their community) 
and their financial capital as a result of the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union and the following period of upheaval, they usually describe 
how they were forced into mobility and commerce to make their living. 
The amount of goods and the frequency of their economic activity are 
rather limited, and the goods they trade are usually not of extraordinary 
quality, but rather cheap products from informal markets abroad. 
All these facts rank the economic activity of these women as highly 
informal. But because their number is non-negligible, and because they 
cross half of the globe, we can perceive them as actors of a ‘globalization 
from below’, who contribute to the flows of goods, people, and ideas 
across a vast area. 
As far as it concerns the women’s translocal experience it is difficult 
to come to clear conclusions. Female petty traders use networks and 
their knowledge of translocal communities, and they flexibly adapt 
their mobility to translocal opportunities and contexts. I am not sure, 
however, how much they are effectively involved in translocal identities. 
Their experiences are translocal, but their involvement in translocal 
belongings and their imagination of translocal space seems rather vague 
and does not really lead to the accumulation of economic wealth. Just 
as they perceive their activity as a fall-back plan, even though it might 
become a permanent occupation, they perceive their engagement in 
trade and translocal networks as accidental, and therefore not part of 
their ‘real’ identity. This is possibly the reason why they are not able 
to fully exploit the chances linked to translocality as described in the 
literature.
Conclusion
As one can conclude from my examples, one has to consider many 
aspects to get a holistic picture of the situation of petty traders and trade 
in the Caucasus, specifically in Georgia. To understand informal trade 
activity, or ‘globalization from below’, it is important to look at the very 
complicated and changing contexts along the trade chains that cross the 
region. One has to consider the socio-cultural background of traders and 
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buyers in different locations, and one has to take into account different 
legal frameworks and historical, geographical, political, and macro-
economic circumstances on the different levels of interaction — local 
and global.
In this contribution, I have tried to suggest some parameters, which, 
taken together, help to describe and classify economic exchange, 
marketplaces, and traders at the grassroots level. These parameters, 
along with their specific character and interrelations, help to cast light 
on the level of informality, and, in my opinion, give some interesting 
insights into how globalization from below and translocality become 
real. As I have shown, the specific locations of economic exchange, the 
social groups of people appearing there, their forms of mobility, the 
goods they sell and buy, the volume of exchange, and the frequency 
of their activity are linked to, refer to, and determine each other. By 
describing these links and dependencies, we come to a portrayal of 
specific groups of traders and their forms of economic behavior and 
embeddedness in socio-cultural contexts, which includes the description 
of their involvement in translocality and globalization. 
In my opinion, although almost all traders described above are 
somehow involved in ‘globalization from below’ purely by virtue of the 
fact that they trade in goods that circulate on the global market, not 
all of these traders live translocal lives in the sense of being linked to 
translocal space or belongings. Especially from the perspective of those 
not participating in mobility, the globalized world is only the backyard 
of their private homes. This is of course a question of perspective. 
Even the traders I met on their travel routes, for example the women 
of my target group, who crossed half of the globe, were very much 
focused on their own problems and duties at home. Even though they 
sometimes profited from translocal relations, they did not necessarily 
feel the tension between the relations of translocal connections. Besides, 
frequently the poor petty traders are people lacking connections of any 
kind who have to fight their own individual battles to survive. If they 
had any ‘local’ or ‘translocal’ networks, they would not have to move. 
Mobility can, as mentioned in the literature, of course result in social 
mobility.12 This is probably true for many labour migrants, who are 
12  Kaufmann et al. (2004) have pointed to the linkages between physical and social 
mobility, thereby introducing the term ‘motility’.
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comparatively successful and able to accumulate wealth. But in many 
cases, the mobility of the traders I observed only ensured economic 
survival or resulted in a small surplus, which was immediately used up 
for personal or family needs. 
Of course, it depends who is travelling and why. While the business 
trips of successful entrepreneurs or the occasional travels of trade 
tourists are quite prestigious, the mobility of the lesser group of traders 
is perceived as a marker of their low social status, which pushes them 
into informal businesses. This was true for most of the female petty 
traders of my target group.
Thus, we can conclude that informal practices are usually part 
of translocality, but do not necessarily lead to translocal identities. 
Informality includes a huge spectrum of techniques of adaptation, 
which are particularly useful to those who can easily escape state 
control. In the case of petty trade, such people generally do not belong 
in permanent locations, they range at the low level of society, they 
are forced into mobility, they trade with small amounts of goods of 
cheap quality, and they perceive themselves as unprofessional, which 
is why they are active only sporadically and if necessary. Looking at 
the whole picture, one can observe, at least in the Caucasus, a certain 
degree of ‘formalization’ as soon as the overall economic situation 
improves. Thus, since the 1990s, the low end of informal petty traders 
has diminished. However, as soon as a new crisis arises (for example in 
2008) they reappear. 
Simultaneously, we observe that all structures are culturally 
embedded and that state structures are far from being exclusively formal, 
which of course calls into question all definitions and dichotomies such 
as formal vs. informal. State capitalism means something different in 
Georgia than in Germany. Thus, the market economy, globalization, 
democracy, nation state, and modernization, etc., have to be considered 
as local adaptions of pretended neutral notions, which makes 
classification even more complicated.
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8. The Economics of Translocality – 
Epistemographic Observations from Fieldwork 
In(-Between) Russia, China, and Kyrgyzstan
Philipp Schröder
Introduction:  
my translocal field and epistemography
My current research project attempts to capture the ‘translocal 
livelihoods’ of Kyrgyz business(wo)men who are involved in the 
trade of consumer goods ‘made in China’. Twenty-five years after the 
dissolution of the Soviet empire and in times of an emerging ‘New 
Silk Road’ through Eurasia, I engage with a broad range of economic 
agents: Kyrgyz traders in Novosibirsk, who sell Chinese merchandise 
in one of Russia’s largest bazaars; Kyrgyz middlemen in Guangzhou, 
who guide their clients through the thick of Chinese manufacturing 
landscapes hunting for profitable wholesale deals; and, finally, Kyrgyz 
entrepreneurs in their nation’s capital, Bishkek, some of whom are, 
in addition to importing ‘raw materials’ (e.g., fabric) from China, 
processing these materials into consumer goods (e.g., dresses). Along 
these various commodity chains originating in China, my aim is to 
trace how ethnic Kyrgyz earn their everyday living at home and abroad 
within their niche of post-Socialist capitalism as well as how their senses 
of wellbeing and identity are shaped by the myriad flows of things, 
people, and ideas across the borders of nation states and the boundaries 
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of diverse linguistic, cultural, and other environments (see Schröder 
and Stephan-Emmrich 2014).
In the following paragraphs, I want to expand the analytical gaze of 
economics — which is said to be about the production, distribution, and 
consumption of something more or less valuable — into the domain of 
epistemology. To arrive at an understanding of what my research ‘can 
know’ about current trading and other business practices in Eurasia, 
I will present different ethnographic vignettes that illustrate both 
methodological possibilities and limitations. In this way, I return to the 
original etymology of the term economics, which in Greek referred to 
the ‘rules of the house’ (oikos = house and nomos = rule/law). Examples 
of such vernacular house rules that came to guide my fieldwork include 
the management of my ambitions for participant observation among 
traders, the accessing of online ‘homing desires’ among younger Kyrgyz 
abroad, and the adjustment to differently ‘sized’ and ‘rooted’ Kyrgyz 
diaspora groups in China and Russia. 
My contribution thus conflates two genres that conventionally are 
kept apart in social and cultural anthropology: so-called ‘professional 
ethnography’, i.e., a researcher’s (re-)presentation of the lifeworlds of 
his or her interlocutors as they express them, and a more self-reflective 
commentary on how this same researcher assesses such self-induced 
processes of knowledge generation. To capture this, I will employ the 
term ‘epistemography’, which Peter Dear (2010:131) has identified 
as ‘an enterprise centrally concerned with developing an empirical 
understanding of scientific knowledge, in contrast to epistemology, 
which is a prescriptive study of how knowledge can or should be made’. 
Returning to economics, the epistemographic notes on the following 
pages will provide some descriptive insights into my ways of working 
towards a translocal ethnography; i.e., how I accessed, selected, 
negotiated, and tailored information for (scientific) consumption in the 
different sites of my field. This will show that when mapping translocal 
assemblages, it is essential not only to identify (the transgressions of) 
factual boundaries of state regimes, social belongings, and so on, but 
also to reflect on how the particular house rules of a fieldworking 
reality, as established between interlocutors and researchers, shape the 
very contours of knowledge production.
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Vignette 1:  
‘He shouldn’t see us trade, it would be 
shameful’ — lost (authenticity) in participation
Since the early twentieth century, ‘participant observation’ has been 
the key data-gathering tool of cultural and social anthropology. 
Located right at the heart of this discipline and its fieldwork practice, 
the professional identity of most ethnographers still crucially rests 
on engaging in long-term, face-to-face, and close relations with their 
interlocutors. Most significantly, this cultural proximity — in terms 
of knowing local traditions and languages — is commonly believed to 
allow deeper insights into the lifeworlds of others, but also claims to 
allow for more ‘authentic’ representations of emic views.
Clifford Geertz (1968:54) once argued that successful fieldwork 
is about a common fiction, which the researcher and the researched 
agree upon regardless of the social distances between them and their 
awareness of these distances. Aside from calling attention to this irony, 
Geertz identified such anthropological research as a ‘form of conduct’ 
(see also Schröder 2014). This again reminds us that, just like any shared 
narration aiming for validity, the practice of fieldwork draws on certain 
conventions and strategies. As the following example from Russia shows, 
one such rule of thumb may be that an enforced ‘witnesshood’, i.e., an 
exaggerated connection to a witness identity (analogous to victimhood), 
which rests on the mantra ‘more participation = more authenticity’, may 
in fact endanger the stability of field relations.
In Novosibirsk, the primary topic of my interest is trading. Mostly, 
this occurs in the city’s main bazaar, which, as in other places in the post-
Soviet sphere, is commonly referred to as the baraholka (‘flea market’ or 
‘rag fair’). At the time of my research, Novosibirsk’s baraholka featured 
about 10,000 sellers, and with its enormous wholesale capacity it was 
said to supply ‘the whole of Siberia’ with goods. At night, when the 
larger-scale trading set in at 2am, busses with re-sellers from cities such 
as Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, and even from Yakutsk — 5,000 kilometers 
away — could be spotted.
The majority of traders working the bazaar are ‘non-Russians’ and 
belong to different ethnic groups from Central Asia. Among them, the 
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Kyrgyz have the largest presence in Novosibirsk’s baraholka, and their 
long-time establishment here is exemplified by the fact that the bazaar’s 
prime restaurant is called ‘Bishkek’ (after Kyrgyzstan’s capital). The 
earliest Kyrgyz traders — the self-acclaimed ‘pioneers’ — had already 
settled in Novosibirsk in the 1990s. Most of them originate from the 
southern regions of the Kyrgyz Republic, which, due to structural neglect 
and demographic pressure since the Soviet era, has been hit harder by 
the later transformation period than the country’s northern part. Within 
the two decades that have passed since this first generation of migrants 
arrived and settled down, the Kyrgyz ethnic communities in different 
parts of Russia have grown. Currently, an unofficial 1 million Kyrgyz 
(of Kyrgyzstan’s approximately 6 million total population) reside in 
Russia, about 30,000 of them in Novosibirsk.
Timur aka is one of these traders. I was introduced to him during a 
fieldwork trip to Novosibirsk in 2013 by a mutual Kyrgyz acquaintance 
of ours, who I had been in touch with since my first research in 
Kyrgyzstan six years before. This ‘friend-of-a-friend’ scenario proved 
to be a very fortunate door-opener for me, as I was credibly vouched 
for as a trustworthy interlocutor: one who meant no harm, who was 
not a ‘Western spy’, and, most importantly, who already knew about 
the Kyrgyz and had even ‘written a book about our capital city’ (see 
Schröder 2012).
On that ticket, I was first granted access in Novosibirsk and quickly 
learned more about the business that Timur aka and his wife Gulmira 
eje were running together. Specializing in men’s underwear, it was part 
of their (gendered) labour-sharing agreement that Gulmira eje was the 
one to travel back and forth between Novosibirsk and Kyrgyzstan’s big 
Dordoi bazaar, where she purchased their goods and sent them north 
to Russia via cargo. While she was considered better qualified for this 
task due to ‘a woman’s better taste in fashion’, Timur aka was the one 
who opened up their selling container at 2am and who received and 
unloaded the cargo. 
Similar to many fellow Kyrgyz traders of their generation, Timur 
aka and Gulmira eje stressed that ‘trading is not our actual profession’ 
and that ‘life forced us to get into this’. With Timur aka’s background 
in engineering and Gulmira eje’s training to be a nurse, the two indeed 
belong to a category that has been described as ‘accidental traders’ 
(Sahadeo 2011). This categorization alludes to the fact that, ever since 
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Fig. 8.1  Novosibirsk’s baraholka. Photo © Philipp Schröder (2017), CC BY 4.0
the later years of the Soviet Union, the shrinking economic opportunities 
in the empire’s peripheral areas have led sizeable numbers of the 
local population to abandon their original professional education and 
instead go into trading (e.g., Yurkova 2004, Kaiser 2003, 2005). In this 
way, many who had envisioned working in Soviet schools or factories 
became ‘speculators’ and merchants due to the accident of the regime’s 
1991 collapse.
For Timur aka and Gulmira eje, Russia became a lucrative option 
because, in their native Kyrgyzstan, goods made in China were available 
at low prices, the borders in between the countries of the region were 
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manageably porous, and because they already had a reliable set of 
relatives and friends in place among Novosibirsk’s Kyrgyz diaspora. 
Aside from such advantageous conditions of economic development 
(especially Kyrgyzstan’s WTO membership), corruption (cheaper 
to pay a bribe than the actual customs tariffs), and social networks 
(who provided initial loans and shared local knowledge), there are 
matters of identification to keep in mind when doing — and when 
researching — business. In the self-presentations of Timur aka and 
other Kyrgyz interlocutors, any mention of their hard-earned material 
success, apparent, for example, in their ownership of several apartments 
in Bishkek and Novosibirsk, was subordinate to their subjective 
perceptions of belonging to a collective with distinct features and what 
they called their ‘unique cultural mentality’.
Much has been written about the feeling of shame that such 
newcomers to trade and the market economy in formerly socialist 
countries experienced during the transformation years (e.g., Heyat 
2002, Hohnen 2003). For the most part, this refers back to Socialist 
ideology, according to which private trade was condemned as ‘capitalist 
exploitation’ and ‘criminal speculation’ for about six decades. While 
all traders, who soon operated between the very western and the very 
eastern end of the former Socialist orbit, shared this background, for the 
likes of Timur aka and Gulmira eje there were additional stigmatizations 
to face. In Russia, just like the members of other ethnic minorities from 
the Caucasus and Central Asia, they were often derogatorily referred 
to as ‘blacks’ (Sahadeo 2012); and for a long time, such everyday racial 
discrimination made them feel ‘as if we are a second class of people’.
During my fieldwork in Novosibirsk, however, none of these aspects 
caused me to reflect on when and where to approach the topic of trading 
with my Kyrgyz interlocutors. Ahead of my first visit to the baraholka, 
thanks to the stories I had heard from Timur aka and others about their 
challenging beginnings, about the big risks and even larger profits 
that seemed to be part and parcel of this place, I was excited about the 
moment when I would actually see them ‘in action’. 
In light of this, the first hours I spent in between the rows of 
containers that make the baraholka its bustling and noisy self were a 
disappointment. When I arrived at the bazaar, after an enthusiastic 
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welcome and a hurried tour of his trading spot, Timur aka slowed things 
down pretty quickly. I could see no obvious reason for that, because 
Timur aka’s business was legal and registered, and he had a license with 
his name and picture hanging inside his container. Also, there were few 
customers around at the time, as I had deliberately come towards the 
end of the trading day. Still, Timur aka remained hesitant. 
This surprised me, because before, whenever we had met in his 
home over tea and snacks, he had not been shy about revealing his trade 
secrets to me (on handling customs, profit margins, etc.). Yet now Timur 
aka was far from his usual proactive self, and despite the fact that my 
questions did not touch on any themes that I imagined could be too 
delicate to discuss in this half-public setting, he responded very briefly 
and with a lowered voice. A final and more obvious hint was necessary 
for me to finally grasp the origin of Timur aka’s distancing in the bazaar. 
Some days later, Timur aka and I had agreed that he would pick me 
up that night in order for me to join him for a whole working day. But 
about three hours before our meeting, I received a call from Timur aka’s 
wife Gulmira eje. Obviously embarrassed about the situation, she let 
me know that her husband could not take me with him, because, and 
then she began to whisper, ‘he said that you should not see them trade, 
especially not at night […] this will be uiat’. 
Uiat in Kyrgyz is governed by strong moral guidelines referring to 
shameful behavior and to the anxiety that someone might lose social 
face. At that early stage of my fieldwork, it was the first time that uiat 
was mentioned to me in regard to trading. Judging from Gulmira 
eje’s words, the main issue here was not only that Timur aka himself 
would trade in front of me, but also that he would bring a foreigner to 
the baraholka, thereby exposing all his fellow traders to that shameful 
situation. Whereas during the day, this could be represented as a social 
visit among acquaintances, at night the obvious purpose of my presence 
would be to witness people trade. 
For my further research, this incident provided me with a valuable 
clue about an essentialized ethnic identity, which was maintained 
by Timur aka and others from a pre-Soviet and Soviet ethnogenetic 
template (Jacquesson, Chapter Six). As part of this primordialist 
perspective, trading was depicted as unusual for those with a nomadic 
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heritage, like the Kyrgyz, but rather was associated with sedentary 
groups, such as their Uzbek neighbors.1 Abramzon (1971:109) remarks 
accordingly in Soviet ductus:2 ‘Despite some developments of trade 
and exchange with neighboring settled people [ethnic groups, P.S.], the 
commodity-production of the nineteenth century Kyrgyz society was in 
a rudimentary [zachatochnyi] state’.
During the following decades of Soviet social engineering, such 
‘perceptions of nationally constructed imagined communities’ (Gullette 
2010:132)3 were continuously reinforced, and among many Kyrgyz 
traders of Timur aka’s generation they have shaped attitudes to the 
bazaar as a (morally) ‘dirty place’ and given rise to statements such as 
‘trade is not in our blood’. In the reasoning of my Kyrgyz interlocutors 
in Novosibirsk, that ethno-cultural element, framed as ‘our Kyrgyz 
mentality’, was felt more strongly than the repercussions of the more 
general Marxist-Leninist ideology, which had condemned private 
trading as ‘illegal, illegitimate, and immoral’ (Hohnen 2003:32). (Quite 
fittingly, I encountered a more welcoming environment with Kyrgyz 
businessmen in Novosibirsk who were active in the service sector — e.g., 
selling SIM cards — and who revealed considerable pride in their work 
when receiving me in their offices.)
In fact, this experience of the trade-shame nexus that I shared with 
my interlocutors marked an instance of ‘cultural intimacy’, which has 
been described by Herzfeld in reference to discourses on nationalism 
(1997:3) as: ‘the recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that 
are considered a source of external embarrassment but that nevertheless 
provide insiders with their assurance of common sociality […]’. 
1  Drawing on earlier work, Finke (2014:45) shows that distinctions between nomads 
and settled groups, the latter, for example, (derogatively) labelled ‘Sart’, had existed 
prior to the Soviet period.
2  Ductus refers to a characteristic way of expressing oneself, either orally or in 
writing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ductus_(linguistics)
3  Gullette (2010:132) identifies ethnogenesis as an important tool in Soviet attempts 
to socially engineer group boundaries: ‘The establishment of ethnic groups, the 
ideological construction of those ethnicities into nationalities and the development 
of the nationalities policy by Lenin (which was continued by subsequent leaders of 
the Communist Party) eventually led to a situation where perceptions of nationally 
constructed imagined communities became markers of identity. Ethno-national 
leaders began to use Gumilev’s theory [of ethnogenesis, P.S.] to emphasize ethnic 
distinctiveness and their place in history’.
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Translated into a methodological insight, such encounters prompted me 
to be sensitive about the frequency and duration of the visits that I paid 
to the baraholka. I learned as a first ‘house rule’ for the Novosibirsk site 
of my translocal research field that I should assess carefully which of my 
Kyrgyz interlocutors did not feel ashamed while trading, and which of 
them did. The latter, just as Timur aka’s example showed, may be better 
suited for an after-work conversation outside of the bazaar. In any case, 
I took Gulmira eje’s call — to which similar such indications were added 
over time from other sources — as a well-meant warning that otherwise 
solid relations might collapse as a consequence of trespassing too far 
into ‘uiat territory’. 
Taking this concern seriously, in my estimation, meant that ‘travelling 
with’ my interlocutors and their goods, or aiming for an ‘apprenticeship’ 
in their trading containers, was far from feasible. Thus, in order to reach 
‘satisficing’ ethnographic data, according to Herbert Simon’s (1956) 
original sense of retreating to a non-optimal but attainable solution 
that both ‘satisfies’ and ‘suffices’, I refrained from an overambitious 
‘witnesshood’: i.e., what I understood as the eagerness to get a glimpse of 
something that my interlocutors thought should not be seen. I accepted 
this inability either to ‘follow the people’ or ‘follow the thing’, which 
Marcus (1995) discusses as two of the basic ‘practices of construction’ 
for multi-sited ethnographies, as a particularity of researching Kyrgyz 
trading. I expected, on the other hand, that fieldwork might have 
progressed differently had I researched an ethnic group with a longer 
historical involvement in trade, for example the Igbo traders of Nigeria, 
who have established institutions to bring people into trade, and who 
thus might have expressed more pride and appreciation for this line of 
work (see Abimbola 2011).
Vignette 2:  
‘My Divine Land — Kyrgyzstan’
The previous vignette illustrates that regardless of the material success 
they have achieved in Russia, many Kyrgyz accidental traders still 
present their current status as a part of post-Soviet decline. A friend of 
Gulmira eje once commented: ‘We [the ethnic Kyrgyz] had been an elite 
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in the Kyrgyz SSR!4 The Soviet Union educated us well and we were on 
our way to a good future… but now we have to do this!’
Eliza Isabaeva (2011) has made a fitting observation here, arguing that 
those Kyrgyz abroad who do not work in their actual profession — e.g., 
a doctor who turned into a merchant (kommersant) — are categorized 
as just ‘being in the field’ (talaada). Furthermore, this is understood as a 
term with a distinctly negative connotation: ‘Being ‘in the field’ — that 
is, being somewhere uncertain, unmoored from home, is often used 
to refer to being lost. The field is not a place of safety but is rather 
unbounded and dangerous, exposed to social and climactic extremes; 
owned — and therefore protected — by no one’ (ibid.:544).
I heard such reflections on the uncertainties and dangers of life 
abroad mainly from those who had remained behind in Kyrgyzstan 
and for this reason were worried about a relative or friend in Russia, 
or from those who were recent or illegal migrants there and thus were 
jeopardized by racial or administrative discrimination or even the threat 
of deportation. In contrast, I could not sense any such anxieties among 
the long-term Kyrgyz residents in Russian cities, who, just like Timur 
aka and Gulmira eje, had lived there for almost two decades and might 
even have obtained Russian citizenship. On the day when I first arrived 
in Novosibirsk, the friend of Gulmira eje who met me at the airport 
welcomed me with the words: ‘Well Philipp, this is our home now, this 
is where we live’. And, indeed, it felt like that right away, once we drove 
in her husband’s car into the city, continued to a modern ‘Sushi-and-
Grill’ restaurant for a snack, and then had tea sitting on Kyrgyz töshöktör 
(mats) in the family’s apartment, which they had already owned for 
several years.
Although nowadays the likes of Timur aka certainly are established 
in Novosibirsk, all of them still remember quite well the initial stages 
of adapting to Siberian urban life. To a limited extent, this was a matter 
of language, as most of them had learned Russian during their school 
and university days back in Soviet Kyrgyzstan (where the knowledge 
of Russian was more widely spread than, for instance, in Tajikistan or 
Uzbekistan). Still, to be limited for the most part to speaking Kyrgyz at 
4  The statement refers to Soviet policies that aimed to develop local cadres through 
‘indigenization’ (korenizatsiia), which Northrop (2004:48) clarifies was an ‘elaborate 
affirmative action program’ to ‘create educated indigenous elites’.
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home, while switching to Russian in any public situation, was commonly 
depicted as a challenging experience. Among this elder generation, the 
Kyrgyz language is thus regarded as providing a crucial link back towards 
the ancestral homeland (ata-meken). Furthermore, some respondents, most 
often men in their fifties, revealed to me romantic fantasies about their 
imminent return to their native Kyrgyz village, where, as one interlocutor 
put it: ‘I would take the money I earned here to buy a tractor, then rent it 
out to my fellow farmers and have a quiet life’.
Novosibirsk’s younger Kyrgyz provide a clear contrast to this. As 
regards the sons and daughters of Timur aka’s generation, it is essential 
for their lifeworlds that they moved there as little children, or even grew 
up in Russia entirely. One notable aspect about these ‘second generation’ 
Kyrgyz is the relevance of education, which is projected onto them by 
their parents, many of whom — as Gulmira eje’s friend phrased it — had 
been ‘good specialists’ during the Soviet era. For their offspring, instead 
of dragging them into the ‘dirty baraholka’, this parental generation is 
prepared to spend significant amounts of money — sometimes up to 
500 USD per month and per child — for private schools, tutoring lessons 
and ‘cultural’ hobbies (such as playing the piano).
Aizhana is one of these bright, next-generation Kyrgyz. When I 
first met her in 2013, she was studying to become a lawyer. Equipped 
with a stipend from one of the more prestigious universities in the city, 
Aizhana was among the best in her class, admittedly in part because, 
as a ‘non-Russian’, she was determined to prove her worth and felt 
‘obliged’ to succeed. Aizhana was certain to be well-integrated in 
Russia. She held Russian citizenship, and envisioned a future working 
for ‘our government’, meaning the Russian one. As is known from other 
diaspora contexts, the flip side of a child’s successful integration might 
be parental anxieties about a loss of culture (e.g., language) and tradition 
(e.g., what is ‘shameful behavior’, or who should marry whom).
Although such inter-generational dilemmas have been part of my 
fieldwork experience, what interests me here is the setup and expression 
of a ‘homing desire’ (Brah 1996) among young Kyrgyz in Russia, i.e., 
their search for a place of belonging beyond simple geographic location 
in or outside of the Kyrgyz Republic. In this regard, for Aizhana and 
her peers, it is not so much language, as among themselves they 
predominantly converse in Russian, and it is definitely not ‘working 
the land’, that drives their attachment to Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, 
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unlike Darieva (2011) has noted for ‘US Armenian Americans’, who 
consider environmental work in their ancestral home to be part of a 
global framework for improving the future of Mother Earth, among 
second-generation Kyrgyz there were no similar grand ‘cosmopolitan’ 
aspirations. And finally, although my Kyrgyz interlocutors would 
commonly self-identify as Muslims, only few articulated their homing 
desire in terms of religious ideals that were directed towards the 
traditional centres of Islam in Saudi Arabia (Stephan-Emmrich, Chapter 
Nine).
Rather than being linguistic, cosmopolitan, or religious, the charitable 
projections of young Kyrgyz in Russia were straightforwardly ethnic 
and aimed at lending a hand to the ‘Kyrgyz nation’ (kyrgyz el). Aizhana 
and her compatriots in Novosibirsk were vocal about the patriotic 
commitment they felt towards their fellow Kyrgyz, which is in line 
with the social phenomenon of a ‘globalizing ethno-nationalism’ that 
currently can be observed in Kyrgyzstan (Jacquesson, Chapter Six). 
From my early conversations with them, I learned, for example, about 
the work of the organization ‘Manas’. Named after the main hero of 
the Kyrgyz traditional epic poem, this group of young compatriots 
offers free-of-charge legal and other support to recent migrants to 
Novosibirsk.5 I also participated in some of Manas’ activities myself, 
such as when, in summer 2013, they collected gifts to be handed to 
‘respected elders’ of the Kyrgyz Novosibirsk community during the 
celebrations for Kyrgyzstan’s Independence Day on 31 August. 
As regards fieldwork methodology, my involvement quite closely 
resembled the classic approach of face-to-face interviewing and 
following up via participant observation. Still, it was for quite a while 
that I missed a key dimension through which the Kyrgyz youth of 
Novosibirsk both organized social support and framed their homing 
desire: the internet. It was by ways of this virtual vehicle that significant 
diaspora resources were mobilized and the emotional attachment to an 
ethnic homeland found expression. For instance, this occurred in the 
group ‘Keremet Jerim — Kyrgyzstan’, which translates as ‘My Divine 
Land — Kyrgyzstan’, and is hosted on the Russian social networking 
website ‘vkontakte.com’ (‘In Touch’)6. Its members, mostly Kyrgyz who 
5  http://rus.azattyk.org/content/article/25395675.html
6  http://vk.com/edinyi_kyrgyzstan
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reside in Russia, share news from Kyrgyzstan, post pictures and video 
files of Kyrgyzstan’s landscape and of traditional food and cultural 
dresses, and discuss aspects of migrant life in Russia.
Fig. 8.2a  ‘My Divine Land — 
Kyrgyzstan’. © VK (2018), all 
rights reserved
Fig. 8.2b  ‘Kyrgyzstan’s tallest man’.  
© Novosti Kyrgyzstana Kloop.kg (2014),  
all rights reserved
In 2014, one of the prevalent stories, both online and in personal 
conversations, concerned the group’s partaking in the support effort 
for ‘Kyrgyzstan’s tallest man’7. Standing at more than 230 centimeters, 
Jenishbek Raiymbaev can move only with crutches and in addition 
suffers from diabetes and other illnesses. After a local news outlet 
first covered his tragic story, and captured on video how, for 100 
Som (€1.50), people could take a picture with ‘the giant’ in a Bishkek 
bazaar, it was primarily through the vkontakte website that donations 
for Jenishbek’s treatment were raised. In total, a sum of 20,000 Som 
(€300) was collected, most of it from young Kyrgyz in Russia. In a 
small ceremony held in a holiday resort at Kyrgyzstan’s lake Issyk-Kul, 
Jenishbek Raiymbaev was handed this donation by a representative of 
the Kyrgyz diaspora. 
The commentaries on this event celebrated it as proof that the 
Kyrgyz abroad could not only affectively but effectively reach back 
home. This again must be seen in light of the fact that some of these 
second-generation Kyrgyz might themselves only rarely travel to 
Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, and in contrast to their parents, many 
7  https://youtu.be/nOgIBtlbo8o
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young Kyrgyz like Aizhana do not imagine that they will permanently 
return to their fatherland. Instead, they have attuned themselves, both 
pragmatically and emotionally, to lead a ‘better life in Russia’, where 
higher living standards join individualized freedoms and meritocratic 
aspirations to shape their distinctly non-Kyrgyz social imagination. 
This then underlines Brah’s (1996) insight that a (emotion-driven and 
performative) desire for home may be something entirely separate from 
a (strategically considered) desire to return home (see also Budarick 
2011:6).
Regardless whether this concerns the present analysis of a virtual 
homing desire among second-generation Kyrgyz, as expressed within 
the online group ‘Keremet Jerim — Kyrgyzstan’, or perhaps the future 
internet-based negotiations of ethnic moralities among (extended) 
families that are split between two nation states, when producing 
my own tri-local ethnography it will be imperative to engage further 
with the field of ‘digital anthropology’ (see Horst and Miller 2012). 
As Kuntsman (2004) notes, aside from the opportunity to create a 
deterritorialized, yet still ‘homey’ place, ‘cyberspace does not simply 
reflect existing off-line identities and power relations, but can silence, 
sublimate or exaggerate them’.8 
When negotiating ‘Kyrgyzness’ abroad online, one such sensitive 
theme involves gender hierarchies and a widespread patriarchal 
quest to control female behavior and bodies. Gathered in groups such 
as ‘Stop debauching KG [Kyrgyzstan]’,9 cyber-vigilantes make it a 
matter of ‘national shame’ and ‘Muslimness’ if Kyrgyz girls upload 
provocative nude pictures in social networks. More violently, Kyrgyz 
men belonging to self-acclaimed ‘patriot’ groups have spread video 
files — to be seen by compatriots back home — of their raids through 
the streets of Moscow and other Russian cities, where they interrogate 
and chastise Kyrgyz women who they accuse of dating men of other 
ethnic groups.10
8  http://www.anthropologymatters.com/index.php/anth_matters/article/view/97
9  http://vk.com/stoprazvrat_kg
10  https://youtu.be/Y_t3gTt4vAQ
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Vignette 3:  
Dungan kitchen and the Italian pub —  
a shallow diaspora
While the previous vignette has shown how young, second-generation 
Kyrgyz in Novosibirsk advance their ‘homing desires’ through social 
media, for those Kyrgyz who operate as middlemen in Guangzhou, the 
internet serves an economic function. It is not surprising that a person 
like Azamat, who has resided in this southern-Chinese metropolis for 
some years now, is involved in multiple Kyrgyzstan-oriented online 
communities and keeps in touch with his relatives ‘back home’ through 
online technologies such as Skype. Despite this, Azamat’s digital profile 
strongly contrasts with that of Aizhana.
To begin with, this is because Azamat is not a student like Aizhana. 
Fifteen years older, he perceives himself as the family breadwinner and 
an established business professional, which is also the capacity in which 
I first met him through a mutual acquaintance in Bishkek. Therefore, 
Azamat sees the internet primarily as a business tool, through which 
he can connect to clients, prepare their buying trips, and find essential 
information about local manufacturing sites. ‘In between my trips 
with these businessmen who I show around in China’, Azamat says, ‘I 
basically live on the internet’. To capture this in my research, I was lucky 
that Azamat allowed me to partially observe his online behavior — not 
from log files or other secondary documentation, but in person, by 
letting me join him in his Guangzhou apartment. There, I could quite 
literally look over his shoulder while he chatted with multiple clients 
and Chinese factory managers simultaneously, switching languages 
from Russian to Mandarin and back, just as he switched between the 
different screen windows of his laptop. 
Aside from the invaluable insights I obtained about how Azamat 
ran his small enterprise, my sessions with him gave me a clear view of 
the spatial organization of the world-wide web as he uses it. Azamat 
lives somewhere other than Aizhana, not only geographically but also 
because he frequents another corner in cyberspace. While in China, 
Azamat forages for reliable producers and the best commodity deals 
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on regional e-commerce platforms, such as taobao.com (consumer-
to-consumer, C2C) or alibaba.com (business-to-business, B2B). He 
communicates with his clients and factory representatives via specific 
software applications such as ‘WeChat’, which is an instant messenger 
that has most of its 400 million users in China. Knowledge of Mandarin 
and local search engines like ‘Baidu’ therefore remain key to navigating 
within China’s state-censored virtual landscape, which is shielded 
from other international social communication platforms by the ‘Great 
Firewall of China’. 
Offline, parallels also emerge to an essentially different private 
life that the Kyrgyz in Guangzhou experience as compared to the 
diaspora community in Novosibirsk. By definition, in his profession 
as a middleman who facilitates business deals between Chinese 
manufacturers and his various Russian-speaking clients from Central 
Asia, the Caucasus, and Russia, Azamat’s primary task and skill is 
translating (see Introduction and Stephan-Emmrich, Chapter Nine). 
This translation work, if successful, bridges multiple translocal gaps 
among borders, languages, and forms of knowledge. Azamat thereby 
addresses a divide, which at first glance might be surprisingly large, 
given that both Russia and Kyrgyzstan share a border with China, and 
that all of these countries look back at a Socialist past. Yet, on the other 
hand, China’s isolationism is historically well-documented, and from 
the 1960s until well into the 1980s this was related to the country’s 
deteriorating politico-ideological relations with the Soviet Union 
(Karrar 2016). 
Despite the so-called ‘Sino-Soviet split’, once Kyrgyzstan became an 
independent Republic in 1991 it could revive its relations with China 
(Tang 2000). Still, during the harsh early years of transformation, those 
Kyrgyz who plunged into an emerging post-Soviet capitalism did not 
turn first to China. One reason was that none of these pioneering Kyrgyz 
business people could draw on a similarly strong historic connection 
to China as was the case for the Dungans of Shortobe in Kazakhstan, 
for example (Alff, Chapter Five). As a group of Chinese-speaking 
Muslims, who had fled the Qing Empire in the late nineteenth century 
to travel to Russian Tsarist territories, Shortobe Dungans managed to 
reestablish links with Hui and Han Chinese business circles in the late 
Soviet days. Aside from a head start, the more favorable positioning of 
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these Dungans in the middleman-game, as compared to the Kyrgyz, 
goes beyond Mandarin language abilities. It entails a more intimate 
acquaintance with local customs in mainland China and the official 
status of Dungans as an ‘overseas Chinese ethnic minority’. 
For the Kyrgyz, on the other hand, the familiarity of shared Soviet 
history, Socialist values, and Russian language — plus, for some, 
the existence of personal networks between Central Asia and the 
empire’s northern region due to both Soviet workforce and student 
mobility — made them see Russia and its burgeoning consumer market 
as a way out of their own collapsing national economies. As the previous 
vignettes have indicated, within the last two decades Kyrgyz diaspora 
life in Russia has become visible, vibrant, and vigorous. In Novosibirsk, 
for example, there exists a ‘Kyrgyz Cultural Center’, different Kyrgyz 
cargo companies and travel agencies, Central Asian restaurants, and a 
neighborhood nicknamed MZHK (Mesto zhitelstvo Kyrgyzsov or ‘Place of 
residence of the Kyrgyz’).
Nothing like this has yet appeared in China. In fact, Azamat and the 
other Kyrgyz I spent time with in Guangzhou do not identify themselves 
as belonging to a ‘diaspora’. Mostly, they relate this to their small size, 
estimated at less than 1,000 Kyrgyz in the metropolis of 14 million 
people, as well as to their rather recent arrival, with reports that date 
the first Kyrgyz relocating there to 2006. Furthermore, with knowledge 
of Mandarin being so integral to success in the Chinese economy, all 
the Kyrgyz middlemen I encountered had studied the language, first at 
a university in Kyrgyzstan and then again in mainland China (often in 
Urumqi). This again sheds light on why my interlocutors in Guangzhou 
were rather young, ranging from students in their twenties to the likes 
of Azamat, who in their mid-30s already call themselves the ‘old guys’. 
Unlike in Novosibirsk, where bold weddings attended by a mix 
of local ‘honorary’ guests and relatives from back in Kyrgyzstan 
are examples of an extensive diaspora, in Guangzhou I found rather 
patchy small networks of young families. With only such weak ties 
to an imagined community of co-ethnics in their immediate living 
environment, some of the Kyrgyz there expressed enjoying this as a 
‘life with more freedom’ and fewer worries about mechanisms of social 
control in regard to what a ‘Kyrgyz society’ would consider appropriate 
or shameful behavior (uiat). ‘Here’, a common joke had it among Azamat 
280 Philipp Schröder
and his friends, ‘you just have to avoid being considered an Uighur [and 
thus a potential Turkic separatist], then you are fine in China’.
This situation opened up new avenues for the Kyrgyz of Guangzhou 
to integrate beyond their own ethnic group. Some therefore engaged 
in loose friendships with ‘other Muslims’, e.g. from Lebanon. ‘For 
food’, I was told, ‘the closest we can find around here to our national 
cuisine are Dungan restaurants, so we go there’. And in early 2014, for 
the occasional evening out among men, the choice of Azamat and his 
friends was the Italian pub that had recently opened around the corner 
in their neighborhood.
Fig. 8.3  Zhongshanba neighbourhood in Guangzhou.  
Photo © Philipp Schröder (2017), CC BY 4.0
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All in all, the Kyrgyz in Guangzhou — and consequently my 
research — had to adapt to something that in comparison with the 
situation in Novosibirsk may be called a ‘shallow’ ethnic diaspora. 
Among China’s Kyrgyz middlemen, belonging was performed less 
as a distant, virtual ‘homing desire’ similar to that of Aizhana and 
other second-generation Kyrgyz in Russia. Rather, Azamat and his 
peers — partly because they had the financial means to do so — regularly 
travelled between China and Kyrgyzstan. Usually, they spend their 
summer holidays and a whole month around the Chinese New Year 
back home; they also return for important cultural events, such as 
weddings and funerals. As regards their futures, most young families 
like that of Azamat clearly expect to spend them in Kyrgyzstan. With 
fewer opportunities to actually settle down in China, where for instance 
they are not eligible for citizenship and consequently not able to acquire 
property, there are greater incentives for Azamat and his peers to try 
and earn their fortunes in Guangzhou now, then to invest these into 
Bishkek’s real-estate market or another post-China business endeavour 
across the border.
As for the final ‘house rule’ of my fieldwork, the previous vignette 
followed a switch I had to make after relocating from Novosibirsk to 
China: to look for less ‘Kyrgyzness’ or a coherent diaspora community 
in Guangzhou, and instead to follow up on the individual ‘translocal 
livelihoods’ of Azamat and other such middlemen during one of 
their frequent trips ‘back home’ to Kyrgyzstan. As regards my own 
positioning, both towards my interlocutors and the themes I could 
tackle, this substantiates George Marcus’s (1995:112) early insight that: 
‘In practice, multi-sited fieldwork is thus always conducted with a keen 
awareness of being within the landscape, and as the landscape changes 
across sites, the identity of the ethnographer requires renegotiation’.
Conclusion: the economics of translocality and 
satisficing ethnographic data
In this contribution, I made an attempt at epistemography. Lynch 
(2006:779) eloquently summarizes this as: ‘an empirical study of 
particular historical and institutional settings in which participants 
organize and deploy what counts, for them, as observation, experimental 
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evidence, truth, and knowledge’. The above pages entwined my own 
(researcher’s) positionality with the situatedness of my interlocutors 
in different localities of Eurasia. From this I have identified three key 
house rules that shaped my fieldwork and thus the production of such 
a translocal ethnography.
The first of these, which debated the essentializing ethno-cultural 
(self-)stigmatization of trading activities among the older generation 
of Kyrgyz abroad, cautioned against an overambitious ‘witnesshood’ 
that might push the limits of what interlocutors consider appropriate 
participant observation. The second house rule may be summarized as 
‘go online!’, and it drew attention to the role of cyberspace in regard to a 
‘homing desire’ among second-generation Kyrgyz who have grown up 
in Russia. Shifting my focus to China, I entered a less intense diaspora 
context than I had experienced in Novosibirsk where many ‘pioneers’ 
had settled already in the 1990s. Given the Kyrgyz’ shorter migration 
history in Guangzhou, which began only around the mid-2000s, and 
because of the smaller and rather dispersed nature of their social 
networks there, the third house rule led me to expand from the local 
gaze, most importantly by following up these middlemen’s ‘homeland 
connection’ during their frequent return trips to Kyrgyzstan. Some of 
these house rules, then, relate to accepting the boundaries of knowledge 
production, for example as regards the observation of trading or the 
adaptation to a ‘shallow’ ethnic diaspora. Other house rules are about 
exploring alternative avenues by which boundaries could be expanded, 
for example by covering social media platforms or by meeting face-to-
face when a Kyrgyz middleman residing in China spends some time in 
Bishkek.
What these house rules reflect as well are the dialogical experiences 
which I shared with my interlocutors. These involved diverse 
negotiations in which the eventual flow of information depended 
on aspects such as credible access, relative age, the location of the 
encounter, and, finally, on power constellations. In comparison to 
my previous research among young Kyrgyz males in urban Bishkek, 
when mutual and straightforward proofs of solidarity dominated our 
relatedness (Schröder 2014), the translocal assemblages of my current 
research comprises diverse sites and types of actors, and turns out to be 
more multidimensional and complex. 
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Regardless of whether the setting was Russia, China, or Kyrgyzstan, 
within the circles of business and entrepreneurship that I attempted 
to associate with, access depended primarily on credible long-term 
relationships with mutual acquaintances who vouched for me, and on 
the professional credentials of possessing a doctorate and being known 
to do scientific work on ‘the Kyrgyz’. Being introduced as ‘our already 
half-Kyrgyz professor’ enabled entry into the field, which gained even 
further traction whenever outside of Kyrgyzstan it was remarked that 
‘he specifically came here [to Russia or China] to write about us’. 
From there, however, my affiliation with certain groups of 
interlocutors evolved differently. With Timur aka and other first-
generation Kyrgyz traders in Russia, who were ten to fifteen years my 
senior, I started off on a quite formal basis that was as much about the 
etiquette of proper hospitality within the Kyrgyz diaspora as about 
providing me with accurate, objective information on everyday business 
life. Only over time, and due to my repeated visits to Novosibirsk, 
did the likes of Timur aka begin perceiving our conversations as an 
opportunity for subjective self-presentation and intimate reflections 
on their own biographies. With the younger generation of Kyrgyz in 
Russia, our relative ages were reversed. As I was their senior by at least 
fifteen years, it was only upon my initiative that regular barriers of 
socializing and communication existing between members of different 
age-groups were lowered in order to encourage Aizhana and her peers 
to be vocal and expressive about their everyday life abroad. China, in 
that regard, proved to be an easy-going site. With interlocutors such 
as Azamat I shared the same position in an idealized Kyrgyz social 
lifecycle, that of a married family man in his thirties, which enabled us 
to interact on an equal level. Furthermore, because in Guangzhou there 
was no one ‘elder’ to Azamat and his peers, the degree of (re-)presenting 
‘Kyrgyzness’ to me did not compare to that of the larger diaspora 
community in Novosibirsk, but was confined to dinner invitations at 
home with some traditional Kyrgyz dishes. 
Despite the geographic distance and age differences between them, 
most of Timur aka’s peers in Novosibirsk and those of Azamat in 
Guangzhou shared membership of what they referred to as an ‘upper 
middle class’. The corresponding discourse of their social mobility 
from humble beginnings was expressed modestly, yet still it reflected a 
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strong confidence in their achievements. In my fieldwork practice this 
meant, for example, that I was not to define where, when, and for how 
long to meet, but that I should conform to their schedule, or that for 
a meaningful conversation to evolve, I needed first to demonstrate to 
know the basic methods and terminologies of doing business within 
post-Soviet capitalism. In these moments, I sensed I was not dealing with 
interlocutors who would be disempowered by my ability to objectify 
them in an ethnographic text, but more immediately I understood them 
to be firmly in the driver’s seat during the process of data-gathering.
By considering the origins and consequences of my fieldwork’s 
house rules, this chapter aims for more than a standard representation 
of my interlocutors’ ‘translocal livelihoods’ in between three countries. 
Blending personal constellations with historical, cultural and other 
aspects of these contrasting (fieldwork) locales, in my view, allows 
for some rewarding insights into the very process of producing 
knowledge. To document how these always only imperfect and 
‘satisficing’ results are achieved under such particular circumstances 
may enhance the validity of the written accounts that we offer of our 
ethnographic experiences. Such insights, of course, are not at all new 
to the anthropological discipline. They go back to early efforts at self-
reflection such as those of William F. Whyte (1943), who elaborated on 
his ways into and around the ‘Street Corner Society’ of a 1930s Boston 
neighborhood in an impressive eighty-page appendix to his seminal 
study. 
However, as the vignettes assembled here have shown, the 
ethnographic field has shifted significantly, not only with time and the 
dawn of new technological advancements, but also because nowadays 
often there is more than one fieldwork location in play. As Barak Kalir 
(2012) has argued recently, one of our tasks ahead will be to move beyond 
conceiving of migration primarily in terms of international border-
crossings and state regimes that facilitate or impede these movements. 
Instead, to overcome such ‘stagnant’ fixation on the paradigm of 
‘methodological nationalism’, we need to expand the ethnographic gaze 
and embed mobile trajectories within the wider context of their various 
translocal institutionalizations (Schröder and Stephan-Emmrich 2014). 
This chapter offered some illustrations of how this occurs within 
personal biographies, informal networks, and social hierarchies 
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(e.g., of gender and generation), within imaginations of the future, 
and, finally, with regards to how belonging is performed and how 
emotional wellbeing (or discomfort) is negotiated both on the ground 
and in cyberspace. The house rules of fieldwork that emerge from the 
various instances of translation and mediation that occur among the 
interlocutors themselves, as much as between these and the researcher 
(see Introduction) are part of such institutionalizations. My contribution 
here emphasizes the translocal aspects of epistemography, i.e., of what 
can be perceived as observation, evidence, or knowledge in cases when 
everyone involved in a research project (the researcher included) has 
been engaging in multiple re-locations and re-adaptations to different 
national and regional contexts.
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PART 4  
 
PIOUS ENDEAVOURS:  
NEAR AND FAR

9. iPhones, Emotions, Mediations: Tracing 
Translocality in the Pious Endeavours of 
Tajik Migrants in the United Arab Emirates
Manja Stephan-Emmrich
Digital practices
Mona, a thirty-year-old Tajik woman whom I met during my field trip 
to the United Arab Emirates in November and December 2013, lives 
with her family in a comfortable apartment complex in the emirate 
of Sharjah. Ma’ruf, her husband, is a graduate of Sana’a University in 
Yemen, where he studied Koran exegesis (tafsir) and Islamic law (fiq) 
from 1999 until 2006. In 2001, he married Mona and encouraged her to 
join him in his religious studies. Five years later and after the birth of 
their first son, they returned to Tajikistan and Ma’ruf started a journalism 
course at the National University in Tajikistan’s capital city Dushanbe. 
After an unexpected three-week spell of medical treatment in an Iranian 
hospital, the university board suspected him of joining radical Islamic 
networks abroad and deregistered him from the National University. 
After 2009 the Tajik government’s control over the religious activity of 
Tajikistan’s Muslims further increased, and the Soviet legacy of fearing 
Islam as ‘dangerous’ to the secular state resulted in a wide range of 
media campaigns and amendments of the law on religion. As a result, 
the family decided to emigrate to the United Arab Emirates. With the 
help of two former Tajik classmates from Sana’a University, who after 
graduation moved to Dubai to work and live, Ma’ruf established a 
© Manja Stephan-Emmrich, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0114.09
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business trading spare car parts in Dubai. Later, he became a successful 
entrepreneur selling fur coats to Russian tourists (see Mirzoev and 
Stephan-Emmrich, Chapter Three). Consequently, he brought his 
family to the Emirates in order to continue his business and live a pious 
life according to Islamic principles in a ‘Muslim-friendly’ environment, 
far away from a secular state regime that classifies Muslim practices 
as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. During the two weeks that I stayed with Mona and 
Ma’ruf in their Sharjah apartment, we had many conversations about 
the family’s mobile life, which in 2013 was centred upon Dubai and 
Sharjah as their main places of residence and work. 
Strikingly, while I shared time with the couple and their (non-)
Tajik neighbors and friends, as well as Ma’ruf’s Tajik coworkers, our 
conversations were often facilitated by the use of smartphones (mostly 
the latest iPhones that the students buy in Dubai). Mona and Ma’ruf’s 
smartphones served as an entry point into stories about their lives and 
so introduced me to the mobile lifeworlds and multiple situatedness 
of the couple and their Dubai friends. Furthermore, their smartphones 
triggered memories and created an atmosphere of shared experience or, 
as I will argue in this chapter, created a sense of immediacy of spatial 
experience that was linked to places my interlocutors had inhabited 
in the past. Thus, in the digital representation of their mobile lives, 
these far-off places turned into virtual landmarks that formed my 
interlocutors’ emotional geographies and acted as reference points to 
help them to narrate their religious biographies. 
When meeting Ma’ruf in his shop in Dubai’s Deira district, or having a 
business lunch with him and his coworkers in one of the city’s numerous 
Afghan, Iranian, or Central Asian restaurants, or when chatting with 
Mona and her close friend Gulnora in the couple’s apartment kitchen, 
I was introduced to their Facebook or classmate (odnoklassnik) contacts 
and their favorite mobile prayer or Koran apps. Furthermore, they 
showed me the online forums and the blogs of former Koran or Arabic 
teachers in Yemen that they use when discussing religious issues or 
searching for advice. Moreover, I learned about the latest smartphone 
cases with Islamic symbols and ringtones imitating the a’zan.1 I listened 
to the women’s favorite Koran recitations and Islamic songs (nasjid), 
1  The call for the daily prayer (Arabic salat, or Tajik namoz).
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and the women shared their digital cake recipes with me, recipes which 
had been shared by their friends in Sana’a, Dubai, or elsewhere abroad. 
By drawing on such digital practices from my multi-sited fieldwork 
in Tajikistan and the United Arab Emirates between 2010 and 2014,2 
in this chapter I trace the entangled study and work trajectories of 
my mobile interlocutors. Furthermore, I am interested in how these 
trajectories intersect with my interlocutors’ religious biographies, 
which evolved over the course of their mobile lives, and which result 
from their multiple situatedness in different geographic places. While 
studying in Sana’a’s Al-Imam or Cairo’s Al-Azhar University, or 
in one of the Islamic universities in the Hejaz, or while working as 
shopkeeper, street broker, or tourist guide in Dubai Deira, many Tajiks 
are exposed to a globally circulating Muslim reformism (isloh) while 
abroad. Consequently, like Mona and Ma’ruf, they become engaged 
in religious self-making projects that involve moral self-perfection and 
spiritual progress. As they gain religious knowledge and shape their 
work ethic and daily practices according to the teachings of Islam, many 
former mobile Tajik students combine spiritual self-improvement with 
economic strategies, educational goals, and social aspirations (Stephan-
Emmrich and Mirzoev 2016). 
The role of new media technology in the migration process is now 
well-documented. Email, Skype, and social media facilitate virtual 
travel, i.e., a ‘virtual mobility’ (Hannam et al. 2006:4), and thus connect 
distant people and places and create a proximity that helps to maintain 
transnational family ties and navigate the often ambivalent experiences 
of multiple belongings (Madianou and Miller 2012). However, shifting 
from the movement of people to their social lives and the use of mobile 
devices such as smartphones, I show how digital representations of 
mobile lives enable an exploration of the intersections between mobility, 
religion, and emotion, or what I call translocal piety. Translocality, as I 
will argue, can be best understood as capturing processes and practices 
of material mediation, i.e., of mediating immediacy. I borrow this term 
2  Multi-sited fieldwork for this project was done between 2010 and 2014 in Tajikistan’s 
capital city Dushanbe and in several regional centres in the Central and Southern 
parts of Tajikistan (Hisor, Kolkhozobod, Kofarnihon), as well as in the United Arab 
Emirates, mainly in Dubai and Sharjah. The ethnographic case studies presented 
in this chapter were chosen from about forty (former) students of Islamic subjects I 
met in either Tajikistan or the Emirates, or with whom I stayed in both places.
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from media and religious studies in order to illuminate the ways my 
interlocutors articulate affiliation, or at least a longed-for affiliation, 
with particular places. They therefore make these places, as well as 
the past religious experiences linked to them, ‘real’ or ‘immediate’, 
for themselves, their social environment, and for the ethnographer 
(O’Sullivan et al. 2004, Lundby 2013a/b, Meyer 2013). 
In the second part of this chapter, I take the locales of Mona and 
Ma’ruf’s mobile livelihoods as geographic reference points and 
highlight how they produce, perform, and strive for piety through 
narrative references to these locales. Thus, as I will show, they use new 
communication technologies to underpin their emotional connection to 
these places. Arguably, these digital mediations produce a piety that is 
translocal because it integrates the locales and the movements between 
them that form part of Ma’ruf and Mona’s mobile biographies and their 
religious experiences. Moreover, in their pious endeavours, Ma’ruf and 
Mona relate these locales to each other in order to create or sustain 
coherence and continuity in their ruptured and fragmented lives (see 
Giddens 1991:53–54).
As I will argue further, through nostalgic narrations about religious 
experiences linked to previous places of study, work, and pilgrimage, 
Mona, Ma’ruf, and the other student travellers I met ‘produce’ (trans-)
locality and thus generate a space to articulate religious ideals, 
belonging, and an elusive ‘homing desire’ that is tied to ideal Muslim 
places somewhere else (see also the virtual ‘homing desire’ of Kyrgyz 
traders in Novosibirsk explored by Philipp Schröder in Chapter Eight). 
This turns their pious endeavours into a highly emotional enterprise. 
Moreover, later in the chapter I clarify that physical movement between 
different geographic, social, cultural and other contexts facilitates a 
mobility within religion that creates new forms of belonging, and that 
expands beyond local or national templates and thus produces hybrid 
and flexible Muslim identities. At the same time, Mona and Ma’ruf’s 
translocal lives promote a heightened mobility through religion, i.e., 
they are mobilized by their desire to live, work, and study in Muslim-
friendly and ‘pure’ Islamic environments that are in accordance with 
their religious ideals.3 The chapter concludes with some epistemological 
3  While some of the students decided to leave their home country in search of 
a Muslim environment that facilitates the pursuit of their religious ideals, i.e., 
performing hijra (the Prophet Muhammad’s exodus from Mecca to Medina in 622 
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thoughts on how to study the making of religious selves in translocal 
settings.
Fig. 9.1  Mobile life trajectories of former Tajik students from Islamic 
universities in the Middle East. Map © Karin Teuber and Manja Stephan-
Emmrich (2013), CC BY 4.0
Entangled pathways to Dubai 
In the short period of post-Soviet religious liberalization between 1991 
and 2006, many young Tajiks like Mona and Ma’ruf travelled abroad 
to study Islam in foreign Muslim countries such as Egypt, Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey.4 
Their religiously motivated travel both enables and is enabled by a 
variety of cross-border mobilities that have reconnected Central Asian 
AD) others turned their religious labour, i.e., their piety, into a religious activism 
that entails missionary activities or religious teaching.
4  The majority of students I met graduated from, or at least studied in undergraduate 
programs in Cairo’s Al-Azhar University. Only a minority of all student migrants 
managed to earn a degree. Most of them dropped out or interrupted their studies 
due to financial problems or lack of motivation. In addition, those student travellers 
in Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia who took up their studies in the early 2000s 
had to cancel their education abroad and return home without an official degree 
after President Rahmon launched his campaign on Tajik TV in 2010 in order to 
prevent any form of ‘radicalization’ of Tajikistan’s Muslim youth abroad. Besides 
Arabic, most Tajik students abroad have studied classic subjects of Islamic 
education, namely Koran reading (hifz or tajvid) and Koranic interpretation (tafsir), 
Islamic law (fiq), philosophy (falsafa) and other subjects.
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Muslims with their fellow believers in South Asia, the Arab Middle 
East, and Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the course 
of the Tajik Civil War (1992–1997), over 75,000 to 100,000 Tajiks fled to 
neighboring Afghanistan. There, they reunited with distant relatives 
who migrated to the region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (Abdulaev 2009, see also Kamoludin Abdulaev, Chapter 
One). From their Afghanistan base, like Ma’ruf’s distant relative, many 
became attracted by the international academic environment of South 
Asian Islamic universities such as the International Islamic University 
of Islamabad. There, they met fellow countrymen and women who 
participated in state-regulated exchange programmes with universities 
in Pakistan and India (Reetz 2014). The religiously-motivated journeys 
of students to Middle Eastern countries were also triggered by Muslim 
encounters that occurred in the course of labour migration to Russia. 
While working seasonally there, many young Tajiks found their way to 
Cairo’s Al-Azhar University through cross-border Tajik or Tatar Muslim 
networks established in urban hubs such as Moscow (see Roche 2014). 
Others, however, undertook Islamic study at a university in Medina or 
Riyad after performing the hajj to Mecca. 
The new ‘objectification of Muslim consciousness’ (Eickelman 
and Piscatori 2004:37ff) in the post-Soviet era has led to a heightened 
identification with the Muslim community (umma) and thus helped to 
overcome the perceived Soviet isolation of Tajikistan’s Muslims from 
the rest of the Muslim world. The new cross-border mobility refreshed 
historical socio-spatial relations and facilitated new forms of Muslim 
belonging that cut across the boundaries of local, regional, and national 
identities forged by the former Soviet elite and later maintained 
by the post-Soviet government (Heathershaw and Herzig 2012). 
Consequently, for many, Islamic study abroad served as a welcome 
escape from a state secularism that increasingly regulates, limits, and 
criminalizes any Muslim religious expression not in accordance with 
the official interpretation of Islam promoted by the government. As 
I have argued elsewhere, Tajikistan’s youth has been influenced by 
aspirations associated with the internationalization of higher education. 
While both young men and women sought alternative routes to gain the 
skills needed for international education (i.e., foreign language skills) 
(Stephan-Emmrich 2017), Tajik male youth simultaneously accepted 
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international labour migration (to Russia or the Arab Emirates) as 
a regular stage during the transition to maturity. However, these 
work- and study-related Muslim mobilities not only opened up new 
possibilities to pursue individual careers; they also produced a wide 
range of constraints and limitations. These include the existence of a 
rigid secular state regime that hampers the professional or educational 
evolution of Tajik citizens and stigmatizes them due to their religion as 
carriers of a ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’ Islam and thus dangerous to national 
culture.5 
While they began as individual religious enterprises that revitalized 
the Muslim tradition of travelling to ‘seek Islamic knowledge unto 
China’,6 for many Tajiks their study-abroad trips therefore became 
wide-ranging mobile livelihood projects that link religious pursuits 
with educational aims, economic needs, and social aspirations. Moving 
between different studying, living, and working places and thereby 
manoeuvring within the complex interplay of local, national, and 
international regulation regimes thus became ‘a way of life’ that shapes 
the mobile biographies of Tajik student travellers such as Mona and 
Ma’ruf. Dubai thereby became an ‘ideal place’ to realize and combine 
their study, work, and religious intentions. 
When Dubai’s oil, property and tourism boom reached Tajikistan in 
the very late 1990s, a transnational trading sector evolved and integrated 
Tajikistan’s local markets into the global circulation of lifestyle goods. 
These consumer goods promote Dubai’s hyper-image of Gulfian 
5  In 2001, as a response to the rise of the Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan, 
President Rahmon ordered hundreds of Tajiks to return from their studies at 
Islamic institutions in Pakistan. The government’s fear of Islamic fundamentalism 
in and outside the country, and of radicalization among its Muslim population, 
increased further around 2005, when Salafi ideologies became more powerful in 
Tajikistan’s religious environment. As a result, travel regulations became stricter 
and increasingly aggressive rhetoric against the practice of religious instruction 
abroad was launched in the public sphere. Popular places of study such as Zahedon 
in South-Eastern Iran, Pakistan, and Arab countries, where religious instructions is 
offered to large degree in unregistered institutions outside state-run universities, 
were placed on so-called ‘blacklists’ that were spread through state TV and print 
media,  and declared ‘not law-compliant’ (ghayriqonunī). Educational travel to these 
places without state permission was officially banned.
6  The term refers to a well-known hadith, in which the Prophet Muhammad appeals 
to Muslims ‘to seek knowledge even unto China’ (‘Utlub il ‘ilma wa law fis-sin’).
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Muslim modernity and thus stimulate local Muslim aspirations and 
desires for social mobility (Stephan-Emmrich and Mirzoev 2016). For 
many Tajiks such as Ma’ruf and his Dubai coworkers, Dubai has become 
a lucrative economic hub that transforms their language skills (Arabic, 
Russian, English, Persian) and their study experiences in a Muslim 
country into economic capital. Hence, many started to work seasonally 
in smartphone and souvenir shops or as street brokers hunting for 
lucrative commissions in order to pay for their tuition. Others cancelled 
or interrupted their studies and became involved in the transnational 
trade of modern communication technologies, luxury cars, and 
automotive spare parts. Still others started a career as middlemen in 
Dubai’s booming tourist sector (see Abdullah Mirzoev and Manja 
Stephan-Emmrich, Chapter Two). In that way, Dubai became an 
important spatial node connecting educational networks with business 
worlds, and Tajiks with Muslim people and places in Central Asia, 
Russia, Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Middle East. Working 
and residing in the United Arab Emirates enabled the pursuit of a career 
as religious entrepreneur (Stephan-Emmrich and Mirzoev 2016:167ff), 
or like Mona and Ma’ruf, the undertaking of the hajj to Mecca.
Fig. 9.2  Al Nasr Square in Dubai Deira: tourist destination, migrants’ living area 
and Tajiks’ workplace. Photo © Manja Stephan-Emmrich (2013), CC BY 4.0
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Tracing translocality…
In his provocative reflections on ‘multi-sited ethnography’, Ghassan 
Hage concludes that for the study of social realities shaped by 
globalization, migration, and mobility the anthropologist needs an 
‘analytical double gaze’. This gaze should be capable of descriptively 
capturing lived cultures and analytically capturing the global-local 
relations that structure them, and at the same time apprehending 
both mobile people’s experiences and the micro-social environments 
and macro-global structures in which these experiences are grounded 
(Hage 2005:474). In order to track the multiple entanglements of the 
local and global in this multi-sited human experience, Hage draws on 
earlier demands for an epistemological shift as voiced by proponents of 
an anthropology of globalization. In line with this, he also advocates a 
fundamental rethinking of the spatiality of culture and identity and thus 
argues for a redefinition of the anthropological field as a ‘global site’ 
(Marcus 1995, Gupta and Ferguson 1992, Appadurai 1996, Burrawoy 
2000). 
However, the term ‘multi-sited ethnography’ reminds us that even 
in times of advanced global connectedness and in the ‘post-national’ 
and ‘de-territorialized’ state of modernity (Appadurai 1996), the 
ethnographer still deals with lifeworlds, social experiences, and identity 
politics that are grounded in very particular localities. Places thus 
continue to be important as sources of meaning and identity for mobile 
actors. Translocality, therefore, is both an ethnographic angle and an 
object of study that responds to the multiple situatedness of mobile 
actors. The researcher must make sense of ethnographic facts by relating 
them to the lifeworlds of her interlocutors through an array of multi-
sited social, discursive, and semiotic relations (Schröder and Stephan-
Emmrich 2014:3). This chapter follows Appadurai’s (1996:186) now-
classic observation that all ‘locality-producing activities’ are ‘context 
generative’. That is, they are shaped by the social, cultural, and other 
politics of a community. At the same time, they are ‘context driven’; that 
is, any such community responds or adapts to wider ‘material contexts’ 
(Peleikis 2010) shaped by the nation state, international politics, and 
global phenomena. Emphasizing the multiple connections rather than 
multiple sites that shape the Tajik students’ mobile livelihoods, I argue 
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for a ‘translocal’ rather than ‘multi-sited’ research perspective, because 
it is the conjunctions, interconnections, juxtapositions, and associations 
among sites and places that matter most, and which in fact define the 
argument of a ‘translocal ethnography’ (Marcus 1995:105, Hannerz 
2013). While the term ‘multi-sitedness’ originated in a methodological 
discussion, ‘translocality’ can serve as the analytical ‘double gaze’ 
sought by Hage in order to trace the dialectic process of movement and 
placemaking, but also to illuminate the significant conjunction of place, 
space, mobility, and the social (or, as in the present case, the religious). 
Even more, translocality as an analytical gaze detects the multiple 
ways in which micro-social or local environments and global dynamics 
permeate mobile lifeworlds.
…through things
Taking these methodological reflections as an ethnographic angle that 
helps to transform abstract objects of study into observable practices 
(Ferguson 2011:200), the next pages will focus on specific mobile things, 
or things ‘on the move’, and how, through their usage, these things 
support the production and performance of translocal piety. Tracing 
how my interlocutors use smartphones (mostly the latest model of 
iPhones) as a prestigious lifestyle commodity to narrate their life stories 
and travel experiences, I take seriously what Marcus identified as the 
core mode for constructing translocal ethnography; namely ‘following 
people, things and biographies’ to track the chains, paths, conjunctions, 
or juxtapositions of locations that shape mobile people’s lifeworlds 
(Marcus 1995:105). 
‘Following things’ also means focusing on a strategically situated 
(single-site) research object, which unfolds into an emerging multi-
sited, or even digital, world (Robben 2013:368), thereby materializing 
the junction of place, life history, human experience, and subjectivity. 
Furthermore, tracing aspects of my interlocutors’ material culture, and 
more precisely the way they integrate new communication technology 
in discursive practices that produce and connect localities, may help us 
to discern the emotional dimension of their translocal lives (Hannerz 
2013). Even more, this chapter illustrates how smartphones support 
biographical narrations and trigger certain memories and nostalgic 
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moments related to particular Muslim places that my interlocutors 
know either from their studies, as a place to travel for work, or, in the 
case of Mecca, as a pilgrimage site. These places provide significant 
landmarks in their long-term attempts to remake their Muslim selves. 
Migration studies have sufficiently described human mobility as an 
intense emotional and transformative experience. The complex range 
of feelings that emerge as a consequence of both dwelling within and 
movement through places produces ‘emotional geographies’ that 
play a major role in the ongoing constitution of mobile subjectivities 
(Conradson and McKay 2007:168), and that provide new forms of 
religious experience and identity (Silvey 2007). Within these emotional 
geographies, the material objects that travel with migrants are 
significant, because they operate both as ‘patients’, i.e., social agency 
can be exercised in relation to things, and as ‘agents’, i.e., social agency 
can be exercised by things (Svašek 2012:14). For example, mobile 
material objects may increase feelings of wellbeing and belonging, but 
they also may evoke feelings of homesickness, triggering memories and 
a strong sense of home that is then generated in new places (Cierraad 
1999). Beyond that, the transportation of objects may contribute to a 
sense of continuity and ‘carry along’ memories and feelings from past 
times and places because they are ‘conditioned by emotional discourses 
and practices already learned’ (Svašek 2012:13, 17). Thus, following the 
‘social life’ (Appadurai 1986) and the ‘mobile career’ (Zolberg 1990) of 
smartphones helps us to explore the connection between emotional 
dynamics, personal memories, and religious experiences that strongly 
shape the multi-sited lifeworlds and modes of mobility among Tajik 
student travellers (Svašek 2012:13).
Mediating immediacy 
The specific articulation of emotional geographies through digital 
practices guides us to what media theories have framed as ‘mediated 
immediacy’. The term refers to communicative behaviors or cues 
supported by mediated channels that reduce physical or psychological 
distance between individuals (and places), convey affiliation, and 
develop perceptions of closeness (O’Sullivan et al. 2004:471, Mehrabain 
1971). Accordingly, through mobile devices such as smartphones, 
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student travellers may translate their intimate experiences of belonging 
to a social environment and thus articulate new forms of connectivity, 
proximity, and affiliation. 
The mediating role of smartphones invites a further conceptual note 
that addresses the link between religion and media. The availability of 
new media technology at a given historical moment, as Meyer (2013:10) 
states, can be taken as a gateway to explore religious changes such as 
new forms of belonging or the remaking of religious experiences that 
result from mobile livelihoods. Even more significantly, media that 
is intrinsic to religion plays a role in practices of religious mediation 
that link human beings with each other and with the divine (Meyer 
2011:23, 27). From such a religious-studies perspective, smartphones 
and other digital devices are instances of the everyday, and their 
usage, valorization, and appeal are not ‘something added to religion 
but inextricable from it’ (Meyer and Houtman 2012:6–7). Studying the 
use of digital media devices and how they trigger nostalgic narrations 
therefore helps to materialize the students’ interior spiritual experiences, 
moral assessments, and the emotional states that strongly inform their 
translocal piety. Moreover, by narrating with or through smartphones, 
my interlocutors enabled my study of their religious practices and how 
religion permeates the everyday of their mobile lifeworlds.
Smartphones and the remaking  
of religious experience
A growing body of literature explores piety and consumption 
through the religious appropriation of new media technologies, 
examining how media engagement, and processes of commodification 
and commercialization, inform the making of pious subjects, the 
reproduction of religious experiences, and the formation of religious 
communities (Piacenza 2009, Meyer and Moors 2006, Armbrust 2006, 
Schulz 2006). 
Schulz, in her study on broadcast media and Islam in Mali (2006:211, 
218) for example illustrates how new religious leaders gain prominence 
and claim authority through their success as a new type of religious 
entrepreneur. Through various media performances, they ‘publicize’ 
Islam, facilitate the adoption of various Muslim identities, and promote 
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religious identity through consumption practices. In her work on 
‘online Buddhism’, Piacenza (2009) shows how digital religion in the 
form of meditation apps facilitates a shift from an institutionalized and 
organized religious tradition to individualized, self-tailored, and hybrid 
religious practices embedded in everyday routines that may induce 
psychological wellbeing. Moreover, mobile or digital religion allows 
for greater flexibility in constructing religious identity than traditional 
forms of religiosity and emphasizes a personal authority to align oneself 
with self-defined ideals and aims (ibid.:11–12). 
Tajik student travellers consume the media performance of a great 
variety of locally and globally active Muslim leaders. These global 
leaders, either known personally or from Muslim blogs and online 
forums, serve Tajik student travellers as an important point of reference 
in their biographical accounts. As the following case study illustrates, 
photographs or images stored in smartphones become ‘chronotopes’ 
that structure time and space, and that map the students’ emotional 
geographies on a semantic landscape. Thus, digital photographs link 
my interlocutors’ religious evolution with places they imagine as future 
destinations, or that they inhabited during their study or work time 
abroad. 
During the two weeks that I stayed with Mona, Ma’ruf, and their 
three sons in their Sharjah apartment, we had many conversations about 
the family’s mobile life: their study in Yemen, their family life and work 
in the United Arab Emirates, the Tajik home they had left behind in 2006, 
and their hajj to Mecca in 2012. Personal photographs played a key role 
in these discussions. Mona showed me extensive collections of images on 
her iPhone from close kin that stayed behind in Tajikistan, family photos 
from Mecca, and selfies showing the couple as students in Sana’a dressed 
up in typical Arab clothing: for men the traditional garment (thawb), 
long beard, and headgear, and for women the black garment (abaya) and 
face veil (niqob). The smartphone thereby operates both as ‘agent’ and 
‘patient’: when storing personal photographs, the smartphone enables 
the transformation of memories, experiences, and imaginations into a 
resource Mona can fall back on to ‘make sense’ of their travel trajectories. 
Thus, Mona assembles the fragments of her religious experiences at home 
and abroad into a coherent story of religious awakening and refashions 
herself and her husband as pious Muslims. 
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Once, while sitting together with a Tajik neighbor and close 
friend Gulnora, Mona showed me a self-made digital compilation of 
photographs of her favorite Islamic preachers (olimhoi muqaddastarin). 
Merging the great variety of Islamic doctrines that shape Mona’s 
educational biography and spiritual progress, some of the personalities 
assembled on her iPhone also connect the core locations of the couple’s 
mobile pathways.
Among others, the photo compilation showed Hoji Akbar 
Turajonzoda, one of the most influential Muslim leaders in Tajikistan 
today. Turajonzoda is from Mona’s natal village in the Kofarnihon 
region, and his image triggers childhood memories connected with her 
strict religious upbringing in a respected, religiously educated family 
(makhsum) (see Malikov in Chapter Three) that cultivated close contacts 
with Turajonzoda, his family, and other currently influential Islamic 
figures in Tajikistan. Storing his photo in her mobile phone expresses 
Mona’s religious attachment to the local Islamic tradition of a religious 
nobility and maintains her emotional connectedness to her natal family 
and village community. At the same time, when viewing Turajonzoda’s 
image, Mona produces a sense of the immediacy of her lived experiences 
and the childhood memories attached to her birth place. But this is above 
all a place she had to leave due to a political environment that obviously 
disadvantages Muslims whose religious biographies do not match the 
official interpretation of a ‘homegrown’ Tajik Islam. At the same time, 
Mona is from a region suspected to be the base for political opposition 
during and after the civil war. This fact hampers the couple’s ability 
to pursue an educational or professional career in Tajikistan’s public 
sector. Obviously, and as the following short conversation between 
Mona, her friend Gulnora, and me shows, translocality can be a highly 
ambivalent experience, requiring substantial emotional work to balance 
both the joys and constraints of multiple belonging. 
Mona: ‘Sometimes, I miss my mother and my sisters so much that I start 
crying. We only see each other once a year, if at all. We travel to Tajikistan 
to visit ‘our folk’ (avdlodamon) (only) during Ramadan. […] I gave birth 
to two of my sons in Tajikistan. I convinced (Ma’ruf) to travel home to 
give birth there. That’s where my mother is, my sisters are, that’s the 
place where I was born’. 
 3059. iPhones, Emotions, Mediations
Thereafter, Gulnora explains jokingly: ‘That’s why she wants so 
many children. That’s a good reason to travel home and stay with her 
folks for a long period of time’. (Both women laugh.)7
Another photo in Mona’s iPhone shows the so-called ‘global mufti’ 
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Arab Islamic scholar and TV preacher (see 
Skovgaard and Gräf 2009), and the Saudi Arabian preacher Muhammad 
al-Arifi. Both are popular authorities among Tajiks working and living 
in the Arab Emirates. Al-Arifi’s visits to Dubai’s city centre mosques, or 
Al-Qaradawi’s sermons broadcast on TV and internet channels such as 
YouTube, awaken feelings of belonging in the followers of rising Muslim 
media stars who claim ‘global authority’ and facilitate the adoption of 
supranational and cosmopolitan orientations. The latter find expression 
in Mona’s enthusiastic descriptions of a sermon that Al-Arifi delivered 
in Dubai in 2012. The sermon was extensively discussed by Mona, 
Gulnora, and other Muslim women from Tajikistan, Afghanistan, 
Lebanon, Egypt, and Pakistan who regularly attend a Koranic reading 
group in the neighborhood mosque close to Mona’s apartment block 
in Sharjah. Such religious events confirm the women’s belonging to 
and ‘feeling at home’ in the culturally mixed urban environment amid 
the conviviality of Muslim friends, neighbors, and students who share 
similar mobile biographies, and who, by sharing memories, enhance 
their religious experiences abroad.
The photo of Abd al-Madjid al-Zindani, founder of the Yemeni 
Muslim Brotherhood and al-Imam University in Sana’a, reminds Mona 
of her years of studying in Yemen. After getting married in 2000, she 
joined her husband and studied Arabic, Koranic recitation (tajvid), and 
Islamic principles (aqidai Islom) at an Islamic learning centre in Sana’a. 
Having been taught by Al-Zindani himself, Mona cultivates a piety that 
centres around the daily reading and reciting of the Koran as a practice 
of self-discipline, self-perfection that helps her to become a pure Muslim 
(musulmoni pok). Placing Mona’s religious experience within the context 
7  In Tajikistan, many of the student travelers who return from their Islamic studies in 
Arab countries are suspected of having joined foreign radical Islamic movements 
and are therefore placed under state surveillance. Under these political constraints 
and in order to build trust I did not record my conversations. As a result, the 
conversations or statements are given as paraphrases but not as direct speech.
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of a purist, script-based, and formal religious instruction, the photo 
also ‘carries along’ positive memories of, and nostalgic feelings for, her 
past studies. These include her assessment of her personal freedom, her 
view of her encounters with other Muslims as an exciting adventure, 
and the hard intellectual labour and focused learning that made her a 
new, more conscious, and pious Muslim woman (mu’min). Moreover, 
through her nostalgic memories, Mona imagines her study place as an 
ideal Muslim place. Thus these memories support her articulation of 
religious ideals and longing for a joyful past and her nostalgia provides 
the parameters with which to evaluate her current imperfect pious life 
in Sharjah. She thereby articulates the ‘idea’ of an ideal Muslim place 
somewhere else that facilitates the best conditions for learning and for 
becoming a devoted believer (mu’min, musulmoni haqiqiy):
‘Our life in Sana’a was perfect, full of happiness. I had the whole day to 
devote to my studies. Nothing and nobody distracted me. At the time 
when we left for home (to Tajikistan), I had mastered both reading and 
writing Arabic and reciting the whole Koran. But here (in Sharjah), being 
occupied with child-care and housework, I have difficulties reciting 
the Koran consistently. I cannot gather myself and I don’t improve my 
reading. I am weak (zayf)’.
Another ideal Muslim place can be found in the nostalgic reminiscences 
evoked by the image of the current Imam of the Al-Haram mosque in 
Mecca, Abdel Rahman al-Sudais. The image, taken from a webpage, 
reminds Mona of her and her husband’s pilgrimage to Mecca in 2012. 
Describing the hajj as the peak of her pious endeavours, Mona completes 
her religious biography with an intense spiritual experience, and a 
religious awakening that symbolizes the ‘immaterial’ success of her 
study enterprise. The pilgrimage, however, led to a moral reassessment 
of the couple’s former pious pursuits, which were focused on Dubai as 
a Muslim-friendly place and stimulated Mona’s longing to relocate to 
Mecca, for her the purest and most sacred site in the Muslim world:
‘When we left our home (in Tajikistan), I imagined Dubai as a paradise 
(bihisht). Many mosques within walking distance, no alcohol, women’s 
space in public transport, no Islamic dress regulations (as governing 
the expression of Muslim piety in the public space in her home country 
Tajikistan). […] But the hajj opened my eyes. Back at Dubai airport 
I realized, Dubai is not a paradise; it is a hell (duzakh). The many 
unbelievers (kofirho), the many drunken and uncovered Russian tourists, 
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the streets full of prostitutes. Also, our neighborhood changed. When we 
settled here, we were only Muslims, from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, 
Syria, Tajikistan. But now, more and more kofir are occupying our area. I 
don’t feel comfortable here any longer. That’s why we are going to leave 
in the near future. My husband already started looking for work in Saudi 
Arabia (Arabiston). We wish to live in Mecca. For us, it is the best place 
(joyi muqaddastarin), the purest place (joyi poktarin) in the world’. 
Figs. 9.3 and 9.4  The United Arab Emirates 
as the ‘ideal Muslim place’: a neighbourhood 
mosque in the emirate Sharjah, a signpost 
near a women’s mosque in Dubai. Photos © 
Manja Stephan-Emmrich (2013), CC BY 4.0
Religious reform, emotion,  
and a ‘mobility within religion’
The nostalgic stories elicited by the images of Islamic personalities 
exemplify the important role that digital media play in the Tajik students’ 
mobile everyday lives, and also in the formation of their religious selves. 
Narrating life stories through prestigious lifestyle commodities such as 
the latest iPhone is also a common discursive practice in Mona’s social 
environment in Dubai, through which her multiple belongings and her 
virtual, spatial, and imagined movements between different locales and 
times are substantiated.
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New forms of media introduce novel ways in which the ‘religious’ 
is circulated, or mediated (Lundby 2013b:190–91). It follows, then, that 
the contemporary mediation of religion needs to be seen in terms of 
its ‘aesthetic capacities’ or ‘sensational forms’ that materialize the 
divine (see Lundby: ibid., Orsi 2012:147, see Meyer 2013:7). Tracing the 
aesthetic and sensational capacity of Mona’s digital photo compilation 
to trigger biographical narratives thus helps to explore how the religious 
reform projects that Mona, her husband, and other former students of 
Islam pursue intersect with emotional engagement. Muslim reformism 
is above all a reflexive self-making project based on education (Frisk 
2009, Mahmood 2011, Janson 2014). ‘Knowing Islam’ thus results from 
the intensive study of religious texts combined with learning Arabic, 
frequently reciting the Koran, and strictly following Islamic principles. 
According to Mona, Ma’ruf, and their Muslim friends in Dubai and 
Sharjah, individual religious improvement leads to increasing ‘inner 
belief’ (iymon) and facilitates the experience of a deep feeling of 
closeness to God (ba khudo nazdik, taqvo). Mona’s efforts to increase and 
perfect such religious experiences, as well as her critical self-evaluation 
of the religious work done in daily life, turn her pious endeavours into 
a highly emotional enterprise. This accords with Meyer (2013:9) who 
states that global religious reform movements are strongly related to 
the body and mobilize it as a sensorial and material ground of religious 
experience and sensation. Moreover, it shows that emotions can be part 
of a strategy for involvement in Islamic revitalization. Thus, the self-
conscious cultivation of feeling is part of a long-term religious program 
(see Gade 2008:44, 47). 
At the same time, Mona’s emotional attachment to certain Muslim 
locales produces a hybrid religious belonging and positioning within 
different and often contradictory discursive fields of Islamic tradition. 
Moving in, through, and between these discursive fields, i.e., being 
‘mobile within religion’, the former student navigates her pious ideals 
through the various mobility regimes that affect her and her family’s 
mobile livelihood. In this way, Mona and her husband are taking an 
active part in the ‘constant struggles to understand, query, embody, 
celebrate, and transform categories of […] difference, belonging, or 
otherness’ pushed by the government and the hegemony of these very 
regimes (Salazar and Glick Schiller 2013:189, Ong 1999:16). 
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Translocality thus becomes a process of mediating, translating, and 
transforming religious experience and imagination. Following Lundby 
(2013b:193) and Latour (2005:39), Tajik student travellers such as Mona 
and Ma’ruf appear as ‘mediators’ who carry the meaning of the cultural 
and social activities in which they are involved during their travel. More 
than that, in the dialectic process of movement and placemaking, the 
students transform, translate, modify, and distort these very meanings 
and thereby contribute to or initiate religious change. Returning then 
to the entangled relationship between digital technology and religion, 
Lundby (2013b:192) rightly points to the transformative effect of digital 
media. With its multimodality, interactivity, and flexibility, digital 
media shapes the religious subject, creates new spaces to mediate 
religious experience and imagination, and thus serves the expression of 
religiosity (see also Campbell 2012 and Hover 2012), or more specifically, 
translocal piety.
However, by using not just any smartphone but specifically the 
latest iPhones,8 Mona, Ma’ruf, and the other student travellers I met 
in Tajikistan and the United Arab Emirates narrated their religious 
biographies through a ‘sign-commodity’, i.e., a prestigious object 
that gained its economic value in the course of the ‘Dubai boom’. 
Smartphones (and in particular iPhones) have therefore become 
associated by compatriots at home with the economic success, the 
modern lifestyles, and the spiritual progress of the many Tajiks who 
like Ma’ruf have become involved successfully in Dubai’s various 
business sectors (Stephan-Emmrich and Mirzoev 2016). As Meyer et 
al. (2010:209) state, the meaning of a material object draws from ‘its 
circulation, its local adaptation, from what people do with it, and 
from the affective and conceptual schemes whereby users apprehend 
an object’. Combining the study of mobile actors and their existential 
experiences in migration with that of mobile things, and examining 
how such mobile things as smartphones are used to refashion Muslim 
selves, may therefore also help us to understand the social contexts in 
which these politics of representation take place. These contexts also 
frame how my interlocutors link their spiritual achievements with 
8  Most of the iPhones in use, however, were inexpensive fakes ‘made in China’ and 
are sold either in Dubai’s streets or by traders in Tajikistan’s bazaars and city malls.
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aspirations for social mobility and economic success in sensational 
ways, and how they thereby also materialize their sense of wellbeing. 
Some epistemological notes  
on ‘translocal ethnography’ 
Having explored the translocal piety of Tajik student travellers from 
the angle of digital practices, I will turn now to ongoing epistemic 
reflections on the production of anthropological facts about mobile 
people’s religious experiences in globalized lifeworlds. To sum up 
the ongoing methodological debates caused by the notion of ‘multi-
sited ethnography’, one core issues stands out: if we acknowledge the 
difficulties of mobile ethnography as guided by classic, Malinowskian 
ideals and norms, according to which one conducts anthropological 
fieldwork at a single geographical and territorial field site, we must also 
acknowledge the urgent need to redefine the idea of the anthropological 
field site and its privileged status in the construction of anthropological 
knowledge. 
Hage (2005) has illustrated the ethnographer’s limited time, material, 
and mental capacities to follow his or her mobile interlocutors to their 
numerous geographical locations in order to produce ‘thick descriptions’ 
of their complex, multiply-situated lived realities. Taking up Hannerz’ 
(2013) plea for a ‘translocal’ rather than ‘multi-sited’ research perspective 
that traces the multiple connections, conjunctions, and associations of 
the places inhabited by mobile people, I instead argue that following 
people and things does not necessarily condition the ethnographer’s 
spatial movement and physical presence at all locales. In fact, as Philipp 
Schröder shows in Chapter Eight, if the ethnographer is too much of 
witness, i.e., too present, this may even endanger fieldwork relations. 
In order to produce ethnographic facts about multi-sited lives, 
we must question the holistic ambitions of classic anthropology 
and admit that ‘ethnography is an art of the possible’ (Hannerz 
2013:407). Hannerz’ epistemic contribution is in line with Ferguson’s 
(1999:208) argument that because, in some field contexts, more 
people are strangers, or outsiders, just like the anthropologist herself, 
anthropological understanding takes on a different character when 
trying to understand things in the way my interlocutors do. That is, like 
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her interlocutors the anthropologist misses most of what is going on 
in her field site. This, as Hannerz states, can be as true in both single-
site and multi-site ethnographies because this insight problematizes 
the general relationship between the knowledge of the interlocutor and 
the ethnographer (Hannerz 2013:405). Such considerations should by 
no means obscure the fact that the ethnographer’s presence in the field 
determines how, why, and by whom things are said (or not). But they 
may open up new epistemological avenues to track how anthropological 
knowledge about individual translocal religious experience is produced 
in digitalized fields. 
Following van de Port (2011:316) and Meyer (2013:5–6), cultural 
mediation is the practice of world-making that engenders shared 
worlds of lived experience. Thus, mediation is a communicative 
process through which social (or, as here, religious) worlds are made. 
Mediation produces a shared world to be inhabited, taken for ‘real’ 
and experienced as ‘immediate’. Accordingly, the discursive practices 
of Tajik student travellers whom I met in the United Arab Emirates 
not only enabled me to explore how translocal religious subjects are 
produced or ‘made’ through digital practices. The invitation of Ma’ruf, 
Mona and other interlocutors to share their digital worlds of nostalgia, 
memory, and spiritual longing, even after my return home to Germany, 
turns the processes of mediating immediacy into an intersubjective 
and continuous process of communicating individual religious 
transformation. I stay connected virtually with Mona, her family, and 
friends. Tracing them online through my own smartphone induces the 
methodological transition from the ethnographer’s physical to a virtual 
co-presence that transcends the geographic and conceptual boundaries 
between the ‘fieldwork site’ and the ethnographer’s ‘home place’. 
To sum up, the significant role played by the researcher’s involvement 
in the digital practices of her interlocutors in mapping emotional 
geographies illustrates that the idea of ‘translocality’ is not restricted to 
the dialectic process of movement and placemaking. Instead, by tackling 
the spatiality of mobile people’s experiences and biographies, translocal 
ethnography invites the inclusion of other, i.e., virtual, imagined, or 
affective ‘fieldsites’ to capture people’s movement and connectedness 
through space and time. Such ‘alternative spatialisations’, as shown in this 
chapter, help to understand religious being, becoming, and having-been 
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in the complex reality of peoples’ lives on the move. Consequently, 
translocality, both as a research object and a perspective, also covers 
interlacing temporalities, or transtemporality, as described in the 
introduction to this edited volume. Nostalgia, as an attachment to the 
past, helps make sense of people’s present lives and futures, but at the 
same time plays a major role in the conservation of a ‘sense’ of locality. 
Demonstrating how the discursive production of locality is bound to 
inhabited pasts, and, conversely, how the past is materialized through 
the production of locales, Mona’s photo compilation exemplifies what 
Smith (2011:190) describes as an ‘iconic rendering of past experience’ 
that also constitutes markers of translocal connectivity. In other words, 
by ‘freezing the past’, the iconography of Mona’s mobile photo library 
also represents a ‘nostalgic longing to belong to somewhere else’ (ibid.). 
Following this continuous reprocessing of ‘home’ across different sites 
of mobility (Taylor 2013), translocal ethnography produces ‘field sites’ 
that are not only ‘geographically non-contiguous’ (Hage 2005:467), but 
also encompass multiple temporalities. These temporalities, however, 
become increasingly facilitated by the flexibility, multimodality, and 
‘deterritoriality’ of digital media. Sharing my interlocutors’ mobile 
lifeworlds virtually while physically absent from the field site, I am thus 
able to trace not only the narrated past and present of their religious 
reform projects but to follow how their translocal piety merges into 
articulated moral, social, and economic futures.
Tracing the significance of time and place to the pious enterprises 
that Tajik migrants create when they move within their virtual emotional 
geographies, pious enterprises that are managed by their mobile phones, 
translocal ethnography turns the field into a single ‘global site’, or more 
concretely, the global site occupied by my mobile interlocutors (Hage 
2005:466). Following the notion of a single global field site, the usage of 
new media and communication technology encourages an ‘exploratory 
freedom’ away from the Malinowskian paradigm and complements 
the ethnographer’s physical presence in a (here: religious) field that has 
become highly virtual and mobile (Marcus 2009).
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10. Translocality and the Folding of  
Post-Soviet Urban Space in Bishkek: Hijrah 
from ‘Botanika’ to ‘Botanicheskii Jamaat’
Emil Nasritdinov
Somewhere beyond right and wrong there is a garden. I will meet you there.
Rumi
Botanika: 70–80s, 90s and 2000s
I live in the ninth micro-district in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan. 
Every Friday, I come home from my work around 1pm, take a shower 
and go to the mosque, which is located just across the small Ala-Archa 
River in Ata-Tyurk Park, formerly known as Park Druzby (Friendship 
Park). The official name of this mosque is Toiiba, but it is better known 
as the KASI Mechet.1 It is a large mosque, and on my way to it I can see 
how the parked cars of people who come to pray fill up both banks of the 
river and one adjacent street. There are so many cars that there is often 
a traffic jam, and the traffic police have to come in advance to control 
the flow of vehicles and keep the street open for movement. Among 
1  KASI is the former name of Kyrgyz State University of Construction, Transport 
and Architecture, which is located on the same side of the river as the ninth 
micro-district.
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the worshippers, there are many students from the nearby university. 
Together with the residents of the local micro-districts, they form a very 
large crowd that fills the two buildings of the mosque, with its large 
yard covered by a plastic roof, and then spills into the space outside. 
Because of my work, I usually come just before the prayer starts and 
I have to pray in the courtyard. Once the prayer is finished and this 
huge crowd moves from the mosque, I make my way against the flow 
of people to a place inside, where my friends meet every week to greet 
and catch up with each other. By the time I get there, they are usually 
already standing in a circle joking and teasing one another. ‘Assalam 
aleikum, Botanika! (peace be upon you, Botanika!)’ — I exclaim, and then 
greet each person in a circle with handshake and triple hug. ‘Walekum 
salam (and upon you, peace)’, — they respond: the warmth of their hugs 
and their smiles make me happy. We stand there for twenty to thirty 
minutes, exchange news, make jokes, and then either go our own ways 
or, as often happens, continue to one of our houses for a meal and more 
socializing. Some men stay in the mosque to join the three-day davaat 
trip,2 which is organized every Friday.3
This chapter is about Botanika, a term that in the context of this 
research represents two phenomena: this particular group of men who 
are now in their early fifties, and the specific territory near the mosque 
(across the park), where these men were born, spent their childhood and 
youth, and where many of them still live. Jointly, these two phenomena 
represent a unique form of urban identity, while their story offers us a 
new perspective on a very special form of urban translocality that, in 
interesting ways, connects people and their narratives to a specific urban 
2  Three-day trips are an important part of davaatchi (Tablighi Jamaat). If davaat is the 
trip, then we still need to define davaatchi and Tablighi Jamaat practices. A group 
of between eight and twelve men travel from their own mosque to a different one, 
usually located in the same city or in the nearby settlements. During the trip, the 
group (jamaat) stays in that mosque and engages in worship, learning, and meeting 
locals. All members travel using their own money for transportation and food. 
During these trips, it is strictly forbidden to talk about politics. The main purpose 
of a trip is not preaching, but personal improvement and development.
3  I am not an insider to this group. I am approximately ten years younger than the 
others and I grew up in a different city in Kyrgyzstan. However, I have developed 
relationships of friendship and trust with the members of this group over the last 
nine years, since I moved here.
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place in transformation. By exploring this, I hope to make a contribution 
to the main debates developed in this volume about translocality and 
to offer an alternative perspective on post-Soviet transition and urban 
transformation. To do so, I first present the main ethnographic account of 
Botanika in chronological order: tracing its history from the 1970s to the 
present day. I then engage with the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s 
book The Fold to develop a more complex theoretical explanation for this 
phenomenon of post-Soviet urban transformation. The fold, described 
by Deleuze as the intricate internalization of external change and vice 
versa, is a concept that represents the complexities of transition very 
well. It shows how the path of individual transformation towards 
becoming ‘a better person’ is embedded in the complex territoriality of 
flows, folds, and obstacles in space, time, and society. To start, I need to 
take the reader back almost forty years, into the 1970s and 1980s, when 
Kyrgyzstan was still a part of the Soviet Union, Bishkek was called 
Frunze, and these men were ten- or twelve-year-old boys. 
Fig. 10.1  People returning from the Friday prayer.  
Photo © Emil Nasritdinov (2016), CC BY 4.0
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Soviet youth street culture:  
Botanika in the 1970s and 1980s
Frunze’s youth culture was very territorial during the Soviet period. In 
my previous research with Philipp Schroeder (Nasritdinov & Schroeder, 
2016), we were able to locate and map nearly fifty unique youth rayons 
(districts) with clear spatial boundaries and interesting histories. These 
rayons played a very important role in the lives of almost all young 
people in Frunze in the 1970s and 1980s: they were a part of their urban 
identity and everyday socialization. The phenomenon of territorial 
youth culture in Frunze followed the trends common to other Soviet 
cities and towns, yet Frunze rayons had many unique features of their 
own.4
Botanika was one such unique rayon. The informal name derives 
from the Botanicheskaya (Botanical) Street that ran through the middle 
of the rayon, connecting its upper and lower parts. The street was later 
renamed Dushanbinskaya, but the rayon kept the name Botanika. 
Botanika was one of the largest youth rayons in the city and it consisted 
of three smaller territories: Verhnyaya (upper) Botanika, Nizhnyaya 
(lower) Botanika, and Treugolnik (triangle) Botanika. The core of 
Botanika was the yard of one particular house in Verhnyaya Botanika 
called Shmal Dvor, where the toughest and most active boys used to 
live. The following maps show the territorial composition of Botanika 
and its neighboring rayons; the aerial photo shows its boundaries, urban 
fabric, and the park.
Botanika was not known only for its size, but also for the physical 
abilities of its boys. The territory had several sport facilities: the Dynamo 
Stadium, sports school #48, and a number of sports clubs, the most 
popular of which were dedicated to boxing and wrestling. Many local 
boys were involved in sports clubs from a very young age; many of them 
had become very good fighters by the age of around ten or twelve and 
joined ‘the army’ of Botanika when they fought other rayons. Their biggest 
rival was the neighboring rayon to the west of Botanika called Porta, but 
the boys of Botanika also fought the members of rayons from other parts 
of the city from time to time. Almost all of my interlocutors mentioned 
one important feature that made Botanika unique — a strong sense of 
4  For a more in-depth discussion of the Soviet territorial youth culture see Nasritdinov 
and Schroeder (2016).
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Figs. 10.2 and 10.3  Territorial composition of Botanika and its 
neighbouring youth rayons and an aerial photo. Map and photo © Emil 
Nasritdinov (2016), CC BY 4.0
Fig. 10.4  Boys of Botanika in the early 1980s (shared by interlocutors).  
Photo © Emil Nasritdinov, CC BY 4.0
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My main group of interlocutors from Botanika includes seven men, 
all within one or two years of age of one another, who were very close 
friends from very early childhood. In fact, some of them were druziya 
s gorshka (potty friends); they went to the same kindergarten and later 
to the same class in school. Today, between forty to fifty years later, 
they remember how they spent their days as kids ‘na rayone’ (in the 
neighborhood). Nobody sat at home and most of their free time after 
school, at the weekends, and during school breaks was spent playing 
outside. The rayon had a lot of greenery, including a large park (Park 
Druzhby), a botanical garden with lots of fruit trees, and a big lake, 
where they went swimming in summer time. These green spaces 
belonged to these kids. They played there, ate fruit in the gardens, and 
collected wood to cook stolen geese and bake potatoes at night. They 
could also hide in these green spaces when running from the police. 
‘There was an old airport near Botanika and we used to steal magnum 
there to make mini bombs. Once we noticed that two of our friends had 
a lot of magnum, but they were hiding it somewhere and not sharing it 
with us. We decided to track them secretly and saw one of them climbing 
a large tree in the park. “This is it”, we thought, “this is where they hide 
their magnum — in the crow’s nest all the way at the top”. The same 
evening one of us climbed this tree and guess what he found in the nest? 
A piece of paper, which said: “Screw you! No magnum here!”’ (Botanika 
member, male, Spring 2015) 
The boys diligently guarded the park against trespassers from other 
rayons. They never touched an outsider if he was with a girl; this was an 
unwritten rule of the informal street code, but all other boys would be 
chased and beaten. As boys got older and became teenagers, the park 
became a place where they would bring girls, drink alcohol, or smoke 
weed.
‘We started drinking in the eighth grade — the first time it was some 
kind of punch. After we graduated with an eighth grade diploma, we 
bought vodka and wine and drank so much that we felt very bad and 
had to vomit — right there in the park, in the apple orchard by the white-
brick fence, where our boys had once killed a cat’ (Botanika member, 
male, Spring 2015). 
friendship and internal solidarity, which, according to them, did not exist 
in other rayons. Together, the large size of the rayon, and its members’ 
strong fighting skills and solidarity, contributed to Botanika’s reputation 
as the rayon to be respected. 
Fig. 10.5  Boys of Botanika in the early 1980s (shared by interlocutors).  
Photo © Emil Nasritdinov, CC BY 4.0
Fig. 10.6  Russian5 boys and girls of Botanika having a picnic in the park 
(shared by interlocutors). Photo © Emil Nasritdinov, CC BY 4.0
5  Botanika was ethnically mixed. The majority of members were Kyrgyz and Russian. 
However, my main interlocutors are predominantly Kyrgyz with only one man of 
Tatar ethnicity.
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The empty space to the east of the park (where the mosque is currently 
located) was a common location for fights between the residents of the 
student dormitory belonging to the university and boys from other 
rayons across the river. During these fights and other adventures, 
Botanika boys solidified their friendship and social ties. 
‘We once went to the night club (diskoteka) in school #62 [across the river 
from the park]. We were ten boys and at some point, somebody from 
the school pushed our circle and a fight started. There were too many of 
them — a whole school — and too few of us, so our boys eventually had 
to escape, but my friend and I got stuck. We fought back to back for as 
long as we could, until I realized that we would not survive, so I pulled 
my friend out and we ran too. He had a new suit, which was completely 
torn and we both had big bruises on our faces. At home I told my parents 
that I played soccer and got hit. Next day, we put together a huge crowd 
from the whole of Botanika and several other friendly rayons, went to 
that school and started beating everyone, including their sports teacher. 
However, the police came very soon and we all had to run. This was 
useless — there were a few hundred boys, but we were able to beat only 
ten or so because the rest of them managed to hide inside the school and 
the police came too soon’ (Botanika member, male, Spring 2015). 
With these kinds of adventure, Botanika boys slowly matured into 
young men, finished school, and most of them entered university. As 
students, they were less active in street life, but they still retained close 
links with each other and shared a few exploits as students, including a 
big fight in a student dormitory, in which Botanika members once again 
fought to protect their fellows. By the time the Soviet Union broke up in 
1991, many of them had completed their university degrees and started 
working. 
‘Lihie 90-e’ (‘The wild 90s’)
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the whole country entered a deep 
crisis. Whole industries collapsed and many people became unemployed, 
while those who still had jobs saw their salaries shrink. In order to 
survive, people traded with China, Turkey, Russia, and Kazakhstan. 
Many migrated to Russia and Kazakhstan for work. The term ‘lihie 
90-e’ (‘wild 90s’) was common across all post-Soviet republics. The 
phrase encapsulated the crisis and chaos in many people’s lives. Frunze 
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was renamed Bishkek, and Botanicheskaya Street was renamed once 
again — this time it became Toktonalieva Street. The street culture also 
changed significantly. High rates of unemployment and growing ethno-
nationalistic sentiments caused a large number of Russian families to 
sell their properties and migrate to Russia. This ruptured the social 
fabric in all parts of the city: old residents left and their apartments 
and houses were bought by the Kyrgyz migrants coming to Bishkek 
from other regions (Schroeder, 2010). As a result, neighbors no longer 
knew each other and, in a very short period, the identity of the rayons 
as cohesive neighborhoods with strong degree of internal socialization 
was destroyed. The system of values changed as well: friendship and 
solidarity were no longer the norm, and cheating and impudence 
became characteristic of the behavior of young people: 
‘My conscience never bothered me in the 90s. In the eyes of my friends 
it was cool to cheat someone. The highest degree of cheating and 
impudence was considered the most prestigious quality a person could 
attain. In some circles, those who could drink a lot were the coolest; in 
my circle, those who could cheat others best were the coolest. These were 
the kinds of values we had then’ (Botanika member, male, Spring 2015). 
This captures the dilemma of the collective attitudes prevalent in the 
Soviet Union versus the individualization of the 1990s.
Soviet youth culture also created many delinquents and possessed 
many links to the criminal world. However, post-Soviet street 
culture was more aggressive, violent, and criminal. New criminal 
gangs emerged and participated in the growing drug trade and in 
the racketeering practiced by newly emerging businesses and small 
enterprises. Young people were among the most affected; during the 
early 90s, a large number of teenagers and men in their twenties died 
from alcohol poisoning and drug overdoses on the streets and in the 
basements of Soviet residential buildings. Many were killed or injured 
in skirmishes between gangs. 
The story of Botanika is not very different. The boys of Botanika did 
not become a criminal gang, but because they were very good fighters 
they were recruited by others,6 and some did take part in criminal 
6  These other gangs were not territorial and included boys from all parts of the city. 
Some gangs involved the new migrants. One of the most notorious was the Ryspek 
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activities. At the same time, many became heavy drinkers and drug 
addicts. Today, when they remember the past, they say ‘those who 
survived the 90s’, or ‘those who are still alive’. The following photo of 
Botanika was taken in 1999 at the funeral of one of its relatively young 
members. 
Fig. 10.7  Members of Botanika at the funeral of one of their friends 
(shared by interlocutors). Photo © Emil Nasritdinov, CC BY 4.0
This is how one Botanika member describes the atmosphere of the 90s:
‘There was one elderly man who went jogging every morning. He would 
jog with a knife or nunchaku in his hands. I used to look around and 
think that the air was different — it was very tense. The money had just 
changed [from the ruble to the som]; heavy drinking, theft, and robbery 
were very common’ (Botanika member, male, Spring 2015). 
Many of my interlocutors are not proud of this part of their lives and 
share it with some hesitation. 
gang, founded by a criminal from Issyk-Kul, who recruited members from among 
the students of Inkub (a residential sport school in Bishkek), the majority of whom 
were from outside of Bishkek.
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‘When I divorced my wife, I came back to Botanika to live with my 
parents. The whole rayon was drinking and everyone was saying to me: 
‘Hey, take a glass and let’s go!’ My mother used to lock the door, but what 
was the use? We lived on the first floor, so I would jump out through 
the window. My sister also divorced and lived with us. I remember one 
day, I came home drunk. My younger brother came after me — drunk. 
Then my dad — drunk! Finally, my sister — drunk as well! My Mom 
was pulling her hair: “What a drunkards’ family!” Later, I got a Russian 
girlfriend from Botanika and we rented a corner in the dormitory in the 
completely opposite part of the city, but Botanika boys would still come 
all the way, because for some reason, shopkeepers used to trust me and 
give alcohol on credit […]. By the early 2000s, I did nothing but drink. 
I used to drink several bottles a day. I had to drink continuously to be 
able to walk and not to shake. I couldn’t even sleep. It was a complete 
intoxication’ (Botanika member, male, Spring 2015). 
Other members of Botanika were involved in criminal activities: some 
in racketeering and some in petty theft and drug trading. One of my 
interlocutors was imprisoned four times: 
‘I was always jailed because of vodka. There was this guy in our rayon, 
one day he gave me a drink and asked me to pass a bag to someone. I 
was drunk and did not know there was heroin inside. I went there and 
the police were already waiting for me. It turned out he was from the 
police and I was not the first one to be framed like that. This was my 
first conviction. For my last conviction I was framed for stealing fifteen 
cell phones. I once got into the police7 and they asked me take them on 
myself.8 I thought: they will beat me first and then frame me anyway. So, 
I agreed and for several days during the investigation, they fed me, gave 
me lots of vodka and took me to court from time to time. The judge knew 
I was framed. Everyone was looking at me and laughing: “What kind of 
thief is this? He is just an old drunk!” Ehhh, everything was because of 
vodka’9 (Botanika member, male, Spring 2015). 
Another member of Botanika shared the story of his life from the early 
90s to 2008: it was all about vodka and weed. He used to work in several 
businesses and state enterprises and earn very large sums of money 
7  I.e., he was taken to the police precinct for a minor violation, such as being drunk.
8 The police asked him to admit that he had stolen the phones.
9  The police often framed people because they had to show their superiors that they 
had dealt with the reports of crime in their locality.
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through various corrupt schemes, but he drank all of this money with 
his friends: 
‘In the 90s, three of my friends and I started doing business together. 
Once, in the fall, we bought the whole KAMAZ [large Soviet truck] of 
cognac to sell. We did not sell a single bottle — we drank it all over the 
winter, not just by ourselves of course. We also used to smoke weed. 
Once we sat and counted how much weed we would need for a winter 
and according to our calculations we needed thirty small boxes of 
hashish. We went to Issyk-Kul, where I had some friends and bought the 
boxes. Well, they did not last for a winter. We finished all thirty boxes 
in one week […] Later [in a different job] my regular day would start 
with a bottle of vodka on my table, which I drank with my subordinate. 
He then would go to work, while I would go to sleep. If I finished my 
cigarettes, I would just call him through the window and he would send 
someone to get me a pack. At lunchtime we would finish our second 
bottle. After work we would drink as much as we could. I remember 
once we had very good food for a snack and we finished a whole box of 
vodka [twenty bottles] overnight […] I lived like that for almost twenty 
years’ (Botanika member, male, Spring 2015). 
The same interlocutor explained that during one of those drunken 
nights, he quarrelled with his very good friends from Botanika; 
their relationship was spoiled for a long time after that. Many of my 
interlocutors share similar experiences; during the 90s, many of them 
lost friendships and rarely saw each other. 
‘In the 90s we did not communicate. Those were wild times, and 
everybody was a lone wolf.10 Why would you share your own piece with 
someone else? Every wolf had his own territory’ (Botanika member, 
male, Spring 2015).
By the end of the 90s the members of Botanika were drunk, doped, 
imprisoned, exiled, dangerous, criminal, isolated, or dead. There was 
little hope of recovery. However, in the early 2000s, suddenly things 
started to change. 
10 As a result of the retreat of the state during this period, everyone had to take 
responsibility for themselves.
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Davaat and the spiritual enlightenment  
of the 2000s
In the mid-90s, the first representatives of the Tablighi Jamaat11 
movement arrived in Kyrgyzstan (Balci, 2012). This was a difficult 
period for them because the majority of the population did not know 
anything about Islam and the first Kyrgyz davaatchiler (followers of 
Tablighi Jamaat) experienced a lot of hostility. However, in a relatively 
short period of time, davaat became very popular; by the early 2000s, 
the number of followers who enjoyed regular three-day, forty-day, and 
four-month spiritual journeys had reached its peak (Ismailbekova and 
Nasritdinov, 2012). The jamaats (travelling groups) were often organized 
on the basis of language: Kyrgyz-speaking and Russian-speaking. The 
city boys usually joined the Russian-speaking groups and on these trips 
they learned the basic premises of Islamic teachings and practices. 
Botanika was one such Russian-speaking urban community and, one 
by one, they became involved in davaat practices and started changing 
their lives on the basis of Islamic teachings. The very first person who 
became interested in religion did so because of the influence of his uncle. 
All the others joined gradually, one after another, like a snowball, over 
a period of approximately eight years. The individual stories of how 
Botanika members became religious are very unique and extremely 
interesting. The first is from an interlocutor I discussed earlier, who in 
the late 90s did nothing but drink: 
‘I was permanently drunk and extremely intoxicated in those times. Two 
of our Botanika friends came to me. One of them was already going to 
Friday prayers, but they were both still into racketeering — they used to 
‘bomb’ [racketeer] everyone. So, they came to me and said ‘You have to 
11  Tablighi Jamaat is an apolitical movement that works towards the revival of Islam. 
It originated in India in the 1920s and has since become widespread all across the 
globe. Its main principles, summarized by its founder Maulana Ilyas Kandahlavi, 
are based on the idea that Muslims can only improve their own condition and that 
of the society they live in through worship (not by engaging in politics or fighting 
jihad). That is why the main purpose of Tablighi Jamaat practice is to improve oneself 
and remind other Muslims about their duties to Allah. It is not a proselytizing 
group — they do not preach to non-Muslims. One of the most important Tablighi 
Jamaat practices is three-day, forty-day, and four-month trips, when a group of 
Tablighi moves from one mosque to another and engages in worshipping, learning, 
and inviting local people to the mosque.
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go for davaat’. I asked them ‘What is it?’ ‘You will sleep for three days in 
the mosque’. ‘Is that it? I can sleep anywhere. What will we do there?’ 
They themselves did not know. Muhammad Sharif gave them targib 
[encouragement] to be concerned for others, so they came to me. They 
told me to take something to cover myself. I took a tiny kids’ blanket and 
I almost died in that mosque: it was snowing, it was very cold inside, and 
someone stole my boots. All three days I was shaking — from my alcohol 
withdrawal and from cold because of this little blanket. “Bastards!” — I 
was very angry with my friends. However, I slowly started recovering 
and on the third day I even ate soup. During these three days I didn’t 
understand anything. The boys in the group told me: ‘Say subhanallah’. 
I couldn’t even pronounce that and asked them to write it down. Then 
at night, one other friend from Botanika who was with us woke me up 
and said ‘Go pray tahajud’.12 I did not understand where to go and how 
to pray, and water for ablution was so damn cold. Anyway, I did my 
ablutions, came inside the mosque — everyone was asleep. I woke him 
and asked why nobody else was praying. He said: “This is voluntary”. I 
said: “You dummy, I’ll break your neck! Then you come and pray with 
me”. He said: “Let’s go and eat instead”. Stupid guy, I couldn’t eat even 
in the day time. That is how I suffered for three days. When I came back, 
I did not start praying five times a day right away, but I started going 
to Friday prayers, and most importantly, after these three days I quit 
drinking and I have never ever had a drop since then’ (Botanika member, 
male, Spring 2015). 
Some stories are told with humour, such as this example from a man 
who used to be involved in various commercial frauds: 
‘One day I met some friends in Botanika. They were going to the funeral 
ceremony for a Botanika boy’s father and they invited me to come with 
them. This was in the 2000s. I thought, well, it is a good occasion to have 
a drink. We drink a lot anyway, but here is a good reason. I went with 
them and saw a lot of men with beards in the room. I thought that this 
might be some kind of fashion or maybe they just didn’t have razors. 
Anyway, I sat and waited for my drink. Instead, they all came to me 
one by one and talked: one talked about Allah, another about angels, the 
third about hell, and the fourth about sahabas.13 I was thinking: “It is ok; 
100 grams of vodka is worth all this listening”. I waited and waited, but 
didn’t get anything. What kind of funeral was this without any alcohol? 
A couple of weeks later, my other friend from Botanika told me I needed 
to go for davaat. I thought, I have been in many extreme situations in 
12  Tahajud — voluntary night prayer.
13  Sahaba — companion of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW).
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life, I can handle that too. So, I went. All the boys in the group were 
young. I didn’t understand anything. I was just mechanically repeating 
all their moves. However, on our way back to the KASI mosque, I felt 
as if I was flying above the ground, and I felt as if everyone was like a 
brother to each other. I wanted to hug and kiss everyone. So, after this 
first davaat ‘the ice moved’. That is how they got me in. However, you 
can understand the essence of religion only in the forty-day trip, and 
dua [supplication] during forty days is also stronger. My daughter was 
studying in England and in my forty-day journey, I asked Allah to give 
her a Muslim husband. When I came home, she called and told me that 
she’d got a boyfriend and that he was a Muslim from Albania. That is 
how the wisdom of religion comes, and its understanding. This is all 
from Allah, of course’ (Botanika member, male, Spring 2015). 
Another member of Botanika was involved in racketeering and at some 
point, he crossed paths with a notorious criminal, Ryspek, who gave an 
order to kill him. He says:
‘I knew I was a dead man. I moved my family to a different place, got 
several guns and waited at home. This is when a friend told me that duas 
[supplications] are accepted in the path of Allah and if I go for a three-
day davaat and make dua, I can solve all of my problems. I had nothing to 
lose and decided to give it a try. I went and for three days I was asking 
Allah for help. When I came back, the issue was miraculously resolved, 
and a few weeks later, Ryspek himself was killed. Everyone was like: 
“Hey, what kind of dua were you making there?”’ (Botanika member, 
male, Spring 2015) 
One other member of Botanika had serious problems with his health 
and with his family: he was jobless and his wife wanted to divorce him. 
Some time after he went for his first three-day trip, his health improved 
and his wife returned. 
In 2008, the Botanika interlocutor who used to drink and had smoked 
weed for twenty years was living in a Western country as a refugee. His 
salary was about 2,000 USD a month but he was living there alone and 
his normal working day would usually finish with a litre of gin and 
a joint. He started seeing his Botanika friends in his dreams a lot, so 
he decided to give one of them a call. This is how he described their 
conversation:
‘We just talked about nothing. He asked: “What are you doing there?” 
I said “I work, what about you guys?” “We do nothing, get together 
every day, drink tea, and enjoy ourselves. Why don’t you come back?” 
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“And what will I do there?” “There is plenty of work here and you 
will also spend time with us, drink tea, and have plov, kuurdak”.14 This 
conversation strongly affected me. I really wanted to go back. I thought 
about it every night and one day I just packed my things and flew back 
to Bishkek’ (Botanika member, male, Spring 2015). 
He came back in January 2009 and for five days he met his friends and 
visited relatives. On the fifth day (Thursday) he had his last drink and 
on Friday, Botanika sent him for his first three-day davaat trip. After he 
returned, this man, who had drank almost every day for twenty years, 
quit drinking. Not long after he went for a forty-day trip and during this 
journey he asked Allah for a good Muslim wife. He explains that a week 
after his return he married a very pious Muslim woman. Nowadays he 
drives a taxi; they live happily and have two children. 
The Botanika brother who was jailed four times learned about Islam 
in jail. He said that during his last imprisonment, out of one thousand 
prisoners, one hundred identified themselves as practicing Muslims. 
They represented diverse Muslim groups. He quit drinking and 
smoking on January 10, 2012 and in 2014 when he was released, boys 
from Botanika helped him to go on a trip, first for three days and then 
for forty days. 
The lives of all seven men have slowly improved since then. Nobody 
drinks or takes drugs anymore. Two of them smoke, but they are 
trying to give it up as the others have. None of them are involved in 
criminal activities; they all have jobs or businesses: one runs an Islamic 
kindergarten, one drives a taxi, three are engaged in commerce, and two 
work as security guards. Four of the seven have families and their wives 
are also practicing Muslims. Some of them travel for three-day davaat 
trips every month and travel for forty days every couple of years. Others 
travel only from time to time. However, all of them pray five times a 
day, fast during Ramadhan and attend Friday prayers. 
Most importantly, they all maintain very close connections with 
one another. They call each other on an almost daily basis and they 
meet every few days for tea or full meals. Sometimes, they invite 
some religious scholars or experienced Tablighi practitioners to these 
meals and listen to their talks. In addition, they spend a lot of time 
14  Traditional Kyrgyz meals.
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talking to other former residents of Botanika whom they have known 
since childhood and encourage them to join in with their religious 
practices. Their friendships have evolved from the loyal relationships 
of childhood, through their comparative estrangement in the 1990s, to a 
new closeness that has been established on a very different foundation. 
This time their friendship has a spiritual basis and according to their 
explanations, this relationship is much deeper; they say that Allah puts 
mahabbat (brotherly love) in their hearts and this connection is a great 
source of support. Botanika — as a group — has reemerged, stronger 
than it ever was. Now it is known among the local residents and in 
the wider community of davaatchis in Bishkek as Botanicheskii Jamaat 
(Botanical religious group). 
Similarly, Botanika as a place has changed significantly. During 
Soviet times, it was a place of internal solidarity and cohesion. However, 
it was also a place where outsiders were beaten, while its boundaries 
were the scene of conflicts with boys from other rayons. During the 90s, 
the place was completely run down: it was not safe; it was full of drunks, 
drug addicts, and hooligans, and there was a lot of litter in the streets 
and parks. Nowadays, it looks very different. The mosque, which was 
built on the empty field between the park and Ala-Archa River is now 
one of the four marqases (regional centres) of Bishkek: it regulates the 
activities of all mosques located within its wider sphere of influence. 
Every day, davaatchiler from this mosque make gasht — knocking on the 
doors of nearby apartment buildings and inviting men to the mosque. 
In the streets, there are lots of small shops, cafes, and businesses. The 
park was renovated by Turks15 (and for this reason renamed Ata-Turk 
Park), and today it attracts lots of visitors from the nearby residential 
districts and even from other parts of the city. Botanika has become very 
safe: one can easily walk through the area even in the middle of the 
night. People are reclaiming the public spaces inside the yards of Soviet 
apartment blocks and, just as in Soviet times, children are among the 
first to make use of them. Most of my Botanika interlocutors still live in 
15  Turkish investors gained influence in post-Soviet Bishkek, particularly in the 
spheres of construction, trade, and education. They own several large construction 
companies and shopping malls and there are now many Turkish cafes in the city. In 
addition, Turkish lyseums (secondary and high-school) and Turkish universities are 
quite popular. 
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the neighborhood. They participate in the activities of the mosque and 
try to recruit more people, particularly their former friends of the same 
age.
This is the happy conclusion to the Botanika story and its ethnographic 
aspect. The end might look somewhat ‘too happy’. As I mentioned 
earlier, many boys from Botanika did not survive the 90s and early 2000s 
and died from alcohol poisoning, drug addiction, and criminal activities. 
Many still continue the same lifestyle. There were many others who did 
not become drunkards or criminals, but also did not become religious, 
while there are others who join in with religious activities but are still 
struggling, trying to improve their lives. In short, their individual paths 
are very diverse. However, the lives of the particular group I have 
focused on in this chapter share striking similarities, and they represent 
a unique and extraordinary transformation, both of a community and 
of a space. My next task is to try to make sense of this transformation 
from a theoretical perspective. In order to do so I shall engage with 
the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, to develop a complex and nuanced 
understanding of the broader post-Soviet urban transformation and the 
more specific theme of urban translocality. 
Deleuze’s fold and the transformation of Botanika
Many academic and policy-based explanations for the changes brought 
about by the post-Soviet transition can be criticized for being simplistic 
and ideological: from socialism to capitalism, from a planned to a 
market economy, from atheism to religiosity. These explanations fail 
to recognize the complexity and unpredictability of developments in 
specific post-Soviet contexts. In Central Asia today, twenty-five years 
after the break-up of the Soviet Union, we can trace a multitude of 
diverging and converging paths, which together form a very uneven, 
complex, and interesting pattern of development. 
To grasp this complexity, we need a new theoretical perspective 
that extends beyond the traditional positivistic approach to the social 
sciences. Postmodern French philosophy can offer a lot in this regard, 
particularly the ideas of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, which 
he developed in his book The Fold. The writings of Deleuze and his 
co-author Félix Guattari are extremely rich in regard to the interpretation 
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of contemporary transformations of space, such as the changes I have 
described taking place in Botanika. Furthermore, Deleuze’s concept of 
the fold offers a way to challenge linear, one-dimensional treatments of 
post-Soviet transition in Bishkek and elsewhere. Deleuze engages in a 
very complex discussion about how different worlds fold and unfold 
into each other and how the boundary between them has a life of its 
own. Deleuze conceptualizes the fold as an intermediate zone between 
physical and metaphysical, animal and spiritual, inside and outside, 
and this model can be used to understand the spiritual transformation 
of Botanika and the stories of my interlocutors. 
Deleuze treats transition as a process with infinite variation. He 
rejects universality and writes that all organisms have the quality 
of irreducible plurality. He is in favour of epigenesis (the view that 
perceives form as shaped by process) as opposed to preformation (the 
view that form develops simply by growth in size). This is also useful 
to consider in relation to transition: it is a process that is impossible 
to predict or describe in a one-dimensional fashion (e.g., the transition 
from a planned economy to a market economy) but instead must be 
conceptualized as something that can develop in any possible and 
unpredictable direction. I shall apply these and other Deleuzian concepts 
to Botanika’s transformation from the 1990s to the present.16 
Caterpillar, cocoon, and butterfly
Deleuze describes transformation as a constant shift from the material 
to the spiritual and back. During the Soviet period, communist 
ideology shaped the materiality of existence. Boys from Botanika were 
predominantly working class. They did not have many opportunities to 
realize material aspirations even if they had them. Although they were 
not strong believers in communist ideology and, in fact, youth street 
culture can be seen as an ideological alternative to it, these boys were 
still driven by the romanticism of street life and by such spiritual values 
as friendship, solidarity, courage, and heroism, rather than by material 
incentives. 
16 All citations in the remainder of this chapter are from The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque (London: Athlone Press Ltd, 1993), unless specified differently. 
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‘Values were different in the Soviet times. We did not divide into rich 
and poor. To strive for wealth was considered abnormal; nobody was 
after money. One the contrary, if a person was rich, people would say: 
“He is hapuga [a greedy person], a thief”. We had uravnilovka [levelling]; 
wages were similar and sufficient for everyone. The future was secure 
and we did not have material aspirations; nobody taught us to pursue 
financial success. We were more motivated by prestige. For example, 
it was prestigious to study economics in university and the whole 
city was trying to get in. The history department was also popular 
because you could then progress along the communist party line. The 
law faculty — not so much; who wants to be a ment [police officer]?’ 
(Botanika member, male, Spring 2015) 
If the Soviet Union did not collapse, perhaps, these boys would have 
slowly turned into regular Soviet citizens with a more traditional Soviet 
outlook. However, as the formal Soviet ideology collapsed in the 1990s, 
the informal ideology of street life also began to erode. No more the 
street ‘code of honour’, but ‘survival of the fittest’: material ‘derivative, 
mechanistic, machinic forces’ (p. 12) and animal instincts became more 
dominant. People survived the ideological, economic, political and 
socio-cultural crisis but they abandoned spiritual and moral values. 
Moral chaos, deception, betrayal, and cheating became very common. It 
was a period when ‘every man was for himself’ (kazhdyi byl sam za sebya). 
According to Deleuze, such changes are accidental and they happen as a 
result of the influence of external factors, which, in the case of Botanika, 
would be the actions of the state and various international actors. 
Deleuze compares life and death, portraying life as something that 
unfolds and death as something folding in on itself. In Botanika in the 
1990s, young people in the urban areas of Kyrgyzstan were dying in 
great numbers due to alcohol poisoning, drug overdoses, and criminal 
activities. This was the period accurately described by Joma Nazypary 
(2002) as post-Soviet bardak — chaos — and as a result many Botanika 
members died young, became addicted to drugs and alcohol, and 
joined urban gangs. During this time, the group dynamics broke down: 
everybody lived his own life and there was very little communication 
between them. In this desperate situation, the salvation ideology 
promoted by Tablighi Jamaat offered an escape for my interlocutors.
Farideh Heyat (2004) and Mathijs Pelkmans (2007) show that the 
chaos in Kyrgyzstan during this period was one of the main reasons 
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people turned to religion in search of spiritual, moral, psychological, 
and socio-economic support. The stories I explored in the first part of 
this chapter reveal how, one by one, ‘demoralized’ members of Botanika 
started practising religion and improving their lifestyles, quitting 
drinking, drugs, and criminal activities. They also became more united 
again, regularly meeting each other, organizing religious activities 
together, and reestablishing a sense of community and communal 
identity as Botanika. Deleuze introduces the concept socius — process, 
in which the world as ‘a theatrical basis, a dream, an illusion’ (p. 125) 
unfolds into ‘collective spiritual unity’ (p. 125). Horizontal unity based 
on friendship, shared memories and experiences, translates itself into a 
vertical17 spiritual unity that connects many of the members of Botanika 
in a shared spiritual quest. 
In the first years of the new millennium, the whole country, including 
Botanika, began to recover. Life began to unfold in many spheres: 
people became more economically secure; two revolutions (in 2005 and 
2010) brought more democratic governance; and it became safer to walk 
the streets. The regular monitoring of public opinion conducted by the 
Center for Baltic Research18 reveals that the population of Kyrgyzstan 
has the most positive perception of life in their country in comparison to 
all the other former Soviet countries, and this perception has remained 
fairly constant over the last several years. 
Deleuze explains how the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
Baroque artistic style evolved in response to the theological collapse that 
occurred under the influence of capitalism, in order to save theological 
ideals from the new forces of materialism through the multiplication of 
existing perspectives and the invention of new ones. We could argue 
that Botanika’s spiritual reemergence is a response to the collapse of 
Soviet ideology in the context of post-Soviet chaos and dikii kapitalism 
(wild capitalism). Post-Soviet society survived by multiplying existing 
perspectives and creating new concepts, therefore in Kyrgyzstan 
today we see a great diversity of religious practices and communities 
(Pelkmans, 2006). 
17  According to Deleuze, ‘vertical’ refers to the connection between the physical and 
metaphysical or spiritual worlds.
18  Dr Rasa Alishauskene, Center for Baltic Research, presentation organized by the 
Tyan-Shan Policy Center, American University of Central Asia, 14 March 2016.
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Deleuze calls this process ‘schizophrenic reconstruction’ by 
‘characters, who reconstitute the world through their inner, so-called 
auto-plastic modifications’ (p. 68). This is exactly how the members of 
Botanika reconstitute society and space — by engaging with their inner 
landscapes, by rediscovering a metaphysical basis for their existence 
and nourishing their spirituality — and it is in this flux the permanence 
is born (p. 79). This calls to mind theories of chaos and complexity, 
which argue that when systems collapse, in the context of overall chaos, 
new centres emerge, so-called ‘strange attractors’, which become the 
main nodes of a new system emerging out of this chaos. According to 
Deleuze, these strange attractors are not of material origin. They are 
ideas, which actualize themselves in physical matter: ‘it is not the body 
that realizes, but it is in the body that something is realized’ (p. 105). So, 
Botanika is the body, both communal and spatial, in which Botanika as 
a spiritual concept is actualized.
To illustrate the relationship between life and death as a process 
of folding and unfolding, Deleuze uses the analogy of a caterpillar 
metamorphosing into a cocoon and then to a butterfly. This analogy 
is very apt to describe Botanika: in the 1970 and 1980s it was like a 
caterpillar, which in the 1990s folded itself into a cocoon, and in 2000s 
emerged from this cocoon as a butterfly. 
Infinite variation in transition
Deleuze distinguishes three main forms of transformation. The 
first — vectorial — is similar to a straight line from point A to point B; it 
is akin to a simplistic understanding of the transition from socialism to 
capitalism. It is very limited, like many such transitological perspectives. 
The second — projective — is based on the projection of internal space 
onto external space, such as an individual explanation or account of 
change. This is similar to one of the Botanika member’s accounts of 
transition. But the third perspective, described by Deleuze as the infinite 
variation that portrays transition as a bundle of curves, each constructed 
through an infinite number of angular points, gives the most complex, 
rich, and diverse interpretation of reconstructed change.
Transition as infinite variation conceptualizes wholes and parts 
of the world using the principles of similitude and extension of time, 
number and matter, which is the ‘original formula of derived infinity’ 
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(p. 46). Transition is the result of the folding and unfolding of space, 
time, and narrative, creating great diversity in a specific place. Due to 
this infinite diversity or fractal complexity, society becomes more and 
more complex and interesting. It is not a transition from one condition 
into another, but from outside to inside, from material to spiritual, from 
simple to more complex. It is an implosion, not explosion, and the story 
of Botanika is one of such multiple diverse trajectories. 
Such implosion happens in two directions identified by Deleuze. 
The first is a converging series, in which individuals come together to 
form one world and create communities with similar visions, practices, 
and lifestyles. Botanika is one such community, which Deleuze would 
call ‘compossibles’ (p. 60). The second direction is a diverging series, in 
which individuals create different worlds, which leads to differentiation 
between communities whose primary principles, concepts, and 
metaphysical bases are different. This model illustrates the great 
religious diversity in Kyrgyzstan today. 
Interestingly, this diversity does not generate conflict because the 
world is reconstituted by first being decomposed into the multiple 
diverging paths of individuals and then by the discovery of the 
‘florescence of extraordinary accords’ (p. 82) in which multiple 
diverging actors play in accord with each other and create a ‘polyphony 
of polyphonies’ (p. 82) or concertation of life. It is a new world in which 
diverse communities with their unique features and distinctions coexist 
without conflict because their main driving force is not external, but 
internal or spiritual. This is where the situation in Kyrgyzstan becomes 
so different from the situation in other Central Asian republics,19 which 
are still ruled by authoritarian regimes, and where the external powers 
of the state still dominate internal sources of change. This kills diversity 
and results in artificial unison instead of polyphony. These countries 
could be said to lack freedom because freedom, according to Deleuze, is 
first of all the moment of a soul. 
19  There is not enough space here to describe how diversity and freedom in Kyrgyzstan 
are more established compared to other Central Asian states. Kyrgyzstan is often 
referred to as ‘the island of democracy in the sea of authoritarian states’. Although 
this statement has been rightly criticized, I believe in that if one takes a more 
comparative view it still makes a lot of sense. For example, today in Kyrgyzstan 
there are more madrasas (Islamic religious schools) than in all other Central Asian 
states together.
342 Emil Nasritdinov
The metaphysical dimension of transition  
and the power of agency
As he develops this understanding of transformation, Deleuze examines 
three forms of singularity within it. The first singularity is a physical 
point, an elastic or plastic point-fold. These are real singular events from 
the life stories of the participant, often connected to specific points in 
space. The second singularity is a mathematical point, a position, a site, 
or a point of view. We can understand it as the material explanation of 
change, an explanation based on common-sense logic and physical, non-
spiritual reasoning, which characterizes many existing ethnographic 
accounts of transition. The third singularity is of particular interest; it 
is a metaphysical point and it focuses on ‘the soul or the subject’; it is ‘a 
higher point of another nature’, a ‘point of inclusion’ (p. 23). 
From this perspective, one perceives change not so much as the 
result of external influences, but as the result of internal spiritual 
change. It is a perspective that can defy the common-sense logic that 
relies on material reasoning and instead can posit spiritual force as the 
basis of all change. In the words of Botanika members referencing the 
Prophet Muhammad’s Hadith, ‘Allah will not change the conditions of 
people, until people change themselves’. This is a narrative born in the 
spiritual journeys of Botanika; it is a new logic that emerged during 
crisis, a logic that reverses causality and places the metaphysical before 
the physical. As davaatchis frequently mention, the main purpose of 
going for davaat is to change one’s yakyn (conviction), to remove from 
the heart the belief in the power of creation and replace it with a belief in 
the power of the creator. The main meaning of ‘La illaha ilallah’ (There 
is no God but God) in the davaatchi’s narrative is that everything that 
happens in our life, good and bad, happens only according to the will 
of God, and therefore, the only way to change one’s ahval (conditions) is 
by improving one’s morals and spiritual practice. 
The implications of such a change might seem insignificant, but 
when we understand that it applies not only to Botanika, but also to 
a much larger group of the population of Kyrgyzstan, which is day by 
day growing in number and becoming more religious, then we see the 
Deleuzian ‘unity that envelops multiplicity’ (p. 128) and connects to 
nothing less than ‘the soul of the world’ (p. 26). This focus on the soul as the 
expression of the world relates the individual metaphysical experiences 
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of human beings to the condition of the world in which they exist. Thus, 
we develop a new dimension of transition — the metaphysical. This 
can be seen in the narratives of Botanika members, both in their use of 
spiritual reasoning to explain their physical transformation, and in their 
numerous stories of spiritual miracles in their personal lives.
The metaphysical dimension of transition revives the power of 
individual and collective agency. Deleuzian individuals, or monads, 
are not passive objects of change — once they channel their internal 
spiritual forces, they become powerful agents, subjects, even ‘superjects’ 
(p. 20), working towards the improvement of their own lives and of 
the condition of the society of which they are a part. People describe 
themselves as becoming empowered: with the help of belief, prayers, 
supplication, davaat, and acts of piety, they contribute to changing the 
world for the better. According to this view, external factors, even such 
strong geopolitical actors as the US, Europe, Russia, and China, who 
are all competing for influence in Central Asia, become less influential: 
according to one of my interlocutors, ‘George Bush and Vladimir Putin 
are both from Allah’. 
The fold
The shift from materiality to spirituality discussed above does not 
have a clear border or threshold. Deleuze describes it as the fold — a 
curve with inflection points marking change. These inflection points 
are all unique for the different members of Botanika: they happened to 
them at different times and under different circumstances. Some of my 
respondents’ stories that describe these inflection points — the times 
when their lives were taking significant turns — are very dramatic and 
illustrate very sharp changes, while others describe a more gradual 
transition. The most frequently mentioned inflection points for my 
respondents were their first three-day and forty-day davaat trips. 
For some, these resulted in their giving up alcohol, for others, in the 
resolution of life-threatening conflicts in the criminal world, and for 
others in finding a pious Muslim wife. For Deleuze, such inflection points 
are a ‘point-fold’ (p. 14), and the ‘ideal genetic element of transition […] 
authentic atom, non-conceptual point of non-contradiction, and a point 
of intrinsic singularity’ (p. 14). They are also a ‘pure Event’ (p. 15), a 
‘weightless non-dimensional point between dimensions’ (p. 15). This 
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is exactly what that first experience represents: the transition from one 
mode of existence dominated by material animal instincts into another, 
characterized by spirituality and morality. The personal accounts of this 
point-fold in the stories of Botanika members are very rich, detailed, 
and well-imprinted on their memories. 
If we project these individual trajectories of spiritual-material-
spiritual change, mapping individual inflection points as they occur, we 
could envision the following diagram to illustrate these transitions from 
the Deleuzian perspective: 
Fig. 10.8  Individual and collective trajectories: the Deleuzian 
perspective. Diagram © Emil Nasritdinov (2018), CC BY 4.0
This diagram allows us to discuss one last Deleuzian concept in the 
quest to debunk a linear perspective of transition — his idea of texture, 
which is freed from structure. Our understanding of the complexity of 
transition is limited by the rigidity of the structuralist perspective, which 
understands transition as the transformation of one structure to another, 
e.g., capitalism to socialism, a planned economy to a market economy, or 
atheism to religiosity. This is too rigid, too stiff, too essentialist. Instead, 
Deleuze draws an analogy with textiles, with cloth that covers the body. 
He describes how, in the baroque style, the shape of clothing is freed 
from the shape of the body; with its multiple and complex folds, it has a 
life of its own. Today, in Kyrgyzstan, the analogue of the multiple folds 
of the baroque style is the hijab and the long and loose Islamic dress. 
The primary aim of Islamic dress is exactly that — to hide the form of 
the body behind the infinite folds of the textile. It is an art of texture, not 
structure, which Deleuze calls the ‘intensity of a spiritual force exerted 
over the body’ (p. 122). It turns the soul inside out and it moulds the 
‘inner surfaces’ of a person (p. 122). We can thus think allegorically 
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about the drapery of the material world: the materiality of existence is 
covered with the spiritual layers of individual self-actualization. 
Conclusion: fold, hijrah, and urban translocality
The fold is the transition from ‘mundus’ to ‘cosmos’ (p. 29) and it is 
the most interesting aspect of this research. How are materiality and 
spirituality connected? How does the internalization of external change 
happen? How does internal change affect external space? How can we 
understand the fold in the stories of Botanika? I suggest bringing to the 
discussion one additional Islamic concept — hijrah. 
Hijrah is an important Islamic concept that is associated with the 
migration of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in 622 AD from Mecca, 
where Muslims were persecuted, to Medina, where the majority of 
residents at that time already accepted Islam. This migration was 
so important that it signified the beginning of the Islamic calendar. 
Traditionally, hijrah is perceived as a journey, a trip, a distance to 
overcome, and traditionally a person moves from a non-Muslim to a 
Muslim place (see Kamoludin Abdulaev, Chapter One). But the Prophet 
Muhammad (SAW) also described hijrah as leaving one’s sins behind 
and beginning a new, pious life. This is a more complex understanding 
loaded with larger potential for interpretation, and it can help us to 
better understand what happened in Botanika. 
Most of my interlocutors did not move from one place to another; 
for the most part their lives are tied to Botanika. Instead of changing 
their place of residence, they changed themselves, and because of their 
(and many other people’s) internal evolution, a place that used to be 
non-Muslim became more Muslim in regard to the daily practices of 
its residents, including those of my main interlocutors. The Deleuzian 
fold is an excellent concept to understand hijrah: it is a membrane, an 
intermediate zone, a connection between two different worlds — non-
Muslim and Muslim, materiality and spirituality, sin and piety. The 
fold helps one world to fold and unfold into another. It is a major zone 
of transition, a ‘sinuous, zigzag, unlocatable primal tie’ (p. 120). This 
hijrah-fold therefore becomes the main translocal connection. 
However, this story is not just translocal, it is also significantly 
‘transtemporal’. It may be that a person remains in the same location, 
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and perhaps that location does not even change significantly, at least 
not physically: all the old Soviet housing blocks are still there in 
Botanika. But the dynamic perception — the ‘trans’ — originates from 
a change within that person in that physical space. Translocality is not 
only the movement of people or goods or ideas across boundaries, as 
it is often understood, but it is also the transformation of place over 
time in tandem with the shifting spiritual perspective of its long-time 
inhabitants. ‘Transtemporality’ as a form of translocality within one 
place is exemplified by the lifecycles and biographies of my interlocutors, 
which, in turn, are closely related to the biography or lifecycle of the 
neighborhood as a very particular urban place and space. The main 
destination of the spiritual journeys of the ‘Botanika boys’ is Botanika 
itself as a ‘Muslim place’ (materially and immaterially). Individual 
biographies are thus connected to that of the neighborhood, thereby 
conflating both into Botanika as a single material-spiritual-spatial entity.
This seems like an apt point at which to end the story. However, let 
me add one final fold of thought, without which this conceptualization 
of translocality in Botanika will be incomplete. At the end of his book, 
when Deleuze applies his analysis of the baroque to the contemporary 
world, he suggests that today everything is in movement and thus 
‘monadology’ becomes ‘nomadology’ (p. 137). All of my interlocutors 
mentioned that the key turning points in their transformation were 
their three-day, forty-day and four-month spiritual davaat journeys. 
Movement is crucial for transformation: at least for a short period of 
time, they all had to perform a real physical hijrah — to leave behind 
the environment of duniya (the worldly environment) and stay in the 
environment of din (religion) ‘to clean the heart’ (a phrase commonly 
used by davaatchis). Just as Joseph Campbell discusses in his 1948 work 
The Hero with a Thousand Faces, a person must leave his home, experience 
difficulties on the journey, and return transformed, enlightened and 
capable of changing the place from which he departed and to which he 
has returned. This is the most important understanding of translocality 
that this chapter contributes to the current volume: hijrah — the 
spiritual-physical journey of Botanika residents — becomes the fold 
that completely transforms the urban space. 
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Afterword: On Transitive Concepts and 
Local Imaginations – Studying Mobilities 
from a Translocal Perspective
Barak Kalir
Translocality as an analytical concept appears to have ignited the 
imagination of many scholars who are considering and reconsidering 
multiple mobilities in space and time. In different academic quarters, 
there is a perceptible increase in the scope of social issues and the 
breadth of geographical locations that fall under a translocal magnifying 
glass. The conceptual appeal of translocality, I believe, has much to do 
with its transitive character. The seductiveness of transitive concepts 
was explained to me in a particularly convincing fashion by the late 
Gerd Baumann, an outstanding anthropologist, a gifted musician, 
and an inspiring teacher. ‘Transitive concepts are good to think with’ 
Baumann enthusiastically advocated, ‘because they put the finger 
on processes and they capture the cadence of social change’. Indeed, 
a cursory view of the great contemporary and classic works that 
have had a lasting effect on the social sciences reveals the dominance 
of transitive concepts in shaping analytical frameworks. From the 
booming field of transnational studies to the importance of translation, 
and from transactional theories, transhistorical accounts, transborder 
movements, transcultural education, and transgender controversies, 
to all sorts of intriguing deviant transgressions, and to the divine 
evocations of the transcendental, one is easily left with the idea that all 
‘great transformations’ are intimately linked to the vital prefix ‘trans’.
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Some of the most obvious advantages of using transitive concepts 
can be found in the ways they sensitize us to alteration and movement 
rather than to fixity and preservation. They pay heed to borders and 
boundaries precisely because they focus our gaze on their permissiveness 
and on the things that move across them (Kalir and Sur 2012). Transitive 
concepts foreground the condition of being betwixt and between (Turner 
1975) when it comes to the identities, locations, and positions that actors 
occupy, embody, and enact in their everyday interactions with others. 
Transitive concepts, thus, make us attentive to potentialities and to 
creative processes that continuously make and remake our social as well 
as our material world.
Translocality, in particular, is a powerful analytical concept because 
it invokes the transitive features of locality. The notion of locality 
is intuitively and romantically associated with fixity, boundedness, 
tradition, and conservation. By adding transitive dimensions to the 
notion of locality we whimsically highlight and inventively break 
open the intricate links and productive tensions between mobility and 
motion on the one hand, and place and community on the other. Much 
of the budding literature on translocality in recent years has carved an 
large niche for the translocal (Brickell and Datta 2011, Freitag and von 
Oppen 2010, Greiner and Sakdapolrak 2013). It suffices here to recall 
how Freitag and von Oppen (2010:5), in their introduction to what 
is by now a seminal volume on translocality, dedicated a section to 
‘Translocality as an object of inquiry and as a research perspective’. This 
is understandable, as translocality seem to be the ‘new kid in town’, 
recently joining the much older and more established debates around 
processes of globalization and the omnipresence of transnationalism as 
an analytical framework for studying mobilities and flows. 
There is something stimulating about the contributions in this 
book, which undoubtedly has to do with the exciting analytical 
originality and richness on offer, as scholars from different disciplinary 
backgrounds use a translocal magnifying glass to inspect very different 
empirical case studies. Yet this collection adds something else to the 
existing literature by revealing a compelling sense of maturity within 
the field of translocal studies. This refreshing sense of confidence 
in translocality as an established field of inquiry is demonstrated 
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throughout this volume and is plainly proclaimed in the introduction, 
where the editors attest that all the contributions ‘tackle “translocality” 
as a social reality’ (p. 31). 
By bringing together the work of scholars with very different 
disciplinary, empirical, and thematic approaches in an unapologetic 
manner, the editors make the merits of studying translocality instantly 
apparent to the reader. In what follows, I would like to highlight three 
major analytical advantages of working in a translocal vein, which 
are made evident in this book. The first has to do with the prime 
role of imagination in inspiring our interlocutors as they creatively 
contemplate and investigate translocal mobility. Since working with 
the imagination can (fortunately) be contagious, contributors to this 
volume appear to have been inspired to pursue their own ‘sociological 
imagination’ (Wright Mill 1959) in their analysis of translocal dynamics. 
The second advantage of a translocal approach is methodological in 
essence: the protracted engagement with localities as crucial research 
sites that register changes, which results from a concern with mobilities, 
immobilities, and the intersections between them. Finally, the role of 
emotion is central to many of the chapters, which causes me to ponder 
a possible link between a translocal perspective and the recent ‘affective 
turn’ in anthropology and other disciplines. Translocality can illuminate 
in its full colors the intimate and fascinating role that emotion can play 
in inducing motion.
But allow me to begin with what is probably the most arresting 
tension in this volume, namely the proclaimed openness that comes 
with a translocal approach and the regional focus of the collection. As 
the editors justly claim, the findings in the different chapters ‘strikingly 
reveal the benefits of a translocal perspective for studying movements, 
transfers, and exchanges in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and beyond’ (p. 
30). It is ‘and beyond’ that saves this statement from becoming an 
oxymoron. As becomes apparent in many of the contributions, the vitality 
of a translocal perspective renders impossible a geographical focus on 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. For example, following the trajectories 
of Kyrgyz traders has taken Philipp Schröder all the way to south China 
as well as to the middle of Russia; the study of Tajik middlemen and 
students has taken Abdullah Mirzoev and Manja Stephan-Emmrich to 
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Dubai, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; and tracing the 
making of a new Kyrgyz ‘globalizing ethno-nationalist’ history has led 
Svetlana Jacquesson’s account to the heart of Europe. 
While a geographical focus can understandably provide coherence 
to a volume such as this, the editors are the first to point to its potential 
limiting effect. In situating the volume in the tradition of ‘new area 
studies’ the editors attempt to bring elasticity to the notion of an ‘area’ 
and to conceive of it as an idea rather than as a concrete territorial 
space. Notwithstanding this effort, one of the major achievements of 
this collection, in my opinion, is the wealth of connections — imagined 
and real — that are drawn by mobile subjects in making (sense of) their 
movements, circulations, and exchanges within trajectories that do not 
lend themselves neatly to any (political?) attempt at zoning.
This leads me straight to one of the palpable gains I see in translocality 
as a creative and critical approach that treats imagination as a crucial 
ingredient in understanding the role and experience of mobility in 
localities around the world. Although it is impossible to quantify the 
influence of the imagination on people’s decisions, almost all of the 
contributions in this collection heed its importance in shaping people’s 
aspirations for, and practices of, mobility: from Muslims moving within 
an imagined overarching global community of believers (umma) in the 
past (Abdullaev, Chapter One) and in the present (Mirzoev & Stephan-
Emmrich, Chapter Three), to imaginings that relate to the past glory of 
a re-emerging Silk Road (Alff, Chapter Five, Fehlings, Chapter Seven, 
and Schröder, Chapter Eight), to an imagined global ethno-nationalist 
history (Jacquesson, Chapter Six), and sacred ancient lineages (Malikov, 
Chapter Three). Furthermore, Dungans in Kazakhstan seem to be 
under the spell of the (at least partly imaginative) promises of Chinese 
modernity (Alff, Chapter Five), while post-Soviet men in Kyrgyzstan 
are enchanted by reveries of Islamic purity (Nasritdinov, Chapter Ten), 
and hypermobile Tajik student travellers entertain imaginings of ‘pious 
endeavours’ (Stephan-Emmrich, Chapter Nine). 
It was C. Wright Mills (1959) who argued for the importance of the 
‘sociological imagination’ in tying everyday subjective experiences to 
social structures and historical developments. Following his cue, many 
scholars have since elucidated the pertinent role of the imagination in 
swaying the energies of individuals and groups towards the realization 
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of major projects, for example, the fermentation of nationalism and the 
formation of nation states (Anderson 1983), the invention of traditions 
and histories (Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012), or the consolidation of 
geography as in the ‘imagining of the Balkans’ (Todorova 2009). More 
specifically, in relation to mobilities, the ‘American dream’ has (falsely) 
fuelled the imagination of millions with respect to socio-economic 
mobility (Hochschild 1996), while going overseas to promising 
destinations has always been a dominant image in metaphors of mobility 
(Cresswell 2006) and in propelling migration worldwide, not always in 
rational or predictable ways (Alpes 2014, Kalir 2010, Massey et al. 1999).
Translocality, being actor-centred and sensitive to the everyday 
nature of particular localities, causes the researcher to consider closely 
the agency of the researched. The translocal point of departure is 
therefore often the aspirations and inspirations of our interlocutors 
as they imagine, plan, and undertake different types of mobility in 
interaction with other relevant mobile and immobile subjects. The 
openness to the trajectories of our interlocutors, with no preconceived 
territorial parameters for what is to be considered meaningful mobility, 
appreciably distinguishes the creative potential of translocality from run-
of-the-mill migration studies and from transnationalism in particular. 
Migration studies and transnationalism concentrate our attention on 
specific geographies (mostly international mobility) and prioritize 
certain subject of study (such as integration). Whether focusing on those 
who settle down elsewhere or those who move across national borders, 
these approaches to mobility are primarily informed by the researchers’ 
ideas or paradigmatic analytical frameworks regarding the type of 
moving that matters (Kalir 2013). 
Conversely, translocality is a creative approach that enriches our 
understanding of a changing world by exploring movement in ways 
and places that matter to those who engage in or experience mobility. 
Whether people move to a neighboring village, cross national borders, 
or take a flight to another corner of the world, translocality treats all 
these movements as equally meaningful and significant, both for the 
localities themselves and for those within them who move or stay put. 
The potential long-lasting contribution of translocality to the social 
sciences might very well be its ability to capture, and consider as 
meaningful, any movement that is conceived as such within a locality 
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by our interlocutors. In this sense, translocality is neatly wedded to 
the creative capacity of ‘grounded theory’ (Glaser and Strauss 2009). 
Translocality allows our understanding to be directed by the experiences 
of those involved in movement and change, rather than by a top-down 
imposition of analytical schemes and methodological standards. There 
can therefore be little doubt that the gains of a creative bottom-up 
translocal perspective are maximized by studying movement without a 
geographic barrier, that is, without setting territorial limitations on our 
potential object of study.
There are obvious methodological and epistemological implications 
of approaching translocality as a bottom-up, actor-centered approach, 
which dovetail with longstanding debates about the production of 
knowledge in the social sciences and the humanities. Focusing on non-
elite actors’ accounts in rewriting history (Jacquesson, Chapter Six) or 
on narrating subjective aspirations for and experiences of historical 
mobilities (Abdullaev, Chapter One), calls to mind Spivak’s (1988) 
disconcerting question about the ability of the subaltern to speak. 
Engaging in close encounters with interlocutors to co-produce our 
accounts of mobility (Schröder, Chapter Eight) invokes challenging 
discussion about the ownership of the text and the ‘poetics and politics 
of ethnography’ (Clifford and Marcus 1986). While these are important 
debates to be had when crafting translocality as a programmatic 
approach, I would like to highlight here another methodological aspect 
that has to do with its long-term engagement with specific localities.
The ‘mobilities turn’ (Urry 2007) has been widely welcomed as 
an overdue and updated way of doing research in a world that is 
increasingly in motion (Massey et al. 1999). Methodologically, the study 
of mobilities has contributed to a dominant social scientific inclination 
to move away from the anthropological tradition of studying neatly 
defined units: places, communities, sectors, and so on. Following 
people and commodities, studying flows, and capturing global 
encounters (Appadurai 1996, Burawoy et al. 2000, Tsing 2011), have 
become — methodologically and thematically — the order of the day. 
We are now at a point, I believe, when it is worth considering whether 
the pendulum has swung too far the other way. Do we too often study 
mobilities in ways that eclipse the intimate and patient examination of 
localities? 
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It appears that nowadays, ‘deep hanging out’ (Geertz 1998) with a 
certain group in a certain locality is increasingly considered by many 
researchers as limited and limiting (Wogan 2004). Bucking the trend, 
translocality thrusts our scrupulous inspection back to localities not 
simply as nodes in a wide network of mobilities, but as important 
research sites in their own right. Locality, then, is not simply a point of 
departure to study mobilities, nor is it a point of arrival in the sense of 
measuring the impact of economic and social remittances (Levitt and 
Schiller 2004) or of return migration (King 2015). Locality, rather than 
regaining its importance from the ‘mobilities turn’, has arguably always 
been a site where change is felt constantly and is registered in people’s 
shifting practices, beliefs, and imaginations. In light of the contributions 
to this book, I would suggest that paying attention to the stationary 
should not be confused with entertaining a conservative perspective 
about fixity and permanence. 
There are two exemplary contributions in this volume that illustrate 
the outstanding quality of a translocal perspective in capturing 
mobilities within a changing locality: Henryk Alff‘s (Chapter Five) 
examination of the changes in villages around Shortobe in southeastern 
Kazakhstan that result from Dungan relationships with China, and 
Emil Nasritdinov’s (Chapter Ten) exploration of changes in Botanika 
in Bishkek. These fresh contributions are so telling about the potency 
of a translocal perspective because they root their detailed accounts 
of change in a long-term engagement with a particular locality. Both 
accounts take the reader on a trip across time that spans more than two 
decades and captures a transition from Soviet times to a new articulation 
of post-Soviet meta-narratives (religion, modernity) and everyday 
practices (pious deeds, consumption, trade, education). This long-term 
engagement with a locality is a rarity in much contemporary social 
scientific research, which is increasingly geared towards ‘going with the 
flow’ or is otherwise limited in its engagement with a single research 
site, not least due to budgetary and time constraints that have to do with 
the neoliberal restructuring of academic institutions (Holligan 2011).
Among other things, a protracted engagement with localities is 
effective in sensitizing us to the intricate relations between the mobile 
and the immobile. In recent years, attention has been increasingly 
drawn to ways in which mobile and non-mobile subjects are entangled 
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in a web of connections that shape the possibilities for mobilities and the 
meanings they assume in different contexts (Kalir 2009, Porter et al. 2010). 
Adding to this growing body of literature, the contribution by Susanne 
Fehlings (Chapter Seven) exposes the increasingly restricted mobility of 
female petty traders in Georgia, and highlights a negative correlation 
between physical mobility and socioeconomic mobility. Given that 
structural market circumstances have changed in ways that disfavor 
petty trade, mobility either becomes immobility for some or leads to 
increased poverty for others. In her contribution, Elena Kim (Chapter 
Four) fixes her gaze on one village to account for the mobility-related 
impoverishment of already poor families who are made increasingly 
dependent on changing irrigation schemes. Both accounts demonstrate 
how a translocal perspective — with its attention to mundane changes 
in localities; to flows of ideas, subjects and objects; and to the interplay 
between mobile and immobile people — can reveal retrogression 
and stagnation as well as advancements in people’s lives. This is a 
sharp correction to an implicit assumption about the positive effects 
of movement that underlies many migration and mobilities studies 
(Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013). Translocality can thus highlight the 
‘dark side’ of mobility that affects millions of people who, although not 
necessarily ‘on the move’, are experiencing mobility in ways that spell 
disaster for their basic livelihood, family structures, and emotional ties.
Emotions are present in different contributions in this collection. 
This points us, potentially, in an exciting direction for the study 
of translocality. Emotions are clearly and intimately linked to the 
motivations that propel people to undertake mobilities, as well as the 
ways in which mobile and non-mobile subjects experience mobilities 
and their material and cultural consequences. It is less clear, however, 
whether there is a direct relationship between a translocal perspective 
and an awareness of the role of emotions. While the jury is still out, 
the contribution by Stephan-Emmrich (Chapter Nine) convincingly 
introduces the term ‘emotional geographies’ in examining how mobile 
Tajik students consider emotion in their experiences of ‘good or bad 
Muslim places’. For his part, Philipp Schröder (Chapter Eight) recalls 
his interlocutors’ and his own emotions of shame and embarrassment 
as crucial in the delicate negotiation of access to intimate spaces and 
moments in a translocal field(work). Many of the other contributions, 
 357Afterword
although they do not discuss emotions directly, make recurrent 
references to desires, longings, nostalgia, pride, and other feelings in 
their investigations of interlocutors’ dealings with (im)mobilities. 
Hence, translocal studies can tap into a burgeoning debate about 
emotions among scholars who are swept up by the recent ‘affective turn’ 
in the social sciences (Clough and Halley 2007). Rather than thinking 
of feelings as ‘autonomic processes that take place below the level of 
conscious awareness and meaning’ (Leys 2011:437), translocality can 
show the value of ‘ethnographic accounts that are specific about how 
humans’ perceptions are social all the way down’ (Martin 2013:157). In 
other words, translocality is positioned at a strategic spatial and temporal 
crossroads, allowing it to demonstrate that emotions — emanating 
from an individual sense of belonging or displacement, yet feeding 
collective negotiations of communal identities and traditions — are 
socially produced in particular contexts to manage tense and potentially 
jolting constellations of mobility and change. To this we can add the 
invaluable intersection between emotion and imagination, as well as the 
manner in which objects can produce feeling. Taking our cue again here 
from Stephan-Emmrich, the usage of iPhones by Tajik students is not 
simply a new medium to document and communicate their spiritual 
progress as they move between ‘pious endeavours’. Instead, it is the 
very consumption of prestigious goods that largely produces emotions 
among these young and aspiring mobile subjects: a sense of progress, 
excitement and pride.
To conclude, the promise of translocality as an exciting conceptual 
framework to analyze mobilities is tremendous. Translocality provokes 
us to reconsider our study of mobility as an examination of an ongoing 
process of em-placement as well as of re-placement. It is a process in which 
ideas, goods, and people are changing places, moving from one location 
to another, transforming, and being transformed by both mobile and 
immobile actors. Crucially, translocality highlights and analyzes these 
processes of re-placement from a perspective that is grounded in the 
everyday and emotional experiences of those who are affected by 
(im)mobilities. A translocal perspective is vital because it allows us to 
interrogate mobilities without privileging physical movement between 
places as the thing that matters most. In other words, movement from a 
translocal perspective is measured not in meters but in matters.
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